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“To say who is poor is to use all sorts of value judgments. The concept has to be limited by 
the purpose which is to be served by the definition. There is no particular reason to count the 
poor unless you are going to do something about them.” 
Orshansky Mollie (1969), How Poverty is Measured, Monthly Labor Review, 92(2): 37.  
 
1 Introduction: Analyzing Working Poverty 
 
Why do we need to study working poverty in postindustrial countries? It would certainly 
make sense to worry about the situation of those who work in developing countries‟ informal 
economy and who are never sure to “make it until the next day”. Similarly, it makes obvious 
sense to analyze the most severe forms of deprivation, especially homelessness, in high-
income countries. But in today‟s advanced economies we may find puzzling the fact that a 
person holding a job – sometimes a full-time job – has to endure poverty. The puzzle is 
particularly striking given the development of dual earnership and the expansion of the 
welfare state in recent decades; yet, working poverty has been “rediscovered” in recent years 
and is perceived as a growing problem. The present work deals with the apparent paradox of 
the re-emergence of working poverty in postindustrial economies and contributes to the 
identification of potential solutions.  
As will be shown below, low wages and income poverty follow partly independent logics, 
which are mainly due to the two above mentioned phenomena, namely the development of the 
welfare state, on one hand, and the increasing share of dual-earner families, on the other hand. 
In countries in which this household type is widespread and set the norm in terms of 
consumption and living standards, living in a single-earner family becomes a disadvantage. 
As a result, there is no compelling reason why workers, even full-time year-round workers, 
should escape (relative) poverty. Moreover, the effectiveness of work as an antidote to 
poverty depends on the amount of work performed. Working only few hours a week cannot 
be expected to protect someone from poverty. 
Working poverty constitutes a puzzle worth studying in the sense that work, nonetheless, 
constitutes for most of us a guarantee of a poverty-free existence. In addition, the 
metamorphoses of the labor market in postindustrial economies have led to a growing relative 
disadvantage for certain subgroups of the labor force, and it is fundamental to understand 
them.  
 
1.1 Research problems and questions 
 
Tradeoffs and tensions are at the heart of the present work. This is, indeed, one of the most 
striking features of the fight against poverty among the working-age population. On one hand, 
by imposing strong labor market protections and high labor costs in the form of nonwage 
costs (mainly social security contributions to finance “generous” social programs), some 
policies may increase the difficulty disadvantaged adults have in finding a job or workers in 
keeping theirs, thereby replacing working poverty by unemployment and inactivity. On the 
other hand, maximizing labor force participation by reducing employment protection and 
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lowering benefits is a risky business that can lead to skyrocketing inequalities, with many 
unemployed persons and welfare recipients thrown into poverty, which is not a desirable 
outcome either. As a matter of fact, it could be said that poor workers, as well as 
policymakers, are held hostage by the situation. 
The central goal of the present work is to identify policy mixes that both limit the 
incidence of poverty among the workforce and enable an employment-friendly 
environment. Put differently, my objective is to identify social-policy interventions that 
support low-income workers and largely limit collateral damages in terms of employment, 
taking into account the fact that there are many tensions at the household level too, between 
labor market participation, earnings levels, family formation, and fertility. 
The specific questions derived from this general objective are the following:  
- what are the main economic and sociodemographic factors that produce poverty among 
workers in postindustrial societies? 
- are there different types of working poverty, depending on its causes? 
- what specific policy tools have a positive antipoverty impact? What is their impact on 
employment? In which context do they work? 
- how are these policy tools organized in real welfare states and what is their impact? 
- to what extent do working poverty mechanisms differ across welfare regimes, and how do 
they translate into differences in terms of the size and composition of the working poor 
population? 
 
1.2 Analytical approach and methodology  
 
How is it possible to identify policy mixes that can ease the tension between working poverty 
and unemployment, that is, between the quality and the quantity of jobs available? 
To start with, it is necessary to review the literature on working poverty and neighboring 
topics (low-wage employment, income inequality, and the like) in order to identify the main 
causes of working poverty. There are economic determinants, such as globalization, 
deindustrialization and the transition to a service economy, as well as endogenous changes 
such as technological developments and evolutions of the production model, and also the 
impact of business cycles and unemployment on working poverty. There are also macrosocial 
and demographic determinants, such as the increase in divorce rates and the growing number 
of lone-parent families, the increased impact of social endogamy in societies characterized by 
growing female employment rates, changes in the social structure, and the fact that poverty 
increasingly affects young adults. Public policy factors are also fundamental; hence, in a 
second step, it is fundamental to review the social policy literature in order to identify public 
policy instruments that seem to be promising and to work in a specific socioeconomic 
context. The main instruments I was able to identify are minimum wages, tax credits for 
workers, family cash benefits, and childcare policies.  
Moreover, after having analyzed the main macrolevel causes of working poverty, I also 
identify three mechanisms through which economic, sociodemographic and public policy 
factors have a direct bearing on households, namely low wage rates, low labor force 
9 
 
attachment expressed as a percentage of full participation (achieved if all working-age 
household members work full-time) and high needs given the household‟s earnings potential 
(mainly the number of children per working-age adult, as well as the increase in needs after a 
divorce). This allows understanding why the size and composition of the working poor 
population differs across countries, and shows that there are various groups of poor workers 
who are in different situations. At this stage, I will able to answer the following questions: 
Why do many workers in postindustrial economies endure relative poverty and what are 
the mechanisms leading to it? Which are the various types of working poverty that can 
be identified? Failing to acknowledge these contrasting situations can only obscure the 
debates on how to fight these problems. 
The chapter devoted to public policy factors is concluded by a reflection on welfare regimes. 
Researchers argue about the best typology of welfare regimes, and Esping-Andersen‟s (1990) 
famous triptych – Social-democratic, liberal and conservative corporatist welfare regimes – 
has been criticized on many grounds. Feminist authors blame it for failing to account for 
gender issues, as countries that promote a dual-earner model and those who promote single 
earnership are classified in the same cluster. Other authors propose typologies based on other 
indicators, specific social policies for instance; finally, other scholars have advocated the 
addition of further clusters of countries, mainly Mediterranean countries and the Antipodes.  
In the present work, I show that the social policy literature allows identifying three 
approaches to the fight against working poverty, namely minimum wages, social transfers, 
and an employment-maximizing strategy. Each approach can be broken down into two 
subcategories: Minimum wages can be either legally enforced or collectively bargained, 
social transfers can either constitute a substitution income for persons who cannot earn a 
living or a complementing income for working households, and the employment-
maximization strategy can be either based on incentives and productivity-enhancing measures 
or on coercion. This allows me to conclude that a four-cluster typology is the most 
appropriate for the analysis of policies that aim at combating working poverty: Social-
democratic, “liberal”1, corporatist conservative, and Mediterranean welfare regimes. 
After the identification of promising social policy instruments and the definition of a welfare 
regime typology, the first prong of my empirical strategy consists in a research synthesis that 
goes beyond traditional literature reviews, namely a meta-analysis - in the form of a weighted 
vote-counting procedure accompanied by statistical tests - of particular social policy tools in 
their “natural” social, political and institutional environment in a recent past (namely articles 
published in the 21
st
 century).The main objective is to assess both antipoverty and 
employment effects. After a systematic selection of articles through scientific search engines 
allowing the collection of regression and simulation results, I assess whether researchers were 
able to reach a consensus as to the efficiency or inefficiency of a measure, and if not, if the 
majority of articles conclude that a given policy has positive or negative effects and if these 
                                                          
1
 The word “liberal” is polysemantic: Its meaning depends on the context and on which side 
of the Atlantic it is used. Esping-Andersen‟s use is very different from that of American 
conservatives who blame the “liberal” welfare state for the behaviors it generates, and the 
“liberal” politicians who implemented it. Esping-Andersen‟s use of the term refers to a 
welfare regime that mainly relies on market mechanisms, whereas public policies compensate 
for market failures and provide help to the poorest members of society. In what follows, the 
expression “liberal welfare regime” refers to Esping-Andersen‟s phraseology, while 
“neoliberal” refers to the belief that free-operating markets and the leanest possible welfare 
state is the only way to achieve wellbeing for all.  
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effects are significant, depending on the methodology used and the population studied. In 
addition to general conclusions, in order to take the “real world” of social policy into account, 
results are broken down by welfare regimes. This first empirical contribution allows 
answering the following question: What policy tools are effective in which context, and for 
whom?  
In the real world of social policies, however, single policy tools are intertwined in a complex 
set of other social policies and labor market regulations, and their efficiency also depends on 
the sociodemographic composition of the labor force, and on the state of the economy (for 
instance, the American Earned Income Tax Credit was strongly expanded at a time when the 
US experienced one of the most prosperous decades of its history). Hence, the second prong 
of my empirical strategy consists in an analysis of existing welfare regimes, by using the 
above mentioned typology (liberal, social-democratic, conservative corporatist, and Southern 
European), which is based on the main social policy tools and labor market regulations that 
have an impact on the extent of working poverty and the relative size of various risks group. 
The US, Sweden, Germany, and Spain epitomize these four welfare state clusters.  
This approach accounts for the fact that various social policy instruments do not work 
independently, but covary; it also includes a reflection on recent shocks to these welfare 
systems and the ways in which welfare regimes reacted to these exogenous shocks. 
Empirically, the relative weight of each working poverty mechanism in each welfare regime 
is assessed, as well as the composition of the working poor population, the latter being a 
consequence of the former. Robustness checks are carried out based on various poverty 
indicators and thresholds. This second empirical contribution allows answering the following 
questions: What kind(s) of working poverty are generated in which welfare regime? 
What factors weigh the most in each regime?  
The combination of the two prongs of the empirical provides indications as to the question: 
Which policy mix works in which welfare regime, and why? At the very end of the present 
work, I analyze the ability of each welfare regime to overcome the tradeoff between working 
poverty and employment performance, based on the empirical results provided throughout 
this document. Most countries do not seem to be in a situation to overcome the tension 
between the quality and the quantity of jobs. However, Scandinavian countries combine low 
working poor rates, low unemployment and high employment rates. The present work 
provides explanations as to why this welfare regime appears to be better equipped to face the 
challenges posed by postindustrial mutations in general and working poverty in particular, as 
well as the very specific conditions under which this model functions that make it difficult to 
export. I also provide some elements as to the main characteristics this tradeoff has in the 
other three welfare regimes.  
However, it is not possible to do what is described in the previous paragraphs right away, 
because there is a big problem with the definition of working poverty in postindustrial 
economies. Until recently, there was a definitional “chaos” characterized by arbitrariness, 
which is probably attributable to the fact that conceptual reflections were largely missing. Not 
only is it difficult to set a poverty line, a task that has kept social scientists busy ever since the 
first poverty reports were published at the end of the nineteenth century. Usually, social 
policy research is based on a monetary poverty line and the headcount ratio (the number of 
poor persons divided by the size of the population), but other monetary thresholds, other 
poverty indicators, and different approaches (nonmonetary and subjective indicators) have 
been proposed. There is no consensus among poverty researchers; however, for national 
studies, I advocate the use of thresholds derived from social policy entitlement thresholds; for 
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comparative studies, it can be useful to rely on official definitions, in order to increase the 
comparability of different studies. More problematic in my view is the fact of setting an 
arbitrary threshold in terms of number of hours a week or months a year to define who is 
“working”. I advocate the use of a very encompassing definition, combined with a typological 
approach to the definition, rather than excluding groups of disadvantaged workers from the 
outset.  
Regarding the empirical part of the present work, other approaches would have been 
conceivable, in particular meta-regression techniques in order to quantify the employment and 
antipoverty impact of each policy, as well as microsimulation methods that allow checking 
the impact the introduction of a new policy mix, or the reform of an existing one, would have 
in a given country.  
Developing meta-regression models would indeed be the next step to take after the meta-
analysis carried out in the present work, once a particular set of policies is deemed to be a 
potentially efficient in a given context, in order to further the understanding of its impact. In 
this case, it would be necessary to enlarge the pool of estimates at disposal, for instance by 
extending the period of time considered for the selection process; indeed, meta-regression, as 
any other econometric technique, requires a minimum number of observations in order to 
carry out reliable analyses. It is probably advisable to have at least 100 estimates to be able to 
draw reliable conclusions. Moreover, meta-regression requires the use of a common metric 
for all results, which is far from evident when generalized linear models are used (logit, 
probit, etc.). This approach necessitates a considerable amount of empirical work; hence, this 
kind of approach usually focuses on a specific policy in a specific subset of countries (with 
comparable institutional and economic environments), whereas my perspective is broader in 
scope as I aim to identify various policy mixes that seem to work in various institutional 
contexts, without attempting to accurately assess the magnitude of their effect.  
As regards microsimulation, this method necessitates to focus on one country and to know in 
great detail its fiscal system, labor market regulations and welfare state. In the case of 
countries with federal institutions, a microsimulation at the national level can become 
extremely tricky. This type of empirical work should only come after a careful examination of 
the interplay of the national context and social policy instruments, a stage that is sometimes 
skipped in the literature, with authors directly assessing whether a specific social policy 
measure would reduce working poverty without any adjustment of the parameters of this 
measure to the socio-demographic reality of the country in which the simulation is carried out. 
This methodological device should, indeed, represent the final step to take in a comprehensive 
approach of the analysis of policies that allow combating working poverty in a specific 
country.  
 
1.3 The main arguments in a nutshell 
 
Throughout this work, I have developed an understanding of the problematic of working 
poverty in postindustrial economies that is structured by three main theses. These arguments 
were not determined from the outset; they progressively emerged as the conceptual and the 
empirical work went forward.  
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- There is no such thing as “the working poor”; there are (at least) three types of 
working poverty. Conceptual reflections about the definition of the “working poor 
phenomenon” and estimations of the size of various risk groups led to an analysis of 
working poverty mechanisms, which in turn led to the conclusion that there are at 
least three types of working poverty: Some workers are poor because they are badly 
paid, others could escape poverty should they work more but they cannot, while a 
third group of poor workers are in a difficult situation because of their household‟s 
needs.  
 
- Different welfare regimes generate different types of working poverty. After 
having identified different types of working poverty, and because it is a well-known 
finding that the socioeconomic composition of the working poor population varies 
across welfare regimes, I investigated the impact of welfare regimes on the three 
working poverty mechanisms I had identified and came to the conclusion that 
welfare regimes have, indeed, a pervasive impact on these mechanisms.  
 
- There is no “one-size-fits-all” policy mix. Each regime must find its own 
combination of policies. As the relative weight of the three mechanisms leading to 
working poverty varies widely across welfare regimes, a logical consequence is that 
it is impossible to determine a single policy mix that would have the same efficiency 
in each regime. This logical conclusion was confirmed by the meta-analyses I 
carried out, especially when results were broken down by welfare regime.   
 
1.4 Analytical limits 
 
In what follows, two important potential solutions to the working poverty problem are not 
dealt with. A first option would be to combat in-work poverty by promoting a general 
upskilling, as low-skilled workers have experienced an increasing disadvantage in 
postindustrial labor markets characterized by the growing importance of computerized 
processes and of interactions with other persons (in the service sector), requiring a higher 
educational level and better “social skills”. This goal, however noble and advisable it may be, 
pertains to a completely different field of public policy, as well as a different type of 
knowledge and strand of literature, than the policies analyzed in the present work. Another 
option would be to put more emphasis on active labor market policies targeted at nonworking 
partners of poor workers, in order to enhance households‟ earnings and financial autonomy. 
This would go, however, far beyond the scope of the present work, and would constitute a 
research topic of its own.  
 
Another limitation needs to be put to the fore. In the empirical part of the present work, 
monetary definitions of poverty have been used. In fact, it has proved impossible to find any 
evaluation using nonmonetary poverty indicators for the meta-analysis. However, as will be 
analyzed below, some researchers have advocated the use of nonmonetary indicators to 
measure poverty as they perceive them as more revealing and more accurate depictions of the 
living conditions of disadvantaged families (Ferro Luzzi, Flückiger, Weber, 2008, Suter and 
Paris 2002). These indicators usually take the form of direct measures of living conditions 
(whether or not respondents possess certain goods) combined with “subjective” indicators, 
e.g. asking respondents why they do not possess a specific good (is it due to lacking financial 
resources or is it a choice?). Other scholars have proposed to use purely subjective indicators 
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such as the degree of satisfaction with family income or the level of income deemed 
absolutely necessary to “make ends meet” (van Praag, Goedhart, Kapteyn, 1980). Whereas I 
fully agree with the idea that nonmonetary indicators may provide a more accurate account of 
living conditions than income, especially for some subgroups of the population whose 
financial situation is very difficult to assess (Antille, El May, Miceli, Silber, 1997), it also 
needs to be said that for the social policy objectives outlined above, monetary indicators 
appear to be more useful, as the vast majority of social and labor market-related benefits are 
monetary (minimum wages, tax credits and allowances, child allowances, family benefits, as 
well as all “passive” benefits related to disability, old age, sickness, unemployment, 
widowhood, etc.) or consist in near-cash benefits (food stamps, housing subsidies, childcare 
vouchers, etc.). This is the reason why a monetary definition of poverty is used in the present 
work, and the robustness of findings is checked by using various indicators of the financial 
situation and various poverty indicators.  
Last but not least, only the formal labor market and legally-earned incomes will be analyzed 
in the present work. Bourgois, an American anthropologist, lived during his fieldwork in an 
East Harlem neighborhood dubbed “El Barrio” and noted that, according to official statistics, 
his neighbors should have been homeless and starving, but the majority was not, which 
indicated the presence of an underground economy that had a major impact on living 
conditions. A part of this economy consists in informal but noncriminal activities, such as 
curbside car repairing and baby-sitting, but the cocaine, crack and heroin-related activities 
seemed to be the only equal-opportunity activities in this neighborhood (Bourgois, 2003). 
Interestingly, all drug dealers working in the crack selling network Bourgois observed had 
had legal jobs in the formal labor market (messenger or mail room clerk, janitor assistant, 
photocopiers and other service-sector entry-level occupations) and started working at very 
young ages. More surprisingly, some of them had not completely withdrawn from the legal, 
just-above-minimum-wage labor market. Bourgois met a female drug dealer who, in order to 
nurture her children, had to cumulate legal low-wage employment, welfare benefits (welfare 
gave this lone mother at the time of the interview $53 a week only) and drug selling. 
According to Bourgois, „[street dealers‟] income is almost never as consistently high as they 
report it to be…According to my calculations, [the dealers Bourgois befriended], for example, 
averaged slightly less than double the minimum wage – between seven and eight dollars an 
hour…it took me several years to realize how inconsistent and meager crack income can be‟ 
(Bourgois, 2003: 92).  
The situation of disadvantaged people earning meager incomes from legal jobs as well as 
from underground, illegal activities is certainly very interesting and of paramount importance. 
Probably, workers holding undeclared jobs are disproportionately affected by poverty. More 
generally, the underground economy is a non-negligible reality in social policy analysis, as it 
allows some employers and employees to circumvent labor market regulations and taxes. 
Nonetheless, I focus in the present work on the situation of legally-employed persons, in order 
to avoid confusions between various important social phenomena, each one requiring 
different social (as well as educational, housing, and judicial) policies. 
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2 Defining Working Poverty  
 
When defining working poverty, obviously, two definitional issues need to be dealt with:  
- how to define poverty  
- how to define work and where to set a threshold in terms of the amount of work 
performed 
 
2.1 What is “poverty” in rich countries? 
 
Ongoing controversies and hard-fought debates have taken place ever since the founding 
fathers of applied poverty research released their first reports (Rowntree, 1901). Mollie 
Orshansky, who developed the American Federal poverty line in the mid-1960s, once wrote 
that „poverty, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder‟ (quoted in Sen, 1983). However, Sen 
thinks that the measurement of poverty is primarily a factual act rather than an ethical one 
(Sen, 1983). 
Some think that poverty does not exist anymore in postindustrial economies, whereas this 
opinion is probably not dominant. In 1989, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
said to The Guardian that „Poverty no longer exists in Britain, only inequality„ (Quoted in 
Atkinson 1998: 45), in line with her conception of the very restricted role of the state in 
redistributing income.  
Shall we study poverty in rich countries, then? A.B. Atkinson gave a convincing answer: „I 
would certainly agree that the problems of the Sahel are more pressing than those addressed in 
[his book Poverty in Europe]… What I am suggesting [is that] …world poverty has priority, 
but poverty within rich countries may legitimately come next on our list of concerns‟ 
(Atkinson, 1998: 1). 
Atkinson has summarized the main questions poverty researchers have to answer:  
- « (…) are we concerned with income rather than standards of living? 
- How is the poverty standard defined? (…) 
- How should we treat families with different composition? (…) 
- How does the duration of poverty enter our considerations? (…) 
- How should we measure the extent of poverty? » (Atkinson, 1989: 9). 
 
It should be noted that the definition and the measurement of poverty will not be my main 
focus. A vast literature already exists and I do not wish to review it extensively; however, the 
main debates and indicators will be presented.  
2.1.1 Absolute vs. relative poverty 
Seebohm Rowntree‟s seminal work, which was carried out in the city of York (England), is 
the most famous example of an absolute poverty measurement method (Rowntree, 1901). He 
collected data pertaining to the basic diet of working class families and determined a bundle 
of absolutely necessary goods that allowed people to satisfy their basic needs; if these were 
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not met, people faced “primary poverty”. Rowntree‟s original poverty line was based on the 
following diet:  
Table 1: Basic diet for a man, 1899 
 Breakfast Dinner Supper 
Sunday Bread, 8 oz 
Margarine, ½ oz 
Tea, 1 pt 
Boiled bacon, 3 oz 
Pease pudding, 12 oz 
Bread, 8 oz 
Margarine, ½ oz 
Cocoa, 1 pt 
Monday Bread, 8 oz 
Porridge, 1 ½ pts 
Potatoes with milk, 
24 oz 
Bread, 2 oz 
Cheese, 2 oz 
Bread, 8 oz 
Vegetable broth, 1 pt 
Cheese, 2 oz 
Tuesday Porridge, 1 ½ pts 
Skim milk, 1 pt 
Vegetable broth, 1 pt 
Bread, 4 oz 
Cheese, 2 oz 
Dumpling, 8 oz 
Bread, 4 oz 
Porridge, 1 ½ pts 
Source: Glennerster, Hills, Piachaud and Webb, 2004, Box 2: 34.  
The cost of clothing, light and fuel was added to theses prices. All in all, the poverty line for a 
couple and three children aged 3, 6 and 8 was, at 2000 prices, £53.10 in 1899.  
Rowntree carried out two more studies in York in 1936 and 1950, which showed that 
“primary” poverty amounted to 9.9 percent at the end of the nineteenth century, 3.9 percent in 
the 1930s, despite of the Great Recession, and had virtually disappeared in the postwar period 
(Atkinson, 1989). Indeed, 'His third survey in 1950…found that poverty had been virtually 
abolished largely as a result of the welfare state...This was the last of the old style local 
poverty surveys' (Piachaud and Webb, 2004: 31).  
Hence, many researchers who analyze the situation in high-income countries define a 
“sociocultural” subsistence level which encompasses more than basic goods. The idea is that 
an individual is poor compared to the average living standard of the society he or she lives in. 
A certain bundle of goods and services is necessary so that people can live a socially 
integrated life. This is a relative definition of poverty: „Needs arise by virtue of the kind of 
society to which individuals belong. Society imposes expectations, through its occupational, 
educational, economic and other systems and it also creates wants, through its organisation 
and customs‟ (Townsend, 1974: 27). Put differently, human needs are socially and historically 
constructed.  
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen summarizes this central problem: „Should poverty be estimated 
by a cut-off line that reflects a level below which people are…“absolutely impoverished”, or a 
level that reflects standards of living “common to that country” in particular.‟ His view is that 
„absolute deprivation in terms of a person‟s capabilities relates to relative deprivation in 
terms of commodities, incomes and resources‟ (Sen, 1983). Moreover, there is an „irreducible 
core of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty, which translates reports of starvation, 
malnutrition and visible hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first 
the relative picture‟ (Sen, 1981: 17).  
British sociologist Townsend insisted on what he called “relative deprivation” and sometimes 
squared off with Sen. From his point of view, the lifestyle and living standard of deprived 
people is always compared to the entire population of a country or a region. Townsend‟s 
approach mainly focuses on the social construction of needs: „Relative deprivation [is] the 
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absence or inadequacy of those diets, amenities, standards, services and activities which are 
common or customary in society‟ (Townsend, 1979: 915). Townsend has played a central role 
in the British tradition of poverty research. Based on the Family Expenditure Survey data, in 
the 1970s, Townsend and other researchers “rediscovered” poverty in Britain. The worst 
forms of poverty had been eradicated, but many households were still experiencing financial 
hardship (Piachaud and Webb, 2004).  
The most satisfying answer to this conceptual problem is, in my view, Sen‟s assertion that 
„poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it will take a relative 
form in the space of commodities‟ (Sen, 1983). Jäntti and Danziger underscore that, 'The idea 
of well-being and poverty as capability suggests that in comparing the well-being of 
individuals, we should analyze not only what they have…but also what they do, and what 
they can do…According to Sen, poverty is a state characterized by levels of capabilities that 
are, in the view of society, unacceptably low' (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000: 314).  
Pierre Bourdieu notes that the modern form of poverty seems very relative compared to the 
worst forms of material hardship, but can hurt people inasmuch as it is a “misery of position” 
(misère de position): Being at the bottom of society, living in a stigmatized neighborhood, 
being a long-term unemployed, or belonging to a socially declining population group. 
Industrialized societies have been very good at reducing extreme poverty, but through a 
process of differentiation, multiplied social spaces, which favored the development of this 
“relative misery‟‟ or “ordinary suffering” (petite misère - Bourdieu, 1993).  
It is extremely important to underline the fact that relative and absolute poverty are not 
synonymous of relative and absolute poverty lines. It is conceivable to define a level of 
poverty related to the customary living standard in a given society at a given time by using an 
absolute poverty line; that is, fixed in real terms in order to observe the evolution of a given 
living standard throughout a certain period. Some authors have used official welfare 
entitlement thresholds as poverty lines (Atkinson, 1989, Leu, Burri, Priester, 1997). These 
thresholds have a relative component since they usually define needs that go beyond mere 
physical survival. On the other hand, they might have an absolute aspect inasmuch as they are 
not directly derived from an average income or consumption level. According to Jäntti and 
Danziger, 'An “absolute” notion of poverty is fixed in terms of the relevant spaces at some 
point in time and, from that time on fixed in “absolute” terms in some space. If the relevant 
space is real income, then an absolute view implies a poverty line that is fixed in real terms' 
(Jäntti and Danziger, 2000: 313). It is perfectly conceivable to define a relative threshold at a 
given point in time and then hold it constant in real terms, for instance Eurostat‟s at-risk-of 
poverty rate anchored at a moment in time.  
2.1.2 Monetary vs. non-monetary poverty, resources vs. living conditions 
According to the United Nations Development Program, „Poverty has many faces and 
represents more than a low income. It reflects bad health, deprivation of knowledge and 
communication, incapacity to exercise human and political rights and the lack of dignity, trust 
and self-respect‟ (Quoted in Budowski, Tillmann, Bergman, 2002: 298). This kind of poverty 
concepts relies mainly on Sen‟s capabilities and functionings theory. Moreover, Sen has 
defined, within his theoretical framework of development and freedom, five instrumental 
liberties: political (civic rights, democracy), economic (access to resources and financing, 
distribution), social opportunities (access to education and health care), transparency (free 
press) and protection (mainly social security) (Sen, 1999). Sen demonstrates that it is 
fundamental to understand the interplay of these five liberties in order to analyze development 
and poverty. Hence, in societies in which political liberty, social opportunities, transparency 
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and social security are ensured, it makes sense to focus on economic liberty, whereas the 
question of access to health care is problematic in the United States (social opportunities). At 
the time of writing, however, a reform of health care is being implemented in the US under 
the auspices of the Obama administration. 
Many scholars have doubted the relevance of income or consumption levels to account for 
someone‟s well-being. Hence, they advocate a direct (and mostly multidimensional) measure 
of poverty, which consists in assessing actual living conditions through the possession of 
consumption goods and the access to services. Some nonmaterial aspects may also be taken 
into account. Townsend was one of first sociologists to promote this direct approach of 
poverty based on a predefined array of goods and services. The main aim is to define central 
dimensions of life in society, e.g. work, education, housing, health, and participation in social, 
political and cultural life. An individual is deemed poor if he or she has not achieved a 
minimum level on these dimensions.  
Mack and Lansley have improved Townsend‟s method by using opinion polls to determine 
what goods and services are deemed to be absolutely necessary by a majority of respondents 
(Mack and Lansley, 1985, Leu, Burri, Priester, 1997). In addition, these authors asked 
respondents who did not possess a given item whether this was so because they did not want 
this item or because they could not afford it (Mack and Lansley, 1985, Halleröd, 2006). 
Recently, social scientists have further developed this approach, using various weighting 
patterns for various items lists (Halleröd, 1994, Andress and Lipsmeier 1995). Others have 
advocated the use of factor analysis to identify subgroups of items corresponding to various 
dimensions of poverty and cluster analysis to determine who must be classified as “poor” in a 
non-arbitrary fashion (Ferro Luzzi, Flückiger, Weber, 2008). This kind of approach allows a 
more detailed and more subtle understanding of the nature of relative deprivation or poverty.  
As Mayer put it: „previous research suggests that within countries income is not a very good 
proxy for the conditions in which people live…Social scientists in other countries [than the 
US] also find a surprisingly weak relationship between income and a variety of measures of 
living conditions‟ (Mayer, 1995: 110). Likewise, Halleröd notes that many studies have 
identified this mismatch between monetary poverty and low living conditions (Halleröd, 
2006). For instance, Nolan analyzed Irish data and concluded that, „Only about half the 
sample households falling below the relative income lines are in fact seen to be experiencing 
basic deprivation‟ (Nolan, 1998: 102). Among others things, income measures usually do not 
take into account disparities in wealth and credit, which can lead to a distorted picture of 
living conditions. Moreover, it is very difficult to adjust income for family size, and there is 
no agreement among researchers as to which equivalence scale is the most appropriate, as will 
be discussed below. Finally, it should be noted that „the greater the adjustment for household 
size the weaker the relationship between income and a living condition‟ (Mayer, 1995: 134).  
The correlation between deprivation and low income may be weak; however, Andress, 
assessing the situation in Germany, states that deprivation increases strongly in the bottom 
income quintile (Andress and Lipsmeier, 1995). Similarly, the share of respondents who state 
they have problems in making ends meets in Switzerland is much larger in the bottom decile; 
this is even the case for subjective problems such as fear, loneliness, and overall lack of 
satisfaction (Niklowitz and Suter, 2002). Halleröd has suggested that only those who 
experience both a low income level and deprivation of various items are “truly poor” 
(Halleröd, 1995). 
It should be noted that the direct measurement of living conditions also has drawbacks: 
International comparisons of living conditions are extremely difficult to carry out, because 
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there is no such thing as a consensus regarding the items that should be included in 
questionnaires and the ones that should be used to compare living standards. Moreover, the 
approach advocated by Mack and Lansley (1985) postulates that it is possible to distinguish 
when people choose not to have a good from when they cannot afford it. This is indeed much 
more complex than it can appear on first thought (Halleröd, 2006), as disadvantaged social 
groups tend to adjust their preferences to their monetary resources (Halleröd, 2006). Indeed, 
Pierre Bourdieu demonstrated more than 30 years ago, with both survey-based and qualitative 
evidence, that one of the main characteristics of the members of the working class was the 
tendency to make a virtue of necessity, by adjusting their expectations and their judgments to 
their material, social and cultural situation (Bourdieu, 1979).  
Moreover, survey respondents tend to “exaggerate” their satisfaction level, and to say they are 
“quite satisfied” with virtually everything (Fowler, 1995, Erens and Bruster, 1994), including 
their household income, unless they are in a very difficult situation. I get back to these issues 
in the section devoted to equivalence scales.  
However important and useful nonmonetary indicators may be, with some notable exceptions, 
most authors examine only income (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000). As indicated in the 
introduction, among all the social policy evaluations I have identified and meta-analyzed in 
the empirical part of the present work, none contains nonmonetary poverty indicators. The 
reason is probably that social benefits and labor market-related benefits overwhelmingly 
consists in cash transfers and near-cash benefits, for instance tax credits for workers, 
minimum wages, childcare tax credits, child allowances, etc.  
Regardless of the drawbacks for social policy evaluations, nonmonetary indicators can be 
very valuable to analyze social problems. They appear as particularly useful in the case of 
subgroups of the population for which it is difficult to calculate disposable income, such as 
self-employed workers in general and farmers in particular (The Canberra Group, 2001, 
Crettaz and Forney, forthcoming), or in the case of social groups for which wealth and home 
ownership may play as important a role as income, for instance pensioners in countries in 
which capitalization pension systems are important components of the social security system. 
In the case of self-employed workers, monetary indicators may well lead to an overestimation 
of their financial difficulties: Based on monetary indicators, they appear to be strongly 
overrepresented among the working poor in Switzerland (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
2008), while an analysis of the goods they own and services they have access to leads to more 
nuanced conclusions (Antille, El May, Miceli, Silber, 1997).  
Last but not least, whereas the overwhelming majority of poverty studies use disposable 
income as a poverty yardstick, other monetary indicators are conceivable, such as 
consumption levels. It is noteworthy that the correlation between income and consumption 
levels is not necessarily very high (Headey, Krause, Wagner, 2009). Debts and indebtment 
can also be interesting for poverty and social exclusion analysis, and Eurostat has included 
debt indicators in its Survey on Income and Living Conditions as indicators of social 
exclusion (European Commission, 2006); however, the primary cause of debts is not 
necessarily income poverty. Wealth is also an important monetary indicator, especially for 
inactive persons of working age and for retirees; the problem is, however, that the vast 
majority of surveys do not include questions pertaining to wealth.  
2.1.3 Subjective and objective poverty 
The subjective poverty approach mainly consists in considering the poor as the true poverty 
experts. Respondents are asked to indicate a minimum level of income they deem necessary to 
“make ends meet”, if their household income is sufficient in order to meet certain needs, or if 
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they are satisfied with their income/consumption level. Put differently, an individual 
categorized as poor by a poverty expert, may well think that he or she is not poor, and vice 
versa. The economists of the “Leyden School” have advocated the use of such indicators to 
define utility functions and poverty lines (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008, van Praag, 
Goedhardt, Kapteyn, 1980, Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003, Falter, 2006).  
Actually, a review of the literature on working poverty reveals that subjective indicators have 
hardly ever been used. It should be noted that these subjective thresholds may “overestimate” 
poverty, as it seems that they yield high poverty rates (Citro and Michael, 1995). Strengmann-
Kuhn e.g. notices that the working poor rate amounts to 3.6 percent with a poverty line set at 
50 percent of the average income (average of 14 European Union member states
2
), whereas it 
is four times higher with a subjective poverty line (16.8 percent). He concludes that using a 
subjective poverty line yields plausible poverty rates in a few countries only (Strengmann-
Kuhn, 2003). 
In addition, whereas this kind of indicators combined with factual questions pertaining to 
living conditions can be useful for the analysis of deprivation in a given country, or even 
across countries (Suter and Paris, 2002), this approach may overestimate the well-being of 
specific subgroups who have lived on below-average income for a long time, for instance 
independent farmers. As indicated above, in order to reduce the subjective feeling of 
deprivation, long-term disadvantaged persons tend to, subconsciously, lower their 
expectations and adjust their satisfaction to their income level (Halleröd, 2006, Crettaz and 
Forney, forthcoming), which is confirmed by ethnographic evidence in the case of farmers 
(Droz, 1998).  
2.1.4 Statistical / microeconomic vs. “microsociological” definition 
Serge Paugam, deriving his thinking from Georg Simmel‟s work, insists on the arbitrariness 
of setting a poverty line and criticizes the idea of poverty as an ontological characteristic. 
Those who are poor are people who are socially defined as such, and it is fundamental to 
know how they perceive their situation. They are labeled as “poor” because society as a whole 
has to take care of them and acknowledges their poverty status. Hence, Paugam in his 
research on “social disqualification” has mainly focused on welfare recipients, not only as an 
administrative category, but rather as a sociological one (Simmel, 1908, Paugam, 1991).  
According to this conception, “hidden” poverty does not exist; there are no households not 
receiving welfare benefits that can be labeled “poor”. This is problematic in the field of social 
policy analysis, as it is well-known that many households are entitled to welfare benefits 
because they have low income levels, but do not apply for them – a problem known as the 
non-take-up of social benefits - and this for various reasons, mainly lacking information about 
social benefits, administrative errors and feelings of shame due to the stigma attached to 
welfare benefits receipt (van Oorschott, 1991, Leu, Burri, Priester, 1997). 
2.1.5 The changing nature of poverty 
As indicated, it is obvious that the most severe forms of poverty deserve urgently needed 
solutions which go light-years beyond the scope of the present work. The work of some Nobel 
Prize winners in economics (Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, notably) have shed a new light 
on the urgency and necessity of new conceptions of economic development. In fact, the nature 
and implications of “poverty” have changed in advanced economies. Serge Paugam has 
                                                          
2
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Finland.  
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recently developed a typology of the elementary forms of poverty found in Europe (Paugam, 
2005) that provides an interesting perspective:  
Integrated poverty (pauvreté intégrée) 
A large number of poor people share a common identity and live in a poor country or region. 
They do not differ much from the rest of the population and lead a normally integrated life, 
with an expanded kinship and a solid neighborhood network. These societies have 
predominantly pre-industrial features and an underdeveloped system of social protection, if 
any. This absence is compensated by solid family networks which provide support in the 
event of severe hardship. The poor are not stigmatized in their community. This description 
fits the accounts of poverty until the eighteenth century, and corresponds to the situation in 
some southern European regions today: On the Island of Madeira, for instance, the official 
poverty rate can be as high as 40 percent, but “subjective” poverty is very low. The catholic 
religion plays a very important role, too.  
Marginal poverty (pauvreté marginale) 
The poor are a small minority of the population and represent a residual category. They are 
taken care of by specialized institutions. They live in a society that has reached a high level of 
economic development with low levels of unemployment. The residual unemployment is 
combated by the unemployment insurance. The degree of stigmatization of the poor is very 
high, as they are perceived as misfits. One of the first authors who described this phenomenon 
in the US was Michael Harrington in 1962. This kind of poverty is typical of the “golden age” 
of Western European economies, and of today‟s Scandinavia (low poverty rates and low long-
term unemployment levels).  
Excluding poverty (pauvreté disqualifiante) 
This third elementary form of poverty is found in highly developed economies that experience 
a major industrial restructuring and even a crisis. Long-term unemployment is particularly 
problematic. The accumulation of social disadvantages and the often accompanying 
degradation of family and friendship ties can lead to social isolation and “social exclusion”. 
The exclusion from mainstream lifestyle and stigmatization are the main outcomes of this 
socioeconomic process. The nonpoor majority is scared by the perspective of being hit by this 
problem, and tends to avoid those who are on a downward spiral. Put differently, middle 
classes avoid rubbing elbows with this group characterized by an accumulation of social 
handicaps, notably the long-term unemployed and immigrants. Today‟s France and Germany 
typically correspond to this third type.  
Paugam‟s typology can be criticized, among other things, for downplaying working poverty. 
This conception of poverty as a phenomenon mainly associated with unemployment is found 
in many European scholars‟ work. Working poverty is not marginal, as it affects a non-
negligible share of workers in postindustrial economies. Of course, their poverty may not be 
as disqualifying as that experienced by jobless persons; it prevents them, nonetheless, from 
leading a socially integrated life and can have a detrimental effect on their children‟s 
academic achievement and future in a broader sense, as will be analyzed in following 
chapters.  
Moreover, it should be noted that Scandinavian countries have experienced a deep recession 
in the early 1990s with high unemployment levels (more than 8 percent in Sweden, for 
instance), which has generated, among other things, an increase in the share of the population 
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benefiting from means-tested benefits; moreover, short-term employment has been on the 
increase, as will be analyzed at greater length in chapter 5 and 7.  
Despite these shortcomings, Paugam‟s perspective is an interesting reflection about the fact 
that poverty not only evolves over time, but that the same notion can describe different 
realities in different postindustrial countries. I also interpret it as follows: The poverty 
problem is redefined and reframed in each social context, which implies that a more 
“constructivist” approach of poverty analysis can be a useful complement to the kind of social 
policy analysis carried out in the present work. 
Another important finding must be put to the fore. The sociological tradition has tackled the 
issue of suicide for more than a century now; it has been shown that macrosocial factors affect 
suicide rates (Baudelot and Establet, 2006). Emile Durkheim found out, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, that the poor had a lower likelihood to commit suicide than the rest of 
society, due to their socially integrated life – in line with Durkheim‟s assumption that a higher 
degree of social integration is an antidote to suicide (Durkheim‟s Le Suicide mentioned in 
Baudelot and Establet, 2006). Today, the suicide rate is higher in richer countries - the notable 
outliers being former Warsaw‟s Pact countries – however, within rich countries, those who 
are hit by poverty have a higher likelihood to commit suicide (Baudelot and Establet, 2006).  
Given all these considerations regarding the definition and the nature of poverty, I can now 
have a closer look at existing poverty indicators (mainly poverty lines).  
 
2.2 Poverty lines  
 
The most widely used poverty lines are presented in the following section. As Jean Olson 
Lanjouw put it, „Poverty lines are widely perceived as occupying a central role in poverty 
analysis. In fact, setting a poverty line often receives the bulk of attention and intellectual 
effort in studies of poverty„(Lanjouw and McKinley, 1997: 7).  
2.2.1 Absolute poverty thresholds  
The US official poverty threshold is the best-known example of an absolute poverty 
threshold. Since the mid-1960s, the US Census Bureau has been publishing poverty rates 
based on the following approach:  
Poverty line = XPH T

  
Where TP

is a vector of prices, X

is an array of foods and H a multiplicator.  
Orshansky‟s multiplicator equals 3, because consumption surveys carried out in the 1960s by 
the US Department of Agriculture had established that low-income households spent about 
one third of their income to meet their alimentary needs.  
This kind of indicator should not necessarily be an indicator of extreme poverty, depending on 
the multiplicator, i.e. the extra income necessary to buy nonfood products and services. As 
already indicated, a threshold kept constant in real terms can measure relative poverty in a 
country where the poor‟s survival is not at stake. The “Orshansky indicator” has been subject 
to criticism in recent years (Citro and Michael, 1995) because it is not in line with today‟s 
American average living standards anymore: The US Federal poverty line for a couple with 
two children in 2008 amounts to about $60/day. 
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Extreme poverty lines are absolute, consisting either in a fixed amount of money (e.g. $1/day 
per person), calories intake levels, or anthropometric measures such as the mid-arm-muscle 
circumference to assess undernourishment. Even these indicators can be arbitrary: „There is 
difficulty in drawing a line somewhere, and the so-called „minimum nutritional requirements‟ 
have an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations between groups and regions‟ 
(Sen, 1981: 12). 
2.2.2 Relative poverty lines and relative deprivation 
Relative poverty lines rest upon measures of central tendency, namely median or mean 
income. In order to compare households of different size and composition, an equivalence 
scale is used to transform the household disposable income into a theoretical one called 
“equivalized” income.  
 
2.3 Equivalence scales 
 
These scales provide a value by which the household income should be divided in order to be 
comparable with that of a one-person household. Usually, equivalence scales are either 
derived from econometric studies resting upon household consumption surveys or are social 
security experts‟ scales. They can also be derived from nutritional and physiological studies, 
as well as from population judgments in opinion surveys, i.e. subjective scales (Jäntti and 
Danziger, 2000, Atkinson, 1998). 
Any equivalence scale can be subsumed to the following expression (Atkinson, 1998): 
n
s
,   s  1;0 .  
If s = 0.5, household income is divided by the square root of the number of household 
members.  
Equivalized income, ye, equals y/s
e
, where s is family size and e is the elasticity of equivalent 
income, and can also be described as follows:  
ca
y
ye
 

)1(1
 , with 0 <   <1,  
with a the number of additional adults and c the number of children (Jäntti and Danziger, 
2000).  
The arguably most widely used equivalence scale in comparative social policy research is the 
so-called “OECD modified scale”, with β=0.5 and  = 0.3. For instance, a couple with two 
children under 14 needs 2.1 times (=1+0.5+0.3+0.3) the income of a single person to achieve 
the same living standards. 
There is no agreement among researchers as to the choice of an equivalence scale, and this 
choice has an impact on the poverty rate of various household types: 'In theory, an 
equivalence scale simply accounts for economies of scale, e.g., a family with ten members 
does not need five times as many kitchens and bathrooms as a family of two persons. 
However, there is much dispute about the extent of economies of scale' (Jäntti and Danziger, 
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2000: 316). The following table shows that equivalence scales used in mainstream research 
can vary notably: 
 
Table 2: Various equivalence scales found in the literature 
 Square 
root 
Modified 
OECD 
Mc 
Clements 
Orshan-
sky 
Canadian 
LICOs 
SKOS 
Single adult 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lone parent, 
one child 
1.41 1.3-1.5 1.33-1.52 1.33 1.22 1.53 
Lone parent, 
two children 
1.73 1.6-2 1.66-2.05 1.55 1.52 1.86 
Couple, no 
children 
1.41 1.5 1.64 1.29 1.22 1.53 
Couple, one 
child 
1.73 1.8-2 1.97-2.16 1.55 1.52 1.86 
Couple,two 
children 
2 2.1-2.5 2.3-2.69 1.95 1.89 2.14 
Source: Whiteford and Adema, 2007 and SKOS 2003 
The McClements scale is used in the UK in the annual publication on “Households Below 
Average Income”, inter alia, whereas the Orshansky scale is the one used in US official 
poverty statistics and mainstream poverty research; the LICOs are the low-income cutoffs 
established by Statistics Canada, and the SKOS is the Swiss Conference of Welfare 
Institutions.  
It should be underscored that the choice of an equivalence scale can, obviously, have an 
impact on the identification of risk groups, as each equivalence scale ascribes a different 
weight to adults and children. Most of the above mentioned scales are quite similar; however, 
they are not the only existing scales. Some researchers advocate the use of subjective 
indicators, for instance the use of income satisfaction questions (Falter, 2006). In the case of 
Switzerland, for instance, Falter uses both the “minimum income question” and the income 
satisfaction question to estimate equivalence scales. The results he gets are at odds with the 
equivalence scales used in poverty research, as they are far less steep; put differently having 
children hardly increases households‟ needs. The “Leyden approach”, based on the minimum 
income question, yields an equivalence scale showing that a couple with one child hardly has 
higher needs than a single person without children, as this family corresponds to 1.161 
consumption units. Larger families do not have much higher needs either, e.g. couples with 
three children correspond to 1.407 units (model IV). The equivalence scale based on the 
income satisfaction question leads to even more surprising results: Families with one child 
(1.757 units) have virtually the same needs as families with four children (1.919 units). The 
latter finding appears at complete odds with the cost of having children in Switzerland as 
measured by econometric techniques applied to consumption data (Gerfin, Stutz, Oesch, 
Strub, 2009, Gerfin, Wanzenried, 2001).  
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Even though consumption partly reflects preferences and not only needs, this huge gap 
remains to be explained, as it is quite unlikely that parents develop luxury tastes once they 
have a second or a third child. These surprising findings could largely reflect the “satisfaction 
bias” generated by survey questions (Fowler, 1995, Erens and Bruster, 1994), i.e. survey 
respondents‟ tendency to declare themselves “rather satisfied” with virtually everything, as 
well as the adaptive preferences phenomenon analyzed by Halleröd (2006). Indeed, answers 
to the income satisfaction question and the minimum income question may rather reflect the 
fact that parents have lowered their expectations rather than the well-being of children. In 
addition, it appears rather unlikely that having three children or more has nearly zero impact 
on needs, which the comparison between couples with one child and couples with four 
children seems to suggest.  
However surprising and at odds with consumption patterns these findings might be (a rising 
number of children hardly increasing needs), they raise important scientific questions: How 
can the extra needs associated with the birth of a child be measured in various countries, as 
consumption patterns reflect, at least in part, parents‟ preferences? The corollary question is: 
How large is the bias created by the use of the same equivalence scale in different countries in 
comparative research, as it is very unlikely that economies of scale and the cost of having 
children are identical across countries? Until now, no satisfying answer has been provided, 
and the use of standard equivalence scales in comparative social policy research remains one 
of the main weaknesses of this approach. In this context, nonmonetary poverty indicators, 
such as those analyzed above, could prove helpful, as they do not require, obviously, the use 
of an equivalence scale.  
These findings also raise interesting political and normative questions: To what extent should 
a welfare state compensate parents who have made the decision to have a large number of 
children? If parents could not afford to have many children at the time they decide to, should 
the welfare state let these children live in poverty, as children cannot be held responsible for 
their parents‟ decisions? Does the fact of having, say, four children reflect a conscious choice 
and to what extent do all women have an easy and informed access to contraception, 
especially among minorities stemming from poorer countries?  
 
2.4 Main relative poverty lines used in empirical research  
 
The most common poverty lines are 50 and 60 percent of median (sometimes mean) income. 
This choice is completely arbitrary and has a pervasive impact on poverty rates, 60 percent 
yielding rates that are approximately twice as high in most OECD countries (Förster and Mira 
d‟Ercole, 2005). American researchers sometimes use 40 percent of median income, as this 
roughly corresponds to the level of the official poverty line (Kamerman, 1995, Smeeding, 
2005). The main advantages of this kind of indicators are their transparency and simplicity, 
contrary to the definition of a basket of basic goods and services which implies many arbitrary 
decisions as to which products and services belong to a “typical” basket and the costs 
associated to them.  
Interestingly, 'In the first half of the [twentieth] century, [Rowntree‟s] poverty lines for a 
single man were 30-35 percent of weekly personal disposable income per capita, while in the 
second half they were around 40 percent...At the end of the twentieth century, poverty lines 
were far higher in absolute (real) terms than ever before, but in relative terms they had 
changed rather little' (Piachaud and Webb, 2004: 37).  
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Relative poverty indicators should only be used to compare countries with similar levels of 
living. The comparison of high income countries and middle income countries might lead to 
surprising results. Eurostat states that some of the lowest at-risk-of-poverty rates in the 
European Union are found in the Czech Republic and Hungary, whereas median income in 
these countries (adjusted for the cost of living) is significantly lower than the UE 25 median 
income (Eurostat, 2005). Jäntti and Danziger express similar concerns, even in the case of a 
comparison between countries with a similar level of economic development: 'Even though 
the US has a much higher poverty rate than, say, Norway, relative to the median standard of 
living in each country, some of the poor in the US may be better off than some of the poor in 
Norway because of the higher median standard of living in the US' (Jäntti and Danziger, 
2000: 338).  
In addition, relative thresholds are sometimes criticized for being mainly inequality indicators 
(Ravallion, 2003); indeed, they are strongly correlated to income inequality indicators such as 
the Gini coefficient. Comparing inequality and poverty measured with an absolute threshold, 
Danziger and Gottschalk conclude that 'if every family's income doubled, there would be no 
change in income inequality, but poverty would decline' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996: 56). 
The case of Ireland between 1998 and 2001 is very revealing: „its combination of rapid 
growth and average living standards combined with a smaller but still significant increase in 
real incomes for the poorest meant that it had both the fastest growth in relative poverty, and 
fastest fall against an absolute standard' (Hills, 2004: 138-139).  
Moreover, relative poverty lines lead to different conclusions than poverty lines held constant 
in real terms, expressed as a percentage of median income in an “anchor” year: “Generally 
speaking, [an absolute] approach shows declines in overall poverty rates in OECD countries 
between the mid-1980s and 2000, while trends in relative poverty have tended to rise in most 
OECD countries‟ (Whiteford and Adema, 2007: 10).  
The advantage of relative poverty lines is that they facilitate international comparisons. 
Hence, these thresholds are used by Eurostat, the OECD and other international organizations. 
It should be noted here that Eurostat does not consider 60 percent of equivalent disposable 
income as a poverty line: It is an “at-risk-of-poverty” line. 
Another way to proceed to international comparisons would be to set an “absolute” line by 
defining a basket of goods and services and by calculating its cost in a given country, and to 
use purchasing power parities to account for differences in the cost of living and exchange 
rates. However, „the commonly-used PPP adjustments are not designed for comparisons of 
real disposable income (as opposed to real national incomes)...These PPP results should be 
viewed with caution, as there are large differences in the extent to which household in 
different countries actually need to purchase certain items...PPPs, developed for national 
accounts purposes rather than for comparisons of household well-being, do not take this into 
account' (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000: 341 to 343).  
In chapter 5, some figures stemming from studies using absolute poverty lines are presented, 
and the country ranking is affected. The comparison of these figures with those found in 
mainstream comparative research, based on relative poverty lines, leads to the following 
conclusions: The use of relative poverty lines “disadvantages” countries with high median 
incomes, such as the US, whereas the use of absolute poverty lines adjusted with PPPs tends 
to “disadvantage” countries in which many services are provided for free or at a very low cost 
by the state, and, hence, need not be bought in the market, such as Sweden.  
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Finally, another relative approach of poverty is conceivable, namely setting a distributional 
threshold, usually quantiles of the income distribution, especially deciles and quintiles. The 
obvious shortcoming is that the poverty rate is constant by definition. These thresholds are, 
however, useful to investigate income mobility by means of a transition matrix (Asplund, 
Sloane, Theodossiou, 1998); it can also be interesting to compare the living conditions and 
income levels, say, in the bottom decile of the income distribution across countries 
(Kenworthy, 2004), as well as its sociodemographic composition. 
 
2.5 Poverty indicators 
 
2.5.1 The headcount ratio  
The headcount ratio is by far the most widely used poverty indicator; it measures the 
incidence of poverty, that is, the number of poor persons divided by the size of the population. 
It is usually called “poverty rate”. The main shortcoming is that it does take into account 
neither the severity of poverty nor the income distribution among the poor (Sen, 1981). Put 
differently, the headcount ratio is not sensitive to the average income among the poor nor is it 
sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000).  
2.5.2 The income gap and the poverty gap 
The poverty gap aims at measuring the intensity or depth of poverty, i.e. how poor 
disadvantaged households are. It is based on the difference between the poverty line and each 
household income: 
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where N p  is the number of poor people, pl the poverty line and xi the i-th observation of 
disposable income among the poor population. It is usually expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line, as in the above formula (Jäntti and Danziger, 2000). This is the case, e.g., for 
Eurostat‟s “at-risk-of-poverty gap” (Eurostat website, Living conditions and welfare 
indicators). 
However, some consider that this indicator is the income gap, whereas the poverty gap takes 
into account the entire population and is the mean distance below the poverty line as a 
proportion of the poverty line where the mean is taken over the whole population, counting 
the nonpoor as having zero poverty gap. According to this conception, the poverty gap is 
defined as:  
 
 
 
       
  
  
  
 
 
with N the population size.  
This definition means than the poverty gap (ratio) is the product of the headcount ratio and the 
income gap (World Bank website, Millenium Development Goals).  
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The squared poverty gap is an indicator of the severity of poverty and is defined as follows: 
    
 
 
  
       
  
 
   
  
 
 (World Bank website, Millenium Development Goals). 
In chapter 7, the poverty gap is calculated as the product of the poverty rate and the income 
gap, the latter being the average distance between poor households‟ income and the poverty 
line, expressed in percent of the poverty line.  
2.5.3  Other poverty indicators 
Some indicators have been proposed to take account of the intensity of poverty and/or the 
severity of poverty.  
Foster, Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) 
The FGT allows taking into account various aspects of poverty and is defined as follows 
(Foster, Greer, Thorbecke, 1984):  
FGT = 
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There are similarities with the poverty gap formula. The higher the  , the bigger the weight 
that is ascribed to the poorest people; it is an aversion coefficient. If α=0, the FGT index is the 
headcount ratio, if α=1, it is the poverty gap (Heinrich, 2003), and if α=2, the FGT index 
measures the severity of poverty. Clearly, the main shortcoming of this indicator is that it is 
more difficult to interpret and has no immediate meaning.  
In the chapter synthesizing evaluations of existing policies that may contribute to the 
alleviation of working poverty, especially the minimum wage and tax credit for workers, 
some evaluations are based on the FGT indicator with various values of α. 
Sen’s indicator  
Sen‟s indicator (Sen, 1976) takes into account the headcount ratio (pr), the poverty gap (pg) 
and the Gini index (G) among the poor population:  
Sen = pr (pg + (1-pg)G) 
The interpretation of the obtained value is also quite unintuitive. But international 
comparisons make sense, as well as pretax/pretransfer versus posttax/posttransfer 
comparisons.  
 
2.6 Poverty indicators used in the present work 
 
Empirical results and estimates found in the present work rely exclusively on monetary 
indicators, as they are directly useful for social policy purposes, as benefits tend to be 
monetary, and also because they allow estimating the cost of “filling the income gap”. Many 
empirical analyses hereafter are based on the headcount ratio and on income poverty 
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thresholds; this is, by far, the most common approach in empirical social policy research, as 
can be seen in the various meta-analyses below. However, the fact that an indicator is 
common does not mean that it is the best indicator available. In the chapter in which a 
typology of welfare regimes is developed, based on their ability to fight working poverty, 
consumption poverty lines are also defined, and both the headcount ratio and the poverty gap 
are calculated. Moreover, two types of relative poverty lines are used, namely 50 and 60 
percent of median disposable income. These variations allow drawing robust conclusions 
regarding the extent of working poverty and the socio-economic composition of the working 
poor population, as well as to the main mechanisms leading to working poverty across welfare 
regimes.  
Whereas direct (and usually multidimensional) poverty measurements are scientifically very 
relevant tools that allow a more subtle understanding of deprivation in postindustrial societies 
(Ferro Luzzi, Flückiger, Weber, 2008), they are rarely found in the social policy literature, for 
reasons already mentioned. It is probably advisable for future research on social policy topics 
to use these indicators more systematically, in order to get a less abstract picture of the 
situation of disadvantaged social groups. As to subjective indicators in general, it is probably 
fair to say that they seem to be of little use for most social policy analyses, as welfare benefits 
are not attributed to families or individuals because they feel poor but because their income is 
too low (Halleröd, 2006). However, subjective factors are necessary to understand specific 
phenomena; they are decisive, for instance, to explain the non-take-up of welfare benefits, as 
feelings of shame and stigma appear to play a significant role (Van Oorschot, 1991, 
Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003, Leu, Burri, Priester, 2007).  
Finally, I make use of the dominant type of equivalence scales, i.e. consumption based and 
expert scales, which are overwhelmingly found in the social policy literature. In my view, the 
fact that expert equivalence scales may reflect normative and political values about children 
needs is not a fundamental problem, as the fight against child poverty appears to be a priority, 
especially in a social investment perspective. Moreover, the fact that parents are able to lower 
their expectations after having chosen to have many children does not say much about the 
well-being of their children.  
 
2.7 Defining labor market participation: Who is “working”? 
 
Regarding labor market participation, I can rely on existing scholarship to a much lesser 
extent, as most of the literature on working poverty uses an arbitrarily set minimum number 
of hours or months worked, ranging from one hour of work in a reference week (usually the 
week prior to the interview) to full-time year-round labor market participation. As a 
consequence, there may be a group of persons who hold a job at the time of the interview but 
are not considered to be “working”.  
The following table shows the absence of consensus among researchers and in official 
statistics, as well as the systematic use of arbitrary thresholds: 
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Table 3: Definitions of “working poor”  
Country  Source  Work definition Poverty threshold 
EU Eurostat Employed at least 15 hours / 
Most frequent activity status in 
the last year 
New indicator: in-work at-risk-
of-poverty rate  individuals 
classified as employed 
(according to their most 
frequent activity status) 
Low-income threshold: less than 
60% of the median equivalised 
household income (relative 
monetary poverty) 
At risk of poverty: individuals 
living in a household with an 
equivalised disposable income 
below 60% of the median 
France Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et de l'Economie 
(INSEE) / 
Academics / 
National action 
plan for Social 
Inclusion 2001-
2003/2003-2005 
Individuals who have spent at 
least six month of the year on 
the labour market (working or 
searching for a job) / Working 
at least six months / Have had a 
job for at least one moth during 
a year 
Low-income threshold: less than 
50% (60%-70% occasionally) of 
the median equivalised 
household income (relative 
monetary poverty) 
Belgium National Action 
Plan for Social 
Inclusion 
Individuals who have spent at 
least six month of the year on 
the labour market (working or 
searching for a job) / Working 
at least six months  
Low-income threshold: less than 
60% of the median equivalised 
household income (relative 
monetary poverty) 
Switzer-
land 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 
/ Academics 
All 'active' individuals, 
regardless of the number of 
hours they work / all 
individuals working full-time 
(i.e. 36 hours or more weekly / 
at least one individual having a 
lucrative activity for at least 40 
hours a week (one full-time 
job) 
- new indicator: individuals 
who work and live in a 
household in which the overall 
volume of work (of all 
members) amounts to at least 
36 hours a week 
Administrative flat rates of 
social security modified 
(Monetary administrative 
poverty) 
 
 
US US Census 
Bureau (USCB) 
Total hours worked by family 
members greater than or equal 
to 1,750 hours (44 weeks) 
Federal Poverty Line (Absolute 
monetary poverty) 
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  US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
(USBLS)  
Individuals who have spent at 
least six months (27 weeks) of 
the year on the labour market 
(working or searching for a 
job)  
Federal Poverty Line (Absolute 
monetary poverty) 
  US researchers 
in general 
Adults working, on average, at 
least half time (approximately 
1,000 hours) / Definition of 
USCB and USBLS (see above)  
Less than 125%-150%-200% of 
Federal poverty line (Absolute 
monetary poverty) 
Canada National 
Council of 
Welfare (NCW)  
More than 50% of total family 
income come from wages, 
salaries or self-employment 
Statistics Canada's Low-income 
cut-offs (LICOs) (Absolute 
monetary poverty) 
  Canadian 
Council on 
Social 
Development 
(CCSD) 
Adult members have, between 
them, at least 49 weeks of 
either full-time (at least 30 
hours a week) or part-time 
work 
CCSD relative low-income 
threshold (Relative monetary 
poverty) 
  Canadian Policy 
Research 
Networks 
(CPRN) 
Full time full year Relative low-income threshold; 
less than $20,000 per year 
(Relative monetary poverty) 
Australia Social Policy 
Research Centre  
All 'active' individuals, 
regardless of the number of 
hours they work 
Henderson absolute poverty line 
(Absolute monetary poverty)  
Source: Peña-Casas and Latta, 2004, modified and completed for the present work.  
I feel that setting an arbitrary threshold is unsatisfactory, and would like to propose an 
alternative solution. My conception rests upon the International Labor Organization‟s 
definition of employment: Those who work at least an hour during a reference week are 
deemed to be in employment.  
Contrary to many authors, I suggest that there is no such thing as THE working poor, as this 
label characterizes various groups of disadvantaged workers who are in different situations 
that require different policy interventions. The approach I advocate relies, as already 
indicated, on a very encompassing conception of “working”, so that no poor adult who 
participates in the labor market is left out of the analysis, whatever her or his degree of labor 
force attachment.  
The goal is, then, to identify multiple types of working poverty according to the main 
mechanisms that have caused it, as will be analyzed in depth in subsequent chapters: low 
labor force attachment, low earnings per unit of time, and higher needs due to household size 
and composition. This classification, which I develop in chapter 5, appears to provide useful 
information for social policy purposes, as it allows answering the following question: Which 
types of poor workers are mostly found in which welfare regime?  
Apart from its use for comparative social policy analysis, my approach can also be useful for 
national analyses. If large datasets are available, which is more likely to be the case in 
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national than in international datasets, it is possible to draw detailed typologies of poor 
workers, by defining various levels of labor force attachment, child-per-working age adult 
ratios, and earnings levels, which are, as will be analyzed at great length below, the three 
immediate causes of working poverty. At that stage, setting arbitrary thresholds is not 
anymore a problem, as no group of disadvantaged workers has been ignored from the outset. 
Moreover, it is also possible to use cluster analysis in order to identify subgroups of poor 
workers without setting arbitrary thresholds: In so doing, it is possible to let “the case define 
the concept” (Becker, 1998). This kind of approach may allow a “fine tuning” of social policy 
intervention and a more appropriate allocation of resources, by defining various categories of 
poor workers who are characterized by the separate “treatment” their poverty requires. I get 
back to this point in the conclusion of this document. 
The approach I advocate, based on a very encompassing definition of work, however, also has 
some drawbacks. First, the situation of poor workers who have a very loose connection to the 
labor market, either because they are unemployed most of the time or not able to work more 
than a few hours, probably requires policy interventions that differ fundamentally from those 
analyzed in the present work. For instance, for this subgroup of poor workers, vocational 
training, counseling, and in some instances health-related interventions if these workers have 
a condition preventing them from increasing their labor force participation, could prove much 
more useful than, say, minimum wages or tax credits. Second, a researcher is always 
dependent, one way or another, on the indicators and findings other researchers produce, 
especially in the field of comparative social policy analysis. In this regard, official definitions 
appear to play a decisive role: As will become obvious in the following chapters, many 
American scholars use the US official poverty definition and European researchers 
increasingly use Eurostat‟s definition of “in-work poverty”. I have shown above that any 
definition of working poverty implies a certain degree of arbitrariness; hence, using an official 
definition has the advantage of limiting each researcher‟s subjectivity and facilitates 
comparisons.  
All in all, even if I think that my approach might be more relevant by not excluding subgroups 
of workers from the outset, in order to obtain more accurate and detailed results - an approach 
I use in Chapter 7 - I also think that comparative analyses using official indicators have 
important advantages.  
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3 The Socioeconomic Determinants of Poverty among Workers 
 
Thanks to the conceptual reflections of the previous chapter, I am able to propose a 
definitional approach to working poverty that can be useful for social policy analysis. I have 
underlined that there is no such thing as THE working poor, but subgroups of poor workers 
who experience very different situations. I will get back to this typological approach of 
working poverty in chapters 7 and 8, in order to systemize it. After having dealt with 
definitional aspects, I can now turn to the main driving factors of poverty among workers in 
postindustrial economies, in order to understand the roots of the problem. The present chapter 
regards socioeconomic factors - after a short historical introduction - whereas chapter 4 will 
analyze public policy factors.  
The contribution of this chapter is to present, in an organized and selective fashion, findings 
derived from a large body of literature in the fields of economic sciences, sociology, and other 
social sciences, analyzing a broad spectrum of topics such as low-wage employment, overall 
poverty, income inequality and unemployment, in order to identify the main working poverty 
factors.  
Perhaps more importantly, whereas the poverty literature identifies a myriad of risk factors 
and of risk groups, I have been able to single out three immediate causes of working poverty, 
which are the channels through which all poverty factors identified in the literature have a 
direct bearing on working households. The existence of these three mechanisms confirms the 
necessity to distinguish various groups of working poor who experience different types of 
disadvantage.  
 
3.1 A brief historical outlook 
 
As far as we can look back into history, we find evidence of severe poverty in Europe, as 
early as the Middle Ages (Castel, 1995, Geremek, 1980). According to Castel, about half of 
the population experienced stringent deprivation at that time. In pre-industrial Europe, the 
main social issue was the situation of able-bodied nonworking adults, vagrants and 
vagabonds, who often faced very harsh punishments. In the nineteenth century poverty among 
workers became the central source for concern, which is reflected in texts that range from 
Pope Leo XIII‟s encyclical Rerum Novarum to Marx‟ Communist Manifesto (Castel, 1995, 
Geremek, 1980, Gans, 1995). As Heclo put it, „Before there were modern social policies, 
there existed what was widely referred to as “the social question” or “worker problem” in 
Europe and North America…From roughly the last third of the nineteenth century onward, 
politicians, social agitators, civic leaders, pioneers in the young social sciences, and many 
others were preoccupied with the problem of what to do about a rapidly emerging industrial 
workforce and its accompanying economic and social changes‟ (Heclo, 1995: 666). 
After World War II, high expectations regarding the seemingly possible end of poverty in 
industrialized countries were fuelled by massive improvements in real wages and living 
conditions for most citizens, mainly due to a stunning productivity growth (Krugman, 1990, 
Esping-Andersen, 1999). This “fordist” configuration was based on three main principles: 
First, the main goal was to reduce the time necessary for each assembly operation, second, 
there was a strict separation between conception, production and marketing, and third, the 
central goal was to reduce production prices (Boyer and Durand, 1998). Indeed, ' If any period 
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can be called the “good old days”, 1949-1973 was it in respect to family income' (Danziger 
and Gottschalk, 1996: 41). High growth rates, full-employment and sharp increases in real 
wages were the main features of this golden age of welfare capitalism. The main goal of the 
fordist system was that those who produced consumption goods should be able to buy them 
too, which in turn would lead to mass consumption; this was the virtuous circle of the mass 
production system (Boyer and Durand, 1998). This era was also characterized by an 
increasing share of wage-earners in the labor force (Castel, 1995). As labor demand exceeded 
supply, immigration was necessary to fill the gap. 
Even unskilled workers were able to hold “well-paid” jobs, which led working class women 
to leave the workforce for housewifery, contrary to the early industrial era where they made 
up a significant share of the labor force. „From 1949 to 1969, the average American factory 
worker saw his real annual earnings increase by 65 percent. In Europe, the rise in prosperity 
began a little later but was even more phenomenal; from 1960 to 1973, average real 
manufacturing wages in Europe rose by 76 percent‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 30). In sum, 
„Mass consumption, growth, and modest unemployment brought middle-class living 
standards to workers…The other side was that families were stable and the economy 
dynamic. Even low-skilled workers could count on well-paid and secure jobs‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 15).  
A global trend toward upward mobility took place, caused mainly by structural changes: „the 
tendency is for the proportion of the work-force in professional, administrative, and 
managerial occupations to rise, while the proportion in occupations at the lowest skill levels, 
both manual and non-manual, either remains stable of falls‟ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 
11). Total upward mobility was 1.8 (Scotland) to 4.5 (Poland) times higher that downward 
mobility in the 1970s. However, though there was much more upward mobility than 
downward in absolute terms, there was a considerable degree of stability in relative rates for 
men aged 20-64 in the 1970s, hence the title of Erikson and Goldthorpe‟s book, “the constant 
flux”: „we have found no evidence of…trends towards higher levels of total mobility or of 
social fluidity‟ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). The vast majority of the population saw its 
situation improve, hence, mobility remained fairly constant in relative terms. 
Another major feature of this era was the very significant development of the welfare state in 
industrialized countries. As Esping-Andersen put it, „the post-war welfare state [was] the 
child of the 1930s Depression and the „workers question‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 33). 
Moreover, the trauma caused by the horrors of World War II, including the worst genocide in 
human history, generated an enormous concern about inequalities and political stability. 
Heclo stresses that „social citizenship was a concept that emerged from a cauldron of Euro-
American history involving domestic turmoil, economic depression, and total war‟ (Heclo, 
1995: 673). This context led to ever increasing social expenditures that allowed expanding the 
spectrum of covered risks: unemployment, old age, disability, child poverty, work-related 
injuries, widowhood, and so on.  
However, massive changes have occurred since the first oil shock: „The oil shock of 1973 
plus slower growth in productivity brought an end to this remarkable quarter-century of rising 
living standards' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996: 42). Growth rates decreased, 
unemployment rates increased and „wages have everywhere stopped growing at the kinds of 
rates that prevailed in the Golden Age‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 127) and the welfare state 
found itself under pressure, due to a less favorable labor market and to problematic 
demographical changes. Low-skilled workers were particularly hit by these changes, which 
had stringent effects, for instance, on American inner-city neighborhoods, with a 
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concentration of poverty and joblessness in metropolitan areas, but also on European 
disadvantaged social groups, notably low-skilled workers and immigrants (Wilson, 1996). It 
is this significant difference between the postwar years and today‟s postindustrial societies 
that allows us to conclude that working poverty has become a “new social risk” (Armingeon 
and Bonoli, 2006).  
In fact, the declining demand for low-skilled labor, sluggish and uneven growth, an aging 
population, rising unemployment among a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce 
and a growing number of households headed by single individuals, are the main features of 
these socioeconomic changes that took place after the mid-1970s (Armingeon and Bonoli, 
2006, McFate, 1995, Standing, 1995). 
In the USA in the 1980s, it became obvious that working poverty would not be eradicated: „In 
1985, 2 million adults – 50 percent more than in 1978 - worked full time throughout the year, 
yet they and their families remained in poverty‟ (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988: 3); between 1978 
and 1991 the number of full-time year-round workers who lived in a poor household 
increased by 59 percent (Morel, 1996). This observation of a quite stunning increase in 
poverty among workers was made possible by the existence, since the 1960s, of official 
poverty statistics.  
It should be noted that American scholars also expressed a strong concern about the 
expansion of an “underclass” – nonworking welfare recipients, mostly African-American and 
Latino residents of inner-city neighborhoods, who are supposed not to share the values of 
mainstream society (Gans, 1995, Wilson, 1996, Bourgois, 2003). At the same time, European 
economists and sociologists were focusing on high, sometimes two-digit, unemployment 
rates. In fact, on both sides of the Atlantic, researchers and policymakers witnessed „changes 
in the size and composition of economically marginal groups, the crystallization of racial 
cleavages among them, a downward turn in their life chances, and an increase in their social 
and political isolation‟ (Lawson and Wilson, 1995: 693). 
In Europe, the concern about widespread “social exclusion” led researchers and policymakers 
to neglect the issue of working households‟ income, as they tended to think that working 
poverty was an essentially Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, especially a North American one 
(Andress and Seeck, 2007). In recent years, however, European researchers (see e.g. Deutsch, 
Flückiger, Silber, 1999, Bonoli, 2003b, Falter and Flückiger, 2004) and official bodies such as 
Eurostat, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, have realized that this was an incorrect assumption, 
and published analyses and figures on working poverty in Europe.  
 
3.2 Economic factors 
 
Most of the explanations provided below pertain to low-wage workers, on one hand, and 
overall poverty on the other hand, as the working poverty literature was quite restricted until 
recently. I hereafter present a wide variety of factors, which range from business-cycle related 
factors, structural transitions in the labor market, to macrosocial changes.  
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3.2.1 General framework 
According to Nobel laureate Krugman, there are three roots of welfare:  
- productivity growth, 
- income distribution, 
- and unemployment.  
 
„If these things are satisfactory, not much else can go wrong, while if they are not, nothing 
can go right‟ (Krugman, 1990: 7). In addition, „Productivity isn‟t everything, but in the long 
run it is almost everything. A country‟s ability to improve its standard of living over time 
depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker…Productivity is the single 
most important factor affecting our economic well-being‟ (Krugman, 1990: 9 and 17). There 
are, obviously, other factors which are of paramount importance for economic development, 
such as trade balance, budget deficit, or inflation. But these factors „only have an indirect 
bearing on the nation‟s well-being‟ (Krugman, 1990: 7). Obviously, working poverty is 
directly linked to the first two roots of welfare. 
Likewise, Wood (1994) underscores the importance of productivity through the following 
formula:  
Y
r
w )1(  ,  
with rw  the average real wage, Y the average output per worker and  the share of profits and 
other nonwage income in aggregate output. „Because  varies only within a rather narrow 
range, Y, which may be loosely called average labour productivity, is by far the more 
important cause of international and intertemporal differences in real wages‟ (Wood, 1994: 
58). Esping-Andersen likewise thinks that productivity growth is the central element of the 
evolution of well-being in postindustrial economies (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Iversen and Wren, however, underscore the fact that the demand for manufactures (or 
services) should be price and income elastic so that productivity growth can translate into 
increased real wages; otherwise, this productivity growth might have a labor-saving effect 
rather than an income-enhancing one (Iversen and Wren, 1998).  
I should also underscore that the first root of welfare has an impact on individual wages, 
whereas the second root pertains to household income and, hence, is more directly linked to 
poverty (the mainstream definition of poverty pertains to household income and needs).  
Hence, in order to explain working poverty, the main factors found in the literature that can 
affect these two “roots of welfare”, namely productivity and income distribution3, must be 
accounted for: 
 
 
                                                          
3
As will be discussed below, the third root of welfare, namely the unemployment rate, also 
has a non negligible on workers, because it exerts downward pressure on wages.  
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- the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, in which service 
employment becomes overwhelmingly important,  
- the impact of business cycles and economic growth, 
- technological changes, which might improve productivity but also affect the labor 
demand, especially if these changes are skill-biased, 
- globalization and the imports of manufactured goods from developing countries. 
 
The interplay of these factors with changing family patterns will be dealt with in the section 
devoted to sociodemographic factors.  
Of course, there are further working poverty factors that belong to the realm of public policy, 
such as welfare state benefits and labor market institutions, especially minimum wage 
legislations and collective bargaining. These factors are dealt with in chapter 4.  
3.2.2 The interplay of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty 
It is noteworthy that findings regarding the impact of economic growth on working poverty 
seem to depend on the kind of poverty measure used: „Roughly speaking, the more “relative” 
your poverty measure, the less impact economic growth will have on its value. Those who say 
globalization is good for the world‟s poor tend to be undisguised “absolutists”…If the poverty 
line is proportional to mean income then it behaves a lot like a measure of inequality…This 
method can show rising poverty even when the levels of living of the poor have in fact risen‟ 
(Ravallion, 2003: 4). Indeed, the correlation coefficients between poverty defined as an 
income lower than 60 percent of median equivalized income and the Gini coefficient, on one 
hand, and the top-to-bottom-quintile ratio, on the other, amount to r = 0.847 and 0.909 
respectively (own calculations based on figures for the EU 25 in 2007, source: Eurostat‟s 
website).  
Nonetheless, economic growth seems to be a necessary prerequisite to fight poverty (Stiglitz, 
2002) even though not sufficient. But once a certain level of economic development has been 
achieved, the relationship between poverty and economic growth might be more complex and 
blurred. In the US, an inequality upswing despite positive economic growth took place, a fact 
sometimes dubbed the “great U-turn” (Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Nielsen, 2003, 
Nielsen and Alderson, 2002). During the period 1983-1990 there was a recovery which led to 
an increase in average wages in the USA; however, the increase in inequality kept poverty 
rates above the levels achieved during the 1970s (Gottschalk and Joyce, 1995). However, the 
1990s in the US told another story; as Blank put it, „the first and most important lesson for 
anti-poverty warriors from the 1990s is that sustained economic growth is a wonderful thing‟ 
(Blank, 2000).  
Levitan and Shapiro note that not only did the working poor rate increase by 50 percent, but 
„the unemployment rate in the 1980s has exceeded the rate in every decade since the Great 
Depression‟ (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988: 27) and that the best remedy for labor market 
problems is a healthy economy, because unemployment, involuntary part-time employment 
and the number of working poor fall. According to McFate, temporary and contingent work 
increased rapidly in America and Europe, especially during the generalized downturn in the 
1980s (McFate, 1995). Mayer notes that „The poverty rate increases during recessions, but 
much of this increase is attributable to people who are poor for only a short period‟ (Mayer, 
1995: 112).  
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Standing notices that unemployment can have an impact on workers too: „Although the long-
term unemployed search less intensively for jobs, they may still exert downward pressure on 
wages even if they themselves may be perceived by employers as less employable‟ (Standing, 
1995: 161). Hence, unemployment can have an indirect impact on working poverty, on one 
hand, if fixed-term contracts become more prevalent and, on the other hand, because 
unemployment exerts downward pressures on wages. Levitan and Shapiro come to similar 
conclusions, „In loose labor markets [i.e. when unemployment increases], low-wage workers 
are bound to have a difficult time. Not only are they more likely to be forced into 
unemployment or part-time work, but their already low wages are likely to stagnate‟ (Levitan 
and Shapiro, 1988: 6). 
In sum, economic growth seems to be a necessary prerequisite to fight poverty, even though 
economic growth alone is only a partial solution to unemployment, involuntary part-time 
employment and low wages (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988). Moreover, it appears that there is 
not a unique answer to the question: “is economic growth good for poor workers?”, as it had a 
very positive impact in some periods, but in other periods of positive growth the evolution of 
poverty and inequality was far less favorable.  
Danziger and Gottschalk (1996) provide decisive evidence on the interplay of economic 
growth, income inequality, and poverty. A long-term perspective is possible in their work 
because the US has collected income data for about 60 years now (especially census data and 
Current Population Survey data) and implemented an official poverty line in the mid-sixties 
(for previous years the poverty threshold can be deflated with a price index). The postwar 
boom had a tremendous impact: The poverty rate was cut in half between the late forties and 
the early sixties, and cut in half again by the early seventies. 'Between 1949 and 1969 the 
poverty rate declined dramatically for every group. It fell by about 26 percentage points for 
persons living in families headed by nonelderly men...about 40 points for families headed by 
blacks and Hispanics, and about 24 points for those headed by whites' (Danziger and 
Gottschalk, 1996: 88-89). At the end of the sixties James Tobin forecasted the elimination of 
poverty by 1980.  
However, 'the decade 1973-1982 [was labeled] the “quiet depression”. During that period, 
median family income fell and poverty increased' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996: 7). Since 
then, the evolution of these phenomena has become less predictable. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the unemployment rate exceeded 10 percent for the first time since the Great 
Depression due to a severe recession that ended in November 1982, and 'Starting from this 
low base in November 1982, the economy entered a long a relatively strong recovery that 
lasted until July 1990: the second-longest recovery on record' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 
1996: 43); nonetheless, the poverty rate did not decrease by much, namely a 1.7 percentage 
point reduction, from 12.9 to 11.2 percent.  
In sum, 'The experience of the 1980s provided a “pseudo-social experiment” for evaluating 
whether policies designed to promote economic growth were sufficient to reduce poverty. 
Average living standards did increase, but the poor gained little during this period of modest 
growth' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996: 36). Indeed, 'Economic growth does matter, but it 
matters less to the trend in poverty now than it did in the past...It is not a question of whether 
poverty rates decline during a recovery, but of whether the declines are commensurate with 
the economy's growth' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996: 59-60).  
Simulating various situations if each factor had remained unchanged (counterfactuals), 
Danziger and Gottschalk were able to decompose the impact of various factors on the poverty 
rate:  
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Table 4: Decomposition of percentage-point change in the poverty rate for all persons, 
1949-1969 and 1973-1991 
 1949-1969 1973-1991 
(1) Actual change in poverty rate -25.7 1.8 
% point change owing to:    
(2) Economic changes -26.9 -0.1 
(a) Growth in mean adjusted income  -21.4 -2.1 
(b) Change in income inequality -5.5 2.0 
(3) Demographic changes 1.2 2.0 
(a) Race/ethnic composition 0.6 0.7 
(b) Family structure composition 0.7 1.6 
(c ) Interaction -0.1 -0.3 
   Source: Danziger and Gottschalk, 1996, Table 5.3: 102.  
What can be seen in table 4 is that economic growth massively reduced poverty between 1949 
and 1969, but only contributed to a small decline in the next period. Demographic changes 
have had a negative impact ever since the war ended, as growing minorities have been more 
affected by poverty, and because of the decline of the traditional family and the resulting 
growth of single-parent families: The impact of single parenthood has become bigger, as this 
household type has become more widespread. Last but not least, it is very striking that the 
inequality upswing that took place in the eighties nearly canceled the positive impact of 
economic growth.  
Hence, 'stimulating economic growth and avoiding recessions are necessary, but not sufficient 
solutions to America's poverty problem. Of course, the problems of poverty and income 
inequality cannot be remedied in the absence of economic growth' (Danziger and Gottschalk, 
1996: 10-11), but public interventions may also be needed.  
Heinrich notes that „in theory as well as in practice, very little is known about the underlying 
mechanisms that transforms economic growth at the aggregate level into better living 
conditions at the individual level...The fact that economic growth has a positive impact on 
incomes, which in turn reduces poverty, while at the same time it is also likely to exacerbate 
income inequality and thus increase poverty inevitably raises the specter of the existence of a 
tradeoff between inequality and growth' (Heinrich, 2003: 2).  
Heinrich defines an inequality-growth tradeoff index (IGTI) defined as:  
IGTI=

 G
G
, with μ the mean income and G the Gini coefficient.  
E.g. if IGTI = 3, an increase in mean income of 3 percent in necessary in order to offset a 1 
percent increase in income inequality. The fact that the US exhibits an IGTI of 2.63 in the 
mid-eighties explains why economic growth was largely offset by the inequality upswing. 
Interestingly, in the mid-nineties Sweden had virtually the same IGTI as the US, whereas 
Sweden is known for its low relative poverty rate. As Heinrich put it, 'Some of the…high-
IGTI countries – e.g. the Nordic countries and the Netherlands – already heed this advice [i.e., 
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if the IGTI is large, an appropriate anti-poverty strategy must focus on redistributing income 
to the poor] and therefore deliver fairly low poverty coupled with fairly low inequality' 
(Heinrich, 2003: 12). His conclusion is straightforward: 'There can be no sustained reduction 
of poverty without income distribution' (Heinrich, 2003: 1). It should be noted, however, that 
the poverty measure used in Heinrich‟s article is relative, namely 50 percent of median 
income, which is likely to be strongly correlated to income inequality: This could be a 
methodological flaw. It would be interesting to measure the impact of the tradeoff index on 
poverty measured with an absolute threshold.  
In summary, the interplay of economic growth, unemployment, and (working) poverty is 
complex. First, the above considerations depend on the degree of economic development of 
the society under analysis. Second, conclusions may depend on the kind of poverty indicators 
used, absolute poverty rates being more responsive to economic growth. Third, the 
antipoverty impact of economic growth can be offset, at least partly, by increases in income 
inequality, a phenomenon observed in the US, for instance. Hence, the welfare state‟s 
redistribution mechanisms play an important mediating role between economic growth and 
labor market performance on one hand, and income levels on the other.  
Obviously, the causal links between business cycles, unemployment and poverty would 
deserve a more in-depth analysis, but this goes far beyond the scope of the present work; 
however, I think it is safe to conclude that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition in the fight against working poverty.  
3.2.3 Productivity and the cost-disease problem of postindustrial societies 
William J. Wilson stated in 1996 that we were witnessing „the decline of the mass production 
system in the United States. The traditional American economy featured rapid growth in 
productivity and living standards…In this system plenty of blue-collar jobs were available to 
workers with little formal education. Today, most of the new jobs for workers with limited 
education and experience are in the service sector‟ (Wilson, 1996: 26-27). In the US, „In 
popular terms, auto workers were being forced to become “hamburgers flippers” ‟ (Gottschalk 
and Joyce, 1995: 204). In New York City, „Between 1950 and 1990, the proportion of factory 
jobs in NYC decreased approximately threefold at the same time that service sector jobs 
doubled…while the total number of jobs of all categories remained more or less constant at 
3.5 millions‟ (Bourgois, 2003: 114). In fact, in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) 
sector, „High school dropouts can no longer find secure jobs in NYC that would allow them to 
maintain conjugal households on a single income in traditional, patriarchal style. This is 
clearly revealed at the national level with a 50 percent increase of working poor families 
between 1979 and 1982, from 12 percent to 18 percent‟ (Bourgois, 2003: 287).  
Pahl and Wallace state that, in the UK, 'it was thought that the transition might be painful…as 
it seemed unlikely that displaced male industrial workers could be readily retrained as office 
workers or computer programmers' (Pahl and Wallace, 1985: 189). In Britain, 1.5 million jobs 
were lost in the manufacturing sector between September 1979 and December 1982, a fall of 
22 percent (Pahl and Wallace, 1985).  
This decline in industrial employment went hand in hand with productivity declines: 
„following two decades of steady improvements in productivity, Western industrialized 
countries experienced a precipitous decline in the real rates of growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) after the first oil crisis of 1973‟ (McFate, 1995). In fact, there is a “cost-
disease” problem in postindustrial economies, because for some service jobs, it is hardly 
possible to improve productivity. „Many services, like hairdressing, psychoanalysis, child-
minding, teaching, or massage, are inherently incapable of raising productivity by much‟ 
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(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 56). As prices rise, even at a reasonable rate, workers in the service 
sector will ask for pay rises in order to maintain their purchasing power. In the long run, these 
workers could be priced out of the market or earn declining real wages.  
This cost-disease problem was first put to the fore by William Baumol, who noted that no 
other factor has a stronger impact on the living standards of a community (Baumol, Blinder, 
Scarth, 1986). As Nielsen and Alderson put it, „Deindustrialization has…produced rising 
inequality because it has entailed the movement of a proportion of the labor force from the 
industrial sector, typified internally by higher average wages and a comparatively flat 
distribution of income, to the service sector, typified internally by lower average wages and a 
higher level of inequality‟ (Nielsen and Alderson, 2002: 1251). Likewise, Gershuny noted in 
1985 that in the UK, Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, 
productivity growth for market and nonmarket services were below average (Gershuny, 
1985). For instance, 'Carework is typically low paid in market economies because it is highly 
labour intensive with limited scope for productivity gains, which perhaps helps to explain 
why, despite the proliferation of work-life balance policies, gender inequality in the labour 
market continues' (Perrons, Fagan, McDowell, Ray, Ward, 2006: 3).  
It is noteworthy that „The lower end of servicing society is where we must pin our hopes for 
mass-employment. Unfortunately, because of their sluggish productivity, low-end service jobs 
are threatened by a long term „cost-disease‟ problem‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 96).  
In addition, a whole range of services has developed, notably nonmarket services such as 
education, health, and welfare, which pose a budgetary problem to governments: 'Low 
productivity growth in non-marketed services mean that extra taxes go disproportionately to 
pay for higher real wages for unchanged jobs...So given levels of non-marketed service 
provision become increasingly expensive as times passes' (Gershuny, 1985: 146). In addition, 
the increased female participation rate in the labor market has generated an increased demand 
in final services. In fact, „Services are…cost-sensitive because...households have budget 
constraints and the choice of self-servicing…Labour-intensive household services are in the 
long run potentially inflationary, since productivity growth is modest compared to 
manufacturing – the Baumol‟s „cost disease‟ ‟(Esping-Andersen, 2000: 102-103). 
Boyer relativizes the cost-disease problem, however, as some service sector industries are 
able to keep on improving their productivity (e.g. transportation and health services). 
Likewise, Merrien is skeptical regarding the impact of the cost-disease problem; indeed, many 
service sectors are able to strongly increase productivity, most notably the computer and 
telecom sectors (Merrien, 2002). Moreover, some industrial sectors also experienced 
declining productivity levels, which can be attributed to the very principles of the 
rationalization of industrial production in the taylorian-fordist system. The rationalization had 
been pushed too far, which led to an underutilization of an increasingly blocked capital, slow 
reactions to market fluctuations, difficulties to diversify production and meet consumers‟ 
expectations, neglect of quality in order to have the lowest costs per unit, and a decreasing 
interest of workers in their job, which became very repetitive and supervised. Actually, the 
growing share of supervisors among the personnel also slowed down productivity growth 
(Boyer and Durand, 1998). Boyer concludes that there is a generalized productivity problem, 
whereas its roots lie in structural aspects of the fordist system (Boyer and Durand, 1998).  
Moreover, as McFate notices, „Recent trends suggest that the standard assertion that 
“increased industrial productivity will lead to increased national prosperity" may no longer 
hold. Automation and technological advance may increase the productivity of each industrial 
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worker and through this leave a larger number and proportion of the workforce in lower-paid 
service and retail jobs‟ (McFate, 1995: 7).  
Moreover, Wood himself relativizes the impact of deindustrialization on earnings inequality. 
Shifts in the sectoral composition of the labor market have played an important role, but most 
of the rise occurred within industries and occupations: „the widening of skill differentials has 
apparently arisen more from intra-sectoral than from inter-sectoral pressures‟ (Wood, 1994: 
272). Actually, the scope and the causes of the productivity slowdown are controversial, but 
according to Wood, it does not simply reflect the shift of employment from manufacturing to 
lower-productivity services.  
3.2.4 The evolution of the occupational composition of the labor force and of social 
mobility  
Switching to a sociological approach of these topics, based on socio-occupational categories 
and social mobility, it appears that the fordist manual worker had a very predictable, stable 
and flat career profile. With the decline of the fordist model, there has been an increase in the 
share of professionals, on one hand, and of lower-end service occupations, on the other hand 
(Esping-Andersen, 1993).  
The absence of mobility at the bottom of the postindustrial society would indicate the 
existence of a “service proletariat”; however, the analysis of mobility patterns in six countries 
leads to the conclusion that the postindustrial society is more open and less polarized than the 
industrial economy. Moreover, three postindustrial paths (Anglo-Saxon countries, Continental 
Europe and Scandinavia) can be identified, as shown by a comparison of the US, Germany 
and Sweden: First, the share of unskilled service jobs varies much across countries, namely 
from 5 (Germany) to 15 percent (Sweden) of the labor force in the early 1990s. Second, in 
North America and Scandinavia, there is an important fluidity; workers are not “stuck” in 
low-wage employment, even though their potential career prospects are modest in the US and 
mostly within the welfare state hierarchy in Scandinavia. In Germany mobility for low-end 
service sector workers is weak and mainly horizontal, especially for those who have not 
followed an apprenticeship training, as Germany has a highly regulated system of vocational 
training (Blossfeld, Gianelli and Mayer, 1993). Britain seems to be some sort of worst-case 
scenario for unskilled service workers, combining the negative aspects of the German and the 
American model, that is, a low mobility for a relatively large share of the workforce. Finally, 
Scandinavia is a special case, with most of mobility taking place in the welfare state 
hierarchy, as many jobs are in the social services and overwhelmingly held by women. In this 
case, the cost-disease problem is solved by “subsidized” wages, as many low-skilled service 
workers are civil servants (Esping-Andersen, 1993).  
In summary, in most postindustrial countries, the bottom is not hermetically closed, contrary 
to the situation of the industrial worker who was usually condemned to a predetermined “class 
destiny”.  
Let us now have a closer look at the evolution of the labor force using the most widespread 
“class schemes” found in the sociological literature. First, I briefly comment results based on 
Erik Wright‟s stratification model, then findings based on John Goldthorpe‟s:  
 
 
 
43 
 
 
Figure 1: Wright’s class scheme  
 
  
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
  
 
Source: Wright (1997) 
 
 
Based on this stratification scheme, Wright analyzes the changes that took place in America 
since the 1960s. The expansion of class locations involving significant credentials and 
expertise is pervasive and took place in most economic sectors (Wright, 1997), as shown in 
table 5 below. Esping-Andersen shares Wright‟s conclusion: „Today‟s growth is indisputably 
dominated by professionals and semi-professionals‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 108).   
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Table 5: the evolution of the class structure in the US, in percent  
 Trend 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Nonowners  
Managers ↑↑ 7.5 7.57 7.95 8.25 
Supervisors ↑ 13.66 14.86 15.23 14.82 
Expert managers ↑↑ 3.87 4.41 5.06 5.99 
Experts ↑↑ 3.53 4.53 5.49 6.90 
Skilled workers ↓ 13.46 14.08 12.92 12.77 
Workers ↓ 44.59 45.13 44.05 41.38 
All Workers ↓ 58.05 59.21 56.97 54.15 
Owners  
Petty 
bourgeoisie 
↓ 5.54 4.09 4.53 5.19 
Employers ↓↓ 7.86 5.33 4.77 4.71 
A double arrow means that the change amounts to at least  10 percent between 1960 
and 1990.  
Source: Wright (1997), modified for the present work. 
 
 
Goldthorpe and Erikson come to similar conclusions regarding the evolution of the “class 
structure” in industrialized countries, based on Goldthorpe‟s class scheme: 
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Table 6: Goldthorpe’s class scheme 
I + II Service class: professionals, administrators and managers, higher-grade technicians, 
supervisors of non-manual workers. 
III Routine non-manual workers: routine non-manual employees in administration and 
commerce, sales personnel, other rank-and-file service workers. 
IVa+b Petty bourgeoisie: small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees.  
IVc Farmers: farmers and smallholders and other self-employed workers in primary 
production. 
V+VI Skilled workers: lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers, skilled 
manual workers. 
VIIa Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture). 
VIIb Agricultural labourers: agricultural and other workers in primary production.  
Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992  
Erikson and Goldthorpe‟s analysis focuses on nine European countries4 between the 1900s 
and the 1970s. The share of the service class had become much larger and the share of 
farmers much smaller in the 1970s. In all non-socialist states, the category of routine non-
manual workers had slightly grown, while the picture for skilled and unskilled workers was 
blurred, as the transition to a postindustrial society was still underway in the mid-seventies 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Like Esping-Andersen, they conclude that economic and 
industrial development is not the only factor underpinning these changes; various policies 
play a role in shaping mobility patterns. In addition, the bottom of the labor market is not 
hermetically closed, as unskilled workers and agricultural laborers are not immobile. No 
proletarianization of the labor force is underway, contrary to Marxist claims (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1992).  
Beside low-skilled service sector employees, another category situated at the bottom of 
postindustrial societies has drawn researchers‟ attention, namely the “outsider” surplus 
population durably excluded from the labor force, as already mentioned above (Castel, 1995, 
Paugam, 1996, Wilson, 1996). In fact, there may be a tradeoff between „accepting a larger 
outsider population or, alternatively, a large service proletariat‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 28). 
In the present work, however, I focus on disadvantaged workers, even though this topic 
cannot be completely disconnected from the “underclass” problem – many members of the 
underclass being former low-wage workers (Bourgois, 2003) – but this marginalized group of 
the population probably requires social policy interventions that are very different from those 
aiming at alleviating poverty among workers.  
From previous sections it has become obvious that education and social skills (Esping-
Andersen, 1993, Bourgois, 2003) have an increasing impact on class outcomes. Actually, in 
recent decades, productivity growth was mainly favored by technology and human capital 
(Wilson, 1996), which means that unskilled workers are more disadvantaged in today‟s 
postindustrial economies than they were in the fordist era of assembly-line, mass production. 
                                                          
4
 England, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Poland, 
Scotland and Sweden 
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Esping-Andersen underscores that „human capital will evolve as the hegemonic determinant 
of life-chances‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 234); likewise, Wilson states that, „education and 
training are considered more important than ever in the new global economy‟ (Wilson, 1996: 
28). For instance, in the European Union, high-skill jobs account for two-thirds of net 
employment creation since the mid-1990s (Hemerijck, 2002). 
The next section identifies the main factors that explain this growing disadvantage of 
unskilled workers, furthering the reflection on productivity presented above; more precisely, 
the question is whether the growing disadvantage of low-skilled workers in postindustrial 
economies is mainly due to endogenous or exogenous economic mutations.  
3.2.5 Globalization vs. skill-biased technological changes: Which factor explains the 
plight of unskilled workers?  
Many developing countries have become major producers of manufactured goods and 
experienced significant economic growth in recent years. Wright highlights the fact that high-
income countries might well have postindustrial economies, but the worldwide labor market 
seems to be more industrial than ever (Wright, 1997: 109). The share of manufacturing in 
total employment roughly doubled in developing countries between the 1950s and the end of 
the 1980s (Wood, 1994). In new industrializing countries, there has been a massive increase 
in productivity in low-skilled manufacturing activities, and the basic and secondary 
educations have been massively expanded. The latter point is vital for developing economies: 
When I talk about “unskilled” workers in advanced economies, I mean workers with no post-
compulsory education, but in developing countries, this category encompasses two very 
distinct groups, namely those who have a basic education and those who are illiterate. The 
latter usually cannot be employed in manufacturing and work, mostly, in agriculture (Wood, 
1994).  
While the imports of manufactures from the South were negligible in the 1950s, they had 
risen to $250 billion by 1990. The share of manufacturing in total employment in the South 
(including China) increased from 6 percent in 1950 to 13 percent in 1990, with a particularly 
sharp increase in the 1980s. Conversely, in the North, this share declined from almost 30 
percent at the end of the 1960s to 21 percent by 1990. The cause of these massive changes lies 
in the fact that „International transport and telecommunications have become much cheaper, 
quicker, and of better quality…shrinking the world…Northern import restrictions and 
exchange controls were liberalized and tariffs drastically reduced, in the 1950s and the 
1960s.‟ Moreover, „Northern companies have learned how to manage globally dispersed 
production and procurement activities‟ (Wood, 1994: 7). Put differently, low-skilled jobs can 
be easily transferred to emergent countries and goods can be produced anywhere in the world 
and then shipped elsewhere (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988). The unskilled have suffered 
disproportionately from structural changes, as the least skill-intensive manufactures have been 
replaced by imports from the South (Glyn and Salverda, 2000).  
But as Wood put it, „although there is little dispute about the pattern of the impact on the 
composition of labour demand, there is a lot of disagreement about its magnitude‟ (Wood: 
1994: 8). The major impact these changes have had, according to his estimations, is that trade 
with the South reduced the demand for unskilled workers relative to skilled workers in the 
North by approximately 20 per cent (Wood, 1994). At first, this growing trade had an impact 
on the profit rates of manufacturing activities. Then the relative labor demand for unskilled 
workers declined, this trend being reinforced by defensive innovation; that is, the tendency to 
replace unskilled workers by robots in labor-intensive sectors, when possible. Then, the skill 
differentials in relative wages widened and were strongest in the UK and the US. Where 
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institutional forces resisted this widening in wage differentials, they generated shortages of 
skilled labor and surpluses of unskilled labor. The rise in wage dispersion and/or in 
unemployment contributed to greater income inequality in most developed countries. Wood 
demonstrates that this was mainly due to the increase in North-South trade, but also to the 
spread of new technology based on microprocessors, and these changes had an impact on 
poverty: „The widening of skill differentials appears to have raised the proportion of poor 
households in most Northern countries‟ (Wood: 1994: 255).  
Many economists have doubted the importance Wood attributes to international trade and 
capital flows; again, they do not question the pattern, but the magnitude. Krugman thinks that 
the American trade deficit does not have a decisive influence on the well-being of American 
workers (Krugman, 1990), and so does the OECD: Imports from developing countries only 
amount to a small share of OECD countries‟ GDP; furthermore, OECD exports to these 
emerging economies have grown in line with imports (OECD, 1997). The bulk of trade occurs 
between OECD countries. In 1994, EU countries imported 7.4 percent of their manufacturing 
from emerging economies, while the US imported one quarter (OECD, 1997). According to 
Esping-Andersen, the share of the European Union trade with non-EU countries is less than 
10 percent, most of which is with North America and the Antipodes (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
Other factors have been put to the fore, for instance macroeconomic policies in the 1980s 
aiming to stop inflation (Wood, 1994, Krugman, 1990). This deflation has led to a further 
increase in unemployment among unskilled workers. More importantly, Gregory and Machin 
state that „the effects [of trade on the demand for low-skilled workers are] small, sometimes 
indiscernible…other suspects have been put forward. The most prominent of these is skill-
bias in technological change‟ (Gregory and Machin, 2000:178). Likewise, Esping-Andersen 
concludes that: „the facts point to technological change as the more potent source of falling 
demand for less-qualified workers‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 102). Wilson stresses that the 
„creation of a new set of computer-operated machine tools…eliminate jobs for those trained 
only for manual, assembly line work‟ (Wilson, 1996: 29). He concludes that „the workplace 
has been revolutionized by technological changes that range from the development of robotics 
to the creation of information highways…demand by employers for less-skilled workers, even 
those who are willing to work at low wages, has declined‟ (Wilson, 1996: 152 and 225). 
Likewise, McFate stresses that „technological advances have automated many low-skilled 
jobs out of existence and/or allowed companies to move labor-intensive production to cheaper 
labor markets‟ (McFate, 1995: 5). For instance, by the mid-1990s 46.8 percent of the EU‟s 
workforce was in jobs involving the use of a computer or automated equipment (Gallie, 
2002). 
Gottschalk and Joyce conclude that the “smoking gun” that fully explains the inequality 
upswing and the degrading conditions of unskilled workers has not been found yet; however, 
they „argue that this increase in demand for skilled workers in the face of rising relative prices 
cannot be explained solely by changes in industrial structure. Technological change must have 
increased the relative productivity of skilled workers since more of them were hired in spite of 
their increased cost to the firm‟ (Gottschalk and Joyce, 1995: 199).  
In addition, it is important to underscore that a new production system has been developed, 
based on the following principles: Just-in-time production, in order to avoid blocking a 
significant share of the capital and to adjust quickly to market fluctuations, and increasing 
quality at a constant price, instead of reducing the price at the expense of quality. This system 
requires more polyvalent, more devoted, and usually more skilled workers than traditional 
mass production, and, thus, lessens the demand for unskilled workers in manufacturing 
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(Boyer and Durand, 1998). In fact, „Both post-Fordist manufacturing and the organization of 
services require far more labour flexibility than does traditional mass-production industry‟ 
(Regini, 2000: 15). Indeed, „a significant development in labour markets has been the trend 
towards people with higher levels of education, notably college graduates, holding jobs 
previously held by people with lower levels of education‟ (Borghans and De Grip, 2000: 198). 
A reinforcing problem is the pattern of in-career training provided by employers: It is mainly 
young and highly educated people who benefit from it. Many low-skilled workers are, hence, 
caught in a “skills trap” (Gallie, 2002).  
Nevertheless, some support for Wood‟s view can be found: Nielsen and Alderson state that 
while „much of the literature on international trade and investment has tended to downplay the 
distributional consequences of such factors [growing capital flows, trade and migration], the 
findings presented… establish empirically that direct investment and North-South trade have 
played a role in the determination of income inequality in the contemporary period‟ (Nielsen 
and Alderson, 2002: 1284). In addition, part of the impact of technological changes may have 
been caused by North-South trade, due to “defensive innovation”. Industrial sectors under 
pressure may choose to invest in technology to counter the import of manufactures from the 
South and to diversify their products (Wood, 1994). 
In summary, most unskilled workers in high-income countries are facing more difficult times 
today than they did 40 years ago. The “golden age” of the fordist model provided these 
workers with relatively well-paid jobs in the manufacturing industry, while today they face a 
higher risk of being low-paid, poor, and unemployed. To a certain extent, this might be due to 
the rise of emerging economies, notably the dragons of South (East) Asia, because low-skilled 
job are being exported; however, endogenous changes within Western economies, especially 
skill-biased technological changes, are more likely to be the main culprits. In fact, as Merrien 
put it, two strands of research square off, namely an “externalist” approach along Wood‟s 
lines, emphasizing world trade and globalization, as opposed to an “internalist” strand that 
underlines changes that took place within developed economies‟ labor markets (Merrien, 
2002). 
I share Gottschalk and Joyce‟s conclusion, „While there is still no “smoking gun” to explain 
the rise in inequality in…industrialized countries…both international competition and 
technological change played a role‟ (Gottschalk and Joyce, 1995: 217).  
Regarding the earnings inequality upswing, Anthony Atkinson found that complementary 
explanations are conceivable. First, a shift in behavioral pay norms occurred, from a 
traditional model with relatively low wage differentials for equally qualified workers to a 
model in which many more workers are paid on the basis of their productivity. The second 
factor can be dubbed the “superstar theory” underlining an increase in superstar wages 
resulting from the expansion of technology and trade, with a switch from a hierarchical pay to 
rent-sharing, with employees paid like “salesmen” rather than on fixed-salary scales: Some 
employees perform much better and get much better earnings (mentioned in Gutiérrez 
Palacios, Guillén Rodriguez, Peña-Casas, 2009).  
Now that the main economic factors that have an impact on working poverty have been 
identified, sociodemographic factors need to be analyzed, as they may have played a very 
important role. As shown in table 4 above, from the 1970s onwards in the US, demographic 
changes had the same impact on poverty as the income inequality upswing (according to 
Gottschalk and Danziger‟s (1996) counterfactuals).  
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3.3 Sociodemographic factors 
 
3.3.1 Changing families: Declining stability and single parenthood 
Virtually all poverty researchers think that changing family patterns are one of the main social 
and cultural changes that took place in industrialized countries; these changes are linked to 
growing female economic independence. Families have become less stable, whereas the 
traditional welfare state expanded in postwar years and was based on the male breadwinner-
housewife model; put differently, it was not conceived to support lone mothers (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, Heclo, 1995). From the 1960s onwards, women have become economically 
more independent and the adult population in general less devoted to the traditional model of 
an everlasting relationship; in most countries divorces rates have doubled (Esping-Andersen, 
1999). Kamerman states that „as women achieve some degree of economic independence, 
they are less willing to remain in unsatisfactory marriages‟ (Kamerman, 1995: 234). 
Actually, the rising labor force participation of married women has been the most dramatic 
change in gender roles during the last decades. Combined with the enormous increase in the 
divorce rate, this led to a massive increase in the share of female-headed single-parent 
households. „Mother-only families have more than doubled in number and as a proportion of 
all families with children in the United States since 1970. They are the major component of 
the “feminization of poverty”, are the heart of the welfare problem, and constitute a major 
factor in the pervasive problem of child poverty‟ (Kamerman, 1995: 239). While the welfare 
problem of single mothers is particularly marked in the United States, the social problems 
associated with lone parenthood are systematically put forth by poverty researchers in all 
postindustrial countries  
Single-parent families are very much exposed to (working) poverty, due to the fact that in the 
aftermath of a divorce there is a strong increase in needs, which can be illustrated with values 
derived from some equivalence scales that take into account economies of scale couples can 
make, and which are often derived from household budget surveys. As already mentioned in 
chapter 2, equivalence scales raise tricky questions, as researchers are still arguing about the 
best equivalence scales to use; this problem mainly concerns, however, the comparison of 
childless households with large families with children. Here, I compare the situation of 
couples with children before and after a breakup, so that using official equivalence scales 
should not be a major problem.  
Usually, then, after a divorce, there is a strong increase in needs, while parents‟ earnings 
remain rather stable in the short run, which leads to a problematic situation: 
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Table 7: Needs before and after a divorce, for a couple with two children, as measured 
by two official equivalence scales (Eurostat and Swiss Federal Statistical Office) 
Household Needs according to the 
OECD modified scale 
Needs according to the Swiss 
Conference of Welfare 
Institutions 
Before divorce: 2 adults, 2 
children 
2.1 consumption units (CU)
5
 2.14 C.U 
After divorce: one adult + 
one adult living with 2 
children 
2.6 C.U. 2.86 C.U. 
Difference  +23.8 percent +33.6 percent 
Source: SKOS (2003), Eurostat (2002) 
This means that needs increase “overnight” by one quarter to one third following a divorce. 
For instance, in the US, „Divorced mothers are at risk because 30 percent more income is 
required to maintain two households than one household at a pre-divorce standard of living‟ 
(Kamerman, 1995: 244). Moreover, married fathers contribute to 20 to 25 percent of their 
income to support their children, while this share amounts to less than 10 percent for divorced 
fathers (McLanahan and Garfinkel, 1995).  
Hence, a growing number of children live in lone-parent households and experience poverty. 
In fact, according to Sawhill and Thomas, the increase in single-parent families explains all of 
the increase in child poverty since the 1970s in the US (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001). 
Moreover, single-headed households also suffer longer poverty spells (Oxley, Dang and 
Antolin, 2000). It is fundamental to note that the most dramatic difference in terms of poverty 
among all groups of non-elderly households across countries is among lone-parents families 
(McFate, Smeeding and Rainwater, 1995).  
As will be shown in chapter 7, single-parent families run a much higher risk of working 
poverty in the US, Germany and Spain, whereas their overrepresentation among the working 
poor is more limited in Sweden. There are significant differences, too, in the labor force 
participation rate of single mothers across countries and poverty is lowest in countries with a 
high maternal employment rate. In Sweden, a very high proportion of lone mothers are in the 
labor force, which is usually attributed to generous childcare policies. Likewise, in France in 
1992, 82 percent of lone mothers worked; this high participation rate can be attributed, at least 
partly, to the very good childcare services provided by the state (Martin, 1996). In other 
countries too, such as the US and the UK, single mothers‟ employment rate has been a central 
policy concern in a recent past, which led to far-reaching reforms that aim at promoting work 
and decreasing poverty among single-mothers, based on employment-conditional benefits and 
other “make work pay” policies (McLanahan and Garfinkel, 1995). I get back to this very 
important topic in chapters 6 and 7. 
Kamerman summarizes these facts in terms of policy implications: „the ultimate question for 
all industrialized countries is: What policy package reduces the risk of poverty for mother-
only families and their children and simultaneously provides working mothers with assistance 
                                                          
5
A couple with two children would need to earn 2.1 times more money than a single person 
who lives alone in order to have a similar living standard 
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in easing the time pressures and stresses that labor force participation generates?‟ (Kamerman, 
1995: 253).  
It appears, then, that single mothers‟ labor force participation is an important working poverty 
factor. But perhaps even more important, in quantitative terms, is the employment rate of 
mothers in two-parent families, as the latter represent a higher share of households. All in all, 
one of the essential dimensions of the present work can be summarized as follows: Maternal 
employment matters a great deal in postindustrial societies.  
3.3.2 Social endogamy and female labor force participation 
“Assortative mating” (Becker, 1981) and “class homogamy”6 refer to the fact that individuals 
tend to marry people with similar social backgrounds and educational levels. Erikson and 
Goldthorpe note that: „If both respondent and spouse within a conjugal family are assigned 
class positions „individually‟ – that is, by reference to their own employment – a significant 
association exists between these positions, typically reflecting a marked tendency towards 
class homogamy‟ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 250).  
Various explanations exist as to the mechanisms leading to this phenomenon. From a 
neoclassical microeconomic perspective, Gary Becker attributes positive assortative mating to 
efficient marriage markets. First, men and women are better off married than single due to 
comparative advantages; moreover, 'In an efficient marriage market superior persons tend to 
marry one another and are compensated for their higher productivity' (Becker, 1981: 67). At 
the core of this theory lies the question of marginal productivities:  
'Assume that men and women differ only in the quantitative traits Am  and A f respectively, 
and that each trait has a positive marginal productivity:  
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 , where Z is the household‟s output. 
The major theorem on assortative mating is that positive sorting of large Am with large A f
and small Am with small A f maximizes aggregate output if, and only if, increasing both Am
and A f adds more to output than the sum of the effects of separate increases in Am and A f ... 
superior persons reinforce each other when traits are complements and offset each other when 
traits are substitute' (Becker, 1981: 70 and 72). In Becker‟s view, there is a rational and 
conscious choice, namely to marry the “best” possible mate and to behave differently than 
other social groups.  
This approach is not unproblematic, however, notably because social norms and cultural 
values are completely ignored (a position Becker corrected in more recent work, see Becker 
and Murphy, 2000), though they seem to play a major role in marital behavior, especially in 
cross-country comparisons. In addition, positive assortative mating remains a widespread 
feature today, though male and female skills have been converging over the last decades, as 
                                                          
6
 “Assortative mating” appears to have a biological connotation, which is unfortunate, as we 
are dealing with a social phenomenon. “Class homogamy” is also problematic, because it 
refers to an existing class structure, which is a contentious issue. I prefer the expression 
“social endogamy”.  
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women now invest much more on education and work-related human capital, while men are 
increasingly willing and able to assume household activities (Gershuny, 2000). Hence, 
Becker's statement according to which 'the time of men and the time of women have generally 
not been close substitutes because of women's investments in and other orientation toward 
child rearing and men's investments in and other orientation toward market activities' (Becker, 
1981: 75) has lost its validity to a large extent.  
From a sociological standpoint, Bourdieu developed a theory explaining why social groups 
distinguish themselves from other groups in terms of tastes and consumption, a theory known 
as the habitus theory, which provides us with convincing and empirically assessed 
explanations regarding social endogamy. Social agents incorporate many dispositions and 
attitudes during their childhood, due to their family's location within the social structure. This 
generates a set of predispositions, tastes, cultural judgments, language features (Trudgill, 
2000), body attitudes, and role expectations. Once generated, this habitus restricts the range of 
possible choices an adult can make.  
Bourdieu conducted both quantitative, survey-based analysis and qualitative fieldwork, and 
noticed that spontaneous criticism of other social groups‟ tastes is very common among 
respondents asked about their personal preferences (Bourdieu, 1979). The habitus leads social 
agents to prefer partners who have similar tastes, cultural predispositions, ways, and customs. 
In some cases, however, people prefer partners who are fundamentally different; these 
configurations are exceptions that confirm the rule; moreover, it appears that such phenomena 
are more common among people who have experienced a significant social mobility, as these 
people tend to display more “dissonant” tastes (Lahire, 2004). Bozon (1991) provides a more 
specific explanation: The places and circumstances in which people meet are of paramount 
importance; persons of lower social origins tend to meet their partners in public places, such 
as bars and clubs, while upper-class persons tend to meet their partners in private social 
contexts or in selective ones, such as occupational organizations, at the university/college, at 
specific cultural events, parties among friends, and so forth (Bozon, 1991). Due to their “in-
between” social position, middle-class persons tend to display a less determined pattern.  
But whatever the main causes of social endogamy may be, the fact that most couples are made 
up of persons with similar social position and status affects income inequality, work 
opportunities, as well as the transmission of cultural and economic inequalities to the next 
generation, as more and more women have entered the labor market in advanced economies 
and invested on human capital. „Positive sorting increases inequality across marriages 
and…increases inequality of investments in the human capital and values of the children of 
these marriages. In recent years, economists have followed sociologists by becoming very 
interested in the transmission of inequality from parents to children‟ (Becker and Murphy, 
2000: 33).  
Social endogamy can, on one hand, reinforce “social exclusion” mechanisms (Esping-
Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles, 2002). People with low educational attainment are worse 
off today, in relative terms, than during the postwar boom. As they tend to marry persons with 
similar educational levels, and because they have a much higher likelihood of being 
unemployed or trapped in low-pay/no-pay cycles, the absence of work tends to be more and 
more concentrated: 'In some countries, the signs of household work polarization are strong. In 
the UK, for example, two-earner households grew from 54 to 62 per cent (1983-1994) while 
workless households grew from 6 to 19 per cent, and we detect similar trends in Belgium, 
France, and Germany' (Esping-Andersen, 2002b: 39).  
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Moreover, the same mechanism has a negative impact on household income. Lester Thurow 
suggested that the rise in female labor force participation and the phenomenon of assortative 
mating could be mutually reinforcing and contributing to an inequality upswing (mentioned in 
Nielsen and Alderson, 2002). Female labor participation has inflated the bottom of the 
earnings distribution, as women have lower average earnings; in addition, due to assortative 
mating, it has amplified the advantage of high-income households and the disadvantage of 
poor ones when both spouses work. The same argument is given by Esping-Andersen: „The 
class-biased character of marriage will mean a greater income differentiation between upper- 
and lower-class household living standards‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 22). Crompton and 
Brockmann come to identical conclusions: 'Indeed as [managerial and professional] women 
are likely to be in partnerships with similar men...the decrease in gender inequality in terms of 
labour-force participation is accompanied by an increase in social class inequalities' 
(Crompton and Brockmann, 2006: 104). For instance, between 1979 and 1997, marital 
homogamy accounts for 13 percent of the rise in household income inequality in the United 
States (Kenworthy, 2004). 
3.3.3 Risks have shifted towards young adults 
In societies in which skills and education have become hegemonic determinants of life-
chances (Esping-Andersen, 1993), employment opportunities scarcer, jobless households and 
single-parent families more widespread, while pension systems efficiently fight poverty 
among elderly households, a logical consequence is that many risks have shifted towards 
young adults and especially towards young parents: „the risks of unemployment and low 
incomes are clearly concentrating in young households…Youth and young families are being 
disproportionally bombarded from all sides with risks of poverty, low income, 
unemployment„ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 159 and 167). Lawson and Wilson, likewise, note 
that „poverty rates…have grown disproportionately among the younger sections of society 
and the prime-age workforce‟ (Lawson and Wilson, 1995: 693). Chapter 7 will show that the 
median working poor is in his/her thirties in all countries analyzed. In this context, maternal 
labor market participation appears to be a decisive poverty factor, whereas not the only one 
(Whiteford and Adema, 2007).  
In what follows, I analyze the interplay of economic and sociodemographic factors and the 
channels through which they have a direct impact on households. This will allow me to 
confirm my initial hunch: There are different groups of disadvantaged workers who ended up 
in relative poverty because of different mechanisms. This is the object of the next section. 
 
3.4 The three immediate causes of working poverty  
 
Apart from its ability to synthesize and organize findings stemming from a plethoric literature 
in the fields of social and economic sciences analyzing a broad spectrum of topics more or 
less related to working poverty, the main scientific contribution of the present chapter is the 
following: On the basis of what I know from the literature on the working poor and low-wage 
workers, I conclude that there are basically three mechanisms or immediate causes of working 
poor status than can be identified: low earnings, low labor force attachment, and high needs, 
especially a high number of dependants, relative to national averages.  
Working poverty can only be the consequence of one or more of these three factors. Hence, 
while the poverty literature identifies a myriad of risk factors and of categories of 
disadvantaged workers, these three mechanisms are the channels through which economic, 
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sociodemographic and public policy factors have a direct bearing on working households. 
Public policy factors, the object of the next chapter, also have an impact on each working 
poverty mechanism, which I now describe:  
- Low hourly earnings. The most intuitive mechanism leading to working poverty is the fact 
of being badly paid. However, several researchers have pointed out that low wages alone are 
seldom the cause of working poverty (Andress and Lohman, 2008, Nolan and Marx, 2000, 
Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003, Peña-Casas and Latta, 2004). However, few will object that being 
paid a low wage rate vastly increases the risk of ending up in working poverty.  
- Low labor force attachment. This mechanism is proteiform and hits underemployed and 
intermittent workers, as well as persons - usually women - who cannot or are not willing to 
work more due the presence of children in the household. The rise in double earnership 
observed in most OECD countries puts families with a non-working spouse in a relatively 
more difficult situation that during the postwar years, when single-earnership was the norm.  
- Large needs, especially a large number of dependent children in the household. Most 
studies show that having many children can lead to poverty. As already discussed in chapter 
2, the conclusions drawn depend in part on the equivalence scale used; mainstream scales 
derived from household budget surveys lead to the conclusion that having children increases 
needs. Evidence derived from opinion questions must be interpreted with caution, as they may 
be a reflection of parents‟ adaptive preferences (Halleröd, 2006) and of a “satisfaction bias” 
associated to opinion questions in general (Erens and Bruster, 1994), rather than a reflection 
of children‟s living conditions. The same number of children is more likely to lead to poverty 
for one-parent families than for two-parent families. In fact, after a break-up or a divorce, 
even just two children may become problematic, because the needs of the two resulting 
households (the ex-husband who lives alone and the mother with the children, most of the 
time) increase significantly, as already discussed. What matters, as a result, is not the absolute 
number of children in a household, but rather the ratio of children to adults.  
Each mechanism can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition; i.e. a working poor 
will have at least one of the features described above; however, none of these factors 
necessarily leads to working poverty. What is more plausible is to assume that the 
accumulation of these mechanisms will increase the likelihood of being a working poor. 
Why focus on mechanisms? As will be shown in chapter 7, the relative weight of each 
mechanism or immediate cause varies across countries. This is the reason why the 
composition of the population of low-income workers varies significantly from one country to 
another. This will reinforce the first main conclusion drawn in chapter 2: Analyzing working 
poverty as a single category is not the best approach for social policy analysis; a typological 
approach is probably more useful. Moreover, focusing on the relative weight of the three 
working poverty mechanisms allows identifying policy mixes that appear to efficiently 
combat various forms of working poverty.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
A review of the literature that analyzes the impact of economic factors on disadvantaged 
workers points us in an important direction: The impact of the transition to a service economy 
and the growing disadvantage of unskilled workers vary considerably across postindustrial 
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nations, because of institutional differences, as underlined by many authors (Wood, 1994, 
Esping-Andersen, 1999, Merrien, 2002). Similar conclusions apply to the review of the 
literature devoted to the sociodemographic changes that have characterized postindustrial 
countries: Everywhere have divorce rates skyrocketed and poverty risks increasingly hit 
younger persons; yet, outcomes vary largely from one country to another, which most authors 
attribute to public policy factors.  
In summary, it appears that public policy factors play a very significant role in shaping the 
income distribution and labor market participation of various groups, especially labor market 
regulations and welfare state benefits and services. These factors are the object of the next 
chapter. Moreover, these policy factors affect the relative weight each of the three immediate 
causes of working poverty have in each welfare regime, and, as a consequence, the relative 
size of each subgroup of poor workers. This point will be clearly demonstrated in chapter 7.  
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4 The Role of Public Policy in Fighting Working Poverty 
 
As indicated in chapter 3, pervasive socioeconomic factors have been affecting the living and 
working conditions in postindustrial economies; these structural changes vary in terms of 
degree and timing, but are broadly the same in all countries. Due to institutional factors, 
however, the practical challenges these countries face vary significantly. In some countries, 
these socioeconomic changes translated into a strong income inequality upswing, while in 
other countries unemployment rates shot up. In further nations, the main problem consisted in 
the explosion of public expenditure and deficit.  
This “trilemma” of postindustrial societies – i.e. the impossibility to achieve income equality, 
employment growth, and budgetary restraint simultaneously – leads governments to chose 
among three alternatives: They can promote freely operating markets and budgetary restraint, 
which eventually leads to an increase in earnings inequality (in the US for instance, workers 
lacking college education had their real wages reduced by 15 percent during the 1980s, 
Hemerijck, 2002), whilst other, mostly Christian democratic, administrations promote 
budgetary restraint and income equality, at the expense of employment growth, by reducing 
labor supply (Germany and Austria being archetypes of this cluster of countries). A third 
option has been chose by Social democratic governments in Nordic countries (Scandinavia): 
They tend to prefer a combination of jobs for all through public employment, and income 
equality, which leads to higher taxes or deficits, which in turn can lead to a growing division 
between private-sector and public-sector employees (Iversen and Wren, 1998).  
Blank, Card and Robins, too, state that policymakers have long struggled to achieve these 
three goals, that is, raise the living standards, encourage work and keep government costs low. 
The conflict between these goals can be described as the “iron triangle” of welfare reform 
(Blank, Card, and Robins, 1999). Likewise, Esping-Andersen states that, „Since service sector 
productivity grows much slower than in manufacturing, the end-result is a cost-disease 
problem…. three outcomes are possible: first, the cost-disease may simply result in mass 
unemployment; the second possibility is that service jobs can be promoted via government-
„subsidized‟ wages…and the third possibility is that service employment will expand because 
of low wages that correspond to productivity differentials‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 10).  
In the present chapter, I first identify the main approaches that underpin the fight against 
working poverty in postindustrial countries – whether or not it was their primary objective 
when they were implemented - namely minimum wages, social transfers and policies aiming 
at the maximization of labor market participation. The role these policies play in each welfare 
regime reflect the approach to the “trilemma” policymakers have chosen. For each approach I 
present expected employment and antipoverty effects based on the literature; these hypotheses 
will be tested in the chapter devoted to the meta-analysis of various social policy instruments.  
 
4.1 Minimum wages 
 
Minimum wages are traditional tools in the fight against poverty, and are the first ones that 
come to mind when working poverty is discussed. Minimum wages are either set through 
collective agreements or legislation. The effects of the minimum wage will obviously depend 
on the level at which it is set, and large variations exist across countries. 
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Statutory or quasi-statutory minimum wages exist in 21 OECD countries. In order to compare 
the level of the minimum wage across countries, one can use purchasing power parities (PPP) 
in order to account for exchange rates and differences in the cost of living; it is also possible 
to express the minimum wage in relation to the average. In 2005, the after-tax value of legal 
minimum wages ranges from 60 percent of net average wage (for a full-time worker) in 
Ireland and France, to around 55 percent in the UK, slightly more than 50 percent in 
Australia, 50 percent in New Zealand, to about 40 percent in Spain and slightly less than 40 
percent in the US and approximately 30 percent in Japan. In US$ at 2005 PPPs, the country 
ranking is affected: The UK and Australia are on top of the ranking with slightly more than 
$7, France at around $7, and Japan, Spain and the US in the same ballpark, with an after-tax 
minimum wage slightly higher than $4 (Immervoll, 2007).  
Two of the four countries I analyze in chapters 5 and 7 have legal minimum wages, namely 
the US and Spain. In the US, the gross minimum wage has decreased between 2000 and 2005, 
from $5.85 to $5.15 at 2005 market exchange rates and constant prices (which represents a 
decline from 39 to 35 percent of gross average wages), but there has been an increase in a 
recent past, from $5.85 in 2007 to $7.25 in 2009. In addition, many states have their own 
wage floor set at a higher level; in addition, some metropolitan areas have enforced minimum 
wage ordinances that compel companies commissioned by local authorities to pay wages 
higher than the legal minimum, as described in chapter 7. In Spain, the minimum wage has 
increased between 2000 and 2005, from $4.12 to $4.27 at 2005 market exchange rates and 
constant prices, which represents a slight increase from 34 to 35 percent of gross average 
wages (Immervoll, 2007). In 2009, the salario mínimo interprofesional amounts to € 624 a 
month (source: OECD website, labour statistics).  
The impact of minimum wages defined in collective agreements is expected to be different. 
Indeed, this process leads to different wage levels according to the industry, the occupation 
type, and the region, which allows a greater flexibility in order to reduce the tradeoff between 
employment and redistribution. Its effect also depends on the share of the workforce covered 
by collective agreements containing a wage convention. Whereas legal minimum wages cover 
the vast majority of workers, this is not necessarily the case for collective agreements.  
In two of the countries analyzed in chapters 5 and 7, minimum wages are set through 
collective bargaining. In Sweden, minimum wages are industry-specific and nationwide 
(Skedinger, 2006), and about 90 per cent of the employees in Sweden are protected by 
collective agreements. In Germany, the coverage is not as high as in Sweden: Around two-
thirds of workers are covered, as discussed in chapter 5, but wage levels are high in 
international comparison, as the German bargaining model has led to a “high skill 
equilibrium”: Workers are paid good wages, and in return, the level of conflictuality is very 
low, staff is relatively stable, and productivity is high (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009).  
Expected employment effects 
The neoclassical argument against the minimum wage is well-known: If the minimum wage is 
set above the productivity level of workers, firms will reduce their labor demand and will 
substitute unskilled workers for automated production processes or for higher skilled workers, 
while others may simply reduce their output. However, other reactions are possible: Firms 
could simply accept that their profit margins are squeezed, or they could invest in order to 
increase productivity, by investing in employees‟ vocational training or innovative 
technologies, or try to develop better products that can be sold at a higher price. Moreover, the 
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fact that low-skilled workers earn more thanks to the minimum wage can stimulate 
consumption and reduce labor turnover.  
It is noteworthy that, at the macro level, the relationship between the level of the statutory 
minimum wage and unemployment is far from obvious. For instance, Spain has one of the 
highest unemployment rates in Europe; yet, Spain has a low minimum wage. Bazen mentions 
the „lack of convincing evidence that minimum wages are responsible for the high 
unemployment rates in Europe‟ (Bazen, 2000: 120). However, most analyses assess the 
minimum wage impact on employment, rather than on unemployment, as will be shown 
below.  
Card and Krueger (1995) have caused a massive earthquake in the world of labor economics. 
Based on a “natural experiment approach”, they showed that a 19 percent increase in the 
minimum wage introduced in April 1992 in the State of New Jersey did not have the 
consequences neoclassical theory predicts. They used New Jersey‟s fast-food industry 
(because it has a high share of unskilled and young workers) as the experimental group, and 
used the same industry in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania as the control group, as this 
state has a socioeconomic structure that is very similar but did not increase its minimum wage 
in 1992. This method seems more appropriate to the authors, because a regression model 
would certainly cause more problems as it is very difficult to control for all possible factors 
affecting the level of employment (demographic changes, economic changes, school system 
changes, and the like). Card and Krueger‟s results are stunning: Employment fell by 9 percent 
in fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania and rose by 2.8 percent in restaurants in New Jersey.  
However, these findings have been subject to harsh criticism: It has been argued that the 
survey was carried out only 8 months after the increase in the minimum wage level and that 
this time span is insufficient to evaluate the impact of an increase of the minimum wage. 
Other researchers think that employers had started firing employees before April 1992 
because they knew the level of the minimum wage would be raised (Neumark and Wascher, 
2007).  
Other explanations of these results are conceivable, among which the fact that price increases 
did not deter consumers. The monopsony model, based on the idea that employers have a 
certain power in the labor market, has been used to explain this pathbreaking finding. Before 
the introduction of the new minimum wage, employers manage to keep wages as low as 
possible, sometimes below the market value (which can happen when the former minimum 
wage was not adjusted for many years and declined in real terms). When employers‟ scope in 
wage-setting is reduced, they can choose to expand their output and hire more workers to 
compensate the fact that their profit margins have been squeezed. Esping-Andersen 
underscores the fact that different economic models lead to different predictions regarding the 
impact of minimum wages, „In the standard competitive model, high minima should produce 
unemployment; in the monopsony model, however, the effect can be opposite‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 2000: 80). 
Regarding the impact wages set by collective agreements may have, the corporatist approach 
states that either fragmented, decentralized and uncoordinated bargaining or highly 
centralized and coordinated bargaining systems can lead to satisfying economic performances 
(Calmfors and Drifill, 1988); there is a “hump-shaped” relationship between the kind of 
bargaining system (coverage, centralization, coordination) and the economic performance 
(mainly inflation and unemployment); that is, „feeble union power, as in the US, or broad 
consensual corporatism might actually diminish unemployment‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2000: 
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82). In a review of 15 studies, the OECD concludes that the evidence is mixed as to the link 
between bargaining centralization and coordination and economic performance. The only 
statistically significant result is that centralized and coordinated countries have lower 
unemployment rates (OECD, 1997). As Esping-Andersen put it, „Economies blessed with 
centralized, co-ordinated bargaining may permit themselves more „equality‟ and social 
protection without adverse employment effects; while the worst off are those where unions 
are powerful but represent only the core workforce, thus creating an insider-outsider divide‟ 
(Esping-Andersen, 2000: 91). Some authors, however, have expressed their skepticism 
towards Calmfors and Drifill‟s “hump-shaped relationship” model (Merrien, 2002). 
In sum, „the purportedly negative impact of the minimum wage is highly disputed‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 1999:126). There is a broad agreement that minimum wages set at “too high” a 
level would harm employment and that youth are most likely to be affected (OECD, 1998) 
and that, „A minimum that does not really bite cannot do much damage‟ (Bazen, 2000: 129); 
however, what “too high” or “a minimum wage that bites” mean remains open to argument.  
Expected antipoverty effects 
Minimum wages have a significant impact on the wage distribution: They reduce earnings 
inequality in general and the gender pay gap in particular, because they “mechanically” create 
a spike at the minimum wage level (Bazen, 2000). In order to understand the impact changes 
in the earnings distribution may have on working poverty, I think that a conceptual and causal 
clarification is absolutely necessary, because, “working poor” and “low-wage workers” are 
sometimes used as synonyms; however, reality is much more complex.  
Low-wage workers are not necessarily poor and the working poor do not necessarily have 
very low earnings, as poverty is measured at the household level, in contrast to low pay, 
which is an individual characteristic (Nolan and Marx, 2000, Welzmüller, 1990, Nolan, 
1998). An important factor is that „many households containing a low-paid individual are not 
depending on his/her earnings as the main income source. Many of the low paid are young 
adults living in the parental home or married women, and the household generally has other 
earners or is in receipt of social welfare transfers. A limited overlap between low pay and 
poverty is thus a common finding…The precise extent of the overlap depends on the way in 
which low pay and poverty are measured‟ (Nolan, 1998: 104). Levitan and Shapiro 
summarize these aspects as follows: „workers escape poverty either because they live alone or 
in small families or, most important, because their income is supplemented by the income of 
other family members, welfare, or nonwage income‟ (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988: 31). 
Strengmann-Kuhn has conceptualized this essential difference as follows (2003): 
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Source: Strengmann-Kuhn (2003) translated and modified for the present work. 
Indeed, a minority of low-paid workers is poor, and, in many cases, a minority of the working 
poor has very low earnings. Of course, conclusions depend on the indicators used. 
Strengmann-Kuhn uses 50 percent of the average wage as a low-wage threshold and 50 
percent of the average household income as a poverty line. About 1 in 5 workers (18 percent) 
with a low pay (low remuneration rate) is poor in 14 European Union countries and low-wage 
workers represent one fourth of the working poor (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003). The European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions defines being poor as 
living on an income lower than 60 percent of the median income and setting a low-wage 
threshold at 2/3 of the median wage; in the EU, one in five (20 percent) low-wage employees 
are poor and 37 percent of the working poor have a low pay (Peña-Casas and Latta, 2004). 
Hence, 'Generally speaking, there does not appear to be a very strong link between low pay 
and poverty' (Marx and Verbist, 1998: 76).  
However, Nolan and Marx use two thirds of median wage as a low-pay threshold, and 50 
percent of median income as a poverty line; that is, they define a relatively “generous” low-
wage threshold, while they use a quite restrictive poverty line. In addition, they focus on full-
time full-year workers, hence excluding a large share of the female labor force. They find, 
too, that a limited share of low-wage workers is poor, and that about 60 percent of the low 
paid are in the top 60 percent of the household income distribution. However, in the 13 
countries considered, a majority of the working poor are low paid, ranging from 54 percent in 
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France to 92.5 percent in the United Kingdom (Nolan and Marx, 2000). This result is 
attributable to the fact that a large share of “secondary earners” is not taken into account.  
The calculations presented in chapter 7 also yield a relatively high share of “low-wage 
workers” among the working poor; I use hypothetical earnings based on what respondents 
would earn should they work full-time all year around; that is, the number of weeks spent in 
the labor market is also included in the calculation. Moreover, the analysis focuses on heads 
of households and their spouse. Still, the link between low wages and poverty is loose, and in 
most countries low-wage employees do not represent more than half the working poor; 
however, a comparison of poor and nonpoor workers demonstrates that having low earnings is 
a significant working poverty factor. 
It is noteworthy that the connection between low pay and working poverty is stronger for men 
and for prime-aged workers than for women and young people, due to the household context: 
'The living standard of a typical household at working age increasingly depends on the 
combined labour market positions of household members rather than, as was typically the 
case two or three decades ago, on the labour market position of the male 
breadwinner...Double earnership has proliferated in most OECD countries, but single 
earnership remains quite widespread throughout Continental Europe, especially in the South' 
(Marx and Verbist, 1998: 67-68).  
Most women in low-wage employment have a partner/husband who works too, which is less 
frequently the case for low-paid men (Nolan and Marx, 2000, Welzmüller, 1990). Indeed, 
numerous working households can make ends meet thanks to ''supplementing earnings''. This 
is particularly true for working-class households (Welzmüller, 1990). Levitan and Shapiro 
draw similar conclusions: ‟Low-earning men are more likely than low-earning women to 
remain in poverty because their incomes are less likely to be supplemented from other 
sources‟ (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988: 29). Marx and Verbist similarly note that 'the 
association between low pay and poverty is stronger for men than for women...Most low-paid 
workers live in multi-earner households. This is certainly the case for low-paid women...Low-
paid 'breadwinners' tend to face a substantial poverty risk' (Marx and Verbist, 1998: 74 and 
81). This is a very important fact, as the incidence of low-wage employment is much higher 
among women.  
As far as youth are concerned, a closer look at age-wage profiles shows that most of them are 
increasing, in line with the human capital theory; however, for some low-wage jobs, the age-
wage profile is rather flat, and can even be declining, in line with the dual labor market 
theory, according to which some low-wage occupations can become “low-wage traps”, e.g. 
hotel and service work, cleaning work, shop assistants: „wage differentials observed across 
occupations cannot be explained entirely by occupation-specific differentials in individuals‟ 
human capital, working conditions and industry affiliation…the incidence of low pay is 
concentrated in a limited number of occupations characterized by comparatively flat age-wage 
profiles‟ (Arai, Asplund and Barth, 1998: 159).  
Historically speaking, the link between low pay and working poverty has weakened, as female 
workforce participation has increased, as well as welfare state benefits. Danziger and 
Gottschalk provide us with a very revealing historical outlook on the situation in the US: 
'men's earnings declined in importance over these four decades, accounting for 82.7 percent of 
family income in 1949, about 75 percent in 1969 and 1973, and 63.4 percent in 1991...The 
share of family income contributed by wives' earnings increased dramatically from 8.5 
percent in 1959 to 13.1 percent in 1969, and to 21.5 percent in 1991' (Danziger and 
Gottschalk, 1996: 77).  
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The British case is also revealing. When Rowntree carried out his first study of poverty in the 
city of York, already mentioned above, he identified the main causes of “primary poverty”, 
which was a low wage in a majority of families. Almost a century later, this was the case in 
three out of ten poor households: 
Table 8: Causes of poverty 1899 and 2001/2002 
 1899 (primary poverty) 2001/2 (60% of median 
income) 
Death of chief wage earner 15.6 5.8 
Illness or old age of chief 
wage earner 
5.1 25.7 
Chief wage earner out of 
work / unemployed 
2.3 8.6 
Largeness of family  22.2 2.1 
Irregularity of work 2.8 31.0 
In regular work but at low 
wage 
52.0 
Other - 26.8 
Total 100 100  
Source: Glennerster, Hills, Piachaud and Webb, 2004, Table 2: 49. 
Hence, in today‟s postindustrial economies, it does not seem absurd to conclude that „A 
solution to the problem of the „working poor‟ will clearly require much broader measures than 
those relating specifically to low pay [because] the majority of the low-paid are not 
„poor‟‟(Gallie, 2002: 104). 
 
4.2 Social transfers 
 
The second approach to the fight against poverty is based on cash benefits. Social transfers 
can be broken down into two functional categories. Some transfers are substitution incomes: 
If someone loses his or her job, gets sick or disabled, benefits are a substitute for lost earnings 
until this person re-enters the labor market (if possible); hence, they do not affect workers 
directly, but they may help nonworking members of disadvantaged households in which there 
is at least one worker. Other transfers provide a supplementing income: They increase 
working households‟ disposable income. Employment-conditional tax credits are the best 
known example, child allowances for workers as well. It is noteworthy that means-tested 
social assistance benefits belong to both categories, as they can supplement the income of 
low-wage workers or constitute the main - or even the sole - income source of a nonworking 
person. 
Substitution income transfers correspond to the traditional role of the welfare state as a 
“passive” institution (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck and Myles, 2002). Most of the “old 
social risks”, i.e. lost earnings due to illness, disability, old age, unemployment, and the death 
of the chief wage earner, are combated with cash transfers mainly; the old welfare state is 
transfer-heavy (Huber and Stephens, 2006, Bonoli, 2007). On the contrary, most of the “new” 
social risks - that is, risks that are typical of postindustrial societies - require an active 
intervention and an investment on the part of the welfare state in order to enable people to be 
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active members of society (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck and Myles, 2002, Armingeon 
and Bonoli, 2006); the postindustrial welfare state is service-heavy.  
It is noteworthy that, in recent years, many employment-conditional social transfers have been 
implemented or greatly expanded, such as tax credits for workers (US, UK, France, Canada, 
Sweden, etc.) or child benefits for working mothers (Spain). These transfers correspond to a 
more recent conception of welfare state cash benefits, as they provide both an increase in 
disposable income and an incentive to work. Obviously, they are of no help if a person is not 
able to find a job. 
Expected employment effects 
After the oil shocks and the recession that occurred in OECD countries in the 1980s, welfare 
states found themselves under pressure. The influence of neoliberal theories grew, especially 
those stemming from the University Chicago in the field of economic sciences (Merrien, 
Parchet, Kernen, 2004). Means-tested benefits were subject to harsh criticism for their alleged 
work disincentive effects (Murray, 2000). Some Conservatives critics also blamed them for 
allegedly generating “irresponsible” and “morally dubious” behaviors, such as out-of-wedlock 
births, teenage pregnancies, etc. Even though neoliberal administrations in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Reagan and Thatcher administrations) were not able to implement a large-scale, 
across-the-board retrenchment (Pierson, 1994), the idea that means-tested benefits could do 
more harm than good has remained and has been adopted by many scholars who do not share 
the Chicago school‟s ideology (Merrien, Parchet, Kernen, 2004).  
In fact, no sound empirical evidence shows that the welfare state systematically has an 
adverse effect on employment; more specifically, neoconservative criticisms fail to explain 
the wide differences observed across European countries. Scandinavian countries, for 
instance, have generous social transfers and high employment levels. Moreover, countries 
with generous unemployment benefits often have lower long-term unemployment (Esping-
Andersen and Regini, 2000). 
This does not, by far, mean that welfare provisions have no impact at all on employment. A 
fundamental question concerns the effective marginal tax rates that persons face when they 
decide to re-enter the labor market, especially welfare recipients and women getting back into 
the labor market after a childrearing period: „In nearly all OECD countries, average effective 
tax rates on the low paid can be higher than on average earners or the high paid, primarily 
through the interaction of direct taxes with the withdrawal of benefits. However, while this 
factor is likely to provide a disincentive to paid work, it does not appear to explain variation 
in joblessness among families with children. Some countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand with high levels of joblessness have relatively low effective tax rates in these 
circumstances, while others such as Denmark, which has very high effective tax rates, have 
very low joblessness‟ (Whiteford and Adema, 2007: 34). 
In fact, conclusions appear to vary across countries. In the US, 'Virtually all researchers who 
have investigated the effects of the existing scheme of transfer payments on labor supply have 
found statistically net negative impacts. Simultaneously, virtually all researchers have found 
the impact to be small' (Darity and Myers, 1987: 218). Esping-Andersen, likewise, notes that, 
„American research has found that unemployment benefits – and also…AFDC – prolong 
employment re-entry…In a broader, comparative context, [some studies] provide evidence 
that replacement rates – and especially duration of benefits – push up unemployment…Such 
effects may be especially strong among low-wage workers‟ However, „Several comparative 
studies conclude that the impact of social protection on unemployment is, at best, marginal‟ 
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(Esping-Andersen, 2000: 73-75). McFate draws identical conclusions: „New research has 
found the connection between poor job growth and the generosity of social protection 
programs in Europe to be tenuous‟ (McFate, 1995b: 635).  
It is noteworthy that, „On average, across OECD countries, there is a fairly strong correlation 
between the effectiveness of tax and benefit systems in reducing poverty and the level of 
family joblessness…In English-speaking countries the argument…appears to apply - more 
generous support to poor families is associated with higher levels of family joblessness 
[r=0.92]. However, among the Nordic countries the correlation between joblessness and 
redistribution is negative (-0.93). While further analysis would be required to verify this, this 
could reflect the pro-employment policy orientation of the Nordic welfare states‟ (Whiteford 
and Adema, 2007: 37).  
It is of paramount importance to distinguish benefits financed through payroll taxes and from 
those financed by general taxation. Social insurance benefits financed by payroll taxes have 
the disadvantage of increasing nonwage costs for employers, which in turn can create hurdles 
for workers with a low human capital. In fact, according to Hemerijck, „the low rates of 
employment in Continental Europe have less to do with the overall level of taxation and more 
to do with the heavy reliance on social security contributions‟ (Hemerijck, 2002: 181). The 
impact of payroll taxes is discussed at greater length in chapter 5.  
Expected antipoverty effects 
It seems that redistributive policies and labor market institutions have a theoretically 
ambiguous effect on income inequality. Redistributive policies directly reduce inequality in 
terms of disposable income, in a static way. However, if dynamic aspects are taken into 
account, the same policies and institutions can reduce labor force participation, thereby 
increasing pretransfer poverty (Burniaux, Padrini, Brandt, 2006).  
Descriptive studies clearly demonstrate that social transfers reduce the poverty rate: The 
lowest poverty rates are found in countries that have “generous” welfare states (McFate, 
Smeeding, Rainwater, 1995, Eurostat, 2002, Esping-Andersen, 1999): „There is no question 
that social welfare programs reduce poverty in a direct, static sense‟ (Kenworthy, 1999: 
1123). Whiteford and Adema (2007) have evaluated the impact of a benefit strategy (mainly 
cash transfers and tax breaks) on child poverty rates, but behavioral responses are not 
accounted for. The poverty rate of working single parents is reduced by 49.7 percent, that of 
two-adult households by 39.3 percent for double-earner households and by 43.0 percent for 
single-earner households (Whiteford and Adema, 2007).  
Interestingly, targeting cash benefits to the poorest segments of the population is not 
necessarily the most efficient approach, as poverty rates are significantly lower in 
Scandinavian countries – where it is mainly universal benefits and services that contribute to 
the fight against poverty - than in Anglo-Saxon countries, where welfare state benefits are 
targeted at the poorest of the poor.  
Indirect, longer-term effects also seem to be positive, as will be analyzed at greater length in 
chapter 8, even in models that predict pretax/pretransfer poverty and “absolute” poverty 
(Kenworthy, 1999), that is, poverty indicators that are directly affected by sluggish economic 
growth and employment declines. It is noteworthy that, 'Among the working-age population, 
the incidence of pre-tax and transfer poverty is roughly similar across the three regime 
types...As one would expect, it is in the incidence of post-tax and transfer poverty that big 
differences between welfare state regime types emerge‟ (Huber and Stephens, 2006: 148). At 
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the very end of the present work, I present some multiple regression models found in the 
literature. These models include labor market institutions and welfare state provisions in order 
to explain the level of poverty in a comparative perspective, controlling for both labor market 
and demographic variables. All regression models seem to indicate that public spending on 
social policy in general, and on social transfers in particular, play a central role in poverty 
reduction, even when dynamic aspects are accounted for.  
However, these rather favorable conclusions do not rule out that “too generous” benefits can 
have a detrimental impact on labor market participation, by generating high reservation wages 
and marginal effective tax rates, which in turn can increase pretransfer poverty.  
Another noteworthy aspect regards child poverty and the cost of combating it: Child poverty 
can be reduced through cash transfers or by increasing the labor force participation of parents 
and by reducing childcare costs (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). The difference is that, „the 
„servicing strategy‟ is clearly more costly than the „transfer strategy‟. But it is vital to note 
that the two are interdependent...The more generous [family benefits] are, the lower childcare 
subsidy will need to be. Conversely, the more that mothers work, the less subsidies will be 
needed‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002b: 61). In addition, if mothers work more, they will also pay 
more taxes, which reduces the net costs of childcare services. The servicing strategy is 
analyzed in the section devoted to childcare.  
Apart from “traditional” social transfers, employment-conditional benefits are often put to the 
fore in the working poverty literature; these complex policy tools require a more elaborated 
treatment and are the subject of the following sections.  
4.2.1 Tax Credits for working families/workers 
Tax credits for working families have received a large amount of attention in recent years, and 
belong to the group of “make work pay” (MWP) policies (see e.g. Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009, Pearson and Scarpetta, 2000). Their main aim is to enhance the labor market 
participation of disadvantaged groups and to increase the disposable income of poor workers. 
It should be emphasized that minimum wage legislations are often included in MWP policy 
mixes.  
The main categories of MWP instruments that contribute to poverty reduction among working 
households are the following (OECD, 2003, Pearson and Scarpetta, 2000):  
- tax credits for workers  
- childcare tax credits for working parents 
- tax allowances for work-related expenses 
- employment-conditional child benefits 
 
Other MWP policies exist; they aim at increasing the labor market participation of 
disadvantaged groups, such as decreases in employers‟ payroll taxes. These MWP policies, 
however, do not mainly support poor workers; they rather help nonworking persons to enter 
the labor market, or to get back into it. These antipoverty strategies are not evaluated in the 
present work, as they do not directly aim at reducing poverty among those already in work.  
I focus here on tax credits for workers that have existed for some time and for which a certain 
number of evaluations are available. The first of these programs is the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), which was introduced in the US in 1975. This is by far the most discussed 
employment-conditional benefit. In the UK, a tax credit for working families has also become 
an important anti-poverty tool. In 1971, the Family Income Supplement (FIS) was introduced, 
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replaced in 1988 by the Family Credit, then by the Working Family Tax Credit in October 
1999 (Dilnot and McCrae, 2000), and eventually by the Working Tax Credit in 2003.  
Over the 2000s, similar programs have been introduced in many OECD countries (Immervoll 
and Pearson, 2009), such as the “Employment Premium” (Prime pour l‟emploi) in France in 
2001, the Family Income Supplement and three other credits in Ireland, the Family Tax Credit 
and the In-Work Tax Credit in New Zealand, the Working Income Tax Benefit in Canada and 
additional programs at the provincial level (some of which existed before the 2000s), an 
Earned Income Allowance in Finland, and earned income tax credits at the local level in 
Sweden. Belgium used to have such a program, but it got replaced by a rebate on employee‟s 
social security contributions in 2004. Other countries such as the Netherlands and Australia 
have employment-conditional benefits that are not completely comparable to earned income 
tax credits but have similar objectives.  
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States 
The EITC was enacted in 1975 and was a footnote to an unremarkable tax bill (Howard, 
1994), only supposed to offset payroll taxes paid by low-income families with children. Since 
then, it has become “the centerpiece of antipoverty efforts in the US” (Husby, 2000: 24). In 
the 1980s, the EITC survived welfare retrenchment during the Reagan era: While the 
Ominibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981 slashed welfare expenditures by $4 billion, 
increasing the poverty rate by 2 percentage points, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 indexed the 
EITC to inflation (Ventry, 2001). Between 1984 and 1996, real dollars received through the 
EITC increased more than tenfold (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001), far outdistancing 
expenditures on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Food Stamp 
Program (MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004).  
The EITC is an employment-conditional benefit based on Federal income tax returns and does 
not depend on the number of hours worked (MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004). A first range, 
called the phase-in range, corresponds to a large earnings subsidy (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 
2001, Nagle and Johnson, 2006, MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004): As of 2007, the phase-in rate 
for families with two or more children amounts to 40 ¢ for each additional dollar up to the 
maximum credit, which is allowed over a range of income called the “plateau”, which 
represents the flat range of the credit. The end of the plateau corresponds to the beginning of 
the phase-out range. It is important to note that „the poverty line is about where the EITC 
starts phasing out‟ (MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004: 16). The phase-out range is meant to 
prevent so-called “threshold effects”, that is the sudden withdrawal of benefits due to a one-
dollar increase in earnings. The phase-out rate of the credit is 21¢ on the dollar, and the 
breakeven point, that is the point above which households receive no EITC, is clearly above 
the poverty threshold (Scholz, 1994, Burkhauser, Couch and Glenn, 1995, Nagle and Johnson 
2006, Greenstein, 2005). A very important feature of the EITC is the fact that it is refundable: 
If the amount of the credit exceeds what the taxpayer owes to the IRS, he or she will receive a 
payment from the US Treasury (Scholz, 1994, Nagle and Johnson, 2006).  
Originally, the EITC was designed to support working families with children. However, there 
is also a modest EITC for childless workers between the ages of 25 and 65, enacted in 1994 
(Scholz, 1994, Nagle and Johnson, 2006). In 2006, only 2 percent of the EITC goes to 
childless workers (Furman, 2006). A majority of EITC dollars go to single mothers 
(approximately two-thirds in the early 2000s), and more than two-thirds of payment go to 
families with two or more children (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001). The parameters of the 
EITC are adjusted for inflation every year by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Levitis and 
Johnson, 2006, Okwuje and Johnson, 2006). However, the situation is less favorable in the 
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phase-in range, because the matching rate used to calculate the credit has been set at 40 ¢ per 
dollar earned for many years now, and the minimum wage is not adjusted for inflation. 
Indeed, for many households that have to live on a minimum wage, the EITC is not generous 
enough to lift a two-parent family with two children above the federal poverty line (Nagle and 
Johnson, 2006). Given that the EITC is administered by the IRS, the take-up rate is very high 
(80 to 86 percent according to Scholz, 1994). By contrast, fewer than half of eligible working 
families participate in the Food Stamps Program (Fishman and Beebout, 2001).  
The EITC has enjoyed broad bipartisan support throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. In recent 
years, however, some conservative politicians are deeply disturbed by the fact that a majority 
of EITC recipients are nonpoor according to the official definition (Ventry, 2001, Husby, 
2000). In 2001, the share of total benefits that accrue to poor families amounts to 38 percent 
(MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004). More problematic is the fact that high error rates were found 
by the IRS; this has led some critics to name the program a “tax credit for crooks” (Ventry, 
2001). In 1994, the IRS examined the returns of 2,046 randomly selected EITC claims, which 
led to the following conclusion: $4.4 billion were claimed in excess, corresponding to an 
overclaim rate of 25.8 percent (the percentage of total dollars paid out in error). It is difficult, 
however, to identify cases were the misreporting is voluntary and cases of unintentional 
mistakes, due to the complexity of certain rules (McCubbin, 2001). The IRS has increased the 
number of EITC returns that are controlled since 2001 (Greenstein, 2005), and since 1998 it 
can also levy penalties against individuals who abuse the EITC (Ventry, 2001). 
In addition to the federal program, a growing number of states have introduced their own 
EITC, set at a flat percentage of the federal credit: They “piggyback” directly on the federal 
EITC. As of 2006, the following 21 states had enacted an EITC, at a given flat percentage 
indicated below (Okwuje and Johnson, 2006, Levitis and Johnson, 2006):  
Colorado   10% (in 2001) 
Delaware*    20% 
District of Columbia  35% 
Illinois   5% 
Indiana   6% 
Iowa*    6.5% 
Kansas   15% 
Maine*   5% 
Maryland   20% 
Massachusetts  15% 
Michigan   10% (effective in 2008, 20% in 2009) 
Minnesota   average 33% 
Nebraska   8% 
New Jersey   20% 
New York   30%    
Oklahoma   5% 
Oregon   5% (6% in 2008) 
Rhode Island   25% 
Vermont   32% 
Virginia*    20% 
Wisconsin   (1 child 4% / 2 children 14% / 3 children 43%) 
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States indicated by a star (*) have enacted a nonrefundable tax credit. All states but Maryland, 
New Jersey and Wisconsin, allow childless workers to claim a state EITC.  
Regarding the expected employment effects of the EITC, the credit in the phase-in range has 
an ambiguous effect in terms of work incentives due to the offsetting impact of income and 
substitution effects (Hoynes, 2007). In the plateau, the theoretical effect is unambiguously 
negative (Hoynes, 2007, Burkhauser, Couch and Glenn, 1995), especially for women in 
married households with children (Scholz, 1994, Furman, 2006). In the phase-out range, the 
impact should be unambiguously negative, due to both negative income and substitution 
effect (Ventry, 2001). However, contrary to what microeconomic theory predicts, given that a 
majority of recipients are either in the plateau or the phase-out range (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 
2001), the overall employment effects of the EITC appear to be positive, as will be shown in 
the meta-analysis of the EITC in chapter 6.  
As far as its expected antipoverty effect is concerned, according to Census data, in 2003, 4.4 
million people living in America were lifted out of poverty, including 2.4 million children 
(Greenstein, 2005); for 1999, Meyer and Hotz-Eakin estimate that 3.7 million people escaped 
poverty; these estimates, however, do not account for employment effects. It is noteworthy 
that the EITC combined with food stamps allow a family of four to escape poverty if there is 
one full-time minimum-wage worker in the household (Greenstein, 2005). 
It is fundamental to underline that the expansions of the EITC took place in a very specific 
social and economic context: During the 1990s, „the United States has enjoyed the longest 
period of economic expansion in its history‟ (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001: 1); moreover a 
major welfare reform took place in 1996, with the introduction of a lifetime limit of five years 
of benefits receipt, leading to a strong decrease in welfare caseloads (Sawhill and Thomas, 
2001, Blank, 2000). By 1999, TANF caseloads had dropped by nearly half, and nearly two 
thirds of mothers who left TANF had a job (Loprest, 2001). Hence, most evaluation results 
are based on a rather exceptional period of time. As Sawhill and Thomas put it, „the 
employment effects discussed in this study will remain relevant only so long as there are jobs 
to be had…implicitly making the assumption that there is a strong demand for labor among 
employers. This assumption…will almost certainly prove problematic in a time of economic 
downturn‟ (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001: 49).  
The Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) in the United Kingdom 
Britain also has a long history of tax credits for workers. The Family Income Supplement 
(FIS) was introduced in 1971, a means-tested benefit for families with an adult working at 
least 24 hours a week. In 1988 the FIS was renamed Family Credit and its generosity 
increased. The WFTC was introduced in October 1999 and replaced the former Family Credit 
(FC). Within the WFTC, there was a Child Care Tax Credit that amounted to up to £150 a 
week (Blundell, 2006). The WFTC itself was replaced by an integrated children and 
employment tax credit in 2003, but the approach was not fundamentally altered; indeed, the 
new WTC is an extension of the WFTC (Marx and Verbist, 2008).  
As of 2009, there is a Child Tax Credit for all parents, whether they work or not, and a Work 
Tax Credit for working households that includes a childcare element if “approved” or 
“registered” childcare services are used; the Child Tax Credit is paid on top of the Work Tax 
Credit, the latter being also paid to workers who do not have children. Childless workers need 
to work at least 30 hours a week to be entitled, with some exceptions, whereas working 
parents of children under 16 or of full-time students have a lower work requirement threshold, 
namely 16 hours a week. The childcare element is worth up to 80p in tax credit for every £1 a 
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week spent on approved childcare, with maximum amounts between £140 a week for one 
child and £240 a week for two or more children. Workers in dual-earner couples can chose 
who gets the WTC, while the childcare element and the Child Tax Credit are paid to the main 
carer of all children in the family (HM Revenue & Customs‟ website).  
In what follows, the WFTC is the only program described, even though it does not exist under 
this label anymore and has been slightly modified, because virtually all available evaluations 
pertain to this program. The “third way” in welfare reform began when Tony Blair and the 
Labour Party won the general elections of May 1997 (Hills and Waldfogel, 2004) and the 
WFTC „was a flagship policy for New Labour‟ (McLaughlin, Trewsdale, McCay, 2001: 164). 
The introduction of UK‟s first national minimum wage was also a major reform in the New 
Labour‟s agenda in 1998. Three goals were pursued: First, the very low level of labor force 
participation of specific demographic groups, both in the UK and the US, in the early 1990s, 
was a strong motivation (Blundell, 2006). In the UK the employment rate of single mothers 
was “stubbornly low” (Blundell, 2000: 426). There was also an increase in the share of 
workless couples in the UK. The second objective was to reduce child poverty, through 
significant real increases in the universal child allowance and other means-tested benefits, and 
the increase in the tax credit for working parents. The third prong of New Labour‟s strategy 
was to reduce welfare dependency with programs that provide childcare or other services to 
pre-school-aged children, in order to break the intergenerational cycle of disadvantages. In 
addition, programs helping teenagers to stay in school were implemented, with allowances 
paid to those who choose to do so (Hills and Waldfogel, 2004).  
The WFTC was notably more “generous” than its predecessor, the Family Credit: The 
maximum credit was higher and the rate at which the WFTC was withdrawn was less steep, 
namely 55p in the pound instead of 70p. The amount paid is dependent on the number and age 
of children, the earned and unearned income of parents and whether the parents have incurred 
approved substitute childcare expenses (McLaughlin, Trewsdale, McCay, 2001). One of the 
challenges posed by the increased generosity of tax credits for workers, however, was that 
many working families could lose all of their housing benefit as a result of the increased 
generosity (McLaughlin, Trewsdale, McCay, 2001).  
Like its American counterpart, the WFTC is not administered by traditional welfare 
authorities, but by the UK‟s Inland Revenue. Contrary to the EITC, the WFTC has a 
minimum workweek requirement, namely at least 16 hours a week; moreover the credit is 
boosted if the head of household works at least 30 hours a week (Blundell, 2006, Brewer, 
2001, Sawhill and Thomas, 2001). Another major difference between the WFTC and the 
EITC is that the WFTC does not have a phase-in range: At 16 hours a week, the recipient gets 
the maximum credit she or he is eligible to; in addition, the UK system displays a much 
steeper withdrawal, that is, a higher reduction rate.  
Regarding expected employment and antipoverty effects, it is very important to note that 
the introduction of the WFTC occurred at the same time as other reforms, and „This 
coincidence of reforms is crucial in understanding the impact of the reforms‟ (Blundell, 2006: 
432). Indeed, this feature of welfare reform in the UK allows explaining a “pronounced 
puzzle”: while the WFTC has a maximum credit that is twice as high in real terms than its 
American counterpart, the impact of the WFTC „looks to be about half of what it was among 
similar groups in the US‟ (Blundell, 2006: 424). While the welfare reform in the US has 
witnessed a decrease in real terms of welfare benefits and the introduction of a lifetime five-
year limit, the level of means tested benefits in the UK were increased, because reducing child 
poverty also was a strong priority in the UK (Blundell, 2006).  
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The “Employment Premium” in France (Prime pour l’emploi PPE) 
The Employment Premium was introduced in May 2001. Its main stated goals are to provide 
incentives to get back to work or to stay in employment through a decrease of the marginal 
effective tax rates (Cahuc, 2002), notably for recipients of the minimum income scheme. The 
first program‟s eligibility criteria were linked to earnings, namely earnings between 0.3 and 
1.4 times the full-time minimum wage (SMIC being its acronym), with an upper limit of 2.1 
SMIC for workers in jointly-filing households who have an inactive partner or whose earnings 
do not exceed 0.3 SMIC in full-time equivalent. Taxable household income is also taken into 
account. 
The approach is completely different from those presented above, as the group of eligible 
workers is very large, namely one in four approximately compared to approximately one in 20 
for the WFTC (Cahuc, 2002) and the credit is much smaller than its more generous but also 
more targeted Anglo-Saxon counterparts (Cahuc, 2002). In 2001, the average credit amounted 
to €144 a year and the maximum credit amounted to slightly less than €400 a year, namely for 
a worker earning the SMIC in a single-earner household. The context in which the PPE was 
implemented was also different. First, the unemployment rate was high, especially for low-
skilled and young workers (Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, Thibault, 2004). Moreover, the 
minimum wage (SMIC) is one of the highest among OECD countries, when expressed in 
percent of the median wage, as already mentioned.  
First evaluations showed that this tax credits could not have any effect on employment in a 
country with a compressed wage distribution and “generous” welfare benefits (Cahuc, 2002). 
Hence, the main effect and advantage of the PPE was redistributive. Moreover, the PPE 
mainly accrued to full-time SMIC workers, which is not the most disadvantaged group in the 
French workforce. Another drawback is that the benefit calculation is very complex, as it both 
depends on individual earnings and household income, making it very difficult to understand 
for recipients (Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, Thibault, 2004).  
Given all these drawbacks, the program was reformed as early as 2003. It increased the 
amount paid to part-time workers, with a 45-percent supplement for workers with less than a 
half time job, which led to a budgetary increase of €126m (Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, 
Thibault, 2004). As of 2003, the maximum credit amounted to €444 a year for a minimum-
wage worker on full-time year round employment (1,820 hours in France); as indicated above, 
a yearly workload of less than 910 hours meant that the credit was multiplied by 1.45 
(Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, Thibault, 2004).  
The calculation remains, indeed, very complex. It depends on the earnings and hours worked 
indicated in the tax return, but also on the average wage rate. It also depends on the 
characteristics of the fiscal unit: Married couples, single parents, and single-earner couples get 
different amounts that, in addition, depend on the number of children. Even after the increase 
of 2003, the PPE level remained low: €27 a month for a SMIC-worker working half time and 
€37 for a SMIC-worker on full-time employment. Thanks to the increase for part-time 
workers, the PPE is better targeted; however, 12 percent of the global amount accrue to 
workers in the fifth income decile (Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, Thibault, 2004).  
Given the small amounts at stake, and the specificities of the French labor market, notably 
high unemployment rates and a compressed wage distribution, the employment and 
antipoverty effects of the PPE are expected to be small.  
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In June 2009, a new benefit was introduced, namely the RSA (Revenu de solidarité active); its 
main aim is to replace the existing minimum income schemes (the minimum income 
guarantee RMI and a benefit for lone parents API); in practice, workers entitled to both RSA 
and PPE must declare the amount of money received through the RSA, and fiscal authorities 
calculate PPE benefits including the RSA in household taxable income.  
So far, the social transfers I have described are employment-conditional. The next section 
deals with benefits that are not conditioned on employment; they can be universal or means-
tested. 
4.2.2 Family cash benefits, child allowances/benefits 
According to the OECD family database, as of 2007, approximately half the OECD countries 
provide family cash benefits that are not means-tested (they are, hence, universal). This is the 
case in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherland, Norway, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  
The level of these benefits varies widely across countries, from less than 1 percent of the 
average wage in Greece to 10 percent in New Zealand. In some countries these cash benefits 
are an important component of low-income families‟ material well-being; for instance, they 
represent around 10 percent of disposable income in Germany for families in the bottom 
decile of the income distribution (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). Eligibility in terms of the 
child‟s maximum age also varies widely, from 12 years in Japan and Lithuania up to 19 in 
Austria. In the large majority of OECD countries, the age limit is higher for students. There 
are employment conditions in Greece, and a reduction of benefits in proportion to days not 
worked in Italy; in other countries, eligibility is not linked to parental employment.  
In some countries, family cash benefits take the form of a tax credit (they should not be 
confounded, however, with childcare tax credits nor with earned income tax credits), namely 
in Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and the UK.  
Regarding the expected employment effects, most of the findings pertaining to social 
transfers in general (except for employment-conditional cash benefits) should apply to family 
cash benefits. It should be noted that universal benefits have the great advantage of preventing 
threshold effects, but their cost is notably higher, as most children do not grow up in 
disadvantaged families.  
The antipoverty effect of these benefits is not easy to assess: In a static sense, obviously, 
they reduce child poverty, and figures based on a pretransfer/posttranfer approach are 
provided in many studies, one of the best-known being Whiteford and Adema‟s report (2007). 
It is important, however, to account for behavioral responses, as these benefits could have a 
negative employment effect, especially in countries in which childcare services are in limited 
supply or expensive, as low-skilled mothers might be financially better off staying at home 
with their children, or reducing their labor force participation, if family benefits are high.  
Among the numerous analyses that do not include behavioral responses, Fagnani and Math‟s 
(2008) is very interesting. They use the “model family method” to analyze the repartition of 
family cash benefits in an 11-country comparison
7
: For each model family – varying 
according to the number of children and earners – the family package is calculated as the 
                                                          
7
Belgium, UK, France, Austria, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark.  
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difference between the net income after transfers and taxes for a household with children and 
the net income of a childless couple, with both families living on identical earnings. The 
components included in the calculation of the disposable income are: earnings, income tax, 
social insurance contributions, local taxes, family cash benefits, housing benefits, social 
assistance, and guaranteed child support. Finally, the overall family package is measured in € 
in Purchasing Power Parities.  
Austria and the UK stand out as the most generous countries when it comes to cash provisions 
for families, be it for couples with children or for lone-parent families. Regarding couples 
with children, France, Belgium and Germany follow the leaders, while Scandinavian 
countries are at the bottom of the ranking. The situation is fundamentally different for lone 
parent families: Here, the Scandinavian countries follow the leaders, and France, Germany 
and Belgium are the lowest ranked countries. Overall, it can be said that the UK is the most 
generous state toward low-income families; the UK and Ireland favor the working poor in 
their family policy. France and Belgium tend to encourage larger families, and Scandinavian 
countries provide more support to single parents than to couples.  
But being the most generous country in terms of average cash benefits per supported family 
does not mean being the most efficient in the war on poverty: „A look at child poverty rates, 
however, exposes the UK as the worst performer by a considerable margin…Clearly, the goal 
to increase social justice while decreasing child poverty depends on providing more than 
simple cash benefits…The Nordic countries, where social inequality is less marked and child 
poverty is virtually non-existent, provide a perfect illustration of this point…Financial support 
is modest but benefits in kind such as community facilities and services are 
considerable…this goes hand-in-hand with high employment rates for mothers with children‟ 
(Fagnani and Math, 2008: 73-74). Indeed, the fact that a country puts more emphasis on cash 
benefits or on family services matters a great deal. In the latter case, the approach is not based 
on social transfers, but on the maximization of employment, analyzed in section 4.3 below.  
Another important category of social transfers, namely social assistance benefits (or welfare 
benefits), must be discussed, as their main aim is to prevent poverty.  
4.2.3 Social assistance benefits  
In fact, most of the elements presented above regarding social transfers in general (except for 
employment-conditional transfers) apply to social assistance benefits in particular, be it work 
disincentive effects as well as antipoverty effects. As indicated above, social assistance 
benefits can act both as substitution income for unemployed and inactive persons and 
supplementing incomes for poor workers. In most countries, however, the unemployed are the 
largest proportionate category of recipients (Eardley, Bradshaw, Ditch, Gough, Whiteford, 
1996).  
The specificity of welfare benefits is that they are associated with stigma (Van Oorschot, 
1991, Leu, Burri, Priester, 1997), as opposed to social insurance benefits, as the entitlement to 
the latter is derived from social security contributions paid by the recipient and is, hence, 
perceived as a due right. Even in countries in which the general public‟s attitude towards the 
welfare state is clearly positive, such as Sweden, the perception of social assistance benefits is 
rather negative (Bergmark, 2000). 
The antipoverty and employment impact of social assistance will not be systematically 
assessed in chapter 6. An abundant literature already exists, and these impacts constitute a 
research topic of their own. Moreover, these evaluations usually do not concern poor workers 
in the first place; most of them are either devoted to disincentive effects for those not in the 
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labor force or measure antipoverty effects without accounting for dynamic aspects. However, 
some of the evaluations meta-analyzed in chapter 6 contain the level of welfare benefits as a 
control variable; these findings will be reviewed.  
Let us now direct our attention to the third approach to the fight against working poverty, the 
employment maximization strategy.  
 
4.3 Maximization of labor force attachment 
 
This third approach can also have an impact on working poverty, because a low degree of 
labor force attachment is one of the three working poverty mechanisms I have been able to 
identify. Policies that allow increasing female employment (especially maternal employment) 
and employment among low-skilled workers of both sexes can, hence, efficiently contribute 
to the fight against working poverty.  
In the US everything is done to maximize labor market participation, which translates into a 
strong emphasis on employment-conditional benefits, especially the EITC, and the existence 
of a five-year lifetime limit for welfare benefits; in Scandinavia, this maximization strategy 
translates into “generous" parental-leave schemes and an access to largely available and 
affordable childcare. In addition, Nordic countries have a long tradition of active labor market 
policies (Esping-Andersen, 2002b). It should be underscored, however, that in neither country 
the fight against working poverty was the main aim of the employment-maximizing approach. 
In the US, the main goal was to reduce welfare dependency, especially among single mothers 
(Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001), whereas in Scandinavia it was a response to labor shortages 
in the 1960s and a way to take feminist claims into account (Bonoli, 2007).  
Labor market participation has not been the number-one priority in many continental 
European countries, in which early retirement, disability pensions, low female labor force 
participation and labor shedding have often been perceived as appropriate ways to regulate 
labor supply in periods of high unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 1999, Hemerijck, 2002). In 
a recent past, however, there has been a departure from the “welfare without work” strategy: 
„Continental welfare states are in the midst of a general paradigmatic 
shift…towards…employment-friendly welfare systems‟ (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009: 23).  
This third approach can also be divided into two subcategories. The first one consists in 
incentives and productivity-enhancing measures in the form of state-provided childcare, 
parental leaves and active labor market policies. The other one is rather based on coercion, 
e.g. welfare-to-work programs or employment-conditional benefits: People are compelled to 
hold a job in order to receive financial support. In everyday language, I distinguish between 
the stick and the carrot. Interestingly, some researchers consider employment-conditional 
benefits to be a carrot rather than a stick (see e.g. Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001). Indeed, in 
the US, welfare-to-work policies and other measures aiming at forcing people back into 
employment are qualitatively different from work-conditional benefits, notably tax credits for 
workers.  
The employment-maximization approach based on incentives implies a conception of the 
welfare state seen as an enabling institution, i.e. a social investment state pursuing prevention 
rather than protection (Van der Veen, 2009, Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles, 
2002, Bonoli and Bertozzi, 2008). Labor protection is replaced by the promotion of work. 
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This approach broadly corresponds to the famous “third way” advocated by Giddens, one of 
Tony Blair‟s advisors, an approach based on a welfare state aiming at the development of 
human capital (Giddens, 2000, Kenworthy, 2004). In Scandinavian countries, the social 
investment approach is not new: The „accent on activation and strengthening individuals‟ 
capacities…is indeed what the Danes and, especially, the Swedes have been pursuing for 
decades‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 5). 
The potential employment effects of the employment-maximization strategy are self-evident. 
As far as potential antipoverty effects are concerned, female unemployment and 
employment rates are significantly correlated to relative poverty (with the threshold set at 50 
percent of median income) over the period 1993-2000, while it is not the case for men, 
confirming the central role of women‟s earnings in reducing poverty risks (Burniaux, Padrini, 
Brandt, 2006). Indeed, „female employment is one of the most effective means of combating 
social exclusion and poverty‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002c: 94), and 'the inability to reconcile 
work and family life can, especially for low-income parents, be associated with a poverty risk' 
(Bonoli, 2007: 500). Moreover, as will be shown in chapter 7, countries with high maternal 
employment rates have a smaller share of working lone mothers who are poor. More 
generally, virtually all studies I am aware of show that unemployment and inactivity are 
important poverty factors, while double earnership reduces the poverty risk.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that combating working poverty per se can also be seen as a social 
investment approach, as many poor workers have children. There is growing evidence that 
poverty has a detrimental effect on the mental health and cognitive development of children. 
Two models explain this impact. The first is the Family Stress Model: As families experience 
economic hardship, parents and other caregivers are subject to emotional distress and 
sometimes behavioral problems, which in turn leads to interparental conflict and sometimes 
inconsistent parenting practices (Conger and Jewsbury Conger, 2007). Another model, the 
Investment Model (IM), is primarily concerned with the advantages for the developing child 
of family financial prosperity: learning materials available in the home, stimulation of 
learning, specialized tutoring or training, and so on (Conger and Jewsbury Conger, 2007). For 
instance, in the mid-1990s, the state of Wisconsin launched an experiment called New Hope, 
which provided adults with earnings below 150 percent of the federal poverty line who 
worked at least 30 hours a week with wage supplements, subsidized health insurance, and 
childcare subsidies. Not only did the program decrease poverty, but it also improved 
children‟s academic achievement (Gupta, Thornton Walker, Huston, 2007).  
4.3.1 Active labor market policies (ALMP) 
ALMP could be considered as a useful tool in the fight against working poverty, by 
contributing to the maximization of workforce attachment. Indeed, ALMP may increase the 
likelihood that unemployed or inactive members of working households find a job and retain 
it. However, whereas an abundant literature exists regarding the effectiveness of ALMP in the 
fight against unemployment, these policies are rarely considered as potential anti-working 
poverty tools outside the US (Hamilton, Freedman, Gennetian, Michalopoulos, Walter, 
Adams-Ciardullo, Gassman-Pines, 2001, Kluve, 2006, Martin and Grubb, 2001). Moreover, 
the impact of ALMP on employment goes far beyond the scope of the present work, and, as 
indicated in the introduction, is not analyzed here.  
4.3.2 Childcare services  
Subsidizing childcare is another strategy that can be pushed in order to boost the labor market 
participation of poor workers and of inactive members of poor working households. 
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Regarding family policies in general, an important fact is that the level of spending varies 
considerably across countries. Within the EU, „The remarkable generosity of the Nordic 
countries…contrasts sharply with the modest contributions made by countries in the southern 
bloc of member states… along with the Nordic countries, France leads the EU in public 
childcare provision and benefits aimed at reducing childcare costs for families‟ (Fagnani and 
Math, 2008: 55 and 57). In addition, the structure of these outlays is fundamental: The 
majority of public spending on family policy in Scandinavian countries is devoted to the 
provision of services, and tax breaks are virtually non-existent. In absolute levels, spending on 
services exceeds 1 percent of GDP in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; 
France is notable too. In France and Germany, the distribution between services, cash benefits 
and tax breaks is quite balanced, with tax breaks playing a more important role in Germany 
than France. In the US, the bulk of public spending on family benefits consists in tax breaks. 
In Europe, Mediterranean countries display the lowest levels of spending overall (Whiteford 
and Adema, 2007).  
In summary, in many countries, family policy mainly belongs to the realm of social transfers, 
while in others, it mainly aims at maximizing employment, especially maternal employment. 
The availability and the cost of childcare services are the two main approaches to the 
employment maximization strategy analyzed here; however, although tax credits for workers 
have been analyzed as employment-conditional transfers, they also belong to the category of 
instruments designed to increase employment rates, especially among single mothers.  
Expected employment effects 
Policies that improve the work-family life balance and, hence, the labor force participation of 
mothers are the following: increasing the availability of formal childcare, lowering childcare 
fees, making childcare expenses deductible from taxable income or from the calculation of 
means-tested benefits, childcare-related cash benefits, as well as tax credits for working 
mothers/parents (Immervoll and Barber, 2005). In the next chapter devoted to meta-analyses 
of existing programs, I focus on tax credits for working parents, and on childcare availability 
and costs/fees.  
In their analysis of 21 countries, Immervoll and Barber (2005) show that, at both extremes of 
the distribution of two important variables, namely the share of children in formal childcare 
and the maternal employment rate (mothers of children aged under three), the situation is 
clear: In Greece, Italy, Spain, and Germany, a maternal employment rate of 45 to 56 percent 
corresponds to a low share of children in formal childcare (less than 10 percent). At the other 
end of the two distributions, Sweden and Denmark display both a high rate of labor market 
participation for mothers (more than 65 percent) and a high share of children under three in 
formal childcare (65 and 64 percent respectively). Regarding “in-between” countries, the 
evidence is less clear. A first group of countries displays employment rates for mothers of 
children under three between 55 and 65 percent, whereas the share of children in formal 
childcare lies between 10 and 30 percent (Canada, the USA, and Switzerland). A second 
group of countries, namely France, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal have 
maternal employment rates of 65 to a high 74 percent and a share of children in formal 
childcare below 30 percent (it equals 30 percent in France and Belgium).  
All in all, these figures tend to show that mothers‟ labor force participation partly depends on 
the share of children in formal childcare, which in turn depends on the availability of 
childcare slots. However, a simple regression model in which maternal employment is 
regressed on the share of children in formal childcare yields a coefficient of determination 
that is rather modest, namely R
2
=0.16; that is, 16 percent of the variation in maternal 
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employment rate is explained by the share of children in formal childcare (Immervoll and 
Barber, 2005).  
Childcare fees doubtlessly play an important role, too. The average fees charged by childcare 
centers, for a two-year old in 2001 in full-time care amounted, on average, to 16 percent of 
gross earnings of an average production worker, ranging from 6 percent in Sweden, the 
Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Spain to 37 percent in Switzerland (Immervoll and Barber, 
2005).  
Immervoll and Barber show that childcare costs can be a heavy burden for working parents in 
OECD countries, but massive variations exist across countries. The situation of various family 
types is assessed in their report. For a dual-earner family with both parents earning 100 
percent of the average production worker (APW) wage, the cost of childcare for two children 
in full-time care, including tax and benefits concessions, expressed in percent of family net 
income, ranges from 6 percent in Germany, Sweden and Greece to 29 percent in Ireland and 
Switzerland. For dual-earner households with earnings amounting to 133 percent of the wage 
of an APW, these costs range from 5-6 percent in Germany, Denmark and Finland, up to 32 
percent of family net income in New Zealand and 40 percent in Ireland. For lone parents who 
earn an APW wage, differences are even larger, from 4-5 percent in Germany and Norway to 
38 percent of net income in the US, 42 percent in New Zealand, and a stunning 53 percent in 
Ireland. For low-wage lone parents, the ranking is notably different, reflecting the fact that the 
US has targeted the bulk of its social policy effort on this population group: For a lone parent 
earning two-thirds of the APW wage, childcare costs range from 2 percent of net income in 
the US (and Finland) to 42 percent in Canada and 58 percent in Ireland.  
In summary, in some countries, childcare costs constitute a large obstacle to maternal 
employment, even for families living on average earnings, whereas in others, family policy 
efforts make childcare services affordable, most notably in Scandinavian countries.  
The relative impact of childcare costs on the incentives to take up employment is summarized 
in tables 13 and 14; some policy mixes can have a different impact on parents on low-wage 
employment (hereunder -) and on higher-wage jobs (hereunder +):  
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Table 9: Work incentives and childcare costs for married couples 
Financial incentives to take up employment (Net income gain) 
Impact of 
childcare 
cost on 
income 
gain 
  Low Average High 
Low Denmark  
Hungary  
Slovak republic 
Finland (-) 
Iceland  
  
Sweden  
Average Finland (+) Belgium  
Norway  
Greece  
Korea  
High Australia (+) 
Ireland  
New Zealand (-) 
Portugal (-) 
Switzerland 
(Zurich) 
UK  
  
  
Australia (-) 
Austria (Vienna) 
Canada (Ontario) 
France (+) 
Japan(-) 
Netherlands 
Portugal (+) 
US (Michigan) 
France (-) 
Japan (+) 
New Zealand(+) 
  
  
  
  
  
Source: Immervoll and Barber, 2005 
 
Interestingly, results are different for married parents (table 9) and for lone parents (table 10):  
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Table 10: Work incentives and childcare costs for lone parents 
  Financial incentives to take up employment (Net income gain) 
Impact of 
childcare 
cost on 
income 
gain 
  
 
 
Low Average High 
Low Austria-Vienna(-)  
Denmark  
France (-) 
Slovak republic 
  
  
Finland (-) 
Belgium  
Iceland 
Germany 
Japan (-) 
Netherlands (-) 
Portugal (-) 
Greece  
Norway  
Sweden  
UK (-)  
US (Michigan) (-) 
  
Averag
e 
Austria-Vienna(+) 
France (+) 
Netherlands (+) 
  Australia (-) 
Hungary  
  
High Canada (Ontario) 
Ireland  
Japan (+) 
Korea (-) 
Australia (+) 
New Zealand  
Switzerland 
(Zurich) 
UK (+) 
Portugal (+) 
Australia (+) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Korea (+) 
US (Michigan) (+) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Source: Immervoll and Barber, 2005. 
Childcare costs appear to play an important role in terms of work incentives. However, it is 
striking that low financial incentives do not only depend on the impact childcare costs have on 
income gain. The tax and benefits system also plays a fundamental role: „The cost of 
childcare acts as a major barrier to work in some of these cases (Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Switzerland) but inactivity traps are also a problem where childcare is much more 
affordable for low-wage lone parents (Austria, Denmark, France, Slovak Republic)‟ 
(Immervoll and Barber, 2005: 36).  
Moreover, it should be noted that „Swedish mothers entered the labour market long before 
there was enough public childcare. In 1970 for example, half of the mothers with preschool 
children (0-6 years) were employed, while only 9 per cent of the preschool children were in 
public childcare. For a long time many parents arranged childcare in the informal sector‟ 
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(Nyberg, 2006: 96). The case of Greece is also interesting in this regard; mothers‟ labor 
market attachment is weak whereas the financial incentives to work are high.  
In addition, it is also important to know whether women work full time or part time. Esping-
Andersen shows that in most countries, except for Scandinavian countries (and surprisingly 
also Italy), the presence of infant children has a very strong negative effect on full-time work, 
e.g. in Germany, France, and the UK. Moreover, as will be analyzed at greater length in 
chapter 5, „Full-time working mothers are…a fairly rare species in Southern Europe‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 2002c: 85). It is noteworthy that, 'In Scandinavia, part-time employment has 
been…in decline in recent years…[it] is increasingly not necessary for working mothers' 
(Hemerijck, 2002: 199).  
It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of statistical discrimination may also depend on 
childcare policies. In countries in which employers expect that women will experience a 
productivity decline due to births, they will be more reluctant to hire them in the first place, to 
invest in their human capital and to pay them equal wages (Esping-Andersen, 2002c).  
In summary, the cost of childcare appears to be a major determinant of maternal employment; 
however, other factors play an important role too, such as the tax/benefits system and overall 
employment performance. Another key factor is the availability of childcare slots. If the 
number of childcare slots is low, then the price is quite unlikely to have much of an influence 
(Del Boca, Vuri, 2007, Kalb, 2009). In fact, there are different ways to achieve a high degree 
of childcare coverage. The first approach is typical of Scandinavia, a region in which 
childcare centers are heavily subsidized by the state; another approach is found in the US, a 
country in which childcare services are bought in the market. In the US, however, it is 
possible to find affordable childcare services, due to a wide earnings dispersion: Childcare 
workers are low-paid. Indeed, Bonoli and Reber demonstrate that both public spending on 
family services and earnings dispersion have a statistically significant and positive impact on 
the percentage of children aged 0-3 in formal childcare (Bonoli and Reber, 2010).  
Another important factor is cultural, as it appears that opinions about what “a good mother” 
should and should not do have an impact on childcare use and employment; in order to 
demonstrate it, regression models can be calculated that include controls for employment and 
sociodemographic variables, as well as public policy factors. Cultural variables are measured 
with opinion questions pertaining to maternal employment; these appear to have a significant 
impact, ceteris paribus (see e.g. Berninger, 2009).  
It is important to note that the impact of childcare services goes beyond its immediate effect 
on maternal employment. In fact, the more women stay in the labor market, the more jobs are 
created in the personal services sector. According to Esping-Andersen, this “multiplier” could 
amount to 10 percent, i.e. approximately one extra job in personal services for 10 mothers 
who stay in the labor market (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
Expected antipoverty effect  
Interestingly, as will be shown in chapter 6, the number of studies evaluating the antipoverty 
effects of childcare policies is limited. Most available evidence pertains to the employment 
effects and the impact on fertility of these policies. Here, I present some descriptive evidence 
found in the literature, whereas evaluations based on regression models and simulations are 
presented in chapter 6.  
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The potential impact of childcare costs on poverty is easy to grasp. For instance, in 2001 in 
the US, 43 percent of all working parents with children pay, on average, around $5,044 a year 
for childcare (the amount ranges from $1,958 to $6,587 a year). That is, „on average, child 
care payments eat up close to a fifth of the incomes of poor and lower middle income working 
families paying for care‟ (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001: 37).  
Childcare policies can increase multi-earnership as well as the work volume of single parents. 
Indeed, single earnership has become a significant poverty factor in countries in which double 
earnership has become the norm. Moreover, a mother‟s labor market participation also plays a 
role in a longitudinal perspective: „As a rule of thumb, if a full-time worker interrupts her 
career for a 5-year interim she will forego 1.5-2 percentage points per annum in potential life-
time earnings (Esping-Andersen, 2002c: 78). In the Swiss case, it has been showed that 
workers who have experienced a career interruption in a recent past face an above-average 
risk of being poor (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2008). This is not only due to foregone 
earnings while the mother is out of the labor force, but also to skills erosion and lost seniority. 
In short, childcare policies can contribute to the reduction of working poverty by increasing 
earned income, both in the short and in the long run.  
Maximizing parents‟ labor force participation may not be sufficient, though. The OECD 
published a report (Whiteford and Adema, 2007) that aimed at evaluating the respective 
impact of a benefit strategy (mainly cash transfers and tax breaks) and of a work strategy on 
child poverty. Whiteford and Adema‟s conclusions are fundamental: „while encouraging 
employment of the jobless and increasing the share of two earner families is likely to be an 
essential part of any effective policy to reduce child poverty, complementary strategies are 
required‟ (Whiteford and Adema, 2007: 31). Hence, it appears that the employment-
maximization approach can play a fundamental role, but may not combat all types of working 
poverty.  
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5 Public Policies in the Real World: The Welfare-Regime Approach 
 
In the real world of social policy, the instruments I present and meta-analyze separately in 
chapter 4 and 6 - for the sake of analytical clarity - do covary. Moreover, not all possible 
combinations of these tools are found in postindustrial economies. Hence, a systemic 
approach is requested, and I briefly analyze which of the existing welfare regime typologies 
found in the literature seems to be appropriate for the analysis of poverty among workers. As 
shown by Merrien (2002), there is disagreement among sociologists and political scientists: 
Esping-Andersen‟s typology (1990) has been criticized, either from a feminist perspective, or 
because other indicators were suggested to draw a typology; moreover, additional regimes 
have been proposed (Merrien, 2002, Bonoli, 1997). Eventually, I have chosen a four-category 
typology: liberal, corporatist conservative, social-democratic, and Mediterranean welfare 
regimes.  
Sweden, the US, Spain and Germany have been chosen to illustrate the welfare regimes used 
in the present work. For each country, I first analyze hereafter the main dimensions that 
underpin the fight against working poverty and, second, underscore other features of its 
welfare state that appear to have an impact on working poverty. Third, all welfare regimes 
were hit by strong exogenous shocks, namely globalization, which went hand-in-hand with 
deindustrialization and technological changes in developed economies. There were objective 
evolutions, capital becoming much more mobile thanks to the development of transportation 
and communication (Wood, 1994) and the removal of many barriers to international trade, but 
also cognitive changes, due to the crisis of the Keynesian model in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which allowed neo-classical “outsiders”, the “Chicago boys” in particular, to make their way 
to the top and impose their viewpoint: The welfare state undermines economic 
competitiveness, generates disincentives to work and irresponsible behaviors, and is, hence, 
the cause of poverty rather than an efficient solution to it (Merrien, Parchet, Kernen, 2005). 
Globalization should, according to this approach, mechanically lead to a strong reduction in 
welfare expenses; however, differences between welfare regimes remain striking (Stiglitz, 
2002, Merrien, Parchet, Kernen, 2005). In what follows, I show that each country has had 
different reactions to these massive shocks. Fourth, the main indicators of poverty, income 
redistribution and employment performance are gathered from official statistics and some 
academic publications. Finally, I outline the main challenges each country is facing today in 
its fight against working poverty.  
 
5.1 Which typology of welfare regimes is appropriate for working poverty analyses?  
 
Obviously, this section does not aim at analyzing at great length the various welfare regime 
typologies that have been proposed and the theoretical and empirical elements they are based 
on; this is a research topic of its own. My goal is to identify, among existing typologies, one 
that appears to be well suited for the analysis of poverty among workers in postindustrial 
economies.  
Esping-Andersen‟s famous typology of welfare regimes – liberal, social-democratic, 
corportatist conservative - is based on three criteria: The first is the degree to which people‟s 
wellbeing is independent from the market (decommodification), the second is the impact of 
the welfare regime on the class composition, as described in chapter 2, and the third is the 
respective role the public and the private sphere play (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
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According to Merrien (2002), there is no agreement among scholars as to the best welfare 
regime typology to use. The choice depends on the point of departure: e.g., social assistance 
types differ from employment-based typologies or from family policy typologies. Moreover, 
some authors have suggested adding new clusters because they thought that some of Esping-
Andersen‟s were too heterogenous, for instance the Antipodes or Mediterranean countries. 
Other authors have suggested the use of further indicators to define welfare regimes (see e.g. 
Bonoli, 1997), the approach followed here.  
Moreover, feminist critics blame Esping-Andersen for not having taken gender-specific 
elements into account (Merrien, 2002, Berninger, 2009), and distinguish regimes in which the 
male breadwinner model is encouraged, even in a modified way, from regimes that promote 
dual-earner families. In my view, it can be said, more generally, that Esping-Andersen mainly 
put emphasis on decommodification and the class structure, and far less on the interplay of the 
private and the public sphere. Hence, he has probably underestimated the role families play, 
and, as a consequence, gender-specific issues.  
What typology shall I use, then? As indicated in chapter 4, there are mainly three approaches 
(each broken down into two subcategories) to the fight against working poverty; they are 
summarized in table 11: 
Table 11: The approaches to the fight against working poverty that underpin the 
typology of welfare regimes  
Minimum wages 
Legal minimum wages Collectively bargained wages 
Social transfers 
Substitution income Supplementing income  
Maximization of labor force participation 
Incentives Coercion  
 
In my view it is possible to define welfare regimes on the basis of the two (out of six) 
approaches that have the largest impact on working poverty. Obviously, sharp distinctions can 
only be made within the framework of an idealtypical approach, idealtypes being simplified 
representations of reality which allow classifying countries by the type they resemble the 
most. Many countries combine all approaches: Substitution and supplementing benefits 
coexist, as well as coercive and productivity-enhancing measures; in many OECD countries 
there is a legally enforced minimum wage and collective bargaining. However, some 
combinations are not really possible in the real world of welfare regimes. For instance, a 
highly regulated labor market may impair a country‟s ability to pursue labor force 
maximization as a strategy. 
The role of the family, female employment patterns, and family policies, are also important 
dimensions of the fight against working poverty. Hence, a useful typology should put enough 
emphasis on the design of family policies and their impact; hence, a brief review of some 
recent evidence regarding the impact of welfare regimes on the work-life balance is 
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interesting, as it is the dimension that has been somewhat neglected by Esping-Andersen, 
according to many authors (Merrien, 2002).  
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (hereafter 
Eurofound) has established a typology of welfare states according to the type of work-life 
balance they tend to shape, in a life-course perspective (Eurofound, 2007). First, Eurofound 
notes that „it is well established in existing literature that female employment rates tend to be 
higher in countries which actively support the employment of women with children through 
the provision of a subsidized, publicly financed childcare system‟ (Eurofound, 2007: 8). The 
typology developed by Eurofound is the following:  
- Nordic regimes (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
- Liberal regimes (Ireland, UK) 
- Continental regimes (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands) 
- Mediterranean regimes (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
 
In addition, a cluster of post-communist member States of the European Union is defined. 
Eurofound identifies three models of female/maternal employment:  
- a continuous model, found in Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Latvia, and Portugal. In these 
countries, the participation rate of women is high and continuous over the life course, even 
during the childrearing phase. In France and Belgium, the situation is quite similar in terms of 
continuity, but the labor market participation level is lower. The high and continuous level 
observed in most countries is mainly due to extensive childcare facilities, especially in 
Denmark, Sweden and Slovenia, and in France and Belgium to a lesser extent. In Portugal and 
Latvia, on the contrary, mothers rather work out of financial necessity. It should be added that 
the continuous model is also predominant in North America: „Lifetime employment is now 
practically the norm among North American and Scandinavian women‟ (Esping-Andersen, 
2002c: 88). 
- a traditional model, is found in West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, as women 
strongly decrease their labor force participation once they have children, and do not increase 
their participation when their children start going to school. In Spain, Greece, Italy and 
Poland, mothers have low employment rates; however, employed mothers tend to work full-
time. A common pattern among all of these countries is a lack of childcare facilities. 
- a transitional model, in which women strongly reduce their working hours when they have 
pre-school age children, but then significantly increase their labor force participation when 
their children start going to school. In this cluster we find most post-socialist countries, 
especially Estonia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania; 
Austria, the UK, and East Germany also belong to this group of countries with a transitional 
model; in the latter five countries, however, the pattern is less pronounced, as mothers‟ 
employment increases when children go to school, but reach a lower level as in the former. 
The overlap between the 3-4 clusters of welfare states and the three clusters of female paid 
employment in a life-course perspective is only partial; nonetheless, some regularities can be 
stressed:  
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 12: Welfare regimes and their impact on the female employment pattern  
 Employment 
pattern 
Social-
democratic 
Mediterra-
nean 
Continental Liberal 
countries 
Other 
countries 
Continuous  Denmark, 
Sweden (2/3) 
Portugal (1/4) France, 
Belgium (2/6) 
  Slovenia, 
Latvia (2/11) 
Traditional    Italy, Spain, 
Greece (3/4) 
Germany 
(west), 
Netherlands 
(2/6) 
Ireland (1/2) Poland, 
Turkey (2/11) 
Transitional  Finland    Austria, 
Germany 
(east) (2/6)  
UK (1/2) Estonia, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, 
Hungary, 
Romania 
(7/11) 
Source: Eurofound, 2007, table created for the present work. 
Clearly, the social-democratic welfare regime, with its extensive childcare system, leads to a 
continuous model. A large majority of post-socialist countries exhibit a transitional model. 
The conservative cluster is more spread across the three types of female working time models; 
nevertheless, more than half of these countries display a traditional model (especially 
Mediterranean countries), whereas France and Belgium rather exhibit a continuous model due 
to better childcare facilities, while in Portugal this is due to financial reasons (mothers do 
have to work).  
It should be noted that Esping-Andersen, though underscoring some specificities in 
Mediterranean countries, notably a higher degree of familialism, does not think it is necessary 
to create a separate cluster for Southern European countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Patterns of maternal employment suggest that Southern European countries are not 
fundamentally different from other conservative Continental European countries, especially 
Germany. However, a specific Southern pattern is noticeable: Mothers tend either to be 
inactive or to work full-time, whereas in the rest of Continental Europe most mothers work 
part time. In addition, the level of expenses on family policies is much lower in Mediterranean 
countries.  
In addition, Southern countries rely much more on labor market regulation by law, and far 
less on collective bargaining than most Continental countries, with the notable exception of 
France. Eventually, I will use the following typology in chapters 6 and 7, as it appears to be 
the most appropriate for working poverty analyses:  
- Social-Democratic, exemplified by Sweden, a country in which it is mainly employment 
maximization through incentives and collective bargaining that explain working poverty 
levels and composition (even if social transfers are high, but mainly aimed at nonworking 
persons), 
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- Liberal, exemplified by the US, a country in which it is mainly an employment-maximizing 
strategy based on financial incentives to work and coercion, as well as complementing income 
in the form of tax credits, that explain the size and composition of the working poor 
population, 
- Conservative corporatist, exemplified by Germany. The size and composition of the 
working poor population is mainly explained by collective bargaining and by social transfers 
in the form of substitution income and family cash benefits,  
- Southern European countries, exemplified by Spain, experience a type of working poverty 
that is mainly explained by the fact that labor markets are strongly regulated and by the use of 
social transfers in the form of substitution income.  
In order to illustrate the difference between idealtypes and real cases, France is noteworthy. 
According to virtually all authors, this country belongs to the Continental cluster; however, it 
is a hybrid case in terms of the main approaches that underpin the fight against working 
poverty. The labor market is largely regulated by law, as unions only represent a small 
minority of workers and bargaining is conflictual (as in Spain). Employment maximization is 
not a priority: France has the shortest workweek among developed countries (according to the 
ILO working time database) and a low retirement age (which is being debated as of the 
writing); in this regard France clearly belongs to the Continental conservative cluster. In 
addition, France shares with Germany and many other Continental European countries its 
heavy reliance on substitution income. At the same time, however, the French state helps 
mothers combine work and family life thanks to kindergarten slots available for young 
children; moreover, among Continental countries, France has one of the highest shares of very 
young children in formal childcare. Put differently, France is not very different from 
Scandinavian countries in terms of work-family life conciliation.  
The following sections are devoted to the four countries that epitomize the four types of 
welfare regimes I will use in subsequent chapters.  
 
5.2 Sweden  
 
a) Main approaches to the alleviation of working poverty  
The main emphasis of this welfare regime is on labor market participation, notably through 
affordable state-provided childcare, parental insurance schemes, and active labor market 
policies. In Sweden, „the importance of waged work is emphasized as being the primary route 
out of poverty‟ (Jones, Burström, Marttila, Canvin, Whitehead, 2006: 421). Moreover, „Public 
childcare, available at low cost, provides poor families with a real opportunity as well as 
incentives to work‟ (Lindbom and Rothstein, 2004: 14). Particularly noteworthy is the very 
high female labor market participation, almost 73 percent in 2003 (Jones, Burström, Marttila, 
Canvin, Whitehead, 2006). In Sweden, as in other Nordic countries, „the pursuit of welfare is 
attached to a „crowding in‟ policy of maximizing citizens‟ employability and productivity‟ 
(Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 14). Scandinavian welfare states in general, and the Swedish one in 
particular, have promoted the right to work for everyone and have focused their policy on the 
maximization of labor force participation, rather than income transfer strategies like in 
Continental European countries. Sweden is a “universalist work-centered society” (Leibfried, 
2000), which is characterized by its reliance on the direct provision of services (Clayton and 
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Pontusson, 2000). This approach is pursued through a generous, state-financed social service 
provision, notably in the field of childcare and active labor market policies, financed by 
general taxation, while social insurance is mainly financed by employers‟ payroll taxes 
(European Commission‟s website, employment, social affairs and equal opportunities, 
MISSOC tables).  
As far as labor market policy is concerned, Sweden is, among the four countries analyzed 
here, the biggest spending country with 1.24 percent of its GDP spent on public employment 
services and administration, training, employment incentives, integration of the disabled, 
direct job creation and start-up incentives, whereas this share amounts to 1.15 percent in 
Germany, 0.72 percent in Spain, and 0.16 percent in the US (OECD, 2006) 
Family policies play a fundamental role in the Swedish employment maximization strategy, 
especially its very developed childcare services. Sweden has been a frontrunner in the 
development of publicly provided childcare, which is partly attributable to a shortage of labor 
in the 1960s (Lundin, Mörk, Öckert, 2008), and the fact that Sweden did not rely on 
immigration to fill the gaps. During the 1970s, mothers‟ employment grew from 30 to 70 
percent. As early as 1976, „the Government and the Swedish municipalities agreed to build 
100,000 childcare slots with the next five years, and a special Government grant was 
introduced to stimulate this growth‟ (Lundin, Mörk, Öckert, 2008: 647). Since 1995, the 
legislation obliges local governments to supply childcare to working parents (or full-time 
studying parents) within four months from parents‟ request. The price is largely subsidized, 
and in 2002, a major reform of childcare fees was implemented, with the introduction of a 
maximum fee, which substantially reduced childcare fees for most parents of preschool 
children (Brink, Nordblom, Wahlberg, 2007). After the reform, the average family paid only 4 
percent of its after-tax income on childcare (Lundin, Mörk, Öckert, 2008). All in all, Swedish 
mothers do not face a tough tradeoff between motherhood and employment.  
Sweden is also characterized by a very strong emphasis on collective bargaining, which is 
highly centralized and coordinated; there is no legally enforced minimum wage and 
„minimum wages are subject to bargaining between employers and unions…The agreements 
apply to all firms in the industry, whether the workers are unionised or not. In general, the 
minimum wages are industry-specific and nationwide‟ (Skedinger, 2006: 261). About 90 per 
cent of the employees in Sweden are protected by collective agreements. An important aspect 
deserves our attention, namely the very high unionization rates found in Sweden. This can be 
explained by the “Ghent system” of unemployment compensation: „Under this system, access 
to unemployment insurance benefits requires union membership‟ (Bonoli, 2006: 18). This 
implies that women, white-collar employees, part-time workers and workers with “atypical” 
contracts are highly represented in the labor movement. By contrast, most unions in 
Continental European countries tend to mainly protect older male blue-collar workers who are 
in the core workforce and public service employees (Ebbinghaus, 2006). 
b) Further aspects of the welfare regimes that have an impact on working poverty 
It should be noted that Sweden displays a high degree of employment protection. It was 
higher than in other Nordic countries in 1990; however, it has decreased ever since and is now 
comparable to the Finnish and the Norwegian level (OECD website, overall EPL strictness), 
which is above the OECD average.  
Social transfers, though generous in international comparison, are not the main tools in the 
fight against working poverty; however, they indirectly support many low-income workers by 
supporting a nonworking partner or a child. As will be clearly demonstrated below, social 
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transfers in Sweden also contribute to the fight against working poverty. Nonetheless, the 
main approach to the fight against working poverty is the maximization of labor market 
attachment combined with collective bargaining.  
Social transfers in Sweden reflect a strongly egalitarian ethos and universalist style (Goodin, 
Headey, Muffels, Dirven, 2000). Another very important intention is to emancipate 
individuals from dependency on the family (Jones, Burström, Marttila, Canvin, Whitehead, 
2006), in complete opposition to the Spanish welfare regime, as will be demonstrated below. 
In Sweden, redistribution plays a very important role by strongly reducing income inequality 
(Kenworthy, 2004). It should be noted that income replacement benefits in continental Europe 
are equally generous than in Scandinavia, whereas they require longer periods of labor market 
participation (Bonoli, 2007).  
The very large size of the public sector is also of paramount importance. Empirical evidence 
gathered by Armingeon demonstrates that, in the fight against new social risks, „the crucial 
variable is the size of the public sector. Generally, public-sector employees are in favor of 
welfare state expansion – probably since many of them work in labor or service intensive 
parts of the welfare state‟ (Armingeon, 2006: 119). Moreover, many well-paid low-skilled 
jobs are provided by the state (Iversen and Wren, 1998) and contribute to the shaping of the 
social stratification in Sweden (Esping-Andersen, 1993). 
In short, the combination of a compressed wage distribution, a high employment rate and a 
work-related welfare system, with high replacement rates for unemployment, sickness and 
disability compensation (Kenworthy, 2004), leads to the fact that Swedes who are in the lower 
income decile are better-off than their counterparts in many other European countries, and 
much better-off in purchasing parity terms than Americans in the lower decile (Freeman, 
1995). 
Interestingly, many institutions and services provided prevent the emergence of a large low-
income segment within the Swedish labor force; yet, none of them was specifically designed 
to combat working poverty, except for collective bargaining which aims at reducing the 
incidence of low-wage employment, an important poverty factor in the industrial era (Bonoli, 
2007). In fact, it could be said that the Swedes started combating working poverty before it 
emerged as a major social policy concern in postindustrial societies. It is fundamental to 
understand why Scandinavian countries have been frontrunners in combating new social risks; 
interestingly, the main reasons are not connected with exogenous macroeconomic shocks. 
Before World War II, Sweden's birth rate was one of the lowest in Europe, which was a 
source for concern. In addition, the timing of various sociodemographic and macroeconomic 
changes that are often included in the label “postindustrial changes” varies greatly across 
nations. Based on an index combining the share of service employment in total employment, 
the female employment rate, and the divorce rate, Bonoli demonstrates that Sweden entered 
the postindustrial era in 1970, the US in 1975, Germany in 1989 and most Latin European 
countries in the 1990s.  
In Sweden, the economic boom of the 1960s was accompanied by the emergence of second-
wave feminism and a strong representation of women in the labor movement and in the Social 
Democratic party and this resulted in a series of measures: „the implementation of mandatory 
individual taxation for married couples; universal provision of pre-school services for young 
children; and the right to work part time for six hours a day without loss of status for parents 
with pre-school children. In 1974 a statutory parental leave insurance was introduced' 
(Daguerre, 2006: 216). In addition, 'In countries that have entered the postindustrial age 
relatively early, new demands generated by the ongoing social transformations found 
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comparatively little competition...In contrast, in countries that have developed into 
postindustrial societies more recently, demands for protection against new social risk are in 
strong competition with demands for the preservation, in spite of population ageing, of the 
current level of protection provided' (Bonoli, 2007: 511). These are the reasons why Sweden‟s 
bulk of social spending on family policies is devoted to the provision of services and to 
generous parental leave schemes, while cash benefits are less important, quantitatively and 
qualitatively speaking. This is in sharp contrast with continental Europe. 
c) Shocks to the system: Globalization, deindustrialization and recent changes in the welfare 
regime 
Comparative welfare state research systematically emphasizes that Sweden spends nearly 
twice as much on its social policies, in percent of the GDP, as the United States. What is far 
less well documented is the fact that this enormous difference is a recent phenomenon, as 
some Anglo-Saxon countries which already had the leanest welfare states carried out a 
significant retrenchment, both in terms of expenditure and social rights, while in Sweden, the 
universalist nature of benefits and services created their own political support and made long-
term retrenchment difficult: „we find increased variation among different types of welfare 
systems in spite of exogenous pressure toward convergence‟ (Lindbom and Rothstein, 2004: 
3). Most of the main social security programs are related to work performance. But the 
political effect of work-related programs is largely similar to that of universal programs, 
namely a broad support among the population, as most citizens both contribute to the 
financing and can benefit from these programs. This also explains why support for social 
assistance schemes is largely negative in a country in which pro-welfare-state attitudes are 
very widespread. In fact, opinions on means-tested programs became increasingly negative in 
the 1990s (Bergmark, 2000).  
The 1990s, however, were years of change: „Sweden experienced the most severe macro-
economic crisis since the 1930s. Between 1990 and 1993…unemployment rose from 1.7 
percent to 8.3 percent…At the same time, large shifts occurred in the age structure that added 
to the demands placed on social policy programmes…Moreover, at a time when 
unemployment peaked…Sweden…received the largest waves of refugee-immigrants in 
modern history‟ (Palme, Bergmark, Bäckman, Estrada, Fritzell, Lundberg, Sjöberg, 
Szebehely, 2002: 329). Swedish governments instituted some important cutbacks in welfare 
programs in the 1990s: Eligibility rules were tightened, while replacement rates and benefits 
levels were reduced in almost all earnings-related schemes (Palme, Bergmark, Bäckman, 
Estrada, Fritzell, Lundberg, Sjöberg, Szebehely, 2002). The number of social assistance 
recipients increased; in 1998, 43 percent of social assistance recipients were in fact 
unemployed but not eligible for the unemployment benefit, a quite widespread feature among 
young adults and recent immigrants (Lindbom and Rothstein, 2004). Another cause was the 
fact that the proportion of children aged 0 to 17 years living in households with annual 
incomes under the level of eligibility for social assistance increase from 6 to 16 percent over 
the period 1991-1997 (Bergmark, 2000). Higher childcare fees were introduced, whereas 
there was an expansion in the number of children enrolled with 82 percent of 3-to-6-year-olds 
in childcare at the end of the decade (from 64 percent at the outset). An increased proportion 
of children are in private childcare centers, mainly middle and upper-class children.  
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, the wage solidarity policy through a centralized 
negotiation between the Swedish Labor Confederation (LO) and the Swedish Employers‟ 
Confederation (SAF) was undermined as early 1983; a decentralization of collective 
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bargaining took place, and this may partly explain the increase in the wage dispersion that 
took place in a recent past (Halleröd and Larsson, 2008).  
But after the economic crisis was over, replacement rates have been raised (Lindbom and 
Rothstein, 2004) and resources increased (Bergmark, 2000), and „the commitment to a high-
equality, high-employment society remains largely intact in Sweden, and as of the writing the 
effort can be judged rather successful‟ (Kenworthy, 2004: 136). For instance, despite reduced 
benefits, the level of social assistance in Sweden is at approximately two-thirds of an average 
wage (Jones, Burström, Marttila, Canvin, Whitehead, 2006). In addition, the crisis did not 
lead to women leaving the labor market and there is no evidence that older workers were 
pushed out of working life (Palme, Bergmark, Bäckman, Estrada, Fritzell, Lundberg, Sjöberg, 
Szebehely, 2002).  
However, even if the Swedish economy and welfare system seem to be back on track, some 
negative elements remain: The poverty rate increased between the mid-90s and the mid-2000s 
(OECD, 2008), and income inequality grew and temporary forms of employment have 
become more common (Palme, Bergmark, Bäckman, Estrada, Fritzell, Lundberg, Sjöberg, 
Szebehely, 2002, Bergmark, 2000); short-term employment is now the lot of more than one in 
six employees in Sweden, namely 17.5 percent in 2007, a 3 percentage points increase in ten 
years (OECD website, Labour statistics). Moreover, the level of earnings inequality in the 
mid-2000s is notably higher than in 1990, with the 9
th
-to-1
st
 earnings decile ratio increasing 
from 2.01 to 2.31 (OECD website, Labour statistics). However, the incidence of low pay 
measured as a share of median earnings (usually two-thirds) is still very low in international 
comparison; indeed, the increasing degree of earnings inequality mainly took place in the 
upper segment of income distribution, and real median wages increased by 22 percent over 
the 1990s, because there was a strong relative decline for public sector employees, which 
contrasted with a strong increase in the managerial wage in the private and public sector 
(Palme, Bergmark, Bäckman, Estrada, Fritzell, Lundberg, Sjöberg, Szebehely, 2002).  
More importantly, in-work poverty in Sweden is a quantitatively small, but growing problem 
(Halleröd and Larsson, 2008), a phenomenon that particularly affects young and single 
workers; the working poor rate is now slightly higher than in Germany (own calculations 
based on EU-SILC 2006 data). Finally, at the end of the 1990s, the overall costs and number 
of recipients of social assistance declined, but „long-term receipt of social assistance has 
established itself at considerably higher levels than ever before in modern times‟ (Bergmark 
and Bäckman, 2004: 426), and the yearly exit rates into work are low (Bergman and 
Bäckman, 2004). Even if the size of this group of welfare recipients is rather modest in size, 
this represents a growing number of persons durably excluded from the labor market.  
In summary, even though the generosity of the Swedish welfare regime is clearly above 
average, and poverty levels low, the expansionary phase of the Swedish welfare state is most 
probably over (Lindbom and Rothstein, 2004).  
d) Poverty, income redistribution and employment performance  
Interesting figures are provided by Notten and De Neubourg (2007), based on the American 
official poverty line adjusted with purchasing power parities (PPP): Sweden has a low level of 
“absolute” poverty, Germany‟s level is even lower; it is higher in the the US and much higher 
in Spain:  
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Table 13: Poverty incidence, measured with the US official poverty line in PPP, in 
percent 
  1995 2000 
France  8.4 6.5 
Germany 7.5 5.1 
Spain  29.1 19.1 
Sweden n/a 5.7 
United States  10.6 8.7 
Source: Notten and De Neubourg (2007) 
In relative terms, too, Sweden appears as a country with a rather modest poverty problem:  
Table 14: Poverty rates based on thresholds set at 50 and 40 percent of median 
disposable income (most recent wave, around mid-1990s, around mid-1980s, and mid-
1970s) 
Year Poverty rate 
(50 percent 
threshold) 
Poverty rate 
(40 percent 
threshold) 
Child poverty 
in two-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Child poverty 
in single-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Sweden, 2005 5.6 2.6 3.3 10.4 
Sweden, 1995 6.6 4.7 1.5 6.6 
Sweden, 1987 7.5 4.4 3.2 5.5* 
Sweden, 1975 6.5 2.8 2.3 3.4 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, 
http://www.lisproject,org/keyfigures.htm (as of September 28, 2008). 
* = Estimates based on 15 to 30 observations only. 
Child poverty is very low and does not exceed a proportion of one in ten among children 
living in single-parent households, an extremely low percentage in international comparison, 
because „For [lone parents], the ability to reconcile work and family life may be crucial if 
poverty is to be avoided‟ (Bonoli, 2006: 6). In Sweden, lone mothers have a very high labor 
force participation rate. This specificity of Scandinavian countries is mainly due to childcare 
services. A low child poverty rate is a logical consequence of having low poverty rates among 
the working-age population in general and among single mothers in particular, and high 
employment rates.  
Regarding “in-work poverty”, the share of workers who have spent at least six month in the 
labor market in the previous year and have a income lower than 60 percent of median 
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disposable income is similar to the percentage measured in Continental European countries, 
whereas slightly higher: 7 percent in Sweden (vs. 6 percent in France and 5 percent in 
Germany in 2006, Eurostat website, in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate). Even measured with a 
poverty line set at 50 percent of median income, and a definition including all workers, the 
working poor rate is slightly higher in Sweden than in Germany (5.3 and 4.4 respectively, 
own calculations with EU-SILC data 2006).  
The effect of redistribution on child poverty due to taxation and the benefit systems is one of 
the largest across OECD countries (poverty measured as having a household income lower 
than 50 percent of median disposable income, Whiteford and Adema, 2007). Focusing on the 
situation of working families, we get a good proxy of the impact of the Swedish redistributive 
system on working poverty: Child poverty among working lone-parent households is reduced 
by 83.3 percent (OECD average: 49.7 percent), among dual-earner families by 68.8 percent 
(OECD average: 39.3), among single-earner couples with children by 75.4 percent (OECD: 
43.0) (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). In fact, „If tax and benefit systems could be made as 
effective as… [in] Sweden, it is estimated that child poverty in OECD countries would be 
more than halved‟ (Whiteford and Adema, 2007: 28).  
In terms of labor market performance, despite the deep recession of the 1990s, Sweden 
displayed in 2000 the highest level of labor market participation and an unemployment level 
that was slightly higher than in the US but significantly lower than in Germany and Spain 
(OECD website, labor statistics). The harmonized unemployment rate amounted to 5.6 
percent, with an overall employment rate of 77.4 percent (civilian labor force divided by the 
population aged 15-64), and a female participation rate of 71 percent. Seven years later, 
before the worldwide recession began, the unemployment rate had slightly increased and 
amounted to 6.1 percent, and overall and female employment rates had increased too, with 
80.5 and 77.8 respectively. Moreover, the maternal employment rate (for mothers of children 
under 16 years of age) was much higher than in the other countries with 82.5 percent of 
mothers in employment. Of the four countries analyzed in this chapter, Sweden is the best 
performer in terms of participation rates, and second best in terms of unemployment levels.  
Hence, Sweden seems well equipped to face the challenges caused by postindustrial 
mutations: „Sweden has the most well established [new social risk] policies and has developed 
labour market activation through training, has supported access to employment…and has 
developed pension policies that combined funded and pay-as-you go schemes‟ (Kananen, 
Taylor-Gooby, Larsen, 2006: 85). In fact, only in the Social Democratic welfare regime did 
the poverty rates of the overall working-age population, of children and of single mothers 
decrease since 1980 (Huber and Stephens, 2006).  
e) Main difficulties and challenges  
In order to fully understand the functioning of a welfare regime, it is important to understand 
the main approaches that characterize it; it also important, in addition, to be aware of the main 
weaknesses identified in the literature. This is why I review them briefly for Sweden and the 
other three countries analyzed in the present chapter.  
The main problem for Scandinavian countries is that financing a large welfare state, „is made 
more difficult due to high capital mobility, the fiscal and budgetary constraints that ageing 
and European monetary integration impose, and increased political tax resistance‟ 
(Hemerijck, 2002: 185); as Esping-Andersen put it, „heavy tax requirements undoubtedly 
constitute a potential Achilles heel of the model‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 14). Kenworthy 
underscores the fact that „a long-term decline in employment could pose a threat to the 
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generosity of welfare states even in countries with relatively egalitarian preferences and 
institutions. The redistributive burden – the tax burden necessary to sustain generous transfer 
programs – in a country with continuously declining employment might eventually become 
unsustainable‟ (Kenworthy, 2004: 42). Moreover, the comparatively high wages at the low 
end of the distribution seem to constitute the main obstacle to job creation in the private-
sector consumer services (Kenworthy, 2004), but this is compensated by public employment. 
Hence, as long as the system remains financially sustainable, this should not represent a major 
problem.  
The Swedish welfare system was put to the test in the 1990s, as unemployment strongly 
increased when recession hit the Swedish economy, leading to a rapidly growing national 
deficit that put a huge pressure on government spending. Unfavorable socio-demographic 
changes, such as an ageing population and high numbers of political refugees arriving in the 
early 1990s, further increased this pressure. As already analyzed, the Swedish authorities had 
to implement welfare state cutbacks in order to reduce budget deficit (Bergmark, 2000).  
However, Sweden has neither witnessed a capital flight nor an investor withdrawal recently, 
and opinion survey data does not show any sign of rebellion against redistribution and taxes: 
The long-run pattern of public opinion shows considerable stability (Kenworthy, 2004). It 
should be noted, however, that this support has not always been constant, „In the period of 
relative affluence that preceded the recession of the early 1990‟s, popular support for the 
welfare state fell…At the same time, people became more negative towards central authorities 
and there was an increased opinion in favour of the privatisation of different 
services…[However, in the early 1990s] the onset of the financial crisis and the visible effects 
of rationing measures reversed all that‟ (Bergmark, 2000).  
 
5.3 The United States of America  
 
a) Main approaches to the alleviation of working poverty: 
The US is characterized by an employment-centered approach, i.e. by strict work 
requirements for welfare recipients and the provision of supplementing income to those who 
are compelled to work but do not earn enough to make ends meet. A “welfare-to-work” 
approach compelling welfare recipients to take any job available, the fact that there is a 
lifetime limit for benefit receipt of five years, as well as the fact that the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, a work-conditional tax credit, has become the main anti-poverty policy since the 1990s 
(Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001, Husby, 2000, Nagle and Johnson, 2006) with a much higher 
level of expenditure than the means-tested Temporary Aid for Needy Families (MaCurdy and 
McIntyre, 2004), are the most distinct dimensions of this “work first approach”. The welfare 
state is conceived as a work-enforcing mechanism (Leibfried, 2000).  
In the US, as in Scandinavia, the maximization of labor market participation is a priority; 
however, the services enabling a significant workforce participation must be bought in the 
market: „What Scandinavians are compelled to pay in taxes, their US equivalents are 
compelled to pay out of their own pockets‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 14). They are 
affordable to many households due to very low wage levels in the low-end service sector. 
However, low-wage workers may find it difficult to buy childcare services in the market and 
pay for other work-related expenses, and, hence, face disincentives to work. According to 
Schulman, child care for a 4-year-old in a child care center averages $4,000 to $6,000 a year 
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in cities and states around the country, and families with younger children face even greater 
costs (Schulman, 2000). This problem is partly solved by the very existence of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit as well as childcare-related credits, which aim at “making work pay” for 
lone mothers and low-skilled, low-wage workers. However, it remains problematic that, 
„Unaffordable childcare can be a serious poverty trap for low income families‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 2002b: 57).  
In fact the difference between an enabling approach of the maximization of labor force 
participation and a more “coercive” approach is not clear-cut. In Scandinavia too, there are 
constraints imposed on unemployed persons to follow training, and in the US the welfare 
reform of 1996 – The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), which replaced the main means-tested program named Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC, created by the Social Security Act of 1935) with a program 
named Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) - also emphasized the provision of 
childcare services and training for welfare recipients in order to improve their employability 
and life chances (Bryner and Martin, 2007).  
The name of the 1996 Act is revealing: The emphasis is put on both responsibility and 
opportunities. Among politicians too, there are different interpretations of workfare: „Large 
gaps remained between the liberal vision of “rehabilitative” workfare and conservative 
perceptions of “deterrent” workfare…”Making work pay” required that day care and health 
care be available to the working poor‟ (Pierson, 1994: 122). Likewise, states differ in the way 
they have implemented their reforms: 'Some states sought to help recipients gain basic 
education, receive job training, and learn other skills, including long-term effort where 
necessary. Others emphasized job placement and moving recipients as quickly as possible into 
the work force' (Bryner and Martin, 2007: 5-6). However, the US relies much more on a 
“work first” approach than Nordic countries, by putting more 'emphasis on manipulating the 
incentive structure they are faced with than on providing protection against new risks' 
(Bonoli, 2007: 497).  
As regards income transfers, the US anti-poverty approach for working-age persons and their 
children relies mainly on means-tested benefits. This is, of course, the case for welfare 
recipients; for the working poor, the main anti-poverty tool is a means-tested work-
conditional benefit that provides a supplementing income, namely the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. However, the breakeven point of the credit is set at a much higher level than the 
official poverty line. 
In summary, the main approach consists in getting as many disadvantaged persons as possible 
back into the labor market, and in providing those on low-wage employment with 
supplementing income sources in the form of a refundable tax credit. In addition, if the 
combination of earnings and tax credits does not suffice, workers are entitled to further 
means-tested cash or in-kind benefits, e.g. food stamps. 
It could be said, then, that the main postindustrial challenges have been regulated essentially 
by market mechanisms (Bonoli, 2006) with notable interventions of the Federal government 
and states in order to “make work pay” and compensate market imperfections.  
b) Further aspects of the welfare regimes that have an impact on working poverty 
The US has a lowly regulated labor market (according to the OECD‟s EPL index, the US has 
the least regulated labor market of all OECD countries) and a decentralized and uncoordinated 
type of collective bargaining. As analyzed above, there is a low federal minimum wage; 
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however, a growing number of states have implemented their own minimum wage, set at a 
higher level than the federal one. Moreover, some metropolitan areas have implemented 
living wage ordinances that force private companies commissioned by local authorities to pay 
wages above the legal minimum.  
In addition, it should be noted that having a systemic approach seems of paramount 
importance here, as „The socio-demographic composition of the U.S. work force is different 
from most European countries. There are more single adult (parent) households, but also more 
multi-earners households. The United States also has an earnings distribution that is totally 
different form virtually every European country‟ (Marx, 2008: 9). As will be shown in chapter 
6, employment-conditional benefits appear to have a very limited impact in Continental 
European countries, partly because the composition of the workforce and the distribution of 
earnings are very different than in the US.  
Overall employment performance has been strong for several decades, and the employment 
rate is high in international comparison, whereas unemployment levels have shot up during 
the economic crisis of the late 2000s. Contrary to what is commonly believed, the US 
economy did not mainly create low-skilled, low-wage service sector jobs: „a disproportionate 
share of the jobs created in the 1980s and the 1990s were in high-paying occupations and 
sectors…in the 1990s the distribution of new employment was U-shaped, with a relative 
shortage of job growth in mid-paying occupations‟ (Kenworthy, 2004: 143). 
Regarding female labor force participation, there is a strong emphasis on gender equality 
issues among workers: „Gender equality in the labour market has progressed faster than in 
other countries in recent years, also thanks to strictly enforced anti-discrimination legislation‟ 
(Bonoli, 2006: 11). In fact, the results regarding the reconciliation of work and family life in 
the US are quite similar to those achieved in Scandinavia, but the distributional consequences 
are fundamentally different across educational levels and income brackets. 
Regarding the tax and benefit system, contrary to Sweden, reducing income inequality is not a 
priority of the US welfare state; its goal is to improve the living standards of the worst off in 
society using targeted benefits (Goodin, Headey, Muffels, Dirven, 2000), a fact reflected, 
inter alia, in the low level at which the official poverty line is set. However, successive EITC 
expansions have led to the fact that households with income clearly above the poverty line 
also get a small benefit.  
c) Shocks to the system: Globalization, deindustrialization and recent changes in the welfare 
regime 
In the 1980s, when unemployment rates skyrocketed and reached two-digit levels, due to very 
heavy losses in industrial employment, „the Reagan administration tried to redesign welfare to 
include work requirements, [an approach] popularly termed “workfare”…Congress was 
receptive to the idea of increasing efforts to move welfare recipients back into the labor 
market…Concerns about welfare “dependency” had surfaced among liberals as well as 
conservatives‟ (Pierson, 1994: 116 and 121-122). At the same time, the EITC was 
considerably expanded in the Tax Reform Act of 1986: „Indeed, the EITC stands out as the 
great political success of the retrenchment era‟ (Pierson, 1994: 125). The next steps were the 
in-depth welfare reform of 1996 with the PRWORA already mentioned above, when 
Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) replaced the AFDC. The word “temporary” 
reflects a fundamental change in the program, as no one should receive welfare benefits more 
than five years during their lifetime (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001, Lindbom and Rothstein, 
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2004). The AFDC program had been subject to criticism for a long time, and „Among means-
tested programs, AFDC turned out to be most vulnerable in the 1980s‟ (Pierson, 1994: 118).  
In fact, the increase in the number of working poor since the mid-1970s made it increasingly 
unfair, for a majority of citizens, for the government to provide welfare recipients with 
benefits and services the working poor did not receive. In addition, a large share of the 
population does not expect the state to provide for these goods and services, as they have 
already bought them on the private market (Lindbom and Rothstein, 2004); means-tested 
welfare benefits became increasingly unpopular.  
States were given much more room for maneuver; some emphasized sanctions and shorter 
time limits while others put emphasis on incentives. A major shift in the structure of social 
expenditures took place, from 77 percent of total spending on welfare programs in 1997 to 44 
percent in 2002, while the proportion of spending on child care, training and education rose 
from 23 to 56 percent (Bryner and Martin, 2007). In fact, the US has experienced a profound 
paradigmatic shift, as the expansion of the EITC went accompanied with a severe tightening 
of welfare eligibility and several increases in the minimum wage.  
In recent years, a fundamental problem has been tackled, namely the lack of universal 
healthcare coverage, in a number of ways. In 1997, the federal government created the State 
Children‟s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), providing funds to states so that they can 
expand health care coverage through Medicaid or a separate program: “By 2000, thirty-seven 
states of the fifty states were providing coverage to children in all households with income up 
to 200 percent of the poverty line‟ (Kenworthy, 2004: 168). As of the writing of this chapter, 
a nearly universal healthcare program is being implemented by the Obama administration.  
d) Poverty, income redistribution and employment performance  
A closer look at the absolute poverty rates provided by Notten and De Neubourg (2007) leads 
to the conclusion that the United States has a non negligible share of its population suffering 
harsh financial poverty. The US poverty rate, measured with an absolute threshold set at the 
low official US level, is 71 percent higher than in Germany, and 53 percent higher than in 
Sweden, but notably lower than in Spain.  
The difference between the US, on one hand, and Germany and Sweden on the other, appears 
larger when it is measured with relative poverty lines. Indeed, based on relative indicators, 
America appears to have the biggest poverty problem among the four countries analyzed in 
the present chapter.  
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Table 15: Poverty rates based on thresholds set at 50 and 40 percent of median 
disposable income (most recent wave, around mid-1990s, around mid-1980s, and mid-
1970s) 
Year Poverty rate 
(50 percent 
threshold) 
Poverty rate 
(40 percent 
threshold) 
Child poverty 
in two-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Child poverty 
in single-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
US, 2004 17.3 11.4 13.5 48.5 
US, 1994 17.8 11.8 14.8 57.1 
US, 1986 17.8 12.4 16.1 62.8 
US, 1974 15.9 10.7 11.6 60.1 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm (as of September 28, 2008). 
Child poverty is notably higher than in Sweden, Germany, and Spain, whereas in the latter 
case the difference is less marked (see corresponding tables in the sections devoted to these 
countries). The incidence is staggeringly high for children living in lone-parent households: 
Half of them are affected by relative poverty. Some factors explain the incidence of poverty 
among single mothers: As of 2003, around 30 percent of single mothers did not work; this rate 
amounted to nearly 40 percent for never-married mothers (Sherman, Fremstad, Parrott, 2004). 
Many of these nonworking single mothers get TANF benefits. In fact, two-thirds of TANF 
families had only one adult recipient in 2000 (U.S. Departement of Health and Human 
Services, undated). In addition, the level of TANF benefits is set at a low level – in most 
states they amount to 20 to 40 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (Bryner and Martin, 
2007). The situation of working mothers is more enviable, thanks to the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, as will be evaluated in chapter 6.  
As far as “in-work poverty” is concerned, in the US case, obviously, I cannot use Eurostat‟s 
figures, nor my own calculations based on EU-SILC; however, the US bureau of labor 
statistics provides figures on working poverty in America. The official poverty line is, as 
already indicated, set at a very low level in international comparison (around 40 percent of 
median income in the early 2000s); nonetheless, around 5 percent of workers were poor in 
2003 (Bureau of labor statistics, 2003), which means that if Eurostat‟s in-work at-risk-of-
poverty rate was calculated, it would be very high. In fact, working poverty has been a source 
for concern since the early 1980s, as the working poor rate grew markedly in that decade 
(Levitan and Shapiro, 1988) and, 'since the 1980s, large numbers of workers have remained 
poor in periods of prosperity' (Gupta, Thornton Walker, Huston, 2007: 33).  
Regarding the impact of the tax and benefits system in the US, I consider the reduction in 
child poverty among working families as a proxy for the reduction in the working poor rate. 
For all working-family types, the poverty reduction effect is below average: -21.2 percent for 
single-parent households (OECD: -49.7), -23.6 percent for dual-earner families (OECD: -
39.3) and -16.7 percent for single-earner couples with children (OECD: -43.0 percent). It 
should be borne in mind that these calculations encompass the impact of the taxation system 
and, hence, take into account the effect of the EITC (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). However, 
it is fundamental to note that the poverty threshold used here is 50 percent of median 
disposable equivalence income, as in virtually all OECD studies. Let us remember that the 
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official poverty line in the US amounted to around 42 percent of median disposable income in 
2002 (Smeeding, 2005). Hence, when American researchers and policymakers make claims 
about “lifting people out of poverty”, it usually means lifting them above the “Orshansky 
threshold”, whereas most of them are still poor according to usual poverty lines used in 
comparative research. This partly explains the quite low impact of the tax system and cash 
benefits described in this section.  
It should be noted that welfare reform combined with the expansion of the EITC and a strong 
economy in the 1990s led to a drop in child poverty rate. The decline was particularly strong 
in single-parent families (see table 15).  
All in all, the US is the worst performer in terms of relative poverty, but the judgment is less 
negative when an absolute poverty line is used, as median income is high in this country.  
In terms of employment and unemployment, the US displays, according to the OECD labor 
statistics, good performances. In 2000, the harmonized unemployment rate amounted to 4 
percent only, and 4.6 percent in 2007, which makes it the best performer among the countries 
analyzed in the present chapter. Regarding the employment rate, the US ranked second just 
behind Sweden with 76.3 percent of the 15-64 years old in civilian employment in 2000 (1.1 
percentage point less than Sweden); however, during President Bush‟s two terms, 
employment stagnated and amounted to 75.6 percent in 2007, leading to a larger gap between 
Sweden and the US (4.9 points), as Sweden increased its participation rate over the 2000s. 
The same trend applies for female employment. As far as mothers are concerned, however, 
the differences are more marked: According to the OECD, as indicated above, more than 8 in 
10 mothers of children under 16 were held a job in Sweden in 2007, whereas this share 
amounted to two-thirds (66.7 percent) in the US. In short, among the countries analyzed in the 
present chapter, the US ranks first in terms of unemployment (lowest unemployment rate) but 
second in terms of employment, especially among mothers. In fact, the employment level 
among American mothers is similar than among German mothers (68.1).  
e) Main difficulties and challenges 
The main problem of the US welfare system lies in the way the unemployment problem of the 
1980s has been solved, mainly by deregulating the labor market and through retrenchment, 
even though the latter was not as severe as is usually thought (Pierson, 1994). Sure enough, 
the unemployment problem has been largely solved, contrary to many Continental European 
countries that still display high unemployment rates and low labor market participation rates 
(I do not comment the impact the worldwide financial crisis and the resulting downturn had 
from 2008 onwards, as it is too early to draw conclusions), but workers are exposed to the risk 
of being paid poverty wages - as in other countries with a strongly market-dependent wage 
determination, such as Britain and Switzerland (Bonoli, 2006).  
The drastic solutions applied in the US have led to a marked inequality upswing and an 
increase in working poverty and low-wage employment. Indeed, „Skill shortages, low wages, 
and poverty have produced cumulative cycles of social disadvantage and exclusion of 
vulnerable groups‟ (Hemerijck, 2002: 186). America‟s main problem is a high level of 
inequalities, which in turn can generate negative side-effects, in particular high crime rates 
(Kenworthy, 2004). This would not be a problem if there were more opportunities to climb 
the social ladder than in other countries (which is widely believed in the US); however, 
income mobility is very similar across affluent countries (Kenworthy, 2004, Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004). 
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It is fundamental to note that though the US has introduced specific policies that aim at the 
alleviation of working poverty, poverty levels among workers remain high in international 
comparison, as will be confirmed by my figures presented below. Moreover, working poverty 
has been a growing concern since welfare reform was implemented, as it was feared that 
former welfare recipients would merely enter working poverty; for instance, in Los Angeles 
county, almost 100,000 welfare recipients found work between 1990 and 1997, but 74 per 
cent of former recipients earned sub-poverty income (Joassart-Marcelli, 2005). 
In addition, the downside of the US‟s work first approach is that, „If benefits are work-
conditional, they do not help workless citizens…Also, work-conditional benefits may produce 
unwanted externalities, such as downward pressures on wages‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 15). 
The latter is limited by the statutory minimum wage. 
Maybe more preoccupying is the fact that more than one in five children live in a family with 
an income below 50 percent of median income (OECD website, society at a glance, mid-
2000s). Even if it is true that median income is high in the US, this phenomenon cannot be so 
easily dismissed. Indeed, this probably constitutes the main challenge the US has to face 
because, as already highlighted, a deprived childhood has detrimental effects on school 
performance, which leads to mechanisms of social reproduction of inequalities. Poor children 
are more likely to become adults who live on low income and need welfare-state benefits to 
make ends meet. However, as long as a majority of Americans believe that their country is the 
“land of opportunity”, which is largely a matter of ideology rather than the reality of income 
mobility (Alesina and Glaser, 2004, Kenworthy, 2004, Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992), this 
should not become a hot political topic.  
In sum, in a social investment perspective, the US has undergone remarkable changes in a 
recent past, with an increased generosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit and childcare 
subsidies, as well as the implementation of the SCHIP program. Nonetheless, levels of child 
poverty remain high in international comparison, and, in my view, more efforts need to be 
done to mitigate the reproduction of social inequality in the US. Indeed, a work-first approach 
alone cannot solve the problem of poverty among working families (Whiteford and Adema, 
2007): 'if the goal is to reduce poverty among families, welfare policies must interact with a 
host of other factors that determine how well that objective will be realized...It appears that 
states should focus more on rewarding work than punishing noncompliance' (Bryner and 
Martin, 2007: 18). 
More recently, a very deep financial crisis and the collapse of the housing market have caused 
a massive increase in unemployment in the US: Between the last quarter of 2006 and 
September 2009, the unemployment rate more than doubled (from 4.4 to 9.5 percent, OECD 
website, labour statistics). It is likely that this deep crisis will reveal the limitations of the 
“work first approach” in a context of high unemployment.  
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5.4 Germany 
 
a) Main approaches to the alleviation of working poverty  
Germany epitomizes non-Latin Continental Europe; one of the main characteristics of this 
group of countries is that, „Employment-linked social insurance protects well those with 
stable, lifelong employment. For this reason, countries that follow the insurance tradition have 
usually also introduced strong employment guarantees and regulations‟ (Esping-Andersen, 
2002a: 16). Likewise, Goodin et al. state that the „„corporatist welfare regime‟, founded in 
Germany in the 1880s, has contributory social insurance as its cornerstone…a quintessentially 
conservative mechanism, whereby you get what you pay for and pay for what you get‟ 
(Goodin, Headey, Muffels, Dirven, 2000: 172).  
This model relies on passive income maintenance for those who are not able to earn a living - 
be it because of a job loss, sickness, injuries, or disability - and strong job guarantees for those 
in work. This model tends to favor those who have a stable and continuous employment 
pattern. Hence, Germany is a typical strong breadwinner regime (Daguerre, 2006), and „For a 
century…[has] relied on a strategy of „paying off‟ problems, of subsidizing „exit‟ from the 
labour market or even „non-entry‟ ‟ (Goodin, Headey, Muffels, Dirven, 2000: 192), which has 
led to a “welfare without work” approach (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009).  
The level of social transfers is generous, in some instances even more generous than in 
Scandinavia, especially pension benefits: „The outstanding characteristic of Continental 
welfare states is the strong increase in old age benefits; by 1998 they even exceeded the 
spending level of Scandinavian countries in this field‟ (Armingeon, 2006: 106). Germany 
devotes a large share of its GDP to family policies, especially cash benefits, with significant 
increases in tax credits for parents in a recent past, as will be further analyzed below. The 
main goal is not to reduce inequalities, but to prevent poverty wages and maintain a certain 
income level in the event of earnings loss, so that Conservative countries mainly promote 
income stability, while Scandinavian countries aim at reducing income inequality (Goodin, 
Headey, Muffels, Dirven, 2000: 184). 
At the end of the 1990s, nine in ten workers with a pretransfer income below the poverty line 
(defined as 50 percent of average income) received social transfers, mainly child 
allowance/Kindergeld (63.8), unemployment benefits (22.2) and pensions (27.8) and housing 
subsidy/Wohngeld (11.5 percent) (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003). Obviously, in the case of 
unemployment and old-age benefits, the support to workers is provided indirectly by 
supporting nonworking household members. However, less than one in ten working poor (9.7 
percent) received social assistance, due to a low take-up rate caused by phenomena such as 
stigmatization, feelings of shame and lacking knowledge on the side of potential beneficiaries, 
as well as errors on the side of social workers, and practical aspects such as the opening hours 
of welfare services (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003, Boos-Nünning, 2000, Leu, Burri, Priester, 
1997).  
In Germany, industrial relations are fully autonomous from state intervention, and are based 
on collective bargaining (Hemerijck, 2002, Bonoli, 2006). Social partners play a very 
important role in the administration of the social insurance system. The coverage of collective 
bargaining was very high in West Germany (Bonoli, 2003a), and is still rather high in 
reunified Germany with approximately two-thirds of the labor force covered, which is, 
however, lower than in Spain and Sweden (International Labour Office, 2008). Trade unions 
tend to represent blue-collar, core-workforce male breadwinners as well as civil servants: 
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„Continental European union movements tend to be more dominated by male blue-collar 
workers, public employees with secure employment and older workers with seniority rights 
than those in the Nordic countries‟ (Ebbinghaus, 2006: 140).  
Minimum wages are defined in collective agreements, usually at the industry level. Extension 
laws exist, but they are used with much more parsimony than in France or Spain (Bonoli, 
2003a). For many years, collective bargaining between trade unions and employers in 
Germany was highly centralized and led to a high-wage economy with a low level of income 
inequality (Andress and Seeck, 2007) and a very low degree of labor conflictuality with few 
strike days (ILO website, database of labour statistics LABORSTA). German wages are high 
in international comparison, but high productivity levels have kept German firms competitive 
(Kenworthy, 2004). This strategy has led to a “high skill equilibrium” which explains the very 
weak development of the private service sector, notably personal services (Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2009).  
Contrary to Sweden and the US, the goal is not to maximize labor force participation: The 
employment rate drops sharply after age 55, and women under 35 years of age tend to display 
relatively low employment rates (OECD website, OECD family database).  
b) Further aspects of the welfare regimes that have an impact on working poverty 
The situation of mothers in Germany stands in striking contrast to that of Swedish mothers. In 
Sweden, a very important goal has been to help wage earners combine work and family life; 
in West Germany, on the contrary, 'social policy [assumes] that children should be looked 
after by their mothers and by compensating mothers for looking after them…For decades, 
West Germany was the exemplar of the male breadwinner model. Its tax system rewarded the 
one-earner marriage: There were generous transfers for mothers of young children to stay at 
home' (Anderson and Meyer, 2006: 173 and 175). Germany has a male-breadwinner biased 
social security rights and taxation system.  
As already mentioned above, Germany spends much more on cash benefits for families and 
much less on childcare services and parental leaves than Sweden; this can prove problematic 
because the provision of services in kind rather than benefits may be key to an European 
antipoverty strategy (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles, 2002). In fact, in Germany, 
„public childcare for children under 3 years of age is practically non-existent‟ (Giesselmann 
and Lohmann, 2008: 112). In 2005, the maternal employment rate was lower than in most EU 
15 member states and only slightly higher than in Spain (Source: OECD website, Family 
database). Employment has been on the increase among women, but so has been part-time 
employment between 1982 and 2000 (Anderson and Meyer, 2006).  
Cash benefits for families with children are generous, especially the non-earnings related 
“Kindergeld” (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003), a tax credit that does not phase out as earnings 
increase (Bäcker, 2000, OECD website, Family database). Other cash transfers also help, 
especially the income-tested “Erziehungsgeld” (child raising allowance) which is designed for 
parents who work less than 19 hours a week (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003) as well as the 
supplementary child allowance (Kinderzuschlag) which is paid to parents to prevent them 
from having to apply for unemployment benefit II/social welfare benefits only because of the 
maintenance of their children (OECD website, Family database). Overall, the level of 
spending on family policy amounts to around 3 percent of GDP and is nearly as high as in 
Sweden, and much higher than in the US and Spain (OECD website, Family database). This 
generosity, amongst other factors, explains why child poverty is not very widespread in 
Germany, as will be shown below.  
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Social policy in general and family policy in particular still entails aspects of the traditional 
family model. The organization of “half-day schools” (Halbtagschule) and of most childcare 
centers is revealing of the persistence of the male-breadwinner/housewife model (Fischer, 
2000), even if the housewife is, more often than not, a part-time worker. The proportion of 
part-time workers in Germany is high in international comparison. The existence of a very 
long maternity leave (3 years), as well as that of the aforementioned child raising allowance 
are further proofs of a conception of motherhood seen as a period spent out of the labor 
market (Butterwegge, 2000). Family and social policy clearly favor a model in which women 
completely give up their job and re-enter the labor market after a three-year period – or even 
longer (Bäcker, 2000).  
In summary, the German model is based on a husband working full-time and his wife part-
time (Andress and Seeck, 2007), i.e. a modified male-breadwinner model, and „the idea that 
mothers are primarily responsible for childcare has prevailed in Western Germany to this day‟ 
(Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008: 110). In the Eastern part of the country, however, women 
tend to work more than in the West; during the communist rule, women would usually hold a 
full-time position, and the dual-earner model was dominant in the German Democratic 
Republic (Andress and Seeck, 2007, Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008).  
c) Shocks to the system: Globalization, deindustrialization and recent changes in the welfare 
regime 
After the strong increase in unemployment in the 1980s and the 1990s, the adjustment of the 
welfare state to new social risks has often been prevented by the fact that an overly transfer-
biased policy is not well suited to combat mass unemployment and social exclusion: „The 
model is unusually vulnerable to employment stagnation and to high inactivity rates…The 
social insurance model is also inadequate in meeting the new risk structure because…it 
deepens the divide between insiders and outsiders‟ (Esping-Andersen, 2002a: 17 and Esping-
Andersen, 2002b: 32). Likewise, Bonoli states that, „the post-war settlement contained 
measures that turned out to protect [new social risks] groups, but also measures that 
contributed to excluding them form access to employment‟ (Bonoli, 2006: 25). In addition, 
postindustrial mutations emerged later than in the US and Scandinavia, at a time when the 
welfare state was already under strong financial pressure.  
Germany is characterized by a low adaptation to new labor market risks, as opposed to 
Denmark and the UK, for instance; in addition, legislative changes mainly affected those at 
the margins of the labor market, while the position of core workers was actually improved, 
and this trend has been reversed only recently (Clasen and Clegg, 2006). But employment 
regulation is not the only important point: Germany‟s main problem may indeed be its high 
level of payroll taxes that average 42 percent of gross wages (evenly split between employees 
and employers), compared to 15 percent in the United States, which may prevent job creation 
in the service sector (Kenworthy, 2004). 
In addition, in Germany, „change away from a corporatist labour market…is limited…owing 
to the capacity of the entrenched social actors to delay or prevent change‟ (Kananen, Taylor-
Gooby, Larsen, 2006: 84-85 and 90). 
However, Germany, which was seen as the “sick man of Europe” throughout the 1990s 
(Eichhorst and Marx, 2009), has experienced many far-reaching changes in a recent past. In 
recent years, “atypical” working conditions have developed through the deregulation of a so 
far rather “rigid” labor market, with a significant decline in the OECD‟s employment 
protection legislation index (version 1) between 1990 and 1998. However, the degree of 
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protection remains fairly high in international comparison (OECD website, EPL strictness). A 
series of far-reaching reforms, dubbed the Hartz reforms (named after the president of the 
commission that proposed them), have changed the philosophy that underpins the German 
welfare state. In 2003, the government introduced an employee subsidy in the form of a 
reduction in payroll contributions: Workers in jobs paying less than 400€ per month (called 
the “mini jobs”) were fully exempted from payroll contributions and employers only pay 5 to 
15 percent of this wage for the employee‟s pension (website of the German “Minijob-
Zentrale”), while those on jobs paying between 400 and 800 € (the “midijobs”) were partially 
exempted with low and linearly growing payroll taxes (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009, 
Kenworthy, 2004, Andress and Seeck, 2007, Jacobi and Kluve, 2006). 
The number of “mini jobs” increased markedly after the reform (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006), 
whereas the share of full-time workers with open-ended contracts, as well as the coverage of 
collective agreements including minimum wage levels, decreased in both parts of Germany 
between 1993 and 2003 (Andress and Seeck, 2007). In addition, labor market insiders‟ 
employment has also become more flexible; this flexibilization did not take place through an 
easing of dismissal protection, but rather through a liberalization of collective bargaining in 
the form of agreements with opening clauses (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009). Interestingly, the 
share of low-wage workers increased in the Western part of the country, while it decreased in 
the Eastern part (the former GDR). The share of fixed-term contracts, however, remained 
relatively constant. 
Another major change concerned unemployment benefits and social assistance that have been 
redesigned to reduce the disincentives to work they supposedly generated (Andress and 
Seeck, 2007); this was the fourth part of the Hartz reforms (dubbed “Hartz IV”). Compulsory 
unemployment insurance has existed in Germany since 1927, and was organized as follows at 
the time the reform was implemented: After a first period of perception of unemployment 
benefits (6 to 32 months) with a replacement rate of 67 percent, an unemployed person would 
get unemployment assistance with a 57-percent rate, without time limit. These relatively 
generous benefits were combined with high benefit reduction rates that taxed away most of 
the additional earned income of a benefit recipient; hence, incentives to take up a job were 
low (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).  
After the implementation of Hartz IV, an unemployed person receives a so-called “type I 
benefit” for six to twelve months and thereafter a lump sum means-tested benefit, the “type II 
benefit” (Kluve and Jacobi, 2006). In fact the former unemployment assistance and social 
assistance for those able to work have been merged into the type II benefit (ALGII), while 
social assistance (“Sozialgeld”) remains for persons unable to work (Christoph, 2008, Jacobi 
and Kluve, 2006, Eichhorst and Marx, 2009). In addition, sanction elements have been 
introduced, and the functioning of public employment services modified in order to operate 
more efficiently, and public job creation has been redesigned for merely targeting those who 
are very hard to place; for this latter group, wage subsidies paid to employers were also 
introduced (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).  
In a review of existing evaluations before the introduction of the Hartz IV reforms regarding 
the type II benefit, Jacobi and Kluve conclude that the impact on placement services was 
positive, as well as the impact of new training measures, wage subsidies to employers and 
temporary work deregulation; the evidence is more mixed for the midijobs and the mini jobs, 
even though a large number of minijobs were created. Jacobi and Kluve‟s conclusion is rather 
positive, „On balance, we… find that the Hartz reforms in their entirety seem to have 
contributed to a better functioning of the German labour market and the effectiveness of 
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specific active labour market policies‟ (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006: 26). Regarding the impact of 
non-standard employment forms, fixed-term contracts „often provide effective entry 
opportunities as they are used during qualification phases…or as extended probationary 
periods in particular in industry and private services…The potential of upward mobility is 
more limited with regard to Minijobs. There are strong disincentives to move to longer part-
time or full-time work due to the rapid phase in of taxation and social insurance contributions 
above the 400 EUR threshold‟ (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009: 19).  
Germany‟s unemployment rate has decreased in a recent past: As of April 2009, and despite 
the worldwide recession, Germany‟s unemployment level was below EU-27 average and very 
similar to Sweden‟s (Eurostat website). In summary, Hemerijck and Eichhorst state that 
„Germany shifted from a passive welfare state accommodating economic restructuring 
through long-term benefit receipt to one of the most ambitious and universal activation 
regimes‟ (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009: 22).  
Regarding the impact of Hartz IV, namely the restructuring and recalibration of 
unemployment benefits and social assistance, fears have been expressed that poverty might 
increase. Indeed, according to Eurostat, the poverty risk (income below 60 percent of median 
income) has been on the increase in Germany since 2005, from 12 to 15 percent (Eurostat‟s 
website, living conditions and welfare indicators), with a strong increase in the Eastern part of 
the country; earnings inequalities have increased too (Müller and Steiner, 2008).  
Family policy, however, has become more “generous”. Between 1991 and 2004, many tax 
allowances were increased, as was the tax credit for families (Kindergeld). As of 2000, child 
allowances represented 11.8 percent of the income of a family with two children relying on 
the earnings of a full-time industrial worker, while this share amounted to 4.7 percent in 1995 
(Andress and Seeck, 2007). Around 2000, family cash benefits represented 10.3 percent of 
disposable income in the lowest income decile (Whiteford and Adema, 2007).  
An important element needs to be underscored here: In the former GDR, a high number of 
companies went bankrupt and a large number of jobs were destroyed after the Reunification 
process (Offermann, 2000). Unemployment in Eastern Germany has been high ever since; in 
2007, while the unemployment rate in Baden-Württemberg (Western part of Germany) 
amounted to less than 5 percent, it exceeded 16 percent in former GDR regions such as 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Sachsen-Anhalt (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland‟s 
website).  
After the electoral loss of the Red-Green coalition in 2005, a “Grand Coalition” formed by the 
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats got to power. The new government took a 
more moderated stance on labor market reforms, reflecting growing concerns regarding 
widening inequalities (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009, Müller and Steiner, 2008).  
d) Poverty, income redistribution and employment performance  
Notten and De Neubourg‟s figures show that Germany had the lowest level of “absolute” 
poverty in 2000. Regarding relative poverty, the Luxembourg Income Study provides the 
following figures:  
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Table 16: Poverty rates based on thresholds set at 50 and 40 percent of median 
disposable income (most recent wave, around mid-1990s, around mid-1980s, and mid-
1970s) 
Year Poverty rate 
(50 percent 
threshold) 
Poverty rate 
(40 percent 
threshold) 
Child poverty 
in two-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Child poverty 
in single-
parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Germany, 2000 8.4 4.6 4.7 38.1 
Germany, 1994 8.2 4.5 5.6 41.0 
Germany, 1984 7.9 3.4 4.8 49.3 
Germany, 1973 6.7 3.6 3.3 28.8 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm (as of September 28, 2008). 
Relative poverty rates are low in Germany: They were slightly higher than in Sweden in 2000, 
but significantly lower than in Spain and in the US. More recently, poverty levels in Sweden 
and Germany have been very similar. The child poverty rate among two-parent families is 
very low; by contrast, around four in ten children living in single-parent households are poor, 
which is clearly the biggest difference between Germany and Sweden in terms of poverty 
outcomes. I get back to this point below. It should be noted that child poverty and working 
poverty are only loosely correlated in Germany, because more than half of poor families with 
children are jobless (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). 
Regarding “in-work poverty”, official figures show that Germany displayed the lowest level 
among the four countries analyzed in the present chapter in 2006 (Eurostat website, in-work 
at-risk-of-poverty rate). Even at the 50 percent level, and including all workers (contrary to 
official figures that only include those who have spent at least six months in the labor market 
in the previous year), the working poor rate was lowest in Germany (4.4 percent, own 
calculations with EU-SILC data 2006). It is noteworthy that full-time employment is an 
almost watertight protection against poverty: As of 2004, only 3.3 percent of full-time 
workers holding an open-ended contract lived in a household with an income below 60 
percent of median disposable income (Andress and Seeck, 2007).  
Regarding income redistribution among working families, the tax and benefit system displays 
a far above average efficiency for dual-earner families (poverty was reduced by 94.3 percent 
vs. 39.3 at the OECD level), but a below-average performance for single-parent households (-
39.6 percent vs. 49.7 at OECD level) and an average impact for single-earner two-parent 
families (-46.7 percent vs. 43.0) (Whiteford and Adema, 2007).  
In summary, among the four countries analyzed here, Germany is probably the best performer 
in terms of working poverty, whereas the difference with Sweden is only slight; moreover, 
Sweden performs better as far as single-parent families are concerned.  
Regarding employment performance, in 2000, the harmonized unemployment rate amounted 
to 7.5 five percent and increased to 8.4 percent in 2007. In a recent past, however, despite of 
the worldwide recession, Germany‟s employment performance has improved. The 
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employment rate is lower than in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, but higher than in 
Spain: In 2000, it reached 70.9 percent of the 15 to 64 years old and increased to 75.9 percent 
in 2007, a level slightly higher than in the US. One of the key differences between Germany 
and Sweden is the maternal employment rate, which is much lower in Germany (in 2007, the 
difference amounted to 14.4 percentage points), and not far above Spain‟s level (6.2 
percentage points), the country with the lowest level among the countries under review 
(OECD website, Family database, 2007). Another key feature, as in many other Continental 
countries, is the low participation rate of workers older than 55, which lies below the 50 
percent mark (48.4 percent in 2006, Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland‟s website). In terms 
of employment, then, Germany‟s performance is neither very good nor disastrous.  
e) Main difficulties and challenges  
One of the main Continental European problems lies in high fixed labor costs – due to 
payroll-based social insurance financing, notably Germany with payroll taxes that amount to 
more than 40 percent of gross wages (Kenworthy, 2004). Indeed, high payroll taxes have 
regularly been seen as the main culprit for Germany‟s modest employment performance in 
general (Andress and Seeck, 2007). In fact „Since the 1990s, Germany has shown to be unable 
to benefit from favourable conditions in the global economy‟ (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006: 5), 
with a GDP growth only half of that in the UK or the Netherlands. Recently, however, 
Germany, as many other Continental European countries (e.g. France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal) has introduced a reduction in social security contributions 
for low skilled workers. 
Another difficulty consists in the fact that „maximizing worker productivity may have resulted 
in a general „inactivity trap‟, whereby a virtuous cycle of productivity growth coincides with a 
vicious cycle of rising wage costs and exit of less productive workers, all requiring further 
productivity increases and eliciting another round of reduction in the work force through 
subsidized early retirement exit‟ (Hemerijck, 2002: 186). From a Bismarckian perspective, 
„the more you do to improve the material situation of the poorest among the workers, the 
scarcer jobs become, and the more people there are who are deprived of the privilege of 
having one‟ (Van Parijs, 2000: 355). For instance, Germany displays a notable deficit in 
consumer service jobs. This sector employs approximately five percentage points less of the 
working-age population than in the typical Anglo-Saxon country, and Kenworthy (2004), 
amongst others, thinks that high payroll taxes aggravate the impact of this high skill 
equilibrium.  
In addition, an ongoing problem is that trade unions in Germany tend to represent the core-
workforce, blue-collar male breadwinner and public-sector employees much more than other 
groups. Moreover, as the unemployment insurance is managed by the social partners, the 
inclusion of activation elements has been much more difficult.  
Moreover, gender issues remain subsidiary and the gap between core workforce breadwinners 
and other workers (“insiders” and “outsiders”) remains an important feature of the German 
welfare regime (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009).  
On the background of these structural problems, many Continental welfare states have 
undergone notable changes aiming at increasing labor market participation, not least in order 
to secure the sustainability of the welfare state (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009). The Hartz 
reforms have been far-reaching reforms going in this direction, but fears are expressed about 
increasing inequalities. Indeed, the share of low-wage employment increased strongly over 
the last decade (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009). 
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Finally, an ongoing challenge is to improve the situation in the former GDR. As already 
indicated, unemployment levels are much higher. Moreover, as of 2004, the poverty risk 
among workers was nearly three times higher than in the Western part of the country (15 and 
6 percent respectively, Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008). This is in large part due to the fact 
than in Eastern Germany, low-wage workers usually are primary earners, while in the 
Western part, they usually are secondary earners (and 79 percent of them are women). A time-
series analysis of working poverty and low-wage rates between 1991 and 2004 yields a 
correlation coefficient of r = 0.97 between low-wage employment and working poverty in the 
East and only r = 0.37 in the West (Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008).  
 
5.5 Spain  
 
a) Main approaches to the alleviation of working poverty  
Southern European countries share many features with other Continental European countries, 
notably the fact that they mainly rely on a passive approach based on substitutive income 
transfers and on employment protection, especially unemployment benefits and means-tested 
benefits for able-bodied working-age persons.  
In Spain, workers who have an open-ended contract are highly protected (Bonoli, 2003a). On 
the OECD‟s overall strictness of employment protection legislation index (version 2), Spain 
displays the fourth highest score behind Turkey, Portugal and Mexico (source: OECD 
website, overall EPL strictness); in addition, there is a statutory minimum wage (Salario 
Mínimo Interprofesional) set at 45 percent of median wage in 2008 (according to the OECD's 
website, labor statistics). Workers dismissed for “objective” reasons can get up to 12 months‟ 
wage; in the event of unfair dismissal, the maximum amount can reach 42 months‟ wages 
(OECD website, OECD indicators of employment protection). Moreover, though the 
unionization rate is lower than 20 percent, the degree of coverage of collective bargaining 
exceeds 70 percent (International Labour Office, 2008), thanks to extensions laws, imposing 
agreements to employers and workers who did not sign them (Bonoli, 2003a).  
 
The other major pillar of the fight against working poverty in Spain is the use of social 
transfers, which mainly benefit nonworking members of working households, such as 
unemployed adult children and/or an unemployed (or inactive) partner. Spain displays a 
relatively high aggregated level of social expenditure, namely 21.2 percent of its GDP in 2005 
(which is comparable to Norway or the UK), half of which is spent on old age and 
unemployment benefits, while expenditures on family benefits and active labor market 
policies amount to less than 2 percent of GDP (source: OECD social expenditure database). 
Spain has experienced one of the largest growth in social spending among EU countries, in 
purchasing power parties, between 1980 and 1993 (Guillén and Alvarez, 2002). 
Among social transfers, two benefits mainly contribute to lowering poverty among working 
families: unemployment benefits (and further subsidies), and minimum income schemes 
(rentas mínimas), both supporting unemployed or nonactive members of working households. 
The unemployment insurance offers generous benefits with high replacement rates (Zubiri, 
2007), namely 70 percent of reference earnings for a maximum period of 6 months (and there 
is no waiting period), then 60 percent of reference earnings for the remaining period of the 
benefits (which can last 24 months).  
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Minimum income schemes were introduced at the level of the autonomous communities 
(Comunidades Autónomas) between 1988 and 1995. The minimum income level is set at the 
regional level and ranges from 40.2 to 64.3 percent of the minimum wage, except for the 
Basque country (76 percent, Arriba González de Durana and Pérez Eransus, 2007); that is, 
their level is low. Indeed, even if minimum income schemes alleviate the difficulties of many 
poor families, they do not lift them above the poverty line (Pérez Eransus, Arriba González de 
Durana, Parrilla Fernandez, 2009). Many reforms of the minimum income schemes have 
taken place, with a growing emphasis on social inclusion and activation; however, the 
coverage and the expenses levels have remained nearly unchanged (Pérez Eransus, Arriba 
González de Durana, Parrilla Fernandez, 2009).  
b) Further aspects of the welfare regimes that have an impact on working poverty 
There is an important difference with the Conservative welfare regime: In Spain, the level of 
spending on family policies is rather low with less than 1.5 percent of GDP in 2005, a feature 
shared with other Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy and Malta), the majority of Central 
European countries, the US, and Switzerland. In the same year, for instance, France and 
Germany spent more than 3 percent of their GDP on family policies (source: OECD Family 
database). More generally, a familialist approach characterizes Spanish social policies 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles, 2002). In fact, 'the role 
played by the family in the Mediterranean regime constitutes one of its more characteristic 
traits' (Moreno, 2002: 1). Hence, I share the conclusion that Mediterranean countries 'seem to 
constitute a welfare state regime of their own. This league comprises Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
to some extent (southern) Italy' (Leibfried, 2000: 194).  
Other components of the Spanish welfare state are, contrary to family policy, very generous: 
Since 1986, a healthcare system financed by general taxes is provided “for free” to the entire 
population. Moreover, as already indicated, unemployment benefits are also characterized by 
high replacement rates. However, some elderly persons were not able to contribute the 
minimum years of service and only get assistance pensions, while many long-term 
unemployed have exhausted their unemployment benefits and receive minimal assistance.  
Another very important feature of the Spanish labor market must be put to the fore, and is, at 
least in part, a consequence of the very high degree of protection workers on open-ended 
contracts enjoy: Spain has the highest share of workers on short-term employment among 
OECD countries, namely 31.9 percent in 2007, a much higher share than in Continental 
countries such as France (13.7) and Germany (14.1, OECD website, labor statistics), a figure 
that skyrocketed after the modification of the Workers Status Act in 1984 (Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores, Ruesga, 2007). Many analysts consider Spain as an extreme case of 
dualization. However, while a majority of workers under 30 hold a fixed-term contract, the 
incidence decreases markedly after that age (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009).  
The Spanish labor market can be seen as a long waiting queue, which leads us to the 
fundamental role played by the Spanish family and the correlated implicit intergenerational 
pact: Children have a long and hectic pattern of integration into the labor market, but they live 
with their parents who hold well-protected jobs (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009). Most people 
leave the parental home in their thirties (García Espejo and Ibáñez Pascual, 2007). As a 
consequence, compared to EU average values, Spain displays higher average household size 
(Gutiérrez Palacios, Guillén Rodriguez, Peña-Casas, 2009).  
The role of the family is, as already mentioned, very important. Traditionally, Spanish 
institutions have favored the pater familias, which largely explains the very high degree of 
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employment protection. The role of the family has undergone profound changes in recent 
years; however, it remains very important (Moreno, 2002, Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009). 
Cultural values play a role, and so do the institutional framework and the economic situation, 
and it is difficult to disentangle the influence of these three factors. For instance, a low level 
of spending on family policy partly explains the type of conciliation of work and family life 
observed; simultaneously, however, it is important to note that 'state intervention in family 
matters brings back memories of authoritarian policies during Franco's dictatorship' (Moreno, 
2002: 3). In the 1980s and the 1990s, grandmothers have played a fundamental role by 
helping their daughters to combine work and family life. Likewise, the drop in the fertility 
rate can be partially explained by the fact that young workers struggle to find a job with an 
open-ended contract and live with their parents for a long period of time, which postpones 
family formation; however, the fertility decline is also attributable to changes in people's 
values and lifestyles and a relaxing of religious codes (Moreno, 2002).  
c) Shocks to the system: Globalization, deindustrialization and recent changes in the welfare 
regime 
A fundamental aspect is often neglected, namely that Spain is a young democracy (as are 
Portugal and Greece) that emerged, at the end of the seventies, from four decades of 
dictatorship. As clearly demonstrated by Amartya Sen, the absence of freedom is an obstacle 
to economic development and arguably one of the main poverty factors (Sen, 1999). The 
emergence of a social dialogue in Spain can be dated back to 1978, when the political 
transition occurred (Ruesga, 2007), with a relatively large share of the labor force still in the 
agricultural sector and a recent industrialization.  
Put differently, Spain faced simultaneously the challenges of the transition to democracy, on 
one hand, and de-industrialization and globalization, on the other hand (Garrido and 
Gutiérrez, 2009). Unemployment skyrocketed from 4.5 percent in 1975 to 21 percent ten 
years later, because the labor market was totally inflexible, a high proportion of the labor 
force worked in the agriculture, many companies were inefficient but were protected by tariffs 
and export subsidies, and the average educational level was low (Zubiri, 2007).  
Given this point of departure, some achievements are quite impressive: European Union 
membership, an immense increase in the employment rate (+14.4 points between 1996 and 
2007, Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009), especially among women who represented 41.2 percent 
of the workforce in 2007, whereas they only made up 27.5 percent of the labor force when 
Franco died (source: OECD website, labor statistics), a large increase in the number of 
persons with tertiary educational level (+150 percent between 1996 and 2007) combined with 
the retirement of a large share of persons without post-compulsory education - this 
combination has sometimes been dubbed the "educational overturn" - and the partly 
correlated massive influx of immigrants, a more than 900 percent increase over the same 
period, to fill the gaps in low-skilled occupations (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009).  
In summary, Spain experienced far-reaching transformations within a short time span and 
entered the postindustrial era in the 1990s (Bonoli, 2007). As Zubiri put it, 'In the last thirty 
years, Spain has undergone a radical political, economic and social change. Dictatorship has 
been transformed into democracy, a closed overprotected and underproductive economy has 
given rise to a modern and highly competitive economy, and a country with low social 
expenditure has been turned into a very generous welfare state' (Zubiri, 2007: 382). Indeed, 
the main characteristic of the evolution of the Spanish welfare regime over the 1990s and 
2000s is an increase in social spending and many reforms.  
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Between 1996 and 2007, employment increased by a stunning 7.5 million persons, a 
phenomenon some called the "Spanish miracle", which appeared to have been partially due to 
unsustainable factors (Felgueroso and Jiménez, 2009, Arellano and Bentolila, 2009). 
However, though many low-skilled and precarious jobs were created, an analysis of the 
occupational composition of the labor force between 2000 and 2008 shows no trend toward a 
deterioration, with the strongest increases in senior corporate and public sector managers, and 
other higher-level occupations (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009). The share of short-term 
contracts remained fairly constant, while gross earnings inequality and the share of low-wage 
workers decreased (OECD website, labour statistics). In the Spanish case, it is impossible to 
identify a general relationship between labor market performance and trends in earnings 
inequality, in line with analyses at the OECD level (Gutiérrez Palacios, Guillén Rodriguez, 
Peña-Casas, 2009, Kenworthy, 2004, Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000).  
However, an increase in relative poverty took place between the mid-90s and the mid-2000s 
(OECD, Growing Unequal 2008, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures). This is 
most probably due to the strong increase in real median income (LIS Key Figures and 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística's website, Indice de Precios de Consumo (Base 2006)).  
The main factors that have contributed to the massive decrease in unemployment and increase 
in employment until 2007 are an above-average economic growth, wage moderation, a 
reduction in firing costs - which remain, nonetheless, high in international comparison - and a 
more efficient economy (Zubiri, 2007). Overall, Mediterranean countries have achieved some 
of the biggest employment gains since the mid-1990s, and female employment is rapidly 
catching up to Northern European averages (Hemerijck and Eichhorst, 2009). However, the 
crisis of the late 2000s gave a massive blow to these positive developments, as discussed 
below.  
d) Poverty, income redistribution and employment performance  
In absolute terms, measured with the "Orshansky poverty line" adjusted with purchasing 
power parities, the poverty rate was, in 2000, more than twice as high as in the US and more 
than three times as high than in Germany and Sweden (Notten and De Neubourg, 2007). It is 
noteworthy, however, that a very significant decrease took place over a short period of time, 
namely a 34-percent decrease between 1995 and 2000, and that this difference probably 
further decreased until the beginning of the recession of the late 2000s, given the strong 
economic growth that characterized these years.  
In relative terms, differences between Spain and the other three countries are less pronounced:  
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Table 17: Poverty rates based on thresholds set at 50 and 40 percent of median 
disposable income (most recent wave, around mid-1990s, and 1980) 
Year Poverty rate 
(50 percent 
threshold) 
Poverty rate 
(40 percent 
threshold) 
Child poverty 
in two-parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Child poverty 
in single-
parent 
families (50 
percent) 
Spain, 2000 14.2 7.6 N/A N/A 
Spain, 1995 13.7 8.4 16.6 34.0 
Spain, 1980 12.1 6.7 12.3 21.5 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm (as of September 28, 2008). 
It is noteworthy that relative poverty is less widespread in Spain than in the US, while the 
poverty rate is notably higher than in Germany and Sweden. Regarding child poverty among 
single-parent families is slightly lower than in Germany, whereas it is much higher among 
two-parent families. This in part due to relatively low female labor force participation rates 
and to a redistributive system that appears to be less efficient than in Continental countries, as 
analyzed below.  
The fact that the difference between Spain and the other three countries analyzed here is more 
marked in absolute than in relative terms is due to important differences in income levels: In 
2000, real median income in Spain amounted to 12,718.46 € (approximately $12,188 as of 
mid-June 2000), less than half the amount in the US with $27,168.50 (Source: OECD website, 
Social and welfare statistics); even accounting for purchasing power parities, this difference is 
very large (OECD website, purchasing power parities for private consumption).  
Regarding the “in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate”, Eurostat‟s figures for 2006 show that the 
incidence of in-work poverty is noticeably higher in Spain (10 percent) than in Germany (5 
percent) and Sweden (7 percent, source: Eurostat website). I reach similar conclusions with 
my own calculations based on SILC 2006 data, with the poverty line set at 50 percent of 
median disposable income and an encompassing definition of “working”: They show that the 
working poor rate is notably higher in Spain (6.9 percent) than in Sweden and Germany (5.3 
and 4.4 percent respectively).  
As far as income redistribution is concerned, unfortunately, Whiteford and Adema's report 
(2007) does not contain data on poverty reduction among working families in Spain. As an 
imperfect proxy, I compare Eurostat's pretax/pretranfer at-risk-of-poverty rates with the 
corresponding posttax/posttransfer rates and obtain the following results:  
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Table 18: A comparison of pretax/pretranfer and posttax/posttransfer poverty rates in 
2006 
  
Pretax/ 
pretransfer, in 
% 
Posttax/  
posttransfer, in 
% 
Poverty 
reduction in % 
Germany 26 13 -50.0 
France 25 13 -48.0 
Sweden 29 12 -58.6 
Spain 24 20 -16.7 
Source: Eurostat website, as of September 28, 2008  
Obviously, these results include nonworking households, and, thus, only allow a crude 
comparison with Whiteford and Adema‟s findings presented above for the US, Germany and 
Sweden. Nonetheless, I get an interesting picture: Poverty reduction is highest in Sweden, 
followed by the two Continental countries, and poverty reduction in Spain is much lower. 
Interestingly, then, Spain has a strict employment protection legislation but a low degree of 
redistribution; as Bonoli put it, 'Countries that developed strong employment protection have 
welfare states that perform little vertical redistribution' (Bonoli, 2003a: 1013-1014). This 
leads to the conclusion that the Spanish welfare regime relies heavily on labor market 
regulation in the fight against working poverty (and on families in the event of a difficult 
integration into the labor market).  
In terms of employment and unemployment, Spain is the worst performer among the four 
countries analyzed here. Employment rates are lower, especially female labor market 
participation. The participation rate of mothers of children under 18 remained low in 
international comparison in 2008 (nearly four in ten mothers did not work, OECD website, 
labor statistics). Regarding unemployment, among the four countries analyzed here, Spain 
displayed, by far, the highest level at the turn of the century, but the gap was closed with 
Germany in 2007 (8.3 and 8.4 percent respectively). However, the unemployment rate has 
massively increased in Spain since 2007 – it more than doubled – while the German level 
remained surprisingly stable.  
e) Main difficulties and challenges  
Continental European countries face, as already indicated, a difficult challenge posed by the 
grim employment prospects of low-skilled workers in a service economy. The Southern 
European labor markets face an even trickier situation, because they are "very insider biased" 
(Hemerijck, 2002). It should be noted, in addition, that Mediterranean countries spend much 
less on "new social risks" than Germany, France, and Scandinavian countries (Bonoli, 2007). 
Apart from the very strict regulation of firing and hiring and other practices, another aspect of 
employment protection in Spain is sometimes subject to criticism, namely the structure of 
collective bargaining deemed inefficient by some authors (Felgueroso and Jiménez in 
FEDEA, 2009). Spain's unionization rate is low (18.1 percent in 2001), and more than twice 
as high among employees with open-ended contracts than among those on fixed-term 
employment contracts (Simón, 2003). Moreover, and maybe as a consequence of these 
features, conflictuality is rather high in the Spanish labor market, with a high number of strike 
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days over the last two decades (ILO website, LABORSTA); however, the number of strikes 
has been decreasing in a recent past.  
Another preoccupying problem is the total fertility rate, one of the lowest in the EU (1.38 in 
2006, source: Eurostat, website, total fertility rate), which is partly attributable to the labor 
market integration of young adults: Many persons in their thirties still live with their parents, 
as indicated above, which significantly shortens the period during which young Spaniards can 
consider having children, a feature shared by other Southern European countries. This 
certainly does not tell the whole story, however, as cultural factors mentioned above also play 
a role. Moreover, part-time employment is rather marginal in Spain and many mothers have to 
combine full-time employment and domestic activities; young mothers usually do not leave 
employment, in striking contrast to their German counterparts. Women with higher 
educational levels who have an access to better jobs sometimes choose not to have a second 
child (Moreno, 2002). The decline in fertility has been sharp and fast: For women born in 
1950, Spain displayed one of the highest fertility rates. Among women born in 1965, the 
fertility rate was one of the lowest at the OECD level (OECD website, Family database).  
Moreover, social security contributions are rather high, as the total rate amounts to 36.95 
percent of gross earnings for the averaged paid workers in 2004, whereas this level is lower 
than in Germany with 41.1 percent (Zubiri, 2007) and social security contributions have 
remained remarkably stable over the last 30 years, despite the relatively high level of 
pensions. However, contrary to Germany's equirepartition, Spanish employers pay 82.81 
percent of total social security contributions.  
In Europe, countries with low expenditure on active labor market policies, rigid labor markets 
and high earnings inequality tend to display the highest working poor rates (Gutiérrez 
Palacios, Guillén Rodriguez, Peña-Casas, 2009). Spain has the second most "rigid" labor 
market of the EU; in terms of earnings inequality measured by the 9th-to-1st decile ratio, 
Spain is in the same ballpark as the UK (in 2002, according to the OECD website, Labour 
statistics); however, its level of spending on active labor market policy is comparable to that 
of many EU countries, with 0.8 percent of GDP in 2005 (OECD website, social expenditure 
database).  
Last but not least, while all developed economies have been affected by the financial crisis 
that started in the US and the resulting recession, Spain is particularly hard hit, which is partly 
due to idiosyncratic factors. Between February 2008 and February 2009, the EU experienced 
an increase of 3 millions in the number of unemployed; half of this increase took place in 
Spain (El País, April 26, 2009): The unemployment rate reached 17.4 percent in April 2009, 
while it amounted to 8 percent in the third quarter of 2008 (Eurostat website, Employment 
and unemployment database).  
In fact, employment in Spain has been strongly cyclical in recent decades; however, there are 
particular aspects in the current crisis. Even if it is true that many jobs have been lost, a good 
part of the evolution in a recent past is rather due to a strong increase in labor supply. As 
already indicated, immigration increased massively in order to fill the gaps in the lower 
segment of the labor market (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009); however, this influx does not 
seem to have had a major impact on the employment of native workers (Felgueroso and 
Vázquez, 2009, Carrasco, Jimeno, Ortega, 2004). The main culprit is a construction bubble 
that burst, which had an extremely detrimental impact (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009). 
Between 1997 and 2008, the number of housing units increased by 5.7 million; in the third 
quarter of 2007, the construction industry represented 13.3 percent of total employment. The 
demand increased due to the economic expansion, as well as to a strong reduction in mortgage 
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interest rates. There was a strong increase in housing prices that were overestimated. A 
significant part of this overvaluation was attributable to speculative behaviors: People would 
buy houses and apartments as a form of investment, hoping that prices would keep on 
increasing at a fast rate. Once the bubble burst and prices plummeted, a massive decrease in 
the number of jobs in the construction industry and related activities led to a dramatic increase 
in unemployment (FEDEA, 2009). 
 
 
Having now identified promising tools in the fight against working poverty and analyzed the 
four countries that epitomize the four clusters of the welfare regime typology I have decided 
to use, I can now proceed to the empirical work. Chapter 6 is based on a meta-analysis of 
evaluations of specific policy tools, while chapter 7 deals with the impact of welfare regimes 
on the composition of the working poor population and on the three mechanisms that lead to 
working poverty among workers. 
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6 Evaluation of Existing Programs 
 
In chapter 4, I have presented the main tools that can be used to fight working poverty and 
analyzed their potential employment and antipoverty effects. These effects must now be 
evaluated. Since there is, for most policies assessed here, a large body of evidence available, 
the empirical contribution of the present chapter consists in a meta-analysis of systematically 
identified and retrieved empirical studies published over the period 2000-2010 that provide 
empirical estimates of the impact a given policy has on poverty and employment. This meta-
analysis consists in a weighted vote-counting procedure that allows drawing overall 
conclusions based on significance tests.  
Moreover, as I am also interested in the way these policies operate in the “real world” of 
social policy, findings are also broken down by welfare regime, and accompanied by a more 
qualitative and detailed examination of results allowing to account for national contexts: 
Labor market performance and composition, other social policies and labor market 
regulations, and, whenever possible, business cycles and economic evolutions. This paves the 
way for the next chapter that assesses the overall impact of welfare regimes on the three 
working poverty mechanisms and, hence, on the size and composition of the population of 
low-income workers.  
The main policies that have been identified as potentially efficient anti-working poverty tools 
are the following:  
-        minimum wages, legally enforced or through collective bargaining 
-        tax credits for workers,  
-       cash transfers towards families  
-        the provision and cost of childcare services. 
But before meta-analyzing each policy, it is necessary to precisely define how the evaluation 
of each policy will be carried out.  
 
6.1 Research synthesis 
 
Attempts to synthesize empirical findings are not new in social sciences. In the early 1900s, 
British statistician Karl Pearson was asked to review the evidence on a vaccine against 
typhoid. He found 11 studies devoted to this topic and calculated, for each one of them, the 
statistic he had recently developed, namely the correlation coefficient, and then calculated the 
mean value of these measures (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001, Cooper, 1998). However, it 
was not until the 1970s that researchers began to develop systematic methods for reviewing 
evidence in order to replace traditional, qualitative literature reviews; indeed, „Until 
recently…social science methodologists paid little attention to how investigators ought to 
find, evaluate, and integrate past research‟ (Cooper, 1998).  
The massive development of social sciences over the twentieth century and early 2000s has 
generated an immense corpus of books, articles, conference proceedings, position papers, 
working papers, etc. (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001). Moreover, the recent development of 
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efficient search engines, scanning within a few seconds the content of thousands of journals, 
has facilitated the development of research synthesis.  
6.1.1 Literature review, research synthesis and meta-analysis 
Many terms are used interchangeably to describe the activities analyzed here: literature 
reviews, research synthesis, and meta-analysis, amongst others.  
The label meta-evaluation is also used at times, but it may have various and conflicting 
meanings. In some instances, it relates to the research activities aiming to produce a 
meaningful synthesis of existing empirical researches (see e.g. Ashworth, Cebulla, Greenberg, 
Walker, 2003), but more often than not it refers to a different kind of scientific endeavor. In 
the latter case, meta-evaluation consists in evaluating the quality of evaluations: The main aim 
is not primarily to synthesize findings and average size effects, but rather to assess the 
methodological quality of experiments and evaluations, by assessing the utility, feasibility, 
accuracy, systematicity, integrity, respectfulness and social responsibility of a research 
program (Stuffelbeam, 2001). Some authors examine whether the evaluation of the quality of 
evaluations is value-free or not (Nilsson, Hogben, 1983), which in my view appears to be an 
extremely ambitious goal. In fact, the evaluation of the reliability of  the findings stemming 
from the studies submitted to a meta-analysis is a key stage of any research synthesis; but 
meta-evaluation appears as a more specific task than meta-analysis or research synthesis.  
Literature review is a very broad term, and can encompass both theoretical reviews, as found 
for instance in the third and fourth chapters of the present work, as well as research syntheses 
which focus on empirical studies of a specific relationship between variables of interest. The 
term research synthesis is more specific, and more accurately fits the empirical work 
described in the present chapter. Meta-analysis is even more specific, whereas it is often used 
as a synonym of research synthesis or research review, but it implies the use of quantitative 
procedures in order to combine study results (Cooper, 1998, Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, Cooper 
and Hedges, 1994).  
Meta-analysis can be seen as a statistical approach similar to that used in usual primary 
quantitative research, the statistical unit being research findings (significance tests, directions 
of relationships, size effects) rather than individuals, households, institutions, companies, and 
other units primary research usually examines.  
The stages of a meta-analysis are the following (Cooper, 1998): First, as in any other kind of 
empirical research, a research question must be formulated. In this chapter, the research 
question is always the same: Does a given social policy (or labor market regulation in the 
case of minimum wages) efficiently combat poverty without having a negative impact on 
employment? Indeed, there are two questions in one here, but they are treated separately in 
the meta-analysis presented below. Moreover, there is a corollary question in the event of a 
positive answer: Where does it work and for whom? Put differently, could it work in another 
country or for other sociodemographic groups?  
Second, an important phase consists in a literature search based on scientific search engines, 
which corresponds to fieldwork or data collection in primary research, which means that this 
phase must be as systematically and rigorously conducted as usual fieldwork. The approach 
used here is not based on a randomly selected sample of articles, but it is an exhaustive data 
collection, as all articles that seem to answer the research question are reviewed.  
The third phase consists in evaluating the data gathered, a stage comparable to what 
researchers normally do when they inspect their database in search of values that are not 
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plausible, or sets of values that are not coherent, or variables that contain too many missing 
values. In the case of a meta-analysis, the idea is to assess the quality of the estimates and the 
degree to which methodological and statistical details are provided (Cooper, 1998, Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001, Cooper and Hedges, 1994).  
Finally, once data has been gathered and its quality evaluated, estimates can be submitted to a 
statistical treatment. This latter stage is what characterizes meta-analysis, and, as any other 
statistical analysis, can take the form of either descriptive statistics or inferential statistics.  
6.1.2 Conceptual issues and operationalization  
An important difficulty research synthesists face pertains to the operationalization of 
concepts. On one hand, the existence of different operationalizations of the same concept 
constitutes a challenge in terms of findings comparability. In fact, it is often complicated to 
aggregate descriptive evidence because social scientists use different scales to express their 
findings. On the other hand, this variety of operations can also be perceived as having the 
potential of stronger inferences (Cooper, 1998), as it may allow more robust conclusions by 
giving various perspectives on the same topic, which is doubtlessly one of the pros of meta-
analysis. Cooper thinks that the only general recommendation that can be made is to begin the 
literature search with the broadest conceptual definition in mind, leaving the possibility to 
restrict the sample at a later stage of the meta-analysis (Cooper, 1998).  
An obvious example in the present research pertains to the definition of poverty and the 
evaluation of antipoverty effects: Some studies measure the impact of social policies on the 
headcount ratio (with poverty lines ranging from the very low US official threshold to the 
much more “generous” EU official at-risk-of-poverty line, which is defined in relative terms), 
while others use poverty measures that also account for the depth of poverty and even for the 
severity of poverty (for instance the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index with         )8, 
that is, whether poor families have, on average, an income slightly below the poverty 
threshold or, on the contrary, way below it, and in the case of severity indicators, whether 
income inequality among the poor population is weak or strong. Moreover, some studies draw 
conclusions on the impact a measure has on poor families‟ disposable income, stating that 
policy x increases disposable income by y percent of by a certain amount of dollars. This can 
lead to the conclusion that policy x significantly reduces the poverty gap; however, it is not 
possible to determine whether it significantly reduces the headcount ratio, i.e. the incidence of 
poverty. In some evaluations, it is the probability of escaping poverty in the following year 
that is assessed.  
Similar variations exist in evaluations of the potential employment effects of various policies, 
sometimes measured with employment rates and employment-to-population ratios, sometimes 
with conditional probabilities to hold a job at time t given the situation in year t-1, and 
sometimes in terms of hours per week or weeks per year.  
6.1.3 Systematic collection of relevant studies and choice of relevant findings 
Many synthesists advise to use a predefined coding sheet, whereas the degree to which this 
advice must be applied depends on the size of the corpus of articles that has been gathered. In 
the present work, given the very specific nature of the research questions and the limited time 
                                                          
8
 As indicated in chapter 2, the FGT-index measures, for each poor person, the distance 
between her or his household‟s disposable income and the poverty line. This indicator 
includes an aversion coefficient, α; if α=0, the FGT indicator equals the headcount ratio, if 
α=1, it measures the poverty gap (or the depth of poverty), and if α=2, it measures the severity 
of poverty.  
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horizon defined (the 2000s), the coding sheets presented in appendix B have been redefined 
many times until they were deemed completely satisfactory, as it was not too demanding to 
reorganize the findings of a relatively limited set of studies.  
An important aspect of data collection is, obviously, the use of scientific search engines, 
which have revolutionized meta-analysis by allowing very far-reaching searches. In addition, 
they allow reducing the impact of subjective factors that may lead a researcher to 
subconsciously omit some publications, thereby increasing the reliability of findings. In what 
follows, a predefined procedure has been established, providing a nonsubjective approach 
based on four search engines, as the use of multiple resources appears to be the most efficient 
strategy. The use of various keywords is also advised, and approach that has been applied in 
the present work (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  
The approach presented here contains one important source of bias, namely the language used 
by the authors, implying that some important pieces of evidence may have been missed. It is 
common to exclude studies that are not written in English (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001), 
especially in comparative research. It is possible that significant results obtained in non-
English speaking countries are not reviewed (Delgado-Rodriguez, 2001). One attempt has 
been made to partly reduce the impact of this bias in the third phase of the article search 
described below, namely the use of Google scholar for specific purposes, based on the other 
languages that I can read, namely French, German and Spanish. This allowed the 
identification of some interesting articles. But obviously, a further step might be taken by 
using scientific search engines that allow identifying articles written in German, French and 
Spanish in a more systematic fashion.  
Another practical aspect pertains to problems in library retrieval (Cooper, 1998). Some 
documents of potential importance are not available at the library a synthesist uses. In my 
case, I have an access to two universities‟ online journals retrieval systems (University of 
Lausanne and University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland), and the number of articles I could not 
retrieved was quite marginal. To the extent that the number was very small (never more than 
three articles for a given policy) and that the journals that were not available did not seem to 
have anything in common, which excludes any systematic bias, I do not account for the 
missing articles. However, to be absolutely accurate I should have attempted to obtain these 
few articles by other means, for instance through a direct contact with primary researchers, 
but the extra effort requested was not deemed justified given the small amount of articles at 
stake.  
Another problem of availability pertains to missing information and missing data; a few 
articles do not display some regression findings (coefficients, t-values or standard errors) but 
mention findings in a general form: For instance, a variable is added in the regression model, 
and the author only mentions that results remained virtually unchanged without any mention 
of the coefficient nor of the standard error.  
A fundamental step is, obviously, to assess whether all the identified articles are based on 
reliable and relevant methodologies. In fact, as opposed to primary studies, there is only one 
criterion (beyond error in recording) for discarding data, namely the validity of the study‟s 
method (Cooper, 1998). I did not exclude studies a priori, but rather evaluated the pertinence 
of articles ex post and excluded studies that were either purely descriptive (that is, that do not 
contain regression-based or microsimulation results) or based on very small samples (less 
than 1000 observations, which is very rarely the case in the kind of evaluations reviewed 
here). Moreover, personal comments found in the summary tables in appendix A, which 
sometimes pertain to the quality of an empirical estimate, are always preceded by my initials 
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(EC) to clearly distinguish them from comments made by the authors. Likewise, the decision 
not to include a study in the meta-analysis in mentioned in the tables presented in appendix A, 
as well as a justification of the decision.  
However, it is important to underscore that the judgment on the relevance and validity of a 
study‟s results is colored by the evaluator‟s predispositions. Studies of evaluator agreement 
about research quality are mentioned in Cooper‟s book (1998): Seven studies are described, 
one of which carried out by Cooper himself, and lead to the conclusion that agreement on 
judgments of methodological quality is less than one would think, due to personal biases. 
There is indeed relatively little agreement among social scientists about what methodological 
quality is, and „methodological quality is something that seems to exist largely in the eye of 
the beholder‟ (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001: 22).  
Interestingly, for instance, Neumark and Wascher (2007) state, in their widely quoted 
literature review, that they do not give much credit to studies of the employment effects of 
minimum wages that rely on a “natural experiment approach”; it happens that most of this 
research stream does not find any significant disemployment effect of minimum wages, a 
position against which the authors of this literature review have fiercely fought in a recent 
past by publishing (together or separately) a large amount of articles showing that minimum 
wages have significant negative effects on employment of various groups of workers, in line 
with neoclassical theory. Whether or not this hostility only reflects a self-confidence based on 
statistical evidence deemed convincing enough by the authors, or whether their personal 
values, subconsciously, also play a role, is impossible to assess. What is interesting in their 
work, apart from the very broad and encompassing scope of their review, is that Neumark and 
Wascher display intellectual honesty by also mentioning the studies they deem less 
trustworthy, that is the ones that do not find any disemployment effect or even find positive 
effects and are based on natural experiments, thereby allowing the reader to draw own 
conclusions.  
I have applied this principle in this chapter. In so doing, I take into account Cooper‟s advice 
not to exclude studies a priori, an approach that is probably „too subjective to be trustworthy‟ 
(Cooper 1998: 84). This opinion might not be accepted by all researchers, however. Some 
have criticized this conception of no a priori exclusion of studies based on a poor 
methodology on the grounds that it does not allow a better understanding of the phenomenon 
studied, because of the “garbage in - garbage out” principle (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001, 
Cooper 1998). Indeed, including good, bad and indifferent studies may be subject to criticism: 
„Proponents of meta-analysis pride themselves on the inclusiveness of the method, rejecting 
the notion that bad studies should be excluded as “subjective”. Yet…inclusion of bad studies 
may completely subvert the true outcome of a hypothetico-deductive analysis‟ (Eysenck, 
1994: 791).  
Basically, there are two main dimensions for an a posteriori examination, namely internal and 
external validity. Put differently, the first dimension pertains to the quality of the 
methodology (population, statistical method, data quality, etc.), whereas the second concerns 
the degree to which the study‟s findings can be generalized (sample size and representativity, 
standard errors, confidence intervals, etc.).  
The present work provides tables containing relatively detailed summaries of the studies 
reviewed in appendix A, allowing the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about the 
evidence, my main concern being transparency and intellectual honesty. Based on these 
summaries, other tables that contain estimates rather than article summaries – the 
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overwhelming majority of articles contain more than one estimate – were produced and 
submitted to a statistical analysis (see appendix B).  
Authors usually agree on the main elements these tables should contain (Cooper, 1998, Lipsey 
and Wilson, 2001, Ashworth, Cebulla, Greenberg, Walker, 2003): A report identification, in 
the present work an abbreviation of the authors‟ names and the publication year, the setting of 
the study, here mainly the country and the policy assessed, the subjects of the evaluation, here 
the population group studied, the methodology, namely regression-based findings or 
microsimulation results, and, obviously, statistical outcomes or effect sizes. Other elements 
are mentioned, but they pertain to experimental evidence, which is absent from the meta-
analyses presented in this chapter.  
Regarding the choice of the estimates included in the meta-analysis, I made the decision to 
only include results from the main specifications and their main variations, whereas results 
from models that were only specified to assess findings robustness are not reported in the 
vote-counting tables, but if, and only if, this intention is explicitly stated by the author(s). 
Moreover, when an article provides econometric models with and without macroeconomic 
controls (GDP growth, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, etc.), only the models including 
economic controls have been kept, as it has been shown above that the economic situation, 
business cycles in particular, can have a decisive impact on poverty. Finally, some US articles 
contain regional estimates that were reported in the summary tables; in the vote-counting 
procedure, however, as US studies are largely represented, these regional findings were 
dropped.  
6.1.4 At the heart of meta-analyses: The statistical treatment of findings  
Until recently, research synthesists did not systematically apply standard statistical techniques 
to their data. As indicated, growth in the amount of research and the development of 
computerized retrieval systems have been two major changes in social sciences that have 
revolutionized research synthesis. Hence, the introduction of statistical procedures into 
research synthesis has become a necessity, and another major change. This introduction of 
statistical tools can be called meta-analysis (Cooper 1998). Modern meta-analysis has become 
more and more interested in quantifying the effects identified in the literature, rather than 
identifying whether or not the relationship between variables exists. This means that meta-
analysis, in a restrictive sense, only applies to empirical research studies that produce 
quantitative findings, and aims at integrating information about the effect sizes (Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2002). 
There are two main sources of variation across studies, namely sampling error, on one hand, 
and methodological differences and/or different sample compositions, on the other hand. 
Meta-analysts have access either to information that can be used to calculate size effects, 
and/or information about whether a test found significant relationships, and/or information 
about the direction of the effects. Vote-counting procedures are useful for the second and the 
third types of data (Bushman, 1994). More sophisticated techniques are necessary for 
synthesizing size effects.  
Vote-counting methods 
The simplest methods for integrating findings are vote-counting methods, which take into 
account the statistical significance and/or focus on the sign of the estimates (Bushman, 1994). 
Basically, the synthesist classifies findings in three categories: Statistically significant 
findings that have the expected direction, usually named positive findings, statistically 
significant findings in the unexpected direction (negative findings), and nonsignificant 
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findings (Cooper, 1998, Bushman, 1994). „The synthesist then would assert that the category 
with the largest number of findings tells what the direction of the relationship is in the target 
population. This vote count of significant findings has much intuitive appeal and has been 
used quite often‟ (Cooper, 1998: 116). The conventional vote-counting procedure counts the 
number of times the three above mentioned categories appear, and the modal category is 
declared the winner (Bushman, 1994). 
It appears, however, that this strategy is very conservative and often leads the synthesist to 
conclude that the relationship does not exist, especially when counting the number of 
nonsignificant findings. An alternative vote-counting method consists in comparing the 
frequency of significant positive and significant negative findings, with a statistical test based 
on the assumption that the number of positive and negative findings is equal, but as it ignores 
nonsignificant findings it may have a low statistical power. A third vote-count approach 
consists in counting negative and positive effects regardless of the significance, which has the 
advantage of using all findings.  
A sign test can be performed (Bushman, 1994, Cooper, 1998), and the test statistic can be 
defined as follows (Cooper, 1998):  
Z= 
   
 
 
  
 
 ,  
Z follows a standard normal distribution, with Np the number of positive findings (i.e. 
findings that have the expected direction). With a confidence level of 5 percent (error type I), 
the critical value is 1.96; for 1 percent it is 2.58.  
Another way to perform this test is to check the assumption that      , with   the 
proportion of “positive” results in the population. An estimator of   is p, the number of 
positive results in k independent studies, and then the tail area is found from a binomial 
distribution table (Bushman, 1994). The sign test can be used in a vote count of either the 
simple direction of all findings or the direction of only significant findings.  
In what follows, the expressions “negative” and “positive effects” have a different meaning 
that relates to the effects various policies have on employment and on poverty. If a study 
examines the antipoverty effects of a policy, the result is deemed positive if this policy 
reduces the poverty rate or the poverty gap; a study examining the employment effects of a 
policy is deemed to have positive effects if employment increases, or unemployment 
decreases.  
Vote-counting procedures have been criticized for not taking account of sample size; 
however, as sample size increases, the probability of obtaining a significant result increases. 
In addition, „this method does not allow the meta-analyst to determine whether a treatment 
“wins by a nose or in a walkaway” ‟ (Bushman, 1994: 194); that is, this procedure does not 
provide estimates of the effect size. Third, when effect sizes are medium to small, the 
conventional vote-counting procedure usually fails to detect any effect.  
These drawbacks have led to the development of more refined meta-analytical techniques.  
More sophisticated meta-analysis techniques 
A vote-counting procedure does not attempt to evaluate the magnitude of the effect, which 
prevents the synthesist from answering the “how much?” question. Still, vote-counting 
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methods appear as an „informative complement to other meta-analytic procedures and can 
even be used to generate an estimate of the strength of a relationship‟ (Cooper, 1998: 119).  
The most advanced statistical procedures used for meta-analysis weight findings according to 
their sample size, for instance by using the inverse of the standard error, so that studies that 
have more accurate estimates - that is, smaller standard errors - are given more weight. In 
addition, if several findings come from the same study, the meta-analyst may want to weight 
them less than a finding that is the only contribution of another study (this weighting is also 
applied in the vote-counting procedure presented below).  
Detailed meta-analysis requires information on the number of findings, the directional 
outcome of each finding and sample size. The key concept in this kind of approach is the 
effect size, which necessitates defining a common metric for all studies based on a 
standardization of findings: The effect size statistic must be the same across studies (Lipsey 
and Wilson, 2001). Another key element is the standard error, that is, the standard deviation 
of the sampling distribution; its identification can at times be technically challenging. These 
standard errors are used, as already mentioned, to weight study findings.  
Some research designs, such as those found in experimental studies, are easy to quantify, as it 
is a simple difference between the experimental and the control group, for instance using the d 
index:  
x1-x2
SD1+SD2
2
  , with SDi the average standard deviation.  
Odds ratios are also often used in the context of experimental research. If the findings have a 
quantitative nature, correlation coefficients can be calculated.  
In more complex research designs, such as those found in most evaluations reviewed in the 
present work, other metrics have to be used. For ex post evaluations based on regression 
models, the findings can be expressed in terms of elasticities (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 
2009). Sometimes, however, it is difficult to calculate them, for instance if the outcome is not 
the employment rate, but the probability of being in employment in year t+1 conditional on 
being in the labor force in year t in a logit or probit specification.  
In fact, multivariate analysis results in general, be it multiple regression, discriminant 
analysis, factor analysis, structural equation modeling, etc., are difficult to transform into a 
size effect statistic. In fact, „multiple regression results cannot generally be represented in an 
effect size statistic…Meta-analysts have not yet developed effect size statistic that adequately 
represent this form of research finding‟ (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001: 16). Even though 
standardized regression coefficients are provided in the standard outputs of many statistical 
softwares, the varying sets of independent variables across regression models complicates 
their synthesis. Multivariate effects are problematic for meta-analysis (Eysenck, 1994). Other 
findings reviewed below are derived from simulations for which it seems difficult to estimate 
an elasticity (it might be possible if a large number of scenarios were tested, which is usually 
not the case). Hence the most recent meta-analysis techniques are not easily used for the kind 
of evaluations reviewed in the present work.  
Another complex step consists in analyzing variance in effect sizes across findings, that is, the 
meta-analyst must pay attention to violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variances, 
which require, usually, a weighted least square regression.  
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Finally, some meta-analysts go even further in order to adjust findings to their needs. For 
instance, findings that are deemed too extreme (outliers) can be windsorized (Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001), or biases due to a small sample or to measurement errors can be corrected. 
6.1.5 Difficulties facing meta-analysts 
A fundamental problem in meta-analysis is the “apples and oranges” problem. Ideally, 
samples/populations and “treatments” should be comparable, but they vary strongly across 
studies (Eysenck, 1994). Indeed, meta-analyses often summarize results from studies that vary 
notably in their operationalization of variables and are based on very different type of samples 
of various population groups. However, „It can be argued…that it is a good thing to mix 
apples and oranges, particularly if one wants to generalize about fruit, and that studies that are 
exactly the same in all respects are actually limited in generalizability‟ (Rosenthal and 
DiMatteo, 2001: 68). A related problem is the above mentioned “garbage in-garbage out” 
phenomenon, due to the fact that studies do not have similar quality standards. Some meta-
analysts advocate some kind of “quality weighting” (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001); 
weighting findings according to their standard error being one of these methods.  
Another important aspect of meta-analysis is the independence of estimates (Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001). A single study may contain multiple tests of the same relationship, either 
because there are various measures of the same phenomenon, for instance in an article using 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator with various values of  , say 0, 1 and 2, or because 
different subsamples might be used in the same study, e.g. a first estimate is based on all 
families, another on single-parent families only, a third on couples with children, and a fourth 
on childless couples.  
Statistical units can be the studies themselves, samples or estimates/comparisons. If the 
statistical unit is the study, the meta-analyst will have to average estimates for each study. 
This is not the option chosen in the present work. If samples, usually population groups, are 
the analyzed units, the meta-analyst should weight their impact by the sample size; moreover, 
in some studies, some results pertain to the entire sample and other to certain subsamples, for 
instance single mothers in general and single mothers without a high school diploma in 
particular. In such cases, units are not independent. A third option is to take the estimates of a 
relationship as the statistical unit; likewise, if several estimates stem from the same study and 
the same population, the assumption that estimates are independent will be violated, which 
can be a problem for meta-regression techniques (as it requires more sophisticated regression 
models that correct for these violations of technical assumptions).  
Other important aspects are common to all quantitative studies, be they primary studies or 
meta-analyses, namely the problem of missing data and outliers. If some important 
information is missing, for instance the specifications of a regression model that is central to 
the analysis or if the estimated effect is surprisingly large. In such cases, I clearly mention the 
problem in the tables presented in appendix A.  
Other potential problems need to be underscored here. Some authors mention the existence of 
a publication bias: In the case of the minimum wage literature, studies showing that minimum 
wages have a significant negative impact on employment may be more likely to be published 
(Card and Krueger, 1995, Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009), as they are in line with 
neoclassical, mainstream economics. One way to detect this bias is to draw a funnel plot, i.e. a 
scatterplot of precision versus estimated effect, e.g. of the inverse of the standard error versus 
the elasticity. If the scatterplot is asymmetric, this is taken as evidence of a publication bias 
(Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009). Another noteworthy difficulty is the “file drawer 
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problem”: It seems that studies that produce significant effects are more likely to be written-
up and published (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  
The bottom line is that the most persistent criticism of meta-analysis concerns the diversity of 
the studies reviewed, and the fact of applying statistical techniques to studies that are hardly 
comparable – the above mentioned apples and oranges problem – leading to an aggregate 
statistical measure that can be a relatively fuzzy “grand mean effect size” (Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001: 8), however sophisticated its calculation might be.  
6.1.6 Why is meta-analysis better than traditional literature reviews? 
Given the difficulties enumerated above, one may wonder why it is important to carry out a 
meta-analysis, that is, to perform a statistical analysis of the estimates contained in the articles 
retrieved.  
To start with, it should be noted that traditional reviews are also confronted with the problem 
of comparing apples and oranges, due to the use of evaluations that vary greatly in terms of 
countries, population groups, sample size, estimation techniques, operationalization of both 
the policy variable and the effect variable, etc. Hence, this problem is at the heart of any 
research synthesis. However, in my view, the use of statistical techniques helps reduce the 
uncertainty associated with this scientific endeavor.  
Probably one of the main advantages of meta-analysis is to provide objective decision 
criteria. A problem associated with any research synthesis is that most evaluations do not 
provide crystal-clear results; the impact of a given policy may be positive for a group of 
workers and negative for another group. This is not completely surprising in many cases, as 
some groups of workers are expected to react to the incentives provided by the policy, while 
others are not supposed to. Moreover, and this is usually more difficult to interpret, some 
specifications yield significant results, while others do not; in some evaluations, results 
stemming from different specifications can even have the opposite sign. For instance, adding 
a time trend, or an interaction term, or a quadratic term, and adding further control variables 
to the model can strongly affect results, and these differences are not always easy to interpret.  
In addition, the variable of interest can be measured in various ways; e.g. in the case of the 
minimum wage, relevant indicators include the Kaitz index, the share of the workforce 
affected by a rise in the minimum wage, or the level of the minimum wage; conclusions may 
vary depending on the definition of the policy variable. Likewise, different operationalizations 
of the dependent variable are conceivable; e.g. the antipoverty impact can be measured in 
many ways, such as the change in the poverty rate, the change in the odds of being poor in 
year t+1, the change in the income-to-needs ratio, the change in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
index, etc., and results may depend on the operationalization of the dependent variable. 
Moreover, some studies contain a large number of estimates, because many models are 
calculated, while other studies are based on more complex regression or microsimulation 
models and contain fewer estimates.  
These difficulties are particularly problematic for traditional literature reviews. Hence, 
statistical techniques contribute to the clarification of certain problems. For instance, using a 
weighting procedure that takes into account the number of estimates contained in each 
evaluation can reduce a first bias: A qualitative review may lead to biased interpretations if 
one study contains a large number of estimates that confirm one of the researcher‟s 
hypothesis, while a sophisticated simulation that contains only one result contradicts it. The 
researcher may be tempted, subconsciously, to infer that there is more evidence that confirms 
his or her hypothesis than that which infirms it. However, this high number of similar findings 
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may be the result of slight modifications of the same regression model based on the same 
dataset. Hence, I think it is very important to weight results according to the number of 
estimates per article. In addition, many researchers advocate to weight results according to the 
accuracy of the estimates – typically by using standard errors.  
Moreover, as overall results are usually fuzzy and difficult to synthesize (Kluve, 2006), using 
a significance test allows the researcher who employs a vote count procedure to draw 
conclusions that are not subjective: The test is either significant or not. Hence, the test is a 
clear indication concerning the interpretation of the results (most articles are positive, most 
articles are significant, etc.): Do they really say something about the impact of a policy, or 
should this majority be interpreted with caution? Hence, in the present work, I have 
systematically used conditional formulations when results were not significant.  
Finally, it should be noted that a meta-regression is better than the type of vote-counting 
procedures I have used here, but its purpose is different. It is better in the sense that it partly 
solves the “apples and oranges problem”, because the regression model allows controlling for 
the population group studied, for other institutional variables that may also have an impact on 
poverty or employment, and for macroeconomic performance, as well as for specific 
sociodemographic factors. In the present work, as indicated below, I have partly solved the 
comparability problem by carrying out overall meta-analyses and, whenever possible, meta-
analyses for each welfare regime. In addition, these statistical procedures are accompanied by 
a qualitative review of the evidence that highlights differences between categories of workers.  
It is fundamental to note, in addition, that meta-regression techniques require having a number 
of estimates that is large enough – this is, in fact, the case for any regression model - and 
focusing on a small number of policies. Most of the time, meta-regression analyses focus on a 
single policy.  
In summary, meta-analysis is superior to traditional literature reviews because it limits the 
impact of researchers‟ subconscious preconceptions, which is, in my view, a great advantage. 
Meta-regression techniques better contribute to the resolution of the “apples and oranges” 
problem than the meta-analyses I have carried out.  
 
6.1.7 My approach to meta-analysis 
The research synthesis presented here consists in vote-counting procedures (based on 
significance, effect direction, and a combination of both) applied to weighted data with sign 
tests. This approach lies, hence, somewhere between meta-regression techniques and 
traditional vote-counting procedures. The goal of this chapter is not so much to precisely 
quantify the impact a specific social policy may have on poverty and employment in a given 
context. It is an attempt to evaluate which policies work in which institutional and economic 
context, and for whom, as my meta-analysis includes a broad spectrum of policies ranging 
from family policy to labor laws, and provides results that are broken down by welfare 
regimes. After that, the global assessment of the impact of welfare regimes on the immediate 
causes of working poverty and the composition of this disadvantaged population is provided 
in chapter 7.  
My analysis is based on a systematic strategy for the identification of articles. More 
specifically, I used the search engine provided by Thomson Reuters, namely ISI Web of 
knowledge, one of the most widely used engines, with a focus on 21
st
 century articles (2000-
2009/2010) written in English. The specific keywords used and the number of hits they 
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yielded are described in the sections devoted to each policy (minimum wages, tax credits, 
family policy). Other search engines have been used, which proved useful when some 
countries where overwhelmingly represented in the sample of articles (especially the US) or 
when the amount of articles was low (especially for antipoverty effects). The goal of this 
second stage of the search for articles was to fill the gaps left by the first research based on ISI 
Web of knowledge. The search engine of IZA, the Institute for the study of labor (a private 
non-profit research institute that works in close cooperation with the University of Bonn in 
Germany), and IFAU, the Institute for labor market policy evaluation in Sweden, were used. 
A third stage was carried out with Google scholar, with specific targets, such as articles 
dealing with a specific country, or the search of further articles on the poverty effects of some 
policies in a given welfare regime. This last step also included French, German and Spanish 
keywords.  
Three types of vote count are provided: The first one counts whether significant or 
nonsignificant findings are predominant, the second focuses on significant findings and 
assesses whether positive or negative findings are dominant, and the third establishes whether 
positive or negative findings are dominant, regardless of their significance.  
In most cases all studies published between 2000 and 2009/2010 were reviewed; yet, the 
number of articles identified that fulfilled the quality criteria I present below was relatively 
low, ranging from four for the antipoverty effects of childcare policy to eighteen for the 
antipoverty effects of minimum wages. There are two exceptions, however. First, the impact 
of minimum wages on employment has been the subject of a large number of evaluations 
published in a recent past, in the Anglo-Saxon world mainly, which is partly attributable to 
the publication of Card and Kruger‟s book (1995). The second topic that generated many 
evaluations, especially in Europe, is the effect of childcare policies on maternal employment. 
In both cases, the number of articles analyzed amounts to 20, on pragmatic grounds: First, the 
systematic search for other policies and their effects, as indicated above, never yielded more 
than 18 articles usable for meta-analysis purposes. Setting the limit at 20 provides a 
comparable number of articles for most policies. Second, I have been able to identify, for both 
topics, encompassing literature reviews published in the 2000s that, of course, include some 
of the studies I have identified and included in my meta-analysis, but cover a longer time 
period. Hence, for these two topics, I present the most recent estimates stemming from my 
meta-analysis and comment on the findings contained in these literature reviews.  
The statistical units are empirical estimates (rather than articles or population groups), and a 
simple weighting procedure has been defined, so that estimates from studies containing a 
large number of findings are given less weight, namely the inverse of the number of estimates 
in the article, adjusted to keep the size of the sample of estimates constant. For instance, a 
literature search for a given topic yielded 20 articles containing 150 estimates in total; if one 
of these articles contains 10 estimates, each one gets a weight of 0.1 multiplied by 150/20 (the 
average number of findings per article), i.e. 0.75.  
However, each estimate has not been weighted according to the sample size
9
 of the study it 
stems from, because the evaluations analyzed here rely on large datasets of many thousands of 
observations, sometimes tens of thousands. The bias due to the fact that sample size is not 
included in the calculation of weights is limited, as I have decided to exclude studies with 
                                                          
9 
As indicated above, some researchers advocate to weight estimates according to their 
accuracy: the larger the sample, the more accurate the estimate, that is, the smaller the 
sampling error.  
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“small” samples of individuals or households (i.e. based on surveys with less than 1000 
cases).  
Empirically unreliable studies were not removed from the summary tables (see appendix A), 
only from the vote-counting procedure, and the reason of their non-inclusion is written in bold 
in the tables. I have removed studies from the vote-counting procedure on the basis of clear 
criteria (the absence of regression and simulation results, and sample size).  
The following table summarizes the results of the article search:  
Table 19: number of articles and estimates pertaining to the antipoverty and 
employment effects of selected policies  
Effect / policy Number of articles Number of estimates 
Employment effect, minimum wage 20 141 
Antipoverty effect, minimum wage 18 87 
Employment effect, tax credits for workers 17 162 
Antipoverty effect, tax credits for workers 10 51 
Employment effect, family cash benefits 11 66 
Antipoverty effect, family cash benefits 7 29 
Employment effect, childcare services 20 171 
Antipoverty effect, childcare services 4 12 
 
Overall, I have read and summarized 93 studies and reviews, most of which have been 
included in the vote-counting procedure, for a total of 719 estimates
10
.  
An important element of the meta-analysis carried out here must be discussed at this point, as 
one of the three vote counts is based on significance. In the case of microsimulation results, 
there is no indication of significance (with a few exceptions, when the simulation is based on 
structural equations parameters, i.e. regression coefficients associated with significance tests). 
I made the decision to classify a simulated effect as significantly different from zero if it 
exceeded ± 5 percent, because in most studies based on regression models a 5-percent 
increase or decrease is usually associated with a significant impact. Hence, simulation results 
expressed in absolute numbers (e.g. 30,000 persons escape poverty) or in percentage points 
had to be transformed into percents, so that a decision could be made.  
For most policies, the choice of this pragmatic “significance threshold”11 is very unlikely to 
have an impact on the conclusions drawn: There is no single simulation result for the 
employment effects of minimum wages, and only nine out of 87 for their antipoverty effects, 
four of which are above 5 percent. Likewise six out of 66 estimates of the employment effects 
of family cash benefits are derived from simulations (four of which larger than 5 percent), six 
out of 29 estimates of the antipoverty effects of family cash benefits (two are larger than 5 
                                                          
10
 It should be noted that, due to the weighting and the fact that numbers are rounded, the 
number of estimates may slightly vary for various vote counts pertaining to the same social 
policy (by one or two estimates). 
 
11
 This threshold has nothing to do with significance levels of 5 percent (or 1 percent) used 
when I check the assumption that the number of estimates in one category equals the number 
of estimates in the other category. These significance levels usually denoted by α in statistics 
correspond to the likelihood to reject a null hypothesis that is in fact true (Type I error).  
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percent, and one is small), 19 out of 171 for the employment effects of childcare services 
(three are larger than 5 percent, and eight are smaller than 1 percent). As far as the antipoverty 
effect of childcare services is concerned, the number of estimates is very limited and, hence, 
they will not be submitted to a statistical treatment.  
On the contrary, many estimates of the employment and antipoverty effects of employment-
conditional tax credits are based on simulations, namely 55 out of 162 estimates of 
employment effects and 19 out of 51 estimated antipoverty effects. The large majority of 
these simulation results were calculated for Continental European countries in which no such 
tax credits exist. The goal was to see what would happen if the WFTC (or in a few cases the 
EITC) was implemented. Hence, the robustness of findings for the Continental European 
welfare regime will be assessed with alternative “significance levels”, namely 2 and 3 percent.  
Now that methodological aspects have been clarified, the meta-analyses of four social policy 
and labor market policy instruments, namely minimum wages, tax credits for workers, family 
cash benefits, and childcare policies, are presented in the following sections. First, existing 
literature reviews are summarized; they were either identified through the article search, or 
often mentioned in the retrieved articles. Second, an overall statistical analysis, for all risk 
groups and all welfare regimes is provided, followed by breakdowns by welfare regime. 
Third, a qualitative review of some results allows me to further certain aspects that remain 
unclear after the quantitative procedure.  
 
6.2 Minimum wages 
 
a) Existing literature reviews  
A study published by Neumark and Wascher in 2007 appears to be a reference publication for 
many scholars participating in the debate on the employment effects of minimum wages, and, 
hence, on the allegedly limited explanatory power of neoclassical labor supply and demand 
equilibrium models.  
Neumark and Wascher (2007) underscore that the minimum wage has always been a 
contentious issue in the US. Stigler suggested, as early as in 1946, that a minimum wage 
could raise employment in a labor market characterized by monopsony, a fact that is central in 
Card and Krueger‟s work. However, in the early 80s there was a broad consensus that 
minimum wage hikes harmed the employment prospects of low-skilled workers, with labor 
demand elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.3. However, in the 1990s, many researchers 
challenged this view.  
This is why Neumark and Wascher carried out an encompassing review of what they call the 
“New Minimum Wage Research”. They note that many factors explain the broad range of 
findings observed. Many new studies rely on a “natural experiment approach” or case study 
approach, typically the employment levels in a state experiencing an increase in the minimum 
wage are compared with those of a state with no such increase (Card and Kruger, 1995). Most 
of the others studies rely on panel data studies; in the US case they often rely on state-year 
observations, whereas some use county-level data.  
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Another line of contention regards the appropriate minimum wage indicator to be used in 
regression models: the Kaitz index
12
, the fraction of workers affected by a minimum wage 
hike, or the level of the real minimum wage. Regarding the dependent variable, results often 
differ depending on whether it is the employment rate or the number of hours (or weeks) 
worked that are predicted. In countries in which working hours are lowly regulated, the 
employment rate might remain constant but employers may reduce the number of hours 
worked by their employees. 
Other debates pertaining to model specifications are noteworthy. For studies based on state-
level panel data, the inclusion of year fixed effects (year dummies) in the regression model is 
subject to criticism. The difference between contemporaneous and lagged effects of minimum 
wage increases is also subject to controversy, as firms may adjust some non-labor inputs 
slowly, and it may take more than a year for a minimum wage hike to have a negative 
employment impact. Finally, there are also potential endogeneity problems, especially if the 
variations in the minimum wage are partly explained by macroeconomic factors that are used 
as controls in the econometric model, for instance if there is a decrease in the youth minimum 
wage as a reaction to a strong increase in youth unemployment, or a global increase in the 
minimum wage allowed by a booming economy. 
In addition, as already indicated, there may be a publication bias: Authors who provide 
analyses that confirm the “textbook model” of labor supply have a higher likelihood of being 
published, as well as an “author bias”, which occurs when economists run regressions until 
they find a specification with the desired effect.  
Eventually, Neumark and Wascher review 87 studies, 42 of which analyze the US case, 5 
Canada, 1 Sweden, 7 the UK, 4 Australia, 3 New Zealand, 3 France, 1 the Netherlands, 1 
Spain, 2 Portugal, 1 Greece, 4 Brazil, 1 Mexico/Colombia and 1 Mexico only and 1 Colombia 
only, 1 Chile, 1 Costa Rica, 1 Trinidad and Tobago, 1 Puerto Rico, and 4 Indonesia. The 
authors conclude that, „two-thirds give a relatively consistent (although by no means always 
statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages, while 
only eight give a relatively consistent indication of positive employment effects‟ (Neumark 
and Wascher, 2007: 121). In sum, the evidence regarding alleged disemployment effects is 
mixed, but tendentially indicate a slightly negative impact.  
b) Overall meta-analysis  
Thanks to the search engine provided by Thomson Reuters, I searched for articles published 
over the period 2000-2009. Searching for “minimum wage*poverty” yielded 37 hits, 44 with 
“minimum wage poverty”, whereas “minimum wage*employment” led to no less than 310 
hits. In the case of articles dealing with antipoverty effects, all 44 articles and proceedings‟ 
abstracts were read; those clearly not dealing with the impact of minimum wages (either 
legally defined or set through collective agreements) were dropped. As to the employment 
effect, the literature is plethoric, which is attributable to the strong impact Card and Kruger‟s 
publication (1995) has had in the field of labor economics. As indicated, I started with the 
most recent article available, until 20 articles directly dealing with this issue were reviewed.  
The vast majority of poverty-related articles and around half of those dealing with 
employment effects analyze the situation in the United States. Hence, in order to find articles 
on antipoverty effects in other countries, other search engines were used, notably IZA, the 
Institute for the study of labor, IFAU, the Institute for labour market policy evaluation in 
                                                          
12
 The Kaitz index is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. 
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Sweden, and Google scholar. I searched the IZA discussion papers series for articles with 
“minimum wage” in the title, dropping articles dealing with employment effects or based on 
US data - i.e. the overwhelming majority - and identified a few interesting articles. With the 
IFAU search engine using “minimum wage”, I could only find an article dealing with poverty 
issues (out of 82 hits) that had already been found through the ISI web of knowledge. The 
same search was carried out on IFAU‟s web site, without success. Finally, I used Google 
scholar with the keywords “minimum wage poverty”, “Mindestlohn” and “Mindestlohn 
Armut” (i.e. minimum wage and poverty in German), “SMI pobreza”, “salario mínimo 
pobreza” and “salario mínimo interprofesional” (the latter being the official denomination of 
the statutory minimum wage in Spain) and “salaire minimum pauvreté” et “SMIC pauvreté”. 
The vast majority of the articles found dealt with employment effects.  
All in all, some elements are noteworthy: First, a large majority of the articles devoted to 
minimum wages I have found deal with employment effects, while the literature on the 
antipoverty impact is much scarcer (Vedder and Galloway, 2001, Müller and Steiner, 2008). 
Second, as already indicated, most of the evidence comes from the US: Regarding 
employment effects, 9 articles study the American labor market, 2 Canada, 1 New Zealand, 1 
Japan, 1 Austria, 1 France, 1 Portugal, 1 Finland and 1 Sweden. As to antipoverty effects, 13 
out of 18 studies are American, while 2 articles study the UK, and 1 New Zealand, which 
means that the evidence only allows drawing conclusions about the liberal welfare regime. 
Third, while most evaluations analyze the impact of statutory minimum wages, some analyze 
countries in which minimum wages are set through collective bargaining (Sweden, Finland, 
and Austria). Fourth, the large majority of the evaluations are empirical estimates based on 
econometric models. Fifth, the overwhelming majority of evaluations of employment 
variations are based on low-skilled groups or groups largely overrepresented among low-wage 
workers, such as teenagers, young adults, high school dropouts, low-skilled immigrants, 
middle-aged married women in Japan, or low-wage industries, such as the retail trade 
industry, or hotels and restaurants. These articles, as well as those not included in the 
statistical treatment of findings, are summarized in tables A1 and A2 in appendix A.  
Employment effects 
Overall results pertaining to the employment effects of minimum wages are presented as 
follows: The first row of the table indicates whether the majority of estimated effects are 
positive or negative, regardless of their significance. The second row shows whether the 
majority of estimates indicate a statistically significant effect of a policy or not. The third vote 
count accounts for statistically significant estimates only, and indicates whether significant 
findings are mainly positive or negative.  
For each vote count, a Z test establishes if the majority indentified (based on the sign of the 
effect, its significance, or both) is statistically significant or if the conclusion might just as 
well be the other way around, at usual significance levels, namely 1 and 5 percent.  
Finally, if a vote count shows a “fifty-fifty” situation, or approximately so (49 percent-51 
percent is the limit), the result is deemed inconclusive, as it is not possible to determine a 
majority. This situation is different from the one in which a majority can be identified but is 
not significant. 
Table 20 displays the results of the three vote counts for the overall employment effects of 
minimum wages:  
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Table 20: Vote count of estimates of the employment effect of minimum wages, based on 
all estimates, weighted results 
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 99/141 negative effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  71/140 inconclusive n.s.  
Sign among significant effects  55/73 negative effects  ** 
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at the 5% level 
Overall, then, I reach similar conclusions as I did based on Neumark and Wascher‟s literature 
review. It seems that the employment effect of minimum wages is globally negative; however, 
findings are mixed in terms of significance, as around half of them find a nonsignificant 
effect. Hence, it appears that the effect on low-skilled workers might be negative, but 
probably limited in magnitude.  
Antipoverty effects 
Table 21: Vote count of estimates of the antipoverty effects of minimum wages, based on 
all estimates, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 63/86 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  65/87 insignificant effects ** 
Sign among significant effects  21/22 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level 
All in all, minimum wages appear to have a positive, yet statistically insignificant impact on 
working poverty. As will be shown below, it is probably safe to say that the impact on the 
incidence of poverty is small, due to the fact that a large majority of low-wage workers is not 
poor, but that minimum wages reduce the poverty gap.  
In what follows, I further my first conclusions by analyzing results by welfare regimes, 
because in the real world of social policy, the impact of a given instrument depends on a large 
set of institutional, economic and demographic factors that varies considerably across 
regimes. Given the very limited number of estimates at my disposal for Southern European 
countries, I made the pragmatic decision to include them in the Conservative cluster; this is 
the case for all policies reviewed in the present chapter.  
c) Meta-analysis by welfare regime and further considerations 
Employment effects 
For the liberal, Anglo-Saxon cluster, results pertaining to the employment effects of minimum 
wages are the following: 
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Table 22: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of minimum wages in the 
liberal welfare regime, weighted results 
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 68/99 negative effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  51/98 insignificant effects n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  36/48 negative effects ** 
** significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
Results are similar to the global analysis, which is not very surprising, given that a majority of 
estimates (78 out of 141) are based on Anglo-Saxon data. The employment impact is 
negative, if there is any impact at all. Indeed, results tend to show a nonsignificant impact of 
minimum wages on employment, but the slight majority of insignificant effects could be an 
artifact.  
As regards the Continental welfare-regime cluster, results are similar; they should, however, 
be interpreted with caution, as they are based on a small sample of 28 estimates:  
Table 23: Vote count of estimates of employment effects of minimum wages in the 
Conservative welfare regime, weighted results 
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 20/28 negative effects * 
Significance (regardless of sign)  16/28 insignificant effects n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  13/17 negative effects * 
*significant at the 5% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
In Continental Europe, the employment impact of minimum wages is also likely to be 
negative, but seems to be insignificant; however, no clear-cut conclusion can be drawn as to 
the significance or nonsignificance of the latter conclusion. Hence, in this cluster too, the 
impact is probably small in magnitude, if there is any negative employment effect at all.  
A closer look at estimates in the Social-Democratic cluster reveals that the number of 
observations is very small, namely 14 (weighted) estimates stemming from 2 articles: The 
large majority of estimates show a negative impact on employment for Finnish workers under 
25 and Swedish unskilled workers in the hotel and restaurant sector.  
After this first, merely quantitative approach, which leads to the conclusion that minimum 
wages are likely to have a slightly negative impact on the employment of low-wage workers, 
a more qualitative interpretation of findings is necessary to improve our understanding. It is 
notable that the impact of the minimum wage depends on other labor market institutions, for 
instance hiring and firing legislations (Neumark and Wascher, 2007), payroll taxes 
(Kenworthy, 2004), and the composition of the workforce (share of unskilled workers, share 
of migrants, etc.). The impact of the minimum wage may be different in the US - where the 
labor market is hardly regulated, firing employees easy and the share of low-skilled labor 
large, especially among a large migrant population - than in some European countries with 
highly regulated labor markets, high payroll taxes, and workers with a higher average 
educational level.  
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Put differently, minimum wages in Continental Europe, even if set at an equivalent level in 
purchasing power parities, have a bigger impact on a company‟s payroll, because of higher 
taxes. Moreover, employers in Continental Europe probably have less room for maneuver in 
term of quantitative flexibility, as it is more complicated to hire and fire employees, and the 
composition of their workforce is different. 
Hence, a qualitative review of unweighted data, based on contrasting cases, appears 
necessary, and comparing the French and the US case can be interesting in this regard. In the 
US, in international comparison, the minimum wage is low, the labor market hardly regulated 
and payroll taxes low. In the present work, around half of estimates are insignificant, while a 
majority is negative. Significantly negative estimates pertain to very low skilled and/or 
disadvantaged groups, mostly teenagers, sometimes teenagers in low-wage industries, single 
mothers high-school dropouts or workers in the retail industry. Only two findings out of 67 
suggest that the employment effect for all workers is significantly negative. The fact that the 
US official minimum wage mainly has a negative impact on very low-skilled workers is not 
all too surprising, given that its level is relatively low, as well as payroll taxes.  
France is in strong contrast to the US: Its minimum wage, expressed as a share of the average 
wage (Kaitz index) is high in international comparison, and so are payroll taxes. Moreover, 
employment protection legislation is rather strict. The only evaluation identified in the present 
work provides two estimates, and both conclude to a statistically significant negative effect of 
the French minimum wage on employment for male and female workers. Neumark and 
Wascher (2007) were able to identify three studies for France published in the 1990s, none in 
the 2000s. The first study compares two periods - one with a strong increase in the minimum 
wage and one with no increase - and concludes that unemployment rose more for groups with 
a greater proportion of workers paid at or below the minimum wage; the pattern for 
employment rates is weaker but in the consistent direction. However, the first period included 
a recession while the second was characterized by a recovery, so it is difficult to draw a clear-
cut conclusion. The second study analyzes youth employment in 32 economic sectors that 
vary in their proportion of young workers: The estimates are negative and statistically 
significant. The third evaluation, which in fact is a set of three studies by the same authors, 
leads to clear conclusions: The authors consistently find considerably higher transitions to 
non-employment for workers newly bound by the minimum wage, with very high elasticities. 
Of course, six studies are not enough to draw conclusions about the impact of the minimum 
wage. Still, all of them seem to show that the French minimum wage has a detrimental impact 
on the employment prospects of low-skilled workers.  
This qualitative interpretation of a subset of findings may be summarized as follows: When 
the minimum wage is low, as is the case in the US, i.e. approximately one-third of gross 
average wage of full-time workers (its after tax value amounts to slightly less than 40 percent 
of the average net wage, Immervoll, 2007) and payroll taxes/social security contributions are 
low, with social security contributions amounting to around 15 percent of an employee‟s 
wage, the employment impact is very small to nonexistent. If the minimum wage is set at a 
high level, with an after-tax value of around 60 percent of the net average wage (or around 45 
percent of gross average wage) of full-time workers and social security contributions are high 
(around 35 to 40 percent of an employee‟s wage), as is the case in France (Immervoll, 2007), 
the minimum wage is likely to have an impact on unskilled and young workers.  
 
 
136 
 
Antipoverty effects 
As to the antipoverty effects of minimum wages, the vast majority of evaluations meta-
analyzed here pertain to the situation in the US; a few findings concern the UK and New 
Zealand, and only four findings concern Continental European countries.  
Hence, the vote count presented here is based on the Anglo-Saxon cluster. 
Table 24: Vote count of estimates of the antipoverty effect of minimum wages in the 
liberal welfare regime, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 53/76 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  61/77 insignificant effects ** 
Sign among significant effects  16/17 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 5% level 
The conclusion is straightforward: The minimum wage in the liberal cluster, especially in the 
US, has a positive yet statistically insignificant impact on poverty. This vote count might be 
too conservative, though; hence, it cannot be excluded that the minimum wage has a slightly 
positive impact on poverty.  
For the conservative cluster, only 10 weighted estimates are available, all of which are 
positive; half these estimates point to significant effects. Hence, in Continental Europe, I do 
not rule out a significant effect on the incidence of working poverty. This would not be very 
surprising, given that minimum wages are higher than in the US. No estimate was found for 
the Social-Democratic cluster.  
An in-depth review of the American evidence can be interesting in this regard. A large 
majority of estimates (54 out of 70) are not significant. This is not very surprising given the 
relatively low level of the minimum wage in America. Actually, a full-time worker with two 
children earning the minimum wage in 2006 brings home about 89 percent of poverty-level 
income (Levitis and Johnson, 2006). Moreover, a large majority of minimum-wage workers 
are not poor, most of them living in middle-income households, a fact often mentioned in the 
reviewed evaluations (e.g. in Leigh, 2007, Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007). However, 
approximately 60 percent of estimates are positive: Put differently, the minimum wage tends 
to reduce poverty if anything, despite the potential disemployment effects.  
A closer look at the 12 (unweighted) estimates that are statistically significant and positive 
reveals that most measure the incidence of poverty among families with children. Moreover, 
one study uses the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator with α=1 and 2, and one measures the 
change in the income-to-needs ratio, for a total of 13 findings, all of which are nonsignificant 
but positive, which suggests a reduction in the depth and the severity of poverty.  
d) Conclusions 
Given the available evidence, it appears reasonable to say that low minimum wages set at 
around one-third of the gross average wage, such as those found in the US, do not strongly 
reduce the incidence of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio. In the case of the US, 
then, it seems appropriate to share Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz‟s conclusion: „a higher 
minimum wage does not seem to be a particularly useful way to help the poor‟ (quoted in 
Vedder and Galloway, 2001). However, it is likely that minimum wages reduce the income 
137 
 
gap, which in turn reduces the expenses the welfare state must incur to combat working 
poverty, as employers also play their part. A minimum wage set at a higher level, but low 
enough not to generate significant disemployment effects, could have a stronger impact on 
poverty.  
Unfortunately, neither the evidence gathered here, nor evidence stemming from literature 
reviews, allows drawing conclusions as to the level at which this minimum should be set. 
Whereas the issue of the disemployment effects of minimum wages has drawn the attention of 
many (labor) economists and generated a plethoric literature in a recent past in the US, the 
topic of the antipoverty impact accounting for employment effects has attracted less interest in 
Europe.  
In my view, it is relatively unfruitful to keep on publishing national studies based on well-
known empirical strategies and argue about specifications of regression models; it would be 
certainly more useful to use comparative methods to try and estimate the level where 
employment effects are not significantly negative and antipoverty effects non-negligible, and 
the conditions in which these conclusions hold.  
It should be added that, whether or not minimum wages efficiently combat working poverty, 
they seem to be necessary when in-work benefits are implemented; indeed, tax credits for 
workers in the US and the UK, which I evaluate below, work in tandem with a minimum 
wage. The existence of a wage floor prevents employers from paying their employees very 
low wages, as they might be tempted to, knowing that low-wage workers benefit from income 
supplements in the form of a tax credit. Last but not least, minimum wages can also be seen as 
useful in order to reduce the gender pay gap.  
I tend to share Marx and Verbist‟s conclusion: „as an isolated measure, higher minimum 
wages – within realistically feasible ranges – cannot contribute much towards fighting in-
work poverty. Which is not to say that minimum wages have no role to play…they do, but not 
as an isolated measure‟ (Marx and Verbist, 2008). 
 
6.3 Tax Credits for working families/workers 
 
a) Existing literature reviews 
A literature review carried out by Hotz and Scholz (2003) is mentioned by many authors of 
the evaluations meta-analyzed here. Their review contains 13 studies of the effects of the 
EITC on labor force participation and hours worked, published over the period 1993-2002. 
Seven studies analyze the impact of the EITC on labor force participation, and six the impact 
on hours worked.  
The 5 studies measuring the impact of the EITC on single mothers‟ employment unanimously 
conclude that the impact is positive; one study concludes that overall employment increased. 
An evaluation of the impact of the EITC on married couples concludes that married men very 
slightly increased their employment levels, while married women worked less after 
expansions of the EITC.  
The evidence pertaining to the number of hours worked is mixed: In some cases the impact is 
positive, in others it is negative, whereas one evaluation finds a nonsignificant effect. One of 
the evaluations deals with the situation of married couples and also points to a decrease in 
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employment among married women. All in all, Hotz and Scholz conclude that the overall 
employment impact of the EITC is positive, despite disemployment effects for married 
women.  
In what follows, the apples and oranges problem may be important, as some evaluations use a 
sample of single mothers, while others include married (and sometimes also cohabiting) 
women, and still others combine both population groups. Hence, after a global analysis, a 
more detailed analysis by population group is provided.  
In addition, I rechecked the articles that evaluate minimum wages, in order to find further 
estimates of the impact of earned income tax credits, as some articles contained specifications 
that checked the impact of minimum wages controlling for the impact of tax credits, 
especially in US evaluations.  
b) Overall meta-analysis 
The search for evaluations of the EITC – with the keywords “Earned income tax credit” and 
“EITC” – with the ISI Web of knowledge search engine yielded 95 hits for the period 2000-
2009, all of which were checked.  
As far as the UK is concerned, the search yielded 60 hits for the period 2000-2009 (keywords: 
“working tax credit” and “working family tax credit”) Regarding the Employment Premium 
in France, the number of hits was very small: “Prime pour l‟emploi”, 1 hit, “tax 
credits*France”, 6 hits.  
As indicated above, other tax credits exist, but the number of articles identified was either 
zero or very low - even when the specific names of these programs were entered in the ISI 
web of knowledge search engine - except for Canada with 31 hits (“tax credit*Canada”); 
however, only one article was usable. In addition, the search for articles based on provinces 
names was unsuccessful. Moreover, neither “In-work tax credit”, nor “tax credit*New 
Zealand”, nor “Working for families”, nor “in-work benefits*New Zealand”, nor “Family 
income supplement”, nor “tax credit* Ireland”, nor “in-work benefits* Ireland”, nor “Earned 
income tax credit* Sweden”, nor “tax credit* Sweden”, nor “in-work benefits*Sweden”, 
allowed identifying potential articles.  
Hence, I made the decision to focus on the EITC, the WFTC and the PPE. The article search 
was furthered by using the IZA and IFAU search engines, looking for articles about these 
three programs: The first provided 190 papers for the EITC and 179 for “working tax credit”, 
most of which, however, had nothing to do with the EITC or the WFTC, while the second 
allowed identifying 62 articles for British tax credits and 77 for the EITC. Some articles were 
identified that had already been retrieved through ISI web of knowledge. Finally, articles in 
French and English about the PPE and the antipoverty effects of tax credits in general were 
searched for with Google scholar, with the keywords “Tax credits poverty” and “Prime pour 
l‟emploi”. This allowed identifying some more articles, especially for the French PPE.  
Employment effects 
The overall vote count that includes the three credits, all population groups and all indicators, 
yields the following results for employment effects employment-conditional tax credits: 
 
139 
 
Table 25: Vote count of estimates of the employment effect of tax credits, based on all 
estimates, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 113/162 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  83/162 inconclusive n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  64/77 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
The employment effect appears to be positive, whereas it is impossible to conclude, based on 
this global analysis, whether the impact is significant or not. This may be attributable to the 
variety of employment indicators and samples used.  
Antipoverty effects 
Table 26: Vote count estimates of the antipoverty effects of tax credits, based on all 
estimates, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 35/52 positive effects * 
Significance (regardless of sign)  36/51 insignificant effects ** 
Sign among significant effects  14/14 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, *significant at 5% level 
The global vote-counting procedure points in the direction of a positive yet insignificant 
antipoverty effect. As already indicated, the vote count based on significance is rather 
conservative, so it is not unlikely that tax credits have, overall, a slightly positive antipoverty 
effect.  
As for the meta-analysis of the effects of minimum wages, it is important to break down 
results by welfare regime. Moreover, it is fundamental to distinguish single mothers from 
married mothers.  
c) Meta-analysis by welfare regime and further considerations 
Employment effects  
In a first step, I want to draw conclusions about the employment effects within the liberal 
cluster. The three vote-counting procedures are summarized in table 27: 
Table 27: Vote count of estimates of employment effects of tax credits in the liberal 
welfare regime, weighted results 
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 101/123 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  73/124 significant effects * 
Sign among significant effects  63/74 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, *significant at 5% level 
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These findings lead to an unambiguous and straightforward conclusion: Tax credits in Anglo-
Saxon countries have a statistically significant impact on employment and a large majority of 
estimates are positive. Tax credits have significantly increased employment.  
Let us now have a closer look at unweighted observations. Nearly all estimates of the effects 
on lone mothers‟ employment are positive, and a large majority is significant. Two estimates 
only are negative and regard full-time year round work (Herbst, 2008). By contrast, all articles 
but one find negative effects for married women or women in couples in general. The 
exception is an article written by Francesconi, Rainer and van der Klauuw (2009) in which 
most effects are positive but insignificant.  
As far as the Conservative cluster is concerned, only four studies could be identified; 
however, they contain 58 estimates. Two articles are evaluations of the French Employment 
Premium, and two are simulations of the introduction of the WFTC in Continental Europe, 
mainly France and Germany (there are two estimates for Finland, however, that were 
aggregated with France and Germany‟s findings).  
Table 28: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of tax credits in the 
Continental welfare regime, weighted results.  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 23/39 negative effects n.s. 
Significance (regardless of sign)  34/38 insignificant effects ** 
Sign among significant effects  2/3 negative effects n.s.  
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
It seems that tax credits would/do not have a significant effect in Continental Europe. 
Strikingly, and in contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries, tax credits may even have a negative 
employment impact, should they have any impact at all. For this cluster, however, conclusions 
in terms of significance have to be drawn with great caution, as they are derived from 
simulations: Policies are deemed to have a “significant” impact if it amounts to a variation of 
at least 5 percent. A robustness check was carried out by using 2 and 3 percent as 
“significance thresholds”, rather than a variation of at least 5 percent. With the threshold set at 
2 or 3 percent, 33 or 32 instead of 34 weighted estimates point to nonsignificant effect. More 
importantly, the three significant additional findings are negative. It is probably safe to say 
that employment-conditional tax credits would not have the same impact in Continental 
Europe as in the UK or in the US; contrary to the Anglo-Saxon world, they may not have any 
impact, or even a slightly negative one.  
A closer look at the unweighted “Continental” estimates based on the simulated effect of the 
introduction of the WFTC in Continental Europe (plus a couple of estimates for Finland) 
leads to the following results: 40 out of 45 unweighted estimates are nonsignificant (with the 
5-percent “significance threshold”); 12 equal zero and 15 are negative. Hence, whereas earned 
income tax credits have a significant positive impact in Anglo-Saxon countries, they seem to 
be inefficient in Continental Europe, as they appear not to have any significant effect on 
employment. All estimates (13) of the impact on married women or women in couple are 
negative or equal zero. For single mothers, only 4 estimates are provided, and all are positive; 
there are 5 additional estimates for single women in general that are also unanimously 
positive. Hence, as in Anglo-Saxon countries, the impact is positive for single mothers, and 
single women in general, but negative for women in couples.  
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These are important findings, despite the fact that they are based on simulations, whereas 
most Anglo-Saxon evaluations are based on regression models and real situations. Continental 
European labor markets are very different from Anglo-Saxon markets: Unemployment is 
usually higher, female employment is usually lower, the earnings distribution is (much) more 
compressed, and lone mothers are not so strongly overrepresented among welfare recipients, 
which was one of the main concerns in Anglo-Saxon countries (Blundell, 2006, Meyer and 
Holtz-Eakin, 2001). Hence, it is likely that, in Continental Europe, the positive impact on 
single mothers would be outweighed by the negative impact on married women, should a 
credit such as the WFTC be implemented.  
Regarding the employment impact of the Employment Premium (PPE) in France, I could find 
20 findings only (unweighted). However, conclusions are virtually unanimous: The PPE has a 
nonsignificant impact (only three unweighted estimates are significant). Moreover, three-
quarters of unweighted results are negative. Hence, it is probably fair to say that the PPE does 
not have any impact on employment in France; should it have any impact, it might be 
negative. The reasons put the fore in the few articles available is that the amounts are very 
small and the design of the program is so complex that it is difficult for recipients to really 
understand it, so that the behavioral impact is necessarily limited. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate is high for young and unskilled workers, and the PPE does not solve the 
problem that many unskilled workers who are willing to work face in an environment 
characterized by a low labor demand (Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu, Thibault, 2004): The high 
level of the minimum wage outprices them from the labor market, given their low level of 
productivity (Cahuc, 2002). The latter argument seems to be in line with the few evaluations 
of the employment effects of the French minimum wage reviewed above. However, more 
empirical work is required to really assess the impact of the French SMIC (minimum wage) 
on employment, as other factors may better explain the grim situation of unskilled workers, 
for instance high social security contributions (Kenworthy, 2004).  
All in all, tax credits for workers may not be the best tool in terms of employment in 
Continental Europe. These programs appear to have been efficient in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
as they allowed a large number of lone mothers to enter the labor market without facing high 
marginal effective tax rates; lone mothers represented, in the 1990s, a large group of welfare 
recipients. This labor market entry of lone mothers more than offset the withdrawal of a group 
of married women, leading to an overall positive employment effect. In many Continental 
European countries, one of the conditions for the effectiveness of tax credits is probably 
missing, namely that there must be enough jobs to be had (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001, 
Stancanelli and Sterdyniak, 2004), so that providing incentives might not be sufficient to 
increase the labor force participation of low-skilled women. The Belgian experience may be 
revealing in this regard: A low-wage tax credit was introduced in 2002; given the limited 
impact it had, it was abolished in 2005 and replaced by a reduction in employee‟s social 
security contributions (Marx and Verbist, 2008).  
Antipoverty effects of tax credits 
For the liberal cluster, 36 estimates derived from seven articles could be identified (five of 
them analyze the situation in the US); that is, the number of estimates of the antipoverty effect 
is much smaller than for employment effects. It is striking, indeed, that the main focus of 
evaluations of tax credits has been on employment – usually female employment - rather than 
on poverty, even though they are always put to the fore as anti-working poverty tools, 
especially in the US. The reason for this apparent paradox lies in the way the fight against 
working poverty is conceived in Anglo-Saxon country; the main approach, especially in the 
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US since the mid-1990s, is the maximization of labor force participation, as already indicated 
above.  
The results of the meta-analysis are shown in the following table: 
Table 29: Vote count of estimates of the antipoverty effect of tax credits in the liberal 
welfare regime, weighted results.  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 25/36 positive effects * 
Significance (regardless of sign)  24/36 insignificant effects *  
Sign among significant effects  12/12 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, * significant at 1% level 
Based on the evidence gathered here, it can be said that tax credits reduce poverty in the US 
and the UK; yet, a significant majority of estimates point in the direction of an statistically 
insignificant impact (but only for α=5 percent), despite numerous claims about numbers of 
families escaping poverty based on descriptive, pretransfer/posttransfer evidence. Again, the 
vote count based on significance may be too conservative, hence, it is not unlikely that tax 
credits have a slightly positive impact on the incidence of working poverty in Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  
Here too, a more qualitative in-depth review of unweighted estimates appears necessary. First, 
ten of the 38 estimates stem from the same study by Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) and all of 
them are nonsignificant, which means that this evaluation weighs heavily on conclusions, 
even after weighting results. Second, 31 estimates stem from American studies, four from a 
Canadian evaluation and three from a British evaluation. This means that conclusions mainly 
concern the US.  
All in all, it seems safe to assert that the EITC has had a slightly positive impact on working 
poverty in the US; many claims have been made, however, that the EITC lifts up to 4 million 
people out of poverty every year, but these claims probably do not take into account 
behavioral responses to tax credits, especially disemployment effects on married mothers that 
are systematically underlined in the evaluations meta-analyzed here.  
Regarding the Continental cluster, 13 estimates have been identified (unweighted), ten of 
which are simulations of the introduction of the WFTC, one a simulation of the introduction 
of the EITC, and two are evaluations of the French PPE. As in the Anglo-Saxon cluster, the 
majority is positive; however, only a minority of estimates point in the direction of a 
significant effect (four estimates only). As shown above, these tax credits are likely not to 
have any effect on employment (or even a slightly negative one); moreover, they do not seem 
to have a significant antipoverty impact (but the sample is very small). All in all, it is 
relatively safe to say that the introduction of the EITC of WFTC in Continental Europe would 
not have much of an effect.  
d) Conclusions  
Based on the evidence meta-analyzed in this section, it appears that earned income tax credits 
have been successful in the UK and the US at increasing female labor force participation, as 
the increase in single mothers‟ employment appears to have outweighed the decline in 
married women employment. In addition, they appear to have slightly reduced poverty among 
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working families, whereas to a probably lesser extent than pretranfer/posttranfer evidence 
suggests.  
Moreover, it appears that the French PPE has had very little effect; if anything, it had a small 
redistributive impact, but the amounts at stake are too small to have a significant impact.  
It is very important to note that a hypothetical introduction of such credits may not have much 
effect in Continental Europe; the employment effect might be slightly negative, or, more 
probably, there would not be any effect at all. The antipoverty effect might exist, but it is 
likely to be slight and limited to a small reduction of the poverty gap, rather than of the 
incidence of poverty. The reasons of this difference are not clearly identified but some factors 
are conceivable. First, the earnings and income distributions are less wide in Continental 
Europe. Second, the situation British and American single mothers faced in the 1990s was 
particularly unfavorable; in Continental Europe, family policy is more generous, be it in terms 
of income transfers and of family services (with the notable exception of Southern European 
countries and Switzerland). Hence, single mothers in Continental Europe, though they are 
much more exposed to working poverty than other mothers, may be in a less detrimental 
situation that was the case in the early 1990s in the US, for instance. Third, these 
employment-conditional benefits are part of a more general approach of the fight against 
working poverty that aims at maximizing labor force participation; a part of the system is to 
have a labor market in which there are enough jobs to be had, especially low-skilled service 
sector jobs. This is far less the case in most Continental European countries than in Anglo-
Saxon countries and Scandinavia.  
 
6.4 Family cash benefits 
 
a) Existing literature reviews 
I have not been able to identify a noteworthy literature review, nor did the review of relevant 
evaluations allow identifying a research synthesis mentioned by most authors.  
b) Overall meta-analysis 
Again, I used the ISI web of knowledge search engine first, and used the following keywords:  
- family cash benefits (58 hits) 
- family allowance-s (22 hits) 
- child allowance-s (82 hits) 
- child benefit-s (32 hits) 
- child poverty (92 hits) 
I checked all these hits; this allowed me to identify and retrieve a smaller number of articles 
than for the policies meta-analyzed above. Again, I used IZA‟s and IFAU‟s search engines 
with the following keywords: child allowances, family benefits, family policy, child benefit, 
poverty, child poverty, family allowances, which yielded a large number of hits ranging from 
around 150 to more than 1000 in a few cases. The IZA search engines generated many more 
hits than IFAU; for each hit, the engine provides an indicator of relevance that increases with 
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its degree of pertinence. I started with the highest scoring articles, and stopped checking 
abstracts when this relevance indicator amounted to around 2.5, which is the level at which 
articles had not much to do with the employment and antipoverty effects of family cash 
benefits anymore.  
As for previous policies, I also used Google scholar with the keywords family cash policy 
(without commas) and got more than 2,000 hits. What is striking is that most articles and 
papers either pertain to the impact of benefits on fertility or to antipoverty effects measured 
with microsimulation model, such as EUROMOD, the tax and benefits simulation model for 
EU countries, without accounting for behavioral aspects. These simulations are very 
interesting in order to understand which family types get how much money from the state, 
however, they do not provide estimations of the antipoverty impact among workers: „in order 
to go beyond [static simulation findings] and perform actual policy recommendations, one 
should also take into account possible behavioral responses to social programs that may affect 
market and net income in any country‟ (Bibi and Duclos, 2008: 13). Regarding the hits 
generated by Google scholar, I reviewed the first 300; from that point onwards, articles and 
papers did not seem to have any relevance with the topics dealt with in this section anymore.  
The large majority of articles regard benefits that are either universal or means-tested, but that 
do not have an employment condition. Two articles, however, pertain to employment-
conditional benefits: one analyzes child benefits for working mothers in Spain, while the other 
one deals with programs that exist in some Canadian provinces and are partly employment-
conditional. Results will be provided with and without these two studies, as it is obvious that 
employment-conditional benefits may have a different impact on parental work.  
Employment effects 
The overall vote count, including all policies and indicators, yields the following results for 
employment effects: 
Table 30: Vote count of estimates of the employment effect of family cash benefits, based 
on all estimates, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 47/66 negative effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  36/66 insignificant effects n.s.  
Sign among significant effects  22/29 negative effects **  
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
The employment effect appears to be negative, whereas it is not possible to conclude, based 
on this global analysis, whether the impact is significant or not. This majority of insignificant 
findings is relatively small (36 out of 66), however, so that it is probably safe to say that 
family benefits only have a slight negative impact on employment. As indicated above, clear 
negative employment effects of social transfers have mainly been observed in the US; in 
Europe, this trend is far less marked, which may explain this low global impact observed here, 
as most evaluations concern European countries. Moreover, negative impacts are usually 
observed for welfare benefits that often constitute an important share of recipients‟ household 
income, whereas this usually not the case for family cash benefits.  
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Antipoverty effects 
The number of articles I was able to identify and retrieve is limited, namely 7 articles 
containing 29 estimates.  
Table 31: Vote count estimates of the antipoverty effects of family cash benefits, based 
on all estimates, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 28/29 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  15/29 insignificant effects n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  14/14 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
Given the small sample size (n=29), these findings are tentative; however, they almost 
unanimously show a positive effect. However, it is not possible to say whether the impact is 
significant or not. Family cash benefits are likely to slightly reduce the incidence of poverty, 
or, at least, they reduce the poverty gap, without generating strong work disincentives.  
c) Meta-analysis by welfare regime and further considerations 
Contrary to the policies presented in previous sections, many studies of the impact of family 
cash benefits are comparative and combine data from Conservative and Social-Democratic 
countries, as benefits tend to have a similar design in many countries (universal). Moreover, 
these benefits exist in most European Union member states, and this fact facilitates the 
production of comparative studies. Hence, the analyses by welfare regimes are more limited 
than in previous sections, as single-country evaluations are less numerous. 
Employment effects  
In a first step, I want to draw conclusions about the employment effects within the liberal 
cluster. Three studies (two American and one Canadian) have been identified as mainly 
focusing on the employment effect of TANF and food stamps among families with children, 
or the National Child Benefit in Canada. These evaluations contain 18 estimates, so that the 
meta-analysis presented here must be interpreted with great caution: 
Table 32: Vote count of estimates of employment effects of family cash benefits in the 
liberal welfare regime, weighted results 
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 12/18 negative n.s. 
Significance (regardless of sign)  11/18 insignificant n.s.  
Sign among significant effects  3/6 inconclusive n.s.  
n.s. not significant at 5% level 
Unsurprisingly, given the small number of estimates, no majority is significant. The two 
American evaluations find negative effects exclusively and are statistically significant for 
single mothers (they usually are insignificant for subgroups of lone mothers, which may be 
due to smaller subsample sizes). The Canadian study finds positive effects as it is, in the 
provinces under study, based on programs that are partly employment-conditional.  
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This vote count can be completed with a review of the evidence found in studies devoted to 
the EITC and minimum wages that I have meta-analyzed above, as many contained the level 
of TANF benefits (sometimes combined with the Food Stamp Program) as control variables; 
TANF benefits help low-income families with children. Five American evaluations are 
virtually unanimous (unweighted estimates), as 21 out of 22 estimates point to negative 
employment effects; 14 out of 21 effects are statistically significant.  
Finally, one evaluation for the UK shows that the effect of the WFTC expansion was positive, 
as it increased single mothers‟ employment rate by 5.95 percentage points; however, the 
impact of all reforms implemented during that period (including increases in benefits that do 
not have an employment condition) increased employment by 3.86 points only, which shows 
that the others reforms reduced the positive impact of the WFTC expansion; indeed „increases 
in Income Support [one of UK‟s main means-tested benefit] dulled the positive labour supply 
impact of WFTC‟ (Blundell, 2006: 437). 
As far as the Conservative cluster is concerned, there is even less evidence available. 
Weighted results lead to the following conclusions: The direction of the impact is unclear if 
all evaluations are accounted for (6 estimates are positive, 6 are negative). However, the 6 
positive estimates stem from the evaluation of the Spanish employment-conditional child 
benefit, which means that the others are unanimously negative. Nine out of twelve findings 
points to an insignificant effect, but that majority could be an artifact (based on the Z-test). If 
the Spanish evaluation is removed, all estimates are nonsignificant. Hence, it is probably fair 
and safe to say that too little is known about Continental Europe to draw clear-cut conclusions 
about the employment effects of these benefits, and that more evaluations that include 
dynamic aspects (rather than static microsimulations) are requested. However, the results 
presented here suggest that the negative impact of these benefits may be insignificant, or at 
least very weak, in line with findings pertaining to cash transfers in general presented in 
chapter 4. One reason could be the situation of single mothers, as already indicated; another 
could be the fact that, for low-skilled mothers, there may be fewer jobs to be had in many 
Continental European countries, as the low-skilled service sector is less developed than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia.  
Some evidence is also available for Scandinavian countries, but scarce. Of the 12 weighted 
estimates I could identify, 5 are negative and 4 equal zero; 8 are statistically insignificant. 
Hence, the impact may be very slightly negative; however, it is probable that there is no effect 
at all. In fact, Scandinavian mothers have a very high employment rate, which is partly 
attributable, as will be shown below, to high work incentives, mainly in the form of available 
and inexpensive childcare services.  
Antipoverty effects  
The number of estimates is too small to draw conclusions as to the antipoverty effects of 
family cash benefits at the welfare regime level; moreover, most findings stem from 
comparative studies.  
d) Conclusions  
Family cash benefits, and, indeed, family policy in general, has drawn researchers‟ interest 
inasmuch as they have an impact on maternal employment and fertility decisions. They are 
also included in studies that use static simulation models, i.e. they do not include behavioral 
responses. The microsimulation models used, one of the most widespread apparently being 
EUROMOD as it accounts for the tax and benefits system of many EU member states, are 
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very sophisticated tools that provide precious and useful findings regarding the distributive 
impact of various tax and social policies. They do not allow, however, policy 
recommendations, as the generosity of some benefits might reduce maternal employment, 
especially in countries in which low-skilled mothers face high employment-related and 
childcare costs.  
Overall, these benefits appear to have a negative impact in Anglo-Saxon countries; on the 
contrary, it seems that the impact is marginal in Europe, despite usually more generous 
benefits. Family cash benefits seem to have a positive antipoverty effect, even when 
employment effects are accounted for. These conclusions are only tentative, though, as the 
sample size of my meta-analysis is relatively small.  
 
6.5 Childcare services  
 
The last policy meta-analyzed in the present chapter is the provision of childcare services. 
This policy belongs to the same group of policies as family cash benefits, obviously, in terms 
of target group. However, these two policy groups (services and cash benefits) differ in their 
positioning on the main dimensions that underpin the fight against working poverty: Whereas 
family cash benefits are income transfers, childcare policies belong to policies that aim to 
maximize labor market participation, mainly female participation.  
a) Existing literature reviews 
Among the articles reviewed here, Kalb (2009) carried out a literature review that summarizes 
23 evaluations of the impact of childcare costs on workforce participation published between 
1992 and 2007; eight were published in the 1990s; all but one of these older evaluations deal 
with the American case. The evaluations published in the 2000s include a broader set of 
countries: the United States (2), Canada (3), Australia (3), Germany (2), The Netherland (1), 
France (1), Italy (1), Japan (1), Sweden (1), and Norway (1). The vast majority of the 80 
estimates deal with the situation of married mothers, some also analyze single mothers (21 
estimates), while four estimates pertain to mothers in general.  
The review does not provide information as to the significance of the effects, but indicates 
elasticities for labor force participation and average number of hours. All virtually all 
estimates are negative, but elasticities vary greatly. For employment elasticities, they range 
from 0 to 0.92 in absolute value: 23 estimates are smaller than 0.1, and 22 are larger. Put 
differently, around half these elasticities predict a decrease of employment of less than 1 
percent for a 10-percent increase in childcare costs, which is a small impact. Regarding the 
impact of childcare costs on the number of hours, 23 out of 35 elasticities are lower than 0.1 
in absolute value: A 10-percent increase in childcare costs reduces work by less than 1 
percent, which is a very small decrease (24 minutes for a 40-hour workweek).  
b) Overall meta-analysis 
The search for evaluations of the impact of childcare costs and availability for the period 
2000-2010, with the ISI web of knowledge search engine, was based on the following 
keywords: “child care” and “childcare”, which led to 744 and 325 hits respectively (I 
restricted the number of research fields to sociology, economic sciences, political sciences, 
social work, economics, public administration, social sciences, and anthropology; without this 
restriction, the number of hits was very high, and most of them totally irrelevant). I checked 
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abstracts until I had identified around 20 articles dealing with the employment effects of 
childcare policies. It proved more problematic to find articles measuring the effect childcare 
services have on poverty. I checked “child care poverty” (134 hits) and “childcare poverty” 
(26 hits), within the same set of research fields, in ISI web of knowledge, and even “maternal 
employment” (143 hits).  
Eventually, I also used IZA and IFAU search engines, and performed a search based on 
similar keywords, but also including very broad searches with keywords such as “poverty”, 
“child poverty”. I stopped searching for articles when the relevance level of articles reached 
around 2.5 for IZA, while I checked all hits generated by the IFAU engine. Likewise, I used 
similar keywords with Google scholar, but quit searching after 400 hits, as papers, reports and 
articles had not much to do with the topic of childcare and poverty anymore.  
Employment effects 
The topic of the employment effects of childcare policies is the one that yielded the highest 
number of estimates among the policies analyzed in the present chapter. The figures presented 
in table 33 pertain both to the availability of childcare (usually the share of children in formal 
childcare) and its cost. In a second step, I check if conclusions differ depending on whether it 
is childcare fees that are reduced, or the number of childcare slots that is increased.  
Table 33: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of the availability and cost 
of childcare, based on all estimates, weighted results.  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 125/171 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  94/171 significant effects n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  85/94 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. majority is not significant at 5% level 
This overall vote count doubtlessly points to positive employment effects of decreases in 
childcare fees or increases in the number of childcare slots, and the vast majority of 
evaluations analyze the situation of mothers. The effect may be significant, whereas the 
estimates I have gathered do not unambiguously show it (based on a Z-test).  
Conclusions are very similar for reductions in childcare fees or increases in the number of 
childcare slots. Regarding fees reductions, weighted estimates are distributed as follows: 62 
out of 93 are positive, and 32 out of 37 significant findings are positive; however, 60 out of 97 
findings are statistically insignificant. Regarding the impact of childcare availability, likewise, 
a large majority of estimates is positive (63 out of 72), as well as a majority of significant 
estimates (53 out of 55 are positive); contrary to childcare fees, however, a large majority of 
effects are significant (55 out of 72). Overall, it appears, then, that both decreases in childcare 
fees and increases in availability have a positive impact on maternal employment, and that 
availability, usually expressed as a percentage of young children in formal childcare, may 
have a bigger impact than fees.  
Antipoverty effect 
Evaluations of antipoverty effects are in stunning contrast to assessments of the employment 
impact of childcare policies: The number of estimates I managed to find and retrieve is 
anecdotal, namely 12 estimates (unweighted) found in four articles. This is indeed the main 
conclusion that can be drawn about the antipoverty effect of childcare services: Very little 
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evidence has been published in a recent past. Needless to say, no meta-analysis broken down 
by welfare regime is provided below.  
A closer look at unweighted estimates shows that all estimates but one are positive: Childcare 
services, by allowing mothers to work more, probably contribute to the alleviation of poverty. 
However, as indicated by some authors, the level of childcare fees may contribute to an 
increase in disposable income inequality if there is a fees cap, as middle-class or high-income 
families may have to spend less on childcare, in relative terms, than lower-income families.  
Chapter 7 will provide indirect evidence about the antipoverty effect of family policy in 
general, and childcare policy in particular, as my comparative perspective includes countries 
with both high and low shares of children in formal childcare, and both highly subsidized 
public childcare and largely private-owned facilities.  
c) Meta-analysis by welfare regime and further considerations 
Employment effects 
Table 34: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of the availability and cost 
of childcare in the liberal welfare regime, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance 
of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 55/85 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  49/85 insignificant effects n.s. 
Sign among significant effects  32/37 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
Estimates found in articles analyzing the situation in the liberal welfare-regime cluster point 
to a positive effect of childcare services, but it is difficult to say whether this impact is 
significant or not. American evaluations mainly deal with programs that reduce the cost of 
childcare, as the state is not involved in the creation of publicly-funded childcare centers; this 
kind of evaluations clearly point to positive employment effects of a reduction of childcare 
fees (15 out of 20 unweighted estimates). Likewise, Australian evaluations measure the 
impact of fees on maternal employment. It appears that estimates are almost unanimously 
insignificant; however, increases in childcare fees have a negative impact on maternal 
employment. Overall, then, childcare fees appear to have a negative impact in Australia, but 
the impact may be very small. One American evaluation pertains to the introduction of 
universal prekindergarten in two states, and analyzes the impact of eligibility, which is 
negative but statistically insignificant. Fitzpatrick (2010) explains this surprising result by the 
fact that comparable women in other states may benefit from childcare subsidies.  
67 estimates were found in articles that analyze the situation in the province of Quebec 
(Canada). Quebec introduced a major family policy reform that began in 1997 with the 
extension of full-time kindergarten to all 5-year-olds, and the provision of childcare at an out-
of-pocket price of $5.00 for all children aged 0-4. The program was phased in, starting with 
the 4-year-olds, than 3-year-olds in 1998, all 2-year-olds in 1999, and all children younger 
than two in 2000. Moreover, the number of spaces doubled between 1997 and 2005. The 
estimates of this increase of coverage and reduction in fees are overwhelmingly positive, 
except for mothers with no children younger than six and with at least a high school diploma. 
It should be noted that, given the features of the family policy of the Quebec province, it is 
debatable whether it really belongs to the liberal cluster on this dimension.  
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As far as the Continental welfare regime is concerned, the number of estimates is relatively 
small. They are displayed in the following table: 
Table 35: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of the availability and cost 
of childcare in the Conservative welfare regime, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority Conclusion/si
gnificance 
Sign (regardless of significance) 21/26 positive effects ** 
Significance (regardless of sign)  19/25 significant effects ** 
Sign among significant effects  18/20 positive effects ** 
**significant at the 1% level 
The interpretation is clear: Increasing the number of childcare slots (or reducing childcare 
fees, but most estimates assess the impact of the availability of childcare slots) has a 
significantly positive impact on maternal employment. These results, however, should be 
interpreted with caution, as the Conservative cluster is very heterogeneous here, with results 
from Germany, Italy and Switzerland (the latter being a rather hybrid “liberal-conservative” 
model, Bonoli, 2003c). These countries have something in common though, namely the fact 
that their childcare policy is little developed. In other Continental countries such as France 
and Belgium, where childcare services are much more developed, results could have been 
different. Only one study is based on a “Mediterranean” country, namely Del Boca and Vuri‟s 
(2007) article. Interestingly, they conclude that childcare costs cannot have much effects in 
the Italian regions in which the share of children in formal childcare is very low.  
Finally, let us have a look at the Nordic, Social-Democratic countries; they are the countries 
in which the share of young children in formal public childcare is highest.  
Table 36: Vote count of estimates of the employment effects of the availability and cost 
of childcare in the Social Democratic welfare regime, weighted results  
Type of vote count Majority  Significance of majority 
Sign (regardless of significance) 9/18  inconclusive n.s 
Significance (regardless of sign)  15/17 insignificant ** 
Sign among significant effects  1/2  inconclusive n.s 
** majority is significant at the 1% level, n.s. not significant at 5% level 
It may seem surprising that the impact of childcare policy on employment is not significant in 
Scandinavia; however, all estimates stem from studies that evaluate the impact of the 
introduction of a fees cap in Sweden. In fact, in a country in which maternal employment was 
already very high, and childcare services already inexpensive, it is not surprising that the 
introduction of a fees cap did not have much of an impact on female employment; moreover, 
this measure mainly benefits middle-class and rich households, in which women tend to work 
more than in low-income families. As far as the direction of the impact is concerned, the 
evidence is inconclusive; the effect could just as well be positive or negative; it is most 
probably zero.  
Antipoverty effects 
As indicated above, the number of estimates is far too small to break down the analysis of the 
antipoverty effects of the cost and availability of childcare slots by welfare regime.  
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d) Conclusions 
The evidence presented in section 6.5 unambiguously shows that the availability and 
affordability of childcare slots have a positive impact on maternal employment. Interestingly, 
the impact varies greatly across countries. In Scandinavia, where mothers have the highest 
labor market participation rates worldwide and childcare is heavily subsidized and 
inexpensive, childcare policy reforms are quite unlikely to have a big impact on both 
employment and poverty levels among working families. By contrast, the situation in 
countries or regions in which childcare coverage is low and waiting lists in public facilities 
long, reforms aiming at reducing childcare fees are also quite unlikely to have any effect on 
employment; they may, however, improve some working families‟ disposable income.  
A second important conclusion is that the link between childcare policies and poverty has 
rarely been directly established in the empirical literature. The impact of childcare policy on 
child poverty is mentioned at times, but it is often taken for granted or indirectly derived from 
risk-group analysis rather than based on empirical estimates, as is the case here. This is 
probably due to an implicit assumption: If childcare centers allow mothers to work more and 
if their cost is reasonable, then, this policy must reduce poverty, one way or another. But this 
link has rarely been demonstrated. This is certainly an interesting avenue of research that can 
greatly contribute to the identification of social policies that reduce working poverty. 
 
6.6 Conclusions: Which policies work in which welfare regime? 
 
The liberal cluster is characterized by the existence of minimum wages, usually enforced by 
law, and of earned income tax credits. Those are two aspects of a more global approach often 
dubbed “make work pay”. Minimum wages seem to have a limited impact on both 
employment levels and working poverty, given that they are set at a low level, especially in 
the US (and with the notable exception of Australia); moreover, their impact also depends on 
labor market regulations and payroll taxes. Tax credits have fulfilled one of their main goals, 
namely to increase employment among single mothers, and contributed to the strategy of 
maximizing labor force participation. But their impact depends largely on other aspects of the 
welfare state. The comparison between the UK and the US is very revealing: Though the 
British program is around twice as generous as its American counterpart, its impact has been 
more limited, because its increased generosity was accompanied by an increase in other 
benefits that are not employment-conditional. Moreover, these “make work pay” policies 
appear to have reduced poverty, whereas their real impact may have been overestimated by 
descriptive evidence. Despite all these policy innovations, actual levels of working poverty - 
presented in the next chapter - remain high in international comparison, which is, at least in 
part, explained by the relatively low levels of these benefits, especially in the US.  
In the Conservative corporatist, Continental European regime, the first striking element is 
that, apart from minimum wages, there has not been, until recently, policies that specifically 
aim at poor workers. I have shown in chapters 2 and 3 that researchers and official bodies 
acknowledged this phenomenon much more recently than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Some 
countries, however, have introduced employment-conditional tax credits in a recent past. I 
will show below that social transfers have, overall, a positive antipoverty impact: Regression 
models show that the level of social expenditure has a positive antipoverty impact, even when 
potential disemployment effects and negative effects on economic growth, are accounted for. 
As social transfers are more “generous” in Continental Europe, they contribute to the 
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relatively low levels of working poverty I measured for Germany (see next chapter), and 
family cash benefits contribute to this poverty reduction. In Continental Europe, tax credits 
for workers are quite unlikely to have any significant effect, be it on employment or on 
poverty, as the composition of the workforce is different, income inequalities less wide and 
family policy usually more generous than in the US (and the UK to a lesser extent). Minimum 
wages may have a more negative employment impact on low-skilled workers than in the US, 
as they are set at higher levels. 
I have not been able to determine, however, the level at which minimum wages could be set 
so that they can really contribute to the fight against working poverty without creating hurdles 
in the labor market. I could only reach very gross conclusions: A low minimum wage set at 
around 35 percent of gross average earnings combined with low payroll taxes, as is the case in 
the US, is unlikely to have much of an effect (neither on employment, nor on poverty), while 
a minimum wage set at around 45-47 percent of gross average wage (i.e. an after-tax value of 
60 percent of net average wage), in countries with high payroll taxes and strict hiring and 
firing regulations, as in France, is likely to have a negative employment impact on low-skilled 
workers.  
In Scandinavian countries, there are not specific policies for poor workers, except for 
minimum wages that are set through collective bargaining. As trade unions represent the vast 
majority of workers, this bargaining is unlikely to reach wage levels that constitute major 
obstacles in the labor market. There is, however, little evidence pertaining to these countries 
in this regard. Scandinavian countries have “generous” and expensive family policies, 
especially in the shape of state-subsidized childcare centers: Fees are affordable and waiting 
lists very short. Paradoxically, however, recent reforms – the introduction of fees caps - did 
not have much effect on female employment, for a very simple reason: It has already reached 
the highest level worldwide.  
Employment-conditional tax credits have been introduced in Scandinavia in a recent past. 
There is, to my knowledge, no evaluation of these programs as of the writing of this chapter.  
Last but not least, for all countries, it is noteworthy that the number of evaluations of the 
antipoverty impact of family policies that allow policy recommendations is limited, because 
evaluations usually do not account for dynamic aspects in the case of family cash benefits, 
while evaluation of the impact of childcare policies focus on employment effects (as well as 
fertility), without paying much attention to distributional effects.  
The conclusions of the present chapter pave the way to the next one that deals with the overall 
impact of welfare regimes on working poverty. In chapter 5, the main features of welfare 
regimes have been analyzed. In the next chapter, I analyze the composition of the working 
poor population as well as the relative weight of the three working poverty mechanisms 
outlined above across welfare regimes. In addition, the robustness of findings is assessed by 
using various poverty lines (50 and 60 percent of median income, income and consumption 
levels) and various poverty indicators (headcount and poverty gap).  
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7 Public Policies in the Real World: Welfare Regimes and the Fight against Working 
Poverty 
 
After having assessed the employment and antipoverty effects of each social policy tool 
identified in the literature as a promising instrument in the fight against working poverty, with 
an analysis by welfare regime, it is fundamental to measure the overall impact of each welfare 
regime on working poverty. As indicated above, the instruments analyzed in the previous 
chapters covary; moreover, they interact with a broad array of institutional arrangements, and 
their impact depends on the sectoral and sociodemographic composition of the labor market.  
This chapter represents the second empirical contribution of the present work. First, I provide 
figures pertaining to working poverty and employment performance in the four countries 
chosen to illustrate the four welfare regimes on which most of my empirical work is based, 
and then carry out a “classical” analysis of the working poor population in terms of risk 
groups, based on a relative poverty line and the headcount ratio. Then, I re-assess my findings 
by using poverty indicators that account for the depth of poverty, namely the income gap and 
the poverty gap; finally, I check the robustness of my findings by using another poverty line 
derived from consumption levels by comparing the situations in three countries for which I 
have information on both household income and consumption expenditure, namely France, 
Italy, and Switzerland.  
Second, I measure the relative weight of each working poverty mechanism, namely getting a 
low wage rate, having a low degree of labor force attachment, and having high needs 
(especially a high number of dependent children). The combination of both approaches (risk 
groups and poverty mechanisms) provides an in-depth insight into the topic of the main types 
of working poverty found in each welfare regime, as well as to the impact specific policy 
mixes appear to have. Hence, the present chapter allows drawing robust conclusions as to the 
following questions: Which welfare regime generates which type of working poverty? 
Which policy mix appears to work in which country? 
Two important restrictions must be underlined: First, the analysis presented here does not 
account for the major economic downturn of the late 2000s, as at the time of the writing of the 
present work, too little is known about the possible consequences of this deep recession on 
welfare regimes. It will probably take a few years to allow analysts to fully understand the 
implications of this massive exogenous shock on welfare states, labor market regulations, and 
the role families play in these difficult times. However, some comments are made, especially 
for the two countries that have been particularly hard hit, namely the US and Spain.  
Second, the analyses presented below mainly describe the situation in the early 2000s and the 
conceptions that were dominant, and sometimes, hegemonic, at that time in each welfare 
regime. This does not mean, however, that every policymaker and every citizen shared these 
dominant perspectives on social issues, nor that the prevailing conception of the fight against 
working poverty has always been the same.  
For instance, in the US, the work-first approach and explanations of poverty in terms of 
disincentives to work (rather than structural problems) have become overwhelmingly 
dominant. The fact that the 1996 welfare reform was implemented by Democrats is very 
revealing in this regard. However, this rather “conservative” conception of social policy has 
not always been dominant in the US; for instance, the 1900-1919 period has been dubbed the 
“progressive era” (Merrien, Parchet, Kernen, 2005), and the same could be said about the 
1960s during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when structural explanations of 
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poverty were dominant (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2001). Moreover, welfare reform and make 
work pay policies are understood differently: For many Conservatives, the main aim is to 
have welfare-deterrent institutions, whereas more progressive viewpoints tend towards an 
enabling welfare state. Likewise, the situation has changed in Germany since 2000; the Hartz 
reforms that I have described in chapter 5 were implemented stepwise, the more recent being 
a reform of unemployment and social assistance benefits (dubbed Hartz IV). These reforms 
represent a “paradigmatic shift” in Germany; however, in a recent past, many have criticized 
these reforms and advocated, among other things, the introduction of a statutory minimum 
wage (Müller and Steiner, 2008).  
In short, the following sections aim at understanding the impact of a welfare regime at a 
moment in time, not to account for the history of each welfare regime nor for the power 
conflicts and different viewpoints that coexisted in the early 2000s. In the meantime, the 
situation has changed significantly in some of these countries (for instance Germany 
implemented the far-reaching Hartz reforms), but this does not play a role here. What matters 
is to analyze the interplay of the situation in the labor market, the welfare regime and the 
mechanisms that lead to working poverty at a given point in time.  
 
7.1 The extent and composition of the working poor population  
 
In order to achieve the objectives presented in the introduction of this chapter, I have used 
Luxembourg Income Study data. This database provides comparable datasets for most OECD 
countries. As its name indicates, the aim of this database is to provide detailed and 
comparable information on household income. A complicated issue regards the definition of 
“disposable” income, that is, the income a household has at its disposal once social security 
contributions and taxes have been paid, and cash benefits received. As the tax and benefits 
system varies from country to country, this poses very challenging difficulties for comparative 
research. However, the Luxembourg Income Study allows this kind of analyses, because it 
provides a measure of disposable income that is comparable across countries. Data are 
derived from national surveys, and the most important variables (for the analysis of the 
financial situation of households) are made as comparable as possible.  
Moreover, the Luxembourg Income Study contains the variables that are necessary for the 
analysis of the three working poverty mechanisms I have presented above: individual wage 
rates, the volume of work performed, household size and composition, the age of household 
members, as well as they status within the household (head of household, spouse, other 
status).  
Some important and tricky empirical difficulties must be underlined. First, the working poor 
(luckily) represent a small share of the labor force in postindustrial countries. The labor force 
itself does not include a large minority of the population (retirees and other non-active 
persons). In addition, in all surveys dealing with the financial situation of households, income 
questions inevitably yield non-response rates that are not marginal. All this indicates that 
large samples are requested; otherwise results would not be statistically reliable, due to large 
confidence intervals. This excludes many comparative databases from the outset; the 
Luxembourg Income Study, luckily, entails national samples that are large enough.  
Second, at the time of the redaction of this chapter, wave VI of the Luxembourg Income 
Study is available for the United States and Sweden, but not for Germany and Spain. Hence, 
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the following calculations rely on wave V (around 2000) for the US, Germany, Sweden and 
Spain. More problematic is the fact that some of the Swedish data used here date back to the 
mid-1990s wave, because in wave V (2000) many variables related to the volume of work are 
not available. As no other Scandinavian dataset contains these variables either, be it for wave 
V or wave VI, we have to settle for Sweden 1995 to calculate the degree of labor force 
attachment and the share of low-wage workers among the working poor, which is certainly an 
important drawback.  
Third, the number of children under 14, which is an important variable when the modified 
OECD equivalence scale is used, is not available in the 1995 Swedish dataset; hence, a weight 
of 0.3 instead of 0.5 has been attributed to children between the age of 14 and 17 years old, 
which means that for a small minority of households the equivalized income might be slightly 
overestimated. In the analyses below, the Swedish child-to-adult ratio among the working 
poor is calculated with 2000 data, in which the number of children under 14 is available. It 
should be added that the situation in Sweden in the mid-1990s was quite grim, as the 
unemployment rate soared and reached rates as high as eight percent, a very unusual level for 
Sweden. At the turn of the century, however, the Swedish economy was back on track 
(Halleröd and Larsson, 2008). Hence, Swedish results based on the 1995 dataset have to be 
interpreted with some caution, while the other countries‟ results do not cause any major 
concern.  
I first assess the extent of working poverty (the poverty status is defined as having a 
household income below half median disposable equivalized income, whereas the at-risk-of-
poverty line is set at 60 percent of median income), with two definitions of “working”, 
namely active at the time of the interview, which is the approach I advocate, and being active 
as the main activity status over the income reference period:  
Table 37: Working poor rate and at-risk-of-poverty rate among workers, and poverty 
rate, in 2000, in the US, Spain, Germany, and Sweden (in percent)  
Country Working poor 
rate (person is 
active at the 
time of the 
interview) 
Working poor 
rate (personal 
status over 
reference 
period is 
„employed‟) 
At-risk-of-
poverty rate 
among 
workers 
(active at time 
of interview) 
At-risk-of-
poverty rate 
among 
workers 
(employed 
over reference 
period) 
Poverty rate 
(regardless of 
work status) 
US 7.2 6.0 11.4 10.0 17.0 
Spain 6.1 4.1 10.1 8.1 14.2 
Germany  4.5 2.9 7.3 5.0 8.4 
Sweden n/a 3.1 n/a 5.3 6.6 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations.  
Poverty rates in the last column from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm, as of October 12, 2008. 
These figures can usefully be completed with information on wages and employment 
performance: 
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Table 38: Employment and unemployment rates and low-wage incidence in 2000 in the 
US, Spain, Germany and Sweden (in percent):  
Country Harmonized 
unemployment rate 
Employment rate  Low-wage incidence 
US 4.0 74.1 24.7 
Spain 11.1 57.4 16.2 
Germany  7.5 65.6 12.9 
Sweden 5.6 74.2 6.1 
Source: OECD website, labor statistics and country statistical profiles, as of June 6, 
2009.  
The working poor rate in the US is approximately twice as high as in Sweden
13
 and Germany, 
based on a relative poverty line, namely an income below 50 percent of median equivalent 
disposable income. The difference between Germany and Sweden may not be significant, but 
other calculations based on other datasets confirm that the working poor rate is slightly lower 
in Germany than in Sweden (Lohmann and Marx, 2008). Spain‟s working poor rate is 
approximately halfway between the US and the tandem Sweden/Germany.  
As indicated in chapter 5, however, the use of an absolute poverty line yields differences that 
are much less marked between North America and Europe, and the highest poverty rates are 
found in Mediterranean countries (Kenworthy, 1999, Notten and De Neubourg, 2007); hence, 
I would probably get smaller differences between the US and the tandem Germany/Sweden in 
terms of working poverty should I use an absolute poverty line adjusted with purchasing 
power parities.  
Table 38 clearly demonstrates that the US and Sweden exhibited, in 2000, the best labor 
market performances. Yet, the incidence of low-wage employment is much higher in the US 
than in Europe and wide differences exist among the EU countries analyzed here.  
In what follows, the 60 percent of median income threshold is used, due to the small number 
of cases obtained in most countries with a threshold set at 50 percent of median income
14
. 
Hence, the working poor are individuals who are active at the time of the interview and live in 
a household with an equivalized disposable income below 60 percent of median income.  
Now that the extent of poverty among workers has been measured for each country, it is 
important to analyze the sociodemographic composition of the “working poor population”.  
Given the important role family policy appears to play, it seems natural to look at the 
differences in terms of gender, household composition and size, and age. As far as wage rates 
are concerned, gender, age and the educational level play a decisive role. Regarding labor 
force attachment, gender, age, educational level and household composition are also likely to 
                                                          
13
 The current labor force status is not available in the Swedish dataset 2000, hence the use of 
the labor force status over the income reference period in columns 2 and 4 of table 37.  
14
 Otherwise, I may have chosen 50 percent of median income. Using the 60-percent threshold 
yields “poverty” rates that are very high: one in six persons is deemed to be poor in the 
average EU member state.  
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play an important role. The incidence of working poverty among these sociodemographic 
groups is the following:  
Table 39: Working poor rate among various sociodemographic groups, 2000, in percent, 
as well as mean/median age and household size among the working poor 
  US Germany Spain Sweden 
16-25 years old 17.3 18.6 11.6 17.9 
26-35 12.4 7.7 7.4 5.3 
36-45 11.1 5.4 12.3 4.1 
46-55 7.7 3.5 11 2.7 
56-65 8 3.7 10.6 2.3 
Mean age 36 33.9 38.3 33.9 
Median age 35 30 39 30 
Men  11 6.2 10.7 5.2 
Women  11.9 8.6 9.3 5.3 
Single 12.9 16.1 13.4 11.6 
Childless couple 5.4 3.1 5.5 2.3 
Couple 1 child 7.8 4.1 9.6 2.6 
Couple 2 children 11.1 4.3 14.8 3.1 
Couple 3+ children 24.1 9.8 34.8 5.5 
Lone parent 1 child 21.1 24.2 29.8 9.3 
Lone parent 2 children 30.9 46.1 44 9.2 
Lone parent 3+ children 57.3 51.1 85.7 8 
No child under 18 8.3 3.5 7.1 2.1 
Mean household size 3.6 2.2 3.8 2.1 
Median household size 3 2 4 1 
low educational level (ISCED 1 
and 2)  27.5  13.1  16.6 6.2  
medium  
 11.3  6.5  5.0 5.6  (ISCED 3 and 4)  
high educational level 
 4.1  3.6  2.5 3.7  (ISCED 5 and 6) 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
German and Swedish poor workers are young. The median disadvantaged worker in these two 
countries is five years younger than in the US, and nearly a decade younger than his or her 
Spanish counterpart. In Sweden, most low-income workers escape poverty early, as the 
working poor rate plummets after 25 years of age; this is also reflected in the fact that the 
median poor worker in Sweden lives alone, whereas the median household size amounts to 2 
among the German working poor, despite of the identical median age, which is probably 
attributable to the very high female labor market participation rate in Sweden: Young adults 
are more likely to escape working poverty as soon as they live with a partner than in the 
German case.  
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In the US, on the contrary, working poverty appears to be a longer lasting problem in a life-
course perspective, as the rate does not decline markedly before 45 years. The Spanish case is 
interesting, as it displays a peculiar pattern. Teenagers and young adults are not, contrary to 
the other countries, harder hit by working poverty than middle-aged people. On the contrary, 
the working poor rate reaches its highest level between 36 and 45 years of age, and hardly 
declines afterwards. This may be due, in part, to the very peculiar labor market integration 
pattern of young adults. As most of them work on short-term contracts until their thirties, they 
keep on living with their parents, as indicated above, until they are able to obtain an open-
ended work contract. Hence, leaving the parental home as late as in their mid-thirties is not an 
oddity.  
In terms of gender, differences between men and women are slight, a relatively well-known 
finding (Andress and Lohmann, 2008, Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2008). This may 
appear as a paradox at first, as women tend to be more exposed to poverty in general, as well 
as to low-wage employment. The reason is mainly due to the definition of the phenomenon: A 
working woman is much more likely to have a working partner than a male worker. In many 
poor families, especially in countries with lower female employment levels, the husband will 
be classified as a working poor whereas his nonworking wife will be classified as poor. In the 
Spanish case, indeed, men are more likely to be working poor, as the employment 
participation gap between men and women, despite a strong reduction in recent years, is still 
marked.  
Regarding the working poverty risk broken down by household type, it appears, once again, 
that family policy in a general sense is an absolutely decisive factor. In the two countries with 
a very limited family policy (namely the US and Spain), the working poor rate of couples 
strongly increases after the birth of the second and subsequent children, whereas it is lower 
than 10 percent even for large families in Germany and Sweden, i.e. in the two countries in 
which parental-leave schemes are much more generous and family cash benefits higher. 
Childcare services are more developed, whereas this is much more the case in Sweden than in 
Germany.  
Another finding is striking: Whereas a divorce or a breakup leading to lone parenthood is a 
decisive factor in the US and Spain, of course, but also in Germany despite its relatively 
generous family policy, it is far less the case in Sweden. Indeed, whereas working poor rates 
are staggeringly high among single mothers with more than one child in most countries, it 
does not exceed 10 percent among Swedish single parents, due to their very high employment 
rates. Of course, the confidence intervals are likely to be large for these subgroups of lone 
mothers with two children and more, but even a margin of error of ± 10 percent would not 
affect the interpretation, as differences are extremely marked. This shows that the choice 
between a family policy largely based on passive income transfers as in Germany and a 
family policy largely based on the provision of services as is the case in Sweden leads to very 
different outcomes.  
The large difference observed between couples with children in the US and Spain, on one 
hand, and Germany and Sweden, on the other, is reflected in the fact that German and 
Swedish disadvantaged workers are notably younger and that households affected by working 
poverty are much larger in the US (the median working-poor household has three members) 
and in Spain (the median size being four persons) than in Germany (the median equals two) 
and Sweden (at least half of Sweden‟s low-income workers live alone).  
Finally, and unsurprisingly, workers with a high educational level are less likely to suffer 
from income deprivation than persons with an intermediate, secondary level, and far less 
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likely than those with a low educational level. However, differences in labor market 
regulation and structure are visible. In the US, a country in which hiring and firing is hardly 
regulated (except against discriminatory behaviors) and the sector of low-productivity, low-
wage personal services large, the disadvantage of low-skilled worker is marked, with a 
working poor rate 2.5 times higher than among workers with a secondary education level. In 
Spain, the difference is even larger than in the US, as the incidence of low income among 
workers with a primary educational level is three times higher than among secondary-level 
workers. In a country in which most women either work full-time or not at all, social 
endogamy might have a particularly strong impact: Low skilled workers are more likely to 
have a non-employed partner than higher-skilled workers. Moreover, some low-wage sectors 
such as the tourism industry and agriculture are large employers of low-skilled workers in 
Spain.  
The difference between educational levels is less marked in Germany, a country in which 
collective bargaining has led to high wage levels. Still, the risk of being a low-income worker 
is twice higher among the low-skilled. It should be borne in mind that the dataset used here 
dates back to 2000; that is, before the Hartz reforms were introduced. It is not impossible that 
the gap between primary-level and secondary-level workers has grown larger with the 
development of low-wage employment (the so-called “minijobs” and “midijobs”) encouraged 
by some of the reforms presented above. In the case of Sweden, the earnings distribution is 
very compressed and many low-skilled employees, especially women, work for the 
government (Esping-Andersen, 1993), so that the group of low-skilled workers is not 
particularly hit by poverty nor by unemployment. Indeed, the working poor rate is very low 
among persons without a secondary or tertiary educational attainment, namely 6.2 percent, 
and the difference with higher level workers is small (5.6 percent for those with a secondary 
educational level and 3.7 for those who have a tertiary-level diploma).  
So far, my analysis has relied on the headcount ratio; the next section is based on an 
alternative poverty indicator.  
 
7.2 Depth of poverty  
 
As indicated in chapter 2, the present work focuses on monetary definitions of poverty, as 
they appear to be more useful for social policy purposes. So far, I have only used the 
headcount ratio. It is, however, advisable to use alternative monetary indicators. Important 
dimensions must be added to the analysis, namely the income gap and the poverty gap: Not 
only is it important to know how many workers have an income below the poverty line in a 
given year, but it also matters a great deal whether disadvantaged workers have, on average, 
an income that is slightly below the threshold or, on the contrary, way below it. Moreover, 
taking into account the depth of poverty may affect country rankings.  
In short, not only is it important to know how many people are poor, but also how poor they 
are. The mean and median income gap ratios are the following:  
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Table 40: Mean and median gap income gap ratios, expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line, 2000 
  United States Germany Spain Sweden 
Mean income gap 29% 27% 29% 27% 
Median income gap 24% 21% 24% 24% 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
The mean income gap ratio is highest in the United States: On average, poor workers in the 
US have an income 29 percent lower than the poverty line. Put differently, not only is the 
incidence of working poverty highest in the US, but the income gap is also deepest. The mean 
and median income gap are similar in Spain, but as the incidence of working poverty is lower 
than in the US, the poverty gap – i.e. the product of the headcount ratio and the income gap 
ratio – is lower in Spain. The mean income gap ratio is identical in Germany and Sweden, 
whereas the median is lower in Germany. Overall, the country ranking is unaffected by the 
inclusion of the depth of poverty, but the distance between countries grows bigger, as the 
countries with the highest incidence of working poverty display the highest income gap.  
Looking at income gaps, and, hence, at poverty gaps, does not fundamentally affect 
conclusions regarding the distribution of the poverty risk among various subgroups of 
workers:  
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Table 41: Income gap (average income of poor workers as a share of the poverty line) 
and poverty gap (headcount ratio*income gap), 2000 
 
US  Germany  Spain  Sweden 
  
Income 
gap 
Poverty 
gap 
Income 
gap 
Poverty 
gap 
Income 
gap 
Poverty 
gap 
Income 
gap 
Poverty 
gap 
16-25 29% 5 30% 5.6 31% 3.6 27% 4.8 
26-35 28% 3.5 32% 2.5 28% 2.1 27% 1.4 
36-45 28% 3.1 22% 1.2 29% 3.6 22% 0.9 
46-55 27% 2.1 22% 0.8 31% 3.4 25% 0.7 
56-65 33% 2.6 23% 0.9 30% 3.2 42% 1 
men  28% 3.1 28% 1.7 27% 2.9 28% 1.5 
women 29% 3.5 26% 2.2 33% 3.1 26% 1.4 
single 32% 4.1 35% 5.6 42% 5.6 32% 3.7 
childless couple 30% 1.6 21% 0.7 23% 1.3 29% 0.7 
couple 1 child 26% 2 17% 0.7 30% 2.9 23% 0.6 
couple 2+ 
children 26% 4.1 20% 1.1 30% 5.4 19% 0.7 
single parent 1 
child 28% 5.9 27% 6.5 32% 9.5 22% 2 
single parent 2+ 
children 32% 13 24% 11.2 33% 17.5 12% 1.1 
low educational 
level 30% 8.3 26% 3.4 29% 4.8 27% 1.7 
medium  28% 3.2 27% 1.8 27% 1.4 27% 1.5 
high educational 
level 27% 1.1 29% 1 39% 1 27% 1 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
The ranking of sociodemographic groups based on the poverty gap is identical to the ranking 
derived from the headcount ratios in the US and Germany. In Spain, the difference between 
men and women is reversed: Whereas the incidence of working poverty is higher among men, 
women have a notably deeper income gap, and, hence, a larger poverty gap. In Sweden, men 
and women display a virtually identical working poor rate, but women‟s income gap is 
slightly narrower. A closer look at age groups shows that, as young people display above 
average income gaps and poverty rates, their disadvantage is even more marked when the 
poverty gap is used as a poverty indicator.  
Regarding household types, not only are lone parents much more likely to be hit by poverty, 
they also have above-average income gaps, which means that they appear to be the most 
disadvantaged household type in terms of poverty gaps. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Swedish lone mothers display below-average income gaps, probably due their very high labor 
market participation rates. Singles also display high poverty gaps in all countries. Conclusions 
pertaining to couples with children vary widely across welfare regimes: In Germany and 
Sweden, thanks to generous family policies, these households have notably below-average 
income gaps; it is also the case in the US, despite a limited family policy, probably owing to a 
high labor market participation among parents, but the difference is less marked. In Spain, on 
162 
 
the contrary, parents living in couple display income gap ratios that are close to those of 
single parents.  
As to the impact of the educational level, low-skilled workers have above-average income 
gaps in the US and Spain, which increases their disadvantage, whereas this is not the case in 
Sweden and Germany.  
All in all, conclusions drawn from the analysis of headcount ratios are not fundamentally 
altered when the depth of poverty is accounted for; however, some disadvantaged groups that 
have an above-average working-poverty risk appear even worse off in terms of the poverty 
gap.  
 
7.3 Robustness checks with a consumption poverty line 
 
Another way to set a monetary poverty line is to use consumption expenditures rather than 
income. Studies have shown that the overlap between income poverty and consumption 
poverty is only partial; in the case of Australia, for instance, the correlation coefficient 
between income and consumption expenditures is only r = 0.52 (Headey, Krause, Wagner, 
2009). Unfortunately, none of the national datasets used in the previous sections contains 
consumption expenditure data. Hence, an attempt has been made to find countries that are 
more or less comparable to the four countries analyzed so far for which consumption data are 
available. It proved impossible to find a Scandinavian country filling this criterion. For the 
Southern European cluster, Italy contains the necessary variables for the purpose at hand. For 
the Continental conservative cluster, French data are available. Within the liberal cluster, the 
US database does not contain consumption expenditure data, nor do the Canadian, Australian, 
UK and Irish databases. A European country that has at least some features in common with 
Anglo-Saxon countries is Switzerland, with its lowly regulated labor market (according to the 
OECD, Switzerland is the non-Anglo-Saxon country with the least regulated labor market), its 
reliance on public-private partnerships (pensions, healthcare, etc.), and its low level of 
spending on family policy and the very limited provision of childcare services. However, 
many aspects of Switzerland‟s welfare regime are rather comparable to other Continental 
countries. Hence, Switzerland can be seen as an in-between, “liberal-conservative” case 
(Bonoli, 2003c).  
In what follows, due to common data limitations in the Luxembourg Income Study datasets, 
the current labor force status was used to identify the French and the Swiss working poor; in 
the Italian database, however, this variable does not exist and the main labor force status 
during the income reference period was used. For both poverty indicators, being poor is 
defined as having an income or expenditure below 60 percent of the median level, and the 
same equivalence scale is used, namely the modified OECD scale. Table 42 shows the 
incidence of income and consumption poverty in the three countries analyzed in this section: 
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Table 42: Working poverty rates according to the type of monetary poverty threshold 
used, 2000 
  Consumption poverty Income poverty 
  France Italy 
Switzer-
land France Italy 
Switzer-
land 
Poverty risk 
(60%) 8.5 8.7 8.7 5.6 9.7 6.5 
Working 
poverty (50%) 4.6 4.6 4.2 2.5 6.2 4.3 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
Are these three countries suitable illustrations of the welfare regimes analyzed in the present 
chapter? The country ranking based on income poverty is quite comparable: The working 
poor rate is lowest in the Continental European country (France), higher in the country that 
mixes Anglo-Saxon and “Corporatist conservative” features (Switzerland), and highest in the 
Southern European country (Italy). It is fundamental to note that the Italian working poor rate 
would be higher if the current labor force status could have been used, instead of the main 
activity status during the income reference period, as the latter excludes respondents who 
worked at the time of the interview, but were mainly unemployed or inactive during the 
reference period. In table 37 above, for the US, Germany and Spain, the working poor rate 
based on the current status is 20 to 55 percent higher than the one based on the main activity 
status during the year previous to the interview. Hence, Italy‟s working poor rate based on the 
current labor force status probably exceeds 10 percent.  
When the poverty line is derived from consumption expenditures, the incidence of working 
poverty is very similar in Switzerland and France. In both countries, the working poor rate is 
higher when a consumption poverty line is used. This may mean that the distribution of 
consumption expenditure is more unequal than the income distribution in Continental Europe; 
the opposite appears to be true in the Southern European country analyzed here (Italy), as the 
incidence of working poverty is slightly lower when based on consumption expenditures. 
Again, Italy‟s figures are based on those who were active in the labor market for most of the 
reference period, which probably means that consumption poverty would also be higher if 
workers with a looser connection to the labor market were included.  
As will be shown below, the differences between the extent of income poverty and 
consumption poverty among workers is mainly due to the situation of workers aged 55 years 
and more. Indeed, it is very important to have a closer look at the sociodemographic 
composition of the group of low-consumption workers and to compare it to that of low-
income workers, in order to assess the robustness of the findings presented in previous 
sections. Table 43 contains working poor rates measured with an income threshold, whereas 
table 44 contains the same risk-group analysis based on consumption poverty:  
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Table 43: Income poverty risk among workers, broken down by age, gender, household 
type, and educational level, 2000, in percent:  
  France Italy Switzerland 
16-25 9.7 10.9 7.9 
26-35 4.7 7.2 6.1 
36-45 5.7 10.7 6.5 
46-55 5.1 10.9 5.5 
56-65 4.5 9.7 7.8 
men 6.1 12.6 6.9 
women 5.1 4.8 6 
single 7.5 3.7 5.6 
childless couple 2.9 3.4 2.4 
couple 1 child 5 10.2 4 
couple 2 children 5.6 15.8 7.9 
couple 3+ children 10.8 33.8 20.9 
lone parent 1 child 9.5 7.1 7.6 
lone parent 2 
children 19.1 12.8 21.9 
lone parent 3+ 
children 17.4 … 40.5 
no child under 18 4.5 8.3 10.2 
low educational level 9.6 16.4 11.2 
medium  5.1 5.4 6.3 
high  2.2 1.8 4.1 
TOTAL 5.6 9.7 6.5 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
Let us first assess if conclusions based on income levels for Switzerland, France, and Italy are 
comparable to those presented above for the US, Germany, and Spain. Indeed, Italy is similar 
to Spain: The incidence of working poverty hardly decreases after 35, whereas the age bracket 
26-35 is the least affected; moreover, the poverty risk strongly increases after the birth of the 
second child, and the educational gradient is very strong. The specificity of the Italian case is 
that lone parents do not seem to be worse off than couples with children, but this result should 
be interpreted with caution given the small number of cases at disposal.  
France and Germany are comparable, but differences exist: Though young workers are the 
most exposed to poverty in both countries, the risk declines regularly with age in Germany, 
whereas in France the working poor rate goes down between 26 and 35 but then increases 
slightly between 36 and 45 and then decreases regularly. In addition, whereas German women 
are slightly more affected than men, it is the opposite in France, which is seemingly 
attributable to the very high poverty rate among working lone mothers in Germany, whereas 
in France this level never exceeds 20 percent, which might be due to a much better provision 
of childcare services. The education gradient is very similar in France and Germany.  
As indicated above, the Swiss case is hybrid. It shares an important feature with the US, 
namely high working poor rates among families with children and single mothers, but also 
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with Spain, due to an underdeveloped family policy. But most of its other features are rather 
reminiscent of Continental European countries (France, Germany): an education gradient that 
is not very steep, no big difference between men and women, and a poverty risk that tends to 
decreases with age; however, in Switzerland as in France, there is a “hump” between 36 and 
45 years.  
Switzerland displays a distinctive feature in terms of its age profile, though, namely a marked 
increase between 56 and 65 years of age, which may be due, at least in part, to institutional 
factors. Switzerland has had a “second tier” in its pension system based on capitalization since 
the mid-1980s, and workers are allowed to withdraw the entire amount when they retire. 
Hence, these financial resources are not accounted for by an income-based indicator. This is 
one of the reasons why Swiss official poverty statistics usually do not contain figures on 
income poverty for workers aged 55 and over, as many have a retired partner and some have 
benefited from early-retirement schemes. Hence, this feature might well be a statistical 
artifact.  
All in all, results obtained with a poverty threshold set at 60 percent of median equivalized 
consumption expenditures are broadly in line with those presented above for the liberal, 
conservative and Southern European welfare regimes.  
Let us now see if these conclusions in terms of risk groups are robust to the use of a poverty 
line derived from consumption expenditures, by comparing table 43 and table 44:  
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Table 44: Consumption poverty among workers, broken down by age, gender, 
household type and educational level, 2000, in percent  
  France Italy Switzerland 
16-25 8.9 12.9 11.1 
26-35 7.7 6.7 6.5 
36-45 9.2 9.2 8 
46-55 8.2 8.2 8.6 
56-65 10 10.2 10.1 
male 9.2 10.5 9.4 
female 7.7 5.6 7.8 
single 9.7 8.9 4.3 
childless couple 5.4 2.8 4.8 
couple 1 child 4.9 8.8 8.1 
couple 2 children 9.8 10.3 10.3 
couple 3+ children 13.3 21.2 22.8 
lone parent 1 child 13.7 5.7 12 
lone parent 2 children 14.6 24.7 12.4 
lone parent 3+ children 28.2 … 34.4 
no child under 18 11 8.8 14.4 
low educational level 15.9 13.6 14.4 
medium  7.5 5.9 9.1 
high educational level 2.4 2.2 3.7 
TOTAL 8.5 8.7 8.7 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
Most findings are comparable to the conclusions obtained with income-based poverty lines. 
Gender differences are hardly modified; in Italy, however, the gender gap is narrower with a 
consumption-based poverty threshold. Regarding the situation of household types, there is 
never more than a one-rank change between the income-based and consumption-based 
rankings, except for singles in Switzerland and lone mothers with children in Italy, who both 
move two ranks. The ranking of educational levels is unaffected, whereas differences are less 
marked with income than with consumption levels.  
There is, however, a factor that is affected by switching from an income threshold to a 
consumption poverty line, namely the impact of age. In terms of rankings, in all three 
countries, the groups most affected by consumption poverty are people under 26 years and 
over 55; whereas the younger age group is also the hardest hit by income poverty, older 
workers appear to be among the least affected by income poverty in France and Italy. In 
Switzerland, older workers are more affected by working poverty both in terms of income and 
consumption levels; however, the difference is less marked when measured with consumption 
levels, and the difference between workers aged 55 plus and workers aged 46-55 is quite 
comparable to that measured in France and Italy, which seems to confirm that the higher 
income poverty risk of Swiss senior workers is, at least in part, a statistical artifact.  
The increase in working poverty due to switching from an income-based to a consumption-
expenditure based threshold is, in France and Switzerland, largely attributable to the category 
167 
 
of the over 45. The pattern in Italy is different, as consumption poverty is lower than income 
poverty among middle-aged workers, which more than offsets the fact that consumption 
poverty is higher among older and younger workers. 
Overall, then, using a consumption poverty line does not fundamentally modify conclusions 
about most risk groups (in Continental European and Mediterranean countries, as well as in 
countries with a lowly regulated labor market and a lowly developed family policy). 
However, the extent of the phenomenon is affected by this definitional change, which appears 
to be largely due to changes among older workers, who appear to spend less than middle-aged 
workers; this may not reflect, however, lower living standards. Indeed, workers aged 55 and 
over usually do not have dependent children (anymore); in addition, they have had more time 
to build up savings and/or to buy a house. Hence, it may well be the fact that they have lower 
needs and more savings; this would explain their lower consumption expenditures. In this 
regard, it would certainly be advisable to carry out the same analysis with nonmonetary 
indicators to compare the situation of middle-aged workers with that of workers over 55. 
Unfortunately, the dataset I have used throughout the chapter does not contain indicators that 
allow a direct measurement of living conditions, but this is doubtlessly an interesting avenue 
for future working poverty analyses.  
Finally, a cautionary note is of order here: Consumption measurement is not, obviously, the 
core of the Luxembourg Income Study, and indicators may be less comparable than income 
variables. Moreover, it is more difficult to collect expenditure data, as it is not possible to do 
it in a standard survey format (Headey, Krause, Wagner, 2009). Swiss and French 
consumption data are derived from household budget surveys, whereas Italian data stem from 
a survey on income and wealth, which may partly explain differences between France and 
Switzerland on one hand, and Italy on the other hand.  
 
7.4 Working poverty mechanisms across welfare regimes 
 
The sociodemographic composition of the population affected by working poverty differs 
across country, as shown above. This is due to the fact that the weight of each mechanism that 
leads to working poverty differs from one country to another; measuring these variations is 
the object of this section.  
Based on the analysis of the four countries presented in chapter 5, I formulate the following 
hypotheses: In Social democratic welfare states I do not expect any of the three mechanisms 
to be particularly strong. Working poverty should be a quantitatively limited phenomenon. In 
Anglo-Saxon countries, I expect working poverty to be mostly the result of low wages and 
high children to adult ratios. Low labor force attachment should play a less important role. In 
Conservative-corporatist welfare states (Continental Europe), working poverty will be mostly 
the result of low labor force attachment, and working poverty should also be little widespread. 
In Southern European welfare states, working poverty should mostly be the result of low labor 
force attachment and high children to adult ratio.  
7.4.1 The relative weight of the three mechanisms leading to working poverty across 
welfare regimes 
My first aim is to assess the relative weight of the three mechanisms outlined above, and to 
verify whether the impact of each factor differs from one welfare regime to the other, by 
comparing the situation of poor and non-poor workers in each country under review. Second, 
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the main features of each welfare regime that explain, at least partly, the weight and impact of 
each working poverty mechanism will be identified. I compare the mean and median values of 
labor force attachment and child-to-adult ratio, as well as the incidence of (hypothetical) low 
full-time year-round earnings as a proxy for the remuneration rate of a wage-earner. The three 
mechanisms are operationalized as follows: 
- Low hourly earnings. The most intuitive mechanism leading to working poverty is the fact 
of being badly paid. However, several researchers have pointed out that low wages alone are 
seldom the cause of working poverty (Andress and Lohman, 2008, Nolan and Marx, 2000, 
Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003, Peña-Casas and Latta, 2004). However, few will object that being 
paid a low wage vastly increases the risk of ending up in working poverty. I operationalize the 
notion of low wages by taking into account the number of hours usually worked, as well as 
the number of weeks spent in the labor market over the income reference period, leading to 
the calculation of hypothetical “full-time year round earnings” (FTYRE). Half median 
FTYRE is used as a low-wage threshold. This indicator (low pay in full-time year round 
equivalents) is calculated for all household members who are wage-earners. 
- Low labor force attachment. This mechanism is proteiform and hits underemployed and 
intermittent workers, as well as persons - usually women - who cannot or are not willing to 
work more due the presence of children in the household. The rise in double earnership 
observed in most OECD countries puts families with a nonworking spouse in a relatively 
more difficult situation than during the postwar years, when single-earnership was the norm. I 
focus on heads of households and their spouses (if any) aged 18-65. In most cases, this 
corresponds exactly to the number of potential workers in a household. In some cases, 
however, there may be working adult children who are not taken into account. This should not 
lead to a large distortion of results for the US, Germany and Sweden, but could be 
problematic for Spain, as most Spaniards live with their parents until they are in their thirties. 
I get back to this point below, when discussing country profiles.  
For example, a couple with children where one parent works full-time and the other one has a 
50-percent job will have a labor force attachment of 0.75 (1.5 full-time equivalents / 2 adults 
= 0.75). 
- Large needs, especially a large number of dependent children in the household. Most 
studies show that having many children can lead to poverty. Having a third or a fourth child is 
a dangerous choice for a couple to make, in terms of poverty risk. The same number of 
children is more likely to lead to poverty for one-parent families than for two-parent families. 
In fact, after a break-up or a divorce, even just two children may become problematic, 
because the needs of the two resulting households (the ex-husband who lives alone and the 
mother with the children, most of the time) increase significantly. What matters, as a result, is 
not the absolute number of children in a household, but rather the ratio of children to adults. 
For this reason, I operationalize this mechanism by dividing the number of children by the 
number of working-age adults (18-65 years). A family of four (two parents and two children) 
will have a children to adults ratio of 1, just like a single parent with one child. A family of 
five (two parents and three children) will have a children to adults ratio of 1.5. 
Low wage rate 
Even if low earnings spontaneously appear as the main, if not the only, cause of working 
poverty, many researchers have underscored the fact that these two phenomena differ. It is, 
hence, fundamental to evaluate the weight of this factor. Figure 3 is very revealing in this 
regard:  
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Figure 3: Share of workers with “full-time year round earnings” below 50 percent of the 
median 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
Even if the relationship between low-wage employment and working poverty is far from 
straightforward, my conclusion is clear-cut: Being on low wage-rate employment seems to be 
an important factor everywhere, whereas the difference is less marked in Spain. Interestingly, 
the incidence of “low full-time year-round earnings” is not higher in the US than in Sweden, 
for instance, despite a much higher incidence of low-wage employment. However, as the 
incidence of working poverty is much higher in the US than in Sweden, the share of the 
workforce made up of poor workers on low-wage employment is noticeably higher. In 
addition, as demonstrated below, the working poor in Sweden and Germany are notably 
younger, i.e. in age brackets in which the incidence of low-wage employment is high.  
Low labor force attachment 
The labor force attachment at the household level is expressed as the ratio of the volume of 
work performed by the head of household and his or her spouse (if any) to their full work 
potential, namely a full-time job for each partner. The following figure compares poor and 
nonpoor workers, both in terms of median and mean work attachment:  
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Figure 4: Median and mean work attachment expressed in percent of the full work 
potential  
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
The level of labor force attachment seems to be a mechanism of working poverty everywhere, 
except in Sweden, where poor and nonpoor workers have similar employment levels, which at 
first may seem counterintuitive. I get back to this fact in the section devoted to country 
profiles. Sweden and the US are the countries in which low-income active persons work the 
most (Sweden exhibiting the highest levels) while the labor force attachment is lower in 
Germany and lowest in Spain. Comparing the mean and the median among the working poor 
indicates whether the distribution of work is symmetric or not. In all countries but Sweden, 
mean labor force attachment is slightly higher than the median, the difference being largest in 
Spain.  
High number of children relative to the number of working-age adults 
This indicator produces more surprising results at first sight. It should be noted that in all four 
countries the median nonpoor worker does not have children – more precisely at least half of 
them do not live with children (a divorced father who does not live with his children, e.g., has 
a child-to-adult ratio of zero).  
Let us consider now the mean number of children per adult. In the US and in Spain, it is an 
important working poverty factor, as the mean value is notably higher among the working 
poor (more than twice as high in the US, 86 per cent higher in Spain). In Germany the mean is 
hardly higher among poor workers, due to very generous family cash benefits, amongst other 
factors, and in Sweden the average ratio is even higher among nonpoor workers. This is very 
counterintuitive, but understandable if one considers that in Sweden poor workers are mostly 
younger people who have left the parental home early, and because family policy is 
generously designed. The fact of having children is clearly not a factor of poverty in that 
country. 
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Figure 5: Median and mean child-to-adult ratio 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations 
Before turning my attention to country profiles, I have to account for the interplay of these 
three mechanisms. It is probable that employees whose work volume is low are more exposed 
to low-wage employment (a low wage rate); moreover, families with children are likely to 
have a lower labor force participation than childless households. In order to assess these 
interactions, a logistic regression model has been calculated: The logarithm of the odds of 
being a poor worker was regressed on the three variables analyzed in the present chapter. 
Each variable has a statistically significant impact, ceteris paribus, on the odds of working 
poverty in each of the analyzed countries (the p values are always smaller than 0.001). 
Moreover, I checked whether there is a multicolinearity problem in the model. None of the 
variance inflation factors exceeds 1.1, which is way below the customary threshold in social 
sciences of VIF = 5. Hence the correlations between the three mechanisms do not bias the 
estimates presented in table 45, which contains the odds ratios of the four regression models. 
In this table, cells are shaded according to the weight of each mechanism (horizontally); the 
larger the weight, the darker the cell:  
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Table 45: Odds of being a poor worker in the US, Sweden, Germany, and Spain 
  US Sweden Germany Spain 
  Odds ratio (Exp(B)) 
Share of full labor potential actualized
15
 0.13 0.094 0.099 0.077 
Child per adult ratio 2.967 2.135 1.832 5.712 
Dummy low wage employment 9.106 7.653 15.612 7.257 
Nagelkerke R
2 
0.281 0.095 0.249 0.192 
Source: Own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study data 
The odds ratios indicate that an increase in employment has the largest antipoverty impact in 
Spain and Sweden, and the smallest impact in the United States: An increase of 0.1 unit 
increase in the work volume (i.e. an 10 percentage point increase, if the potential is measured 
in percent) performed by the head of household (and his or her spouse) reduces the odds of 
being a poor worker by 33 percent in Spain (ln(0.077)= -2.56 and exp(-0.256) = 0.77) and by 
28 per cent only in the US (ln(0.13)=-2.042 and exp(-0.2042)=0.82). An increase of one child 
per adult (hence of two children for a couple) has the strongest impact in Spain, as the odds of 
being a working poor are multiplied by 5.7, whereas they are multiplied by 3 in the US and 
are lowest in Sweden and Germany (the odds are multiplied by 2.1 and 1.9 respectively). 
Having a low earning potential (that is, low “full-time year round earnings”) has the worst 
effect in Germany, where the odds of working poverty are multiplied by 15, whereas they are 
multiplied by 9.1 in the US, by 7.6 in Sweden and by 7.3 in Spain. These findings are largely 
in line with the descriptive evidence presented above. Last but not least, based on 
Nagelkerke‟s pseudo-R2, it can be said that these three mechanisms have the strongest 
explanatory power in the US, followed by Germany and Spain; as expected, it is smallest in 
Sweden.  
7.4.2 Country profiles  
I have already given a certain number of indications on why these mechanisms vary from one 
country to another. Now I have to discuss country profiles in relation to my hypotheses in a 
more systematic fashion. 
United States  
The three mechanisms play an important role, even if low labor force participation is a less 
decisive factor than in Germany and Spain, as the American working poor have a relatively 
high labor force attachment. This is not surprising because increasing labor market 
participation of disadvantaged groups was the main aim of the welfare reform brought about 
by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Clinton 
administration) and the repeated increases in the generosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
Indeed, working poverty has been a growing concern since the reform was implemented, as 
indicated above (Joassart-Marcelli, 2005). The fact that the incidence of low “full-time year-
round earnings” is not higher than in Germany and Sweden can be surprising, given that the 
incidence of low-wage employment is notably higher in the US. However, even if the share is 
                                                          
15
 A value of 1 indicates that the head of household and his or her spouse (if any) work full-
time.  
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similar among poor workers in these three countries, the fact that the incidence of working 
poverty is much higher in the US means that the percentage of the workforce on low-wage 
employment living in poverty is significantly higher.  
Having children is also a significant poverty factor, which is not very surprising given that 
working parents have to buy childcare services in the market, which can be a financial burden 
for low-income families even in the presence of a large low-wage personal services sector; in 
addition, there are no child benefits in cash (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, Myles, 
2002). Yet, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has been strongly expanded since the early 
1990s and it benefits working families with children mainly. In fact, it is generally considered 
by American scholars that many families are lifted out of poverty by the EITC - out of 
poverty by American standards. This means that these families are not necessarily lifted 
above 60 per cent of median equivalized disposable income – not even above 50 per cent, 
probably. The following example is revealing in this regard: A microsimulation was carried 
out by Swiss researchers in order to assess the poverty reduction potential of the EITC in 
Switzerland, using purchasing power parities to set the boundaries of the various ranges 
(phase-in, plateau, phase-out) that characterize the design of the EITC. The authors conclude 
that the EITC is not generous enough to significantly reduce working poverty in Switzerland, 
using Swiss poverty standards amounting to approximately 55 percent of median income 
(Gerfin, Leu, Brun, Tschöpe, 2002, Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2007).  
Another factor that has not been stressed so far deserves attention, namely the fact that 
household size is similar among poor and non-poor workers (the median value is three for 
both groups according to own calculations based on the same database). This may seem 
surprising as poor workers tend to have more children. This, however, is in line with the 
finding that poverty incidence among single-parent families is extremely high in the US: 
According to LIS-based own calculations shown in table 39, the working poor rate is much 
higher among single parents then among couples.  
Sweden 
This is probably the country for which I have obtained the most puzzling findings. First, there 
is virtually no difference in terms of mean and median labor force attachment between poor 
and nonpoor workers. The overall high work attachment of poor workers is not surprising in a 
country with a very high labor market participation rate. My results are in line with others; for 
instance, Halleröd and Larsson note that a vast majority of the working poor in Sweden work 
more than 30 hours a week (Halleröd and Larsson, 2008). Another, at first sight, surprising 
feature is the fact that nonpoor workers have more children than the working poor. This is due 
to the fact that childcare services are largely available and affordable in Sweden and that 
parental-leave schemes are very generous (Fagnani and Math, 2008); put differently, the 
opportunity cost of having children in Sweden is very low in international comparison 
(Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006). Indeed, child poverty is very low in Sweden (Whiteford and 
Adema, 2007). But a perhaps more revealing indication is that the median Swedish low-
income worker lives alone (own calculations based on the same data set), while the median 
among nonpoor workers amounts to 2.1 household members: In a country in which two-
earner couples constitute the very dominant form of household arrangement and set the level 
of median income, being single is a disadvantage. Moreover, many Swedish poor workers are 
young and single (Halleröd and Larsson, 2008); young Swedes tend to live the parental home 
early in international comparison. Our calculations are revealing: At least half the Swedish 
working poor are younger than 31.  
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In Sweden, having a relatively low wage seems to be a precondition to working poverty 
(Halleröd and Larsson, 2008), which is a widespread characteristic of young employees, not 
only in Sweden. In this regard, working poverty in Sweden, in a social investment 
perspective, is probably a less problematic social issue, as it often concerns young, single and 
childless adults. Child poverty is very low, owing to a “generous” family policy and high 
maternal employment rates (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). Working poverty, then, does not 
massively affect children, nor does it seem to have a long-lasting character: The working poor 
rate drops after age 25 (see table 39). However, the problem of working poverty should not 
been ignored, as it is a growing problem among Swedish employees (Halleröd and Larsson, 
2008).  
1995 Swedish figures on low wage rates and labor force attachment, however, should be 
interpreted with some caution, as they rely on family units rather than households (contrary to 
the 2000 data), which leads to an overestimation of the number of households by some 12 per 
cent. It is estimated that around 50 percent of family units in the first decile of equivalized 
disposable income are children between 18-29 years who are considered as independent units. 
Hence the average volume of work among low-income workers is probably underestimated in 
1995. 
Germany  
A significant poverty factor among workers is the degree of labor market participation, as the 
difference between low-income workers and the rest of the workforce is marked. Indeed, 
poverty among full-time workers who benefit from standard employment conditions 
(Normalarbeitsverhältnis) is very low: As of 2004, only 3.3 percent had an income below 60 
per cent of median income (Andress and Seeck, 2007). Unemployment was high at the turn of 
the century in Germany, and female employment rate quite low, owing to the fact that the 
German welfare regime reflects a modified male-breadwinner model that does not aim at 
maximizing women‟s participation in employment. It is still expected that women leave the 
labor market for some years when they become mothers (Andress and Seeck, 2007, 
Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008). If male partners have relatively low earnings, this can then 
easily lead to financial difficulties; however, child poverty is low in Germany, due in large 
part to a generous tax credit program which has been very significantly increased in a recent 
past (Kindergeld, Andress and Seeck, 2007). The other mechanism that plays a significant 
role is to have low earnings per unit of time. In fact, this is the main difference between both 
groups of workers. This mechanism probably plays a bigger role in the Eastern part of the 
country, as low-wage workers are much more likely to be the main, if not the sole, wage-
earner of the family, while most low-paid employees in Western Germany usually are 
“secondary earners” – mostly women – whose earnings allow the household to escape poverty 
(Giesselmann and Lohmann, 2008).  
Another factor is certainly important: As mentioned above, the working poor are usually 
young, as they have virtually the same age as the Swedish working poor. According to 
Giesselmann and Lohmann (2008), based on another indicator and another database, 4 in 10 
workers with an income below 60 percent of median income are under 31 years of age. This is 
also reflected by the fact that the median working poor lives in a smaller household than his or 
her nonpoor counterpart (2 versus 2.7 members, own calculations based on the LIS 2000 
dataset).  
The fact of having children in Germany is not a decisive poverty factor, even if poor workers 
tend to have more children than the rest of the labor force, but the difference is not as striking 
as in the US or Spain. In fact, this is due to very generous cash benefits for families with 
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children: Child allowances represented 11.8 percent of the income of a family with two 
children relying on the earnings of a full-time industrial worker, while this share amounted to 
4.7 percent in 1995 (Andress and Seeck, 2007). Interestingly, Germany‟s generous family 
policy (more than 3 per cent of GDP is spent on family policy around the mid-2000s, 
according to the social spending database of the OECD, a level only slightly lower than 
Sweden‟s) largely prevents child poverty and contributes to the reduction of working poverty 
among working parents. However, as it is largely based on cash transfers, and far less on 
childcare services than in Sweden (Fagnani and Math, 2008), the outcomes are perceivable in 
terms of maternal employment levels.  
Spain  
In Spain, low labor force participation seems to be an important poverty factor, even if the 
impact of this mechanism is less marked than in the other “Bismarckian” country reviewed 
here, namely Germany. Interestingly, the difference between the mean and the median is 
largest in Spain, probably owing to the fact that part-time jobs only represent a small share of 
available positions. Hence, women either work full-time or not at all when they have children 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007, 
Moreno, 2002). Put differently, single earner couples are more widespread than in most 
countries (Gutiérrez Palacios, Guillén Rodriguez, Peña-Casas, 2009). This all-or-nothing 
phenomenon among mothers probably explains the dissymmetric distribution of labour 
market participation of heads of households and their spouses in Spain. All in all, the Spanish 
working poor display the lowest mean and median work attachment, due to a higher 
unemployment rate and a lower female participation rate; however, these factors have 
changed significantly in Spain in a recent past, with an increasing female workforce 
participation (Guillén and Alvarez, 2002). Between 2000 and today, the female participation 
rate has skyrocketed (OECD website, labour statistics), which may contribute to a decline in 
working poverty, but also to an increasing gap between single-earner and dual-earner couples.  
Having children can also be a poverty factor, as the mean as well as the median child-to-adult 
ratio is higher among the working poor, which is not completely surprising in a country with a 
low level of spending on family policy (Fagnani and Math, 2008). However, due to the 
importance of the family, one of the most characteristic traits of the Spanish welfare regime 
(Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009, Moreno, 2002), the effect of the limited provision of childcare 
services is reduced.  
These results are in line with those obtained by García Espejo and Ibáñez Pascual with a 
logistic regression of the working poor rate on various poverty factors (in terms of risk 
groups) – occupational profiles, household type, demographic factors - based on SILC data, 
concluding that the main factors are labor market attachment and the number of dependants 
(García Espejo and Ibáñez Pascual, 2007). 
An important remark is of order here, namely the fact that the median household is larger in 
Spain than in the other countries analyzed in this chapter (Gutiérrez Palacios, Guillén 
Rodriguez, Peña-Casas, 2009); my calculations indicate a median household size of four 
persons among poor workers, and three among the rest of the workforce. This is due to the 
fact, among other factors, that a large majority of young Spaniards leave the parental home in 
their thirties, in very striking contrast with Sweden for instance. This factor is important, 
because the labor force attachment calculated in the present chapter is based on the situation 
of the head of household and his or her spouse/partner. Hence, the conclusions drawn may be 
slightly distorted for the Spanish case; young adults‟ income is accounted for, but not their 
labor force participation. So the reader should always keep in mind that we are talking about 
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the head of household and his/her spouse when analyzing labor market participation. Another 
important consequence is that these households with many workers benefit from economies of 
scale in their consumption, which probably contributes to a reduction in the working poor 
rate.  
Finally, a rather surprising finding is the relatively low incidence of low pay among poor 
workers, when both the hours per week and the weeks per year are accounted for, as available 
data do not seem to suggest that wage dispersion is more compressed in Spain than in Sweden 
for instance – the opposite is true. As indicated, the role played by the Spanish families in the 
provision of welfare is fundamental, by allowing economies of scales in consumption. The 
aforementioned research carried out by García Espejo and Ibáñez Pascual (2007) also 
concludes that the incidence of low pay is not very high among poor workers in Spain. This is 
largely attributable, in my view, to the fact that young low-wage workers escape poverty, as 
the working poor rate is low among young workers (see table 39).  
In fact, the incidence of low-wage jobs (below two-thirds of median hourly gross wage) in 
2000 was much higher among workers on fixed-term contracts (approximately 30 per cent) 
than among workers with a permanent contract (less than 10 per cent, Blázquez Cuesta, 
2008). This corresponds to the fact that the share of non-permanent contracts falls sharply 
with age (Garrido and Gutiérrez, 2009), and that the incidence of low-wage jobs is high 
among young and prime-age workers (73 percent of low-wage workers are under 40) and 
much lower in their parents‟ age brackets.  
7.4.3 Preliminary conclusions: Working poverty mechanisms and policy factors 
It is undisputable that working poverty is by far not merely a matter of low earnings, and that 
the relationship between individual earnings and household income is loose, as has been 
shown by many authors. However, it seems to be a very important factor that should not be 
downplayed in social policy analysis. It is noteworthy that the explanations of the incidence of 
low-wage employment among poor workers differ from one country to another: In Sweden 
and Germany, it is mainly the young age of poor workers, whereas in the US it is mainly the 
high incidence of low-wage employment in general. These explanations point to the impact of 
labor market regulations, among other factors.  
However, being badly paid is not the sole working poverty mechanism: Other factors are also 
very important, notably household size and composition as well as labor market participation, 
as has already been demonstrated by others in terms of the composition of the working poor 
population (see e.g. Andress and Lohman, 2008).  
Family policy broadly understood, that is including family cash benefits, of course, but also 
parental leave schemes and the provision of childcare services, seems to be the most 
important welfare state related factor – in terms of the relative weight of the three mechanisms 
leading to working poverty. This factor plays a decisive role in terms of the cross-sectionally 
measured levels of working poverty, but also in a social-investment, life-course perspective, 
as it allows working parents to have a lower likelihood of falling into poverty, and, hence, 
reduces the share of children of working parents who grow up in poverty.  
This leads us, hence, to another conclusion, namely that working poverty in Sweden and 
Germany is probably less detrimental a social problem than in Spain and the US: First, 
because the incidence is weaker, but also because many working poor are young and childless 
workers who may well escape poverty once they start living with a partner who works too; in 
addition, they will benefit from generous family-policy schemes should they have children.  
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7.5 Conclusions: Working poverty mechanisms and risk groups across welfare 
regimes 
 
The present chapter has shown that despite the massive exogenous shocks that occurred in the 
1970s and the 1980s, differences across welfare regimes are still marked – in terms of the 
approaches that allow combating working poverty - even though a certain degree of 
convergence has been perceivable in recent years. These differences translate into the fact that 
each working poverty mechanism has a different weight in each welfare regime, which 
explains the differences in the extent and composition of the working poor population.  
In the liberal cluster, all three mechanisms play a role, but labor market participation less so. 
In Conservative corporatist countries, a low degree of labor force attachment is an important 
factor, as well as having a low wage, due to the fact that most working poor are young; 
children are not an important risk factor. In Southern European countries, too, low workforce 
participation is a significant determinant, as well as having children; low-wage employment is 
not fundamental due to the very specific patterns of labor market integration of youth. In 
Scandinavia, no factor appears to be decisive, except for low wages, as the Swedish working 
poor are very young. The extent of working poverty is highest in the liberal and Southern 
European clusters and noticeably lower in Scandinavia and in Corporatist European countries. 
In terms of employment, until the beginning of the crisis of the late 2000s, the best performers 
were Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, whereas Germany‟s perspectives look less 
grim today than they did at the turn of the century.  
In terms of risk groups, the main differences across regimes concern families with children. 
The case of single mothers is particularly striking. These findings confirm that family policies 
are extremely important public policy variables, as maternal employment rates appear to play 
a fundamental role. Difference are also striking for workers under 30 years of age; in Sweden 
and Germany, the median working poor is 30 years old; he or she is about five years older in 
the US and nearly a decade older in Spain.  
These findings are robust to the use of alternative poverty lines and poverty indicators. The 
situation of senior workers remains somewhat unclear, though. In income terms, they appear 
to be better off workers, whereas they seem more disadvantaged when consumption 
expenditures are accounted for. This may, however, reflect lower needs and higher savings 
and wealth rather than deprivation. Hence, the use of nonmonetary indicators could prove 
very useful for further researches on the financial situation of senior workers.  
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8 Conclusions 
 
Given the conceptual reflections presented in chapter 2, the analysis of the causes of working 
poverty presented in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the empirical results provided in chapters 6 
and 7, I can now draw conclusions regarding the three arguments presented in the 
introduction. I can also answer the question that has been at the heart of my analysis: Is it 
possible to combat working poverty without generating hurdles in the labor market? The 
results presented here open up interesting avenues of research.  
 
8.1 Main findings 
 
The main findings are grouped into three sections. Each section corresponds to one of the 
arguments formulated in the introduction.  
8.1.1 Argument 1: There is no such thing as “the working poor” 
Given the evidence presented in this work, this first thesis is clearly established. There are 
three working poverty mechanisms through which economic, sociodemographic and public 
policy factors have a bearing on working households, and, hence, three basic types of working 
poverty. The evidence is synthesized in the following sections.  
There are three basic types of working poverty 
A striking feature of mainstream research has been, until very recently, a “definitional chaos” 
characterized by the use of a large number of poverty thresholds, on one hand, and thresholds 
defined in terms of hours a week or months a year, on the other hand, for the definition of 
“being in work”. In many cases, some groups of poor workers (whatever the poverty line 
used) are not classified as “working poor” for reasons that are, more often than not, implicit. 
These implicit assumptions might be connected to personal values as to what “really being in 
work” means. They could also pertain to social policy implications: The situation of workers 
with a low labor force attachment requires other types of policy interventions. I think that this 
“chaos” is potentially harmful to social policy analysis, and would like to suggest some 
solutions.  
The main reason behind this myriad of definitions and concepts is mainly due to the fact that 
conceptual reflections have largely been missing. Throughout the first part of the present 
work, my idea was to take a step back and think about what “being in work” could mean, and 
if it is a good idea to exclude some groups of workers from the outset. Another central 
element is the definition of poverty, a problem that has kept social scientists busy ever since 
the first poverty analyses were published in the nineteenth century; unfortunately, no 
consensus has been found to this date.  
Regarding the first element, I suggest that a very encompassing definition of “working” 
poverty should be used in order not to exclude groups of workers from the outset. Sure 
enough, a respondent who has been working one day a week during the month prior to the 
interview and was unemployed before is in a completely different situation than a respondent 
who has worked full-time over the whole period. But if this person is in work and has an 
income below a given poverty line, why exclude her or him from the group of the “working 
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poor”? Not classifying this person in this category means, as a consequence, including him or 
her in the category of the “nonworking poor”; however, her or his situation is also very 
different from that of a person who did not work in the year prior to the interview and who is 
not looking for a job (that is, an inactive person). It is also different from that of an 
unemployed person who has been actively looking for a job, but failed to find one.  
The approach I advocate is the following: Based on a very encompassing definition of 
“working”, it is then possible to draw a typology of working poverty. I have shown that there 
are three working poverty mechanisms, namely being badly paid, having a low degree of 
labor force attachment, and high needs (especially the number of children per working-age 
adult). These mechanisms are the channels through which macrolevel factors have a direct 
bearing on working households. Starting from these three mechanisms and, hence, from the 
three basic types of working poverty, it is possible to draw a typology of poor workers in 
order to allow a “fine tuning” of social policy. This can be achieved through setting some 
threshold values – at this point, setting arbitrary values is less problematic, because no low-
income worker has been excluded from the outset – for instance, for the child-per-adult ratio: 
less than one child per adult, between 1 and 1.5 children per adult, and more than 1.5 children 
per adult. The same can be done for the percentage of full work potential that is actualized 
(e.g. 50, 66 and 75 percent of full work potential), and for the “full-time year round” wage 
expressed as a percentage of the median (e.g. 50, 66 and 75 percent of median earnings). 
Another, and arguably better, possibility is to use a statistical classification technique in order 
not to set arbitrary thresholds, cluster analysis for instance.  
Another way to proceed is to use official definitions, especially in comparative research. 
These definitions also entail a certain degree of arbitrariness, but at least they have the 
advantage of increasing the comparability of analyses by limiting each researcher‟s 
subjectivity. Researchers specialized in comparative social policy analysis are partly 
dependent on the studies and figures produced by other researchers and official bodies; as an 
increasing number of European researchers use Eurostat‟s definition, for instance, it might be 
advisable to use it too in order to get comparable results. Ideally, a European researcher could 
use both approaches, namely Eurostat‟s criterion of having spent at least 6 months in the labor 
market, as well as the most encompassing definition of working, and compare results, which I 
have done in chapter 7 (table 37) by using both the current labor force status and the main 
activity status over the income reference period.  
Regarding the definition of poverty, there is no readily available solution, no answer out 
there waiting for clearing up the confusion. Poverty lines vary from around 40 percent of 
median income up to 60 percent, which represents a very broad spectrum. Moreover, even if it 
is true that the vast majority of researches dealing with working poverty rely on income 
thresholds as poverty lines, and the headcount ratio as a poverty indicator (i.e. the number of 
poor persons divided by the size of the analyzed population), other possibilities exist and are 
used in comparative social policy analysis or in studies that focus on neighboring topics. 
Accounting for the depth of poverty (poverty gap), or even the severity of poverty (squared 
poverty gap) are also useful approaches, and the former has been used in the present work. In 
addition, other monetary indicators are conceivable, consumption expenditure in particular, an 
approach presented in chapter 7 that leads to different conclusions for senior workers.  
The absence of a consensus regarding poverty lines does not, in my view, constitute a major 
problem for social policy analysis. All poverty definitions in rich countries entail a certain 
degree of arbitrariness, as those who are considered to be “poor” do not face difficulties that 
threaten their survival - famines and death from easily curable diseases have largely been 
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eradicated in postindustrial societies
16
. Hence, a pragmatic solution to definitional problems 
can be the use of a poverty definition that corresponds to a social policy objective. In every 
country, social policy defines a minimum income level any citizen is entitled to, in order to 
live a decent life; these thresholds are often found in social assistance programs. This is not 
advisable, however, for comparative purposes; in this case, poverty lines set by a 
supranational body can be used, especially if this institution aims at reducing the share of the 
population with an income below that threshold.  
The interest of a typological approach of working poverty has been demonstrated in chapter 7, 
in which the relative weight of each working poverty mechanism explains why the size of 
various risk groups varies across countries.  
The main drawback of this approach is methodological, namely that it requires large samples. 
Using a cluster analysis, however, allows choosing the number of clusters wanted at the end 
of the procedure; hence, a researcher can adjust the number of clusters to the number of poor 
workers in the sample. 
Once the extent of the three types of working poverty is assessed (it is possible to have a more 
refined typology, because the three working poverty mechanisms may partly overlap, for 
instance in the case of workers who have a low labor force attachment and more than two 
children, or workers who combine a low wage rate and part-time employment), it is important 
to understand why it is so in a given country. This is due to economic factors and to 
demographic evolutions; moreover, I have shown that existing policy mixes have a pervasive 
impact.  
 
Economic and sociodemographic changes have an impact on working households 
through three working poverty mechanisms 
Regarding the main determinants of poverty among workers in postindustrial economies, the 
following conclusions have been drawn: 
- economic development per se is a good thing, especially in the early stages of the 
development process. In advanced economies, however, further development can lead to more 
inequality and relative poverty. Hence, in postindustrial countries, economic growth can help 
reduce poverty in the short run, but its impact depends on the evolution of the income 
distribution, 
- concerns about globalization and North-South trade have sometimes been exaggerated. 
Nonetheless, should North-South trade represent a higher share of total trade in the future, i.e. 
if there is less trade among OECD countries and more between OECD countries and 
emerging economies, the situation could become more preoccupying for the low-skilled labor 
force in high-income countries. Moreover, endogenous mutations, especially skill-biased 
technological changes, have had a pervasive impact,  
- the evolution of productivity growth could be a potential danger, as many service 
occupations suffer from the cost-disease problem identified by Baumol; some authors, 
however, relativize this phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that increased productivity 
                                                          
16
 Unfortunately, however, some cases of extreme poverty still exist: for instance, homeless 
people die of hypothermia in many American and European cities every winter. 
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will lead to increased national prosperity may no longer hold, due to automation and 
technological changes that could leave a large share of workers in lower-paid service jobs, 
- the welfare state reduces poverty, in a static sense, thanks to its redistributive effect, but also 
in the longer run. It seems that worries pertaining to the potential poverty-generating effect of 
welfare state benefits are not verified empirically. It is reasonable to think, however, that a 
very heavy tax burden generated by welfare expenses could impede the economy to be 
running at full speed,  
- there have been pervasive demographic and social changes in high-income countries over 
the past four decades: Families are less stable and divorce rates have skyrocketed. Single 
parenthood is a significant poverty factor. Moreover, in a society still characterized by social 
endogamy, increased female labor force participation furthers inequalities in terms of income 
and employment, 
- risks have shifted towards young adults, as they are more affected by problems to find and 
hold a stable job, to reconcile work and family life in a society in which dual-earner couples 
have become the norm, and by much higher obstacles for low-skilled and inexperienced 
workers,  
- public policy factors appear to play a pervasive role. The economic and demographic 
changes that took place over the last three to four decades have been broadly the same in all 
postindustrial countries; yet, great variations in terms of outcomes are striking and virtually 
all authors acknowledge the impact of institutional factors, such as labor market regulations 
and welfare state benefits and services. Public policy factors shape the socioeconomic and 
demographic composition of the working poor population and have a different impact on each 
type of working poverty in each welfare regime. 
One of the main contributions of the present work is to show that these economic, 
demographic, and public policy factors have a bearing on households through three channels, 
namely the remuneration rate, the degree of labor force attachment and the level of needs, 
especially the number of children per adult. The following scheme summarizes the main 
findings presented in chapters 3 and 4: 
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Figure 6: Economic, sociodemographic and public policy factors and the three working 
poverty mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own representation.  
Figure 6 simply aims at summarizing the findings of chapters 3 and 4; it is not meant to show 
all possible causal relationships between each set of causal factors. Moreover, the dynamic 
dimension is deliberately absent.  
In fact, figure 6 does not include all possible factors explaining the incidence and duration of 
working poverty in postindustrial countries, even though the factors mentioned are the most 
important according to low-income/low-wage research. For the sake of intellectual honesty, 
though, I have to mention that some authors put forth individual factors.  
An example of this approach, which downplays the impact of social and economic factors, is 
Herrnstein and Murray‟s explanation (1994): IQ test results tend to follow a normal 
distribution, hence the title of their book “the Bell Curve”. People with low IQs are more 
affected by poverty, unemployment, welfare dependency, and prison sentences. Herrnstein 
and Murray also try to show that African Americans have, on average, lower IQs, which in 
turn explains why they fare less well than other Americans (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994), 
which scaringly reminds us of old theories that asserted that some “races” are inferior by 
nature. Put simply, their assumption is that intellectually limited people, coming from 
intellectually limited minorities, do not fare well in life precisely because they are less 
intelligent, which IQ tests are supposed to prove. Obviously, this model would fall short of 
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explaining anything in the absence of proof that IQ tests really measure some form of 
biologically determined cognitive skills. Actually, IQ tests may reflect parents‟ educational 
level and language skills, a child‟s cultural environment, and knowledge acquired in school. 
Moreover, oversimplistic, single-factor explanations always raise suspicion, especially when 
they have a racist connotation. Hence, I did not include this pseudo-scientific factor in my 
model, even though it is undisputable that psychological and cognitive factors have an impact 
on an individual‟s life chances.  
The factors summarized in figure 6 affect various sociodemographic groups, defined in terms 
of: 
- age: Youth have a higher risk of being unemployed or low paid, as they lack experience in 
the labor market. Prime-age adults, i.e. most young parents, are more exposed to working 
poverty in many countries because the presence of children increases household needs, 
especially if they divorce, as the poverty rate of single-parent households is significantly 
above average in most countries, 
- gender: Women are more likely to be low paid than their male counterparts, and are 
overrepresented in unskilled service sector jobs, while many unskilled males work in the 
manufacturing sector. Women are also more likely to be unemployed or involuntarily in part-
time employment and much more likely to be heads of lone-parent households. Hence, they 
are more at risk of poverty. However, they are not necessarily more exposed to working 
poverty, especially married women, because disadvantaged female workers are more likely to 
have a working partner than their male counterparts; this raises the question, however, of their 
economic independence,  
- education: Low-skilled workers, especially people with no post-compulsory education, are 
more likely to be low paid and unemployed, as the educational level has become the most 
hegemonic determinant of life chances. Social endogamy reinforces the disadvantage of low-
skilled workers, both in terms of income and of employment, 
- household type: Single parents and large families are more exposed because of high needs 
and also because, in many cases, labor force participation must be reduced.  
- immigrant or minority status: Whereas there are very mobile and cosmopolitan elites 
made up of CEOs, executives, academics, high-ranking officials, and the like, persons with a 
migration background as well as other minorities tend to have a lower educational level - or 
their diplomas are not accepted by the host country - and less desirable positions in the labor 
market, as they are overrepresented in low-wage sectors. Moreover, they are more exposed to 
unemployment. However, it is often difficult to distinguish class-related factors (skills, 
diplomas, etc.) from “ethnic”/“racial” disadvantages (statistical discrimination). Limited 
linguistic skills of non-native speakers are also an obvious barrier to employment and vertical 
mobility. For children, having parents who are not native speakers is an obstacle to 
educational achievement. Moreover, some immigrant groups tend to have a larger family, 
which increases their needs. 
Risk factors such as belonging to a visible minority or having a migration background have 
not been analyzed thus far, because they are mainly reflected in the three working poverty 
mechanisms, due to differences in skill levels, diplomas, language proficiency, family size 
and composition, among other factors. However, there may be elements that are specific to 
these groups, such as, for instance, statistical discrimination; this phenomenon, likewise, 
mainly translates into lower wage rates and lesser employment opportunities. However, I 
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briefly review some figures I have not presented in chapter 7, namely the incidence of 
working poverty broken down by nationalities or minority groups, based on Luxembourg 
Income Study data for the year 2000. I do not review this evidence extensively, but the main 
findings illustrate the heterogeneity of “minorities” and of the population with a migrant 
background.  
In 2000 in the US, natives born in the US make up 87 percent of nonpoor workers but only 74 
percent of the working poor; one in eight working poor (12.3 percent) arrived in the US 
between 1990 and 2000. In the same year, German nationals make up 93 percent of nonpoor 
workers and only 82 percent of poor workers; interestingly, EU-15 citizens have a lower 
working poor rate than Germans. The difference between nationals and other workers is less 
marked in Sweden, probably owing to the smaller size of minority groups in 2000. Swedes 
represent 96 percent of nonpoor and 92 percent of poor workers; as in Germany, some groups 
of European non-nationals have a lower working poor rate than Swedes, especially other 
Scandinavians and Finns (4.3 percent vs. 5.1 percent among Swedes). In Spain, in 2000, the 
presence of non-nationals was still limited; however, this has changed in a recent past, as 
indicated above, with a 900-percent increase between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. But 
in 2000s, Spaniards made up 99 and 98 percent of nonpoor and poor workers, respectively. 
These figures show, unsurprisingly, that non-nationals or persons with a migration 
background are more exposed to working poverty. However, in each country, some groups 
are less affected than native born nationals; in Europe, it is often the case of persons coming 
from “old” EU member states. It should be borne in mind that any form of discrimination or 
of difficulties due to the non-acceptance of diplomas do not constitute a working poverty 
mechanism per se; they translate into lower wage rates and higher difficulties to find a job.  
 
8.1.2 Argument 2: Different welfare regimes generate different types of working 
poverty  
 
The three working poverty mechanisms have a different weight in each welfare regime. I was 
able to show in chapter 7 that all three factors have an impact in the US, whereas workforce 
participation has a lower weight than the other two. In Germany the main mechanisms are a 
low workforce participation and being badly paid, whereas the latter has much to do with the 
young age of the median working poor in this country, and also with specific problems in the 
Eastern part of the country (the former GDR). In Spain, having children and a low workforce 
participation are the main determinants of working poverty; having a low-paying job is not a 
pervasive factor. In Sweden, none of the mechanisms appears to play a fundamental role, 
whereas having a low wage is very widespread due to the fact that most Swedish working 
poor are very young and live alone. Hence, I can conclude that this second thesis is clearly 
established, in terms of mechanisms and of risk groups.  
Family policies appear to play a particularly important role in shaping working poverty; their 
“generosity” as well as their emphasis on either cash benefits of family services are decisive 
factors. Chapter 7 also demonstrates that the sociodemographic distribution of the working-
poverty risk varies considerably across countries. Hence, from this risk-group perspective too, 
it comes as no surprise that some policy mixes appear to be more efficient in some countries 
than in others.  
In addition, the present work allows understanding how existing policy mixes shape the three 
types of working poverty (extent and composition), and that any reform aiming at reducing 
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working poverty will have to identify the types of working poverty that are not efficiently 
combated as well as the negative side-effects a policy that efficiently combat one type of 
working poverty can have on the other working poverty mechanisms.  
Though I have already analyzed working poverty mechanisms in each welfare regime, I still 
have to provide a succinct depiction of the functioning of each welfare regime in systemic 
terms. 
The liberal cluster is mainly characterized by legally enforced minimum wages and earned 
income tax credits, which are both components of a “make work pay” strategy (MWP). In the 
US, this MWP approach is accompanied by a welfare-to-work orientation, and caseloads have 
markedly decreased since the welfare reform of 1996. The US case, as it is today, is based on 
a “work-first approach”. The UK is somewhat different in this regard, as means-tested social 
assistance benefits were made more generous at the same time as the WFTC was expanded, 
because the reduction of child poverty was also an important goal of the proponents of the 
“third way”. The functioning of this policy mix is the following: The goal is to maximize 
workforce participation. Labor markets are lowly regulated, the minimum wage set at a 
relatively low level (the latter comment does not apply to the Antipodes), and welfare 
recipients are strongly encouraged, and sometimes forced, to accept any job available. A large 
low-skilled service sector exists. Moreover, efforts have been made in the field of childcare 
policies, in order to further help low-skilled mothers in general, and lone mothers in 
particular, to participate in the labor market. Hence, there are many workers who need a 
public intervention in order to be able to make ends meet. If a person holds a low-paying job, 
then she or he is granted financial support through the tax system, which is less stigmatizing 
than going to a welfare agency, mainly through earned income and childcare tax credits. It is 
hoped that, by keeping low-skilled workers in the labor market, they will climb the earnings 
ladder after some time and become financially more autonomous and will not be back on 
welfare. This approach requires, on the part of voters-taxpayers, the acceptance of large 
inequalities and a reluctance to see the state heavily involved in the economy in general, and 
the labor market in particular.  
In the Social Democratic Scandinavian cluster the approach to the fight against working 
poverty is fundamentally different. The central goal is also to have high employment rates and 
low unemployment levels, but another fundamental aim is to keep income and earnings 
inequality as low as possible. Active labor market policies, generous parental leaves and 
childcare policies, combined with the existence of a very large public sector, ensure that 
enough jobs are available and that all groups of citizens can have a high employment rate, 
including mothers of young children and senior workers. Earning inequalities are kept at a 
low level through collective agreements; public employment also plays an important role, as 
many low-productivity jobs are provided by the state and are, hence, relatively well-paid. 
Income inequalities are combated through generous income transfers towards unemployed 
and inactive citizen. Moreover, households‟ expenses on childcare services and healthcare are 
low. In the Swedish case, for instance, this combination of factors ensures that households 
who are in the bottom decile of the income distribution are better off than their counterparts in 
most OECD countries, especially US low-income families. The Scandinavian model requires 
a fundamental condition: Voters-taxpayers must be ready to pay high taxes and to accept a 
heavy involvement of authorities in many aspects of everyday life - employment, family 
matters, disposable income, etc. - and they must have a relatively egalitarian ethos. This 
appears to be more or less the opposite of the prerequisites of the liberal model.  
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The Conservative corporatist European model constitutes a largely different world of social-
policy efforts than both the liberal and the social-democratic model. Until recently, the goal 
was not to maximize employment, but to ensure “good quality” jobs for those who are in the 
labor market, while early retirement, low female labor force participation and labor shedding 
were perceived as appropriate measures, i.e. the reduction of labor supply. The core labor 
force is well protected, both through employment protection regulations and collective 
bargaining, whereas the relative weight of each component varies largely across countries. 
For instance, regulation by law plays the main role in France (legal minimum wage, the 
frequent use of extension laws, etc.), while in Germany collective bargaining is at the heart of 
the regulation of the labor market. While the situation of the core workforce has remained 
stable in recent years, flexibility has been obtained by deregulating the labor market at its 
margins, a trend that has been observed in many Continental European countries in a recent 
past. Short-term employment, the use of temporary agencies, lower payroll taxes for low-
paying jobs, among other measures, have been used, thereby generating a certain degree of 
dualization. In addition, exception clauses have increasingly been accepted in collective 
agreements. Working poor rates are low in Continental Europe, and can be even lower than in 
Scandinavia, through a combination of relatively high wages, whatever the way minimum 
wages are set, combined with “generous” social transfers for the unemployed or inactive 
members of working households. But whereas Scandinavian countries combine both low 
working poor rates and good employment performance, Continental European countries 
appear to be subject to a complex tradeoff. For instance, better employment performances and 
larger inequalities characterize Germany in the 2000s. The tradeoff seems to be reinforced by 
the fact that voters-taxpayers are reluctant to see inequalities increase: Some authors think that 
the perceived unfairness of some of the Hartz reforms explain the electoral loss of the Red-
Green coalition in 2005.  
The Southern European cluster has some features in common with other Continental 
European countries, mainly its heavy reliance on passive income transfers to support those 
who are not in the labor force, and the fact that employment maximization has never been a 
priority. This cluster has, however, distinctive features, mainly the role families play. The 
main pillars of the fight against working poverty are generous social transfers combined with 
a very strict regulation of the labor market: Spain and Portugal are the two European countries 
with the strictest employment protection legislations. Hence, workers who are in the core 
labor force are very well protected, and in the event of a layoff, severance pay is very 
expensive for employers. In Spain, young workers have a long and relatively hectic pattern of 
labor force integration, and alternate between unemployment and short-term employment. In 
periods of economic slump, their unemployment rate shoots up and can reach staggeringly 
high levels: Around one in three young adult in Spain is unemployed as of the writing. 
Unemployment in Spain is, hence, strongly cyclical. However, the working poor rate is 
relatively low among workers in their late twenties and early thirties, as a large majority live 
with their parents, who hold well protected jobs; in addition, unemployed households member 
get “generous” unemployment benefits. Most of them leave the parental home when they are 
in their thirties, once they obtain an open-ended work contract. Hence, one of the 
characteristics of the Southern European welfare state is that it attributes an important role to 
families: Young workers are expected to live with their parents if they do not have an open-
ended contract (unemployment benefits are generous, but they require a certain period of 
labor market participation); moreover, family policy is not very developed.  
Finally, I can draw conclusions as to the efficiency of the fight against working poverty in 
each welfare regime. It is probably fair to say that Scandinavian countries are the best-
equipped in the fight against new social risks in general, and working poverty in particular. 
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These countries demonstrate that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between unemployment 
and working poverty, but they display a very specific constellation of institutional factors. 
Anglo-Saxon countries appear to be relatively well prepared to face postindustrial challenges; 
after the culmination of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, which led to a strong increase in 
social exclusion and poverty in general, and working poverty in particular, these countries 
have largely expanded tax credits for workers, reduced the impact of childcare costs, and, in 
the US, expanded healthcare coverage. Relative poverty levels remain high, though. 
Continental European countries have had many difficulties in facing the challenge posed by 
postindustrial mutations; in the 1990s and early 2000s, they appeared to be unable to tackle 
high unemployment levels and were perceived as a “frozen landscape”. However, according 
to many authors, they seem to be in the midst of a paradigmatic shift, with a gradual 
transformation of the model. Understanding and analyzing this evolution will certainly be a 
key component of European social policy analysis in the near future; researchers are currently 
analyzing this “long goodbye to Bismarck” (Palier, 2010). Finally, it does not seem unfair to 
say that Southern European countries are the less well equipped to adjust to new social risks. 
However, it should be borne in mind that they are young democracies who had closed 
economies until recently, and, given this point of departure, many improvements they have 
made in recent years are quite impressive. In Spain, female labor force participation has 
increased massively, the average educational level is much higher than it was 15 years ago, 
and the welfare state has been expanded to unprecedented levels. Yet, Spain‟s labor market 
probably needs very far-reaching reforms.  
 
8.1.3 Argument 3: There is no “one-size-fits-all” policy mix. Each regime must find its 
own combination of policies. 
 
This thesis is largely confirmed by the meta-analysis; it shows that various instruments do not 
have the same impact across welfare regimes. The risk-group analysis clearly shows that the 
composition of the working poor population varies across countries, which further confirms 
that it is not possible to determine a single policy mix that would work everywhere.  
Different social policy instruments affect different types of working poverty (in different 
welfare regimes) 
I have shown that the fight against working poverty relies on three basic approaches, namely 
minimum wages, social transfers and an employment-maximizing strategy, and that each 
approach can be broken down in two main subcategories. The first and the third approach 
mainly combat one type of working poverty (poverty due to a low wage rate and that caused 
by a weak labor force attachment, respectively), whereas social transfers can support each 
type of poor workers, by providing benefits that supplement low earnings, by supplementing 
the income of “high-needs” households, and by providing incentives to work if they are 
employment-conditional. 
It is possible to draw a typology of welfare regimes according to the two main subcategories 
that underpin the fight against working poverty: A coercive employment-maximization 
approach combined with complementing cash transfers in the US, an employment-
maximizing strategy based on incentives and collective bargaining in Sweden, substitution 
income transfers and collective bargaining in Germany, and legal minimum wages and 
substitution cash benefits in Spain.  
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I have then analyzed the impact of specific social policy instruments in chapter 6 with a meta-
analysis of social policy tools and labor market regulations that are usually put to the fore in 
the literature and appear to have an impact on poverty among workers. These are minimum 
wages, be they legally enforced or collectively bargained, employment-conditional tax credits, 
namely the American Earned Income Tax Credit, the UK‟s Working Family Tax Credit, and 
the French Employment Premium (prime pour l‟emploi), as well as family cash benefits, be 
they universal or means-tested, and policies that aim at reducing the fees or increasing the 
availability of childcare services. These meta-analyses have been accompanied by qualitative 
interpretations that focused on subsamples of estimates.  
The main conclusions I have been able to draw on the basis of meta-analyses are the 
following: Low minimum wages set at around one-third of gross average wage, such as the 
American federal minimum wage, are unlikely to efficiently reduce working poverty and they 
seem to have little disemployment effects, if any. In countries with higher minimum wages, 
such as France with a legal minimum set at 45-47 percent of average gross wage, they are 
more likely to reduce working poverty, but they also appear to have a more negative impact 
on employment performance, whereas it may not be as negative as is often assumed in 
“textbook” labor economics. Moreover, even if minimum wages set at a level that does not 
harm employment do not strongly reduce the incidence of working poverty, they reduce its 
depth, and, hence, welfare state expenses needed in order to fill the poverty gap. 
Unfortunately, neither the evidence I have gathered, nor the one stemming from literature 
reviews, has allowed me to draw conclusions as to the level at which these minimum levels 
should be set.  
It is fundamental to note, in addition, that minimum wages interact with other labor market 
regulations and taxation; the same minimum wage (in purchasing power parities) will not 
have the same impact in countries with high payroll taxes and strict employment regulations 
as in countries that have a lowly regulated labor market and low social security contributions. 
Finally, minimum wages appear to be necessary complements to employment-conditional 
benefits, in order to prevent employers from lowering wages after the introduction of these 
work-conditional programs.  
Second, employment-conditional tax credits for workers appear to have efficiently 
contributed to employment increases in Anglo-Saxon countries, but these conclusions apply 
to very specific contexts. First, single mothers had very low employment rates and made up a 
large share of welfare recipients before the expansion of these credits. Second, the UK and the 
US have lowly regulated labor markets and a large low-skilled service sector, with a high 
degree of wage dispersion and a high incidence of low-wage employment. Third, both the UK 
during Tony Blair‟s era and the US during Bill Clinton‟s experienced very good economic 
performances; this is particularly true for the US with one of the most prosperous decades in 
its history. Fourth, in the case of the US, the increased generosity of the EITC was 
accompanied by a fundamental welfare reform which led to a massive decrease in caseloads, 
contrary to the UK, a country in which means-tested benefits were also increased as the 
reduction of child poverty was high on the political agenda. This fundamental difference 
between the American and the British reform helps explain a pronounced puzzle, namely that 
the WFTC, which was twice as generous as its American counterpart, was roughly twice less 
efficient in employment terms. In both countries, it was mainly lone mothers who were 
reactive to the positive incentives provided by the EITC and the WFTC; on the contrary, 
married women reduced their labor force participation following the expansions of the tax 
credits. Nonetheless, the increase in single mothers‟ employment appears to have outweighed 
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the decline in married women employment. These tax credits also appear to have slightly 
reduced the incidence of poverty among working families.  
Interestingly, simulations of the introduction of similar programs in continental Europe lead to 
different conclusions, as it appears that these credits would have little effect, if any. The 
employment effect may even be slightly negative, with disincentives effects for married 
women outweighing the positive impact on lone mothers. Some reasons could be indentified: 
First, the distribution of earnings and income is more compressed, and the incidence of low 
wages smaller. Second, the situation of single mothers appears to be less grim, due to more 
generous family policies; in countries in which family policy mainly takes the form of cash 
benefits, the impact of such credits might be dulled by relatively generous benefits. Third, the 
number and types of jobs available in Continental European labor markets probably do not 
allow a large influx of low-skilled (single) mothers. Some attempts have been made in 
Continental Europe, and many led to disappointing results. A tax credit introduced in Belgium 
was suppressed after a few years only, and virtually all evaluations of the PPE in France also 
conclude that its impact is very limited and only redistributive. It will be interesting to see 
whether the tax credits that have been introduced in Scandinavia in a very recent past will be 
more successful; this could be the case, because Scandinavian welfare systems actively 
promote maternal employment.  
Family policy appears to be a more promising tool for European countries, whereas this 
conclusion largely varies from one instrument to another. First and foremost, providing 
affordable childcare slots in sufficient number has a positive impact on maternal 
employment in countries in which the supply of childcare slots is still quite limited, and/or 
prices high. In countries in which childcare slots are already largely available and not 
expensive, mainly in Scandinavia, recent reforms have not had, logically, a large impact, as 
the vast majority of mothers were already in work and in-work poverty low. It should be 
noted, however, that this approach works in Scandinavia because there are enough jobs to be 
had, even for low-skilled mothers, because there is a large pool of public sector jobs in 
personal services, including the employees of publicly funded and subsidized childcare 
facilities. Moreover, this servicing strategy is articulated with other employment-maximizing 
policies, mainly active labor market policies and “generous” parental leave schemes. It might 
not be necessary, however, to have a similar institutional environment as Scandinavian 
countries for childcare policies to be successful. If unemployment is reasonably low, 
increasing the number of subsidized childcare slots and decreasing childcare fees may 
contribute to the fight against working poverty, because this would create a virtuous circle, 
due to the “multiplier effect” of female employment in postindustrial economies.  
Interestingly, while the impact of childcare policy on maternal employment and on fertility 
has been evaluated by many authors, its antipoverty impact has been much less subject to 
quantification. This might be due to the implicit assumption I have often read between the 
lines of many articles that an increase in maternal employment leads to a reduction of poverty. 
This is probably true, overall, but in many cases, as indicated by Whiteford and Adema 
(2007), the servicing strategy alone is not sufficient. Hence, I think that investigating the anti-
working poverty effect of an increase the availability of childcare slots and/or a decrease in 
childcare fees, is probably an important avenue for future research on potential efficient 
policies in the fight against working poverty.  
Another approach to family policy is possible, namely supporting families with children 
through cash benefits. Their antipoverty impact has often been assessed, and some 
sophisticated evaluations based on static microsimulations are available. Yet, they do not take 
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into account the fact that low-skilled mothers may reduce their labor force participation after 
an increase in family cash benefits. Evidence stemming from Anglo-Saxon countries, in 
which family benefits are mostly means-tested, tends to indicate a negative employment 
effect. On the contrary, disemployment effects appear to be only marginal in European 
countries. This may be due to the fact that there are, as already indicated, probably less low-
skilled jobs available in the service sectors in Continental Europe; in addition, due to the more 
compressed wage distribution and the lower incidence of low-wage jobs, mothers who hold a 
job may be less likely to leave the labor market in the event of an increase in family cash 
benefits. Family benefits appear to have a positive antipoverty impact; however, this 
conclusion is only tentative. As in the case of childcare policies, the number of estimates of 
their antipoverty effect is limited – estimates that take into account the potential negative 
employment effects. I should be borne in mind, in addition, that the regression model 
provided by Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley and Nielsen that I have presented above shows 
that family cash benefits have a positive antipoverty impact, even when economic growth and 
employment are controlled for.  
With hindsight, I realize that, as social policy instruments cannot be expected to have the 
same impact in all socioeconomic contexts and for all groups of poor workers, it would be 
ideal to follow my model and to evaluate the impact of social policies on each type of 
working poverty, or on each working poverty mechanism, in each welfare regime. This, of 
course, is usually not the case in evaluations, whereas some estimates pertain to specific 
subgroups, such as families with children or full-time workers. As the first prong of my 
empirical contribution is a meta-analysis, that is a statistical analysis of estimates produced by 
others, this would require an in-depth retreatment of their findings and would prove 
impossible in most cases. Still, I will shortly analyze, in retrospect, the impact of the 
instruments I have meta-analyzed on different types of working poverty.  
Minimum wages, obviously, have an impact on the fact of being badly paid, by preventing 
wage rates to be too low. As the wage a worker gets is not a function of his or her household‟s 
size and composition, then, minimum wages cannot fight working poverty when it is caused 
by high household needs. If minimum wages are set at a “high” level that may affect the 
employment opportunities of low-skilled or inexperienced workers, or, on the contrary, if they 
help low-wage workers without creating hurdles in the labor market because they are set at an 
“optimal” level, they can have an impact on the second working poverty mechanism, namely 
the degree of labor force attachment at the household level. Hence the impact of a minimum 
wage will depend on the number of badly paid workers among poor workers, on their 
sociodemographic characteristics, and on how low their wages are. Finally, it appears that 
minimum wages set through collective bargaining, by allowing more flexibility, may allow 
taking into account the characteristics of economic sectors (especially low-productivity 
industries, such as hotels, catering, tourism, retail, and the like) and of specific groups of 
workers (for instance workers under 25), thereby reducing the risk of creating hurdles in the 
labor market. However, the coverage of minimum wages set in collective agreements is never 
universal, and in some countries, it is far from universal, which means that many workers still 
have the risk to be paid a “poverty wage”.  
Tax credits for workers have an impact on two mechanisms. They were mainly designed to 
increase the labor force participation of low-skilled workers, especially lone mothers, and 
reduce welfare dependency. In Anglo-Saxon countries, they have had a positive employment 
impact and have, hence, helped workers who were poor because of a low labor force 
attachment. Second, as the level of the maximum credit depends on the number of children, 
they have also contributed to combat poverty among those who were in a difficult situation 
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due to high needs. As minimum wages exist in countries in which these employment-
conditional credits are more developed (notably in the UK and the US), it can be said that the 
tandem earned income tax credits/minimum wage dulls the effect of the three working 
poverty mechanisms. In the US, however, as these programs are relatively modest and mainly 
aim at preventing workers from falling into extreme poverty (the official poverty line, which 
is very low in international comparison, is about where the EITC starts phasing out), they do 
not lift many workers above the usual poverty thresholds used in mainstream comparative 
social policy analysis. Moreover, the program lifts millions of people out of poverty (by 
American standards) because, at least in part, there is a large number of workers who need 
support to make ends meet.  
Cash benefits and services for families mainly affect two mechanisms. First, of course, they 
help workers who are poor because they have higher needs due to the presence of children in 
their household, by providing them with cash benefits; however, they may reduce the 
workforce participation of mothers (mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries, and less so in 
Continental European countries), which in turn could have a negative impact on the second 
working poverty mechanism. Childcare services, if they are largely available and affordable, 
allow parents of young children to work more. They reduce the type of working poverty that 
is generated by a low degree of labor force attachment, but this approach is quite unlikely to 
have striking results if job opportunities are scarce, especially for low-skilled mothers. In 
Scandinavia, there is a large public low-skilled service sector (and it is noteworthy that public 
employment accounts for about one-third of employment in Sweden); this allows mothers to 
work more if they wish to, which in turn generates more personal-services jobs due to the 
“multiplier effect” of maternal employment. In other countries, especially in Continental 
Europe, mothers have less employment opportunities. Still, even in these countries, mothers 
who have a job will also be better off if the availability of childcare slots is increased and fees 
reduced. Moreover, as already indicated, employers may be more inclined to pay better wages 
and invest more on mothers‟ human capital if they think that the birth of children will not 
strongly decrease their productivity.  
These are the main answers I can give to the question: Which policy mixes have an impact on 
which kind of working poverty in which welfare regime? This leads me now to another 
empirical contribution of the present work, namely the overall impact welfare regimes have 
on various types of working poverty.  
 
The tradeoff between the quality and the quantity of jobs is dealt with in various ways 
across welfare regimes 
In the introduction of the present work, I suggested that policymakers are held hostage by a 
tradeoff between combating (working) poverty and establishing an employment-friendly 
environment. However, the fact that there is no tradeoff between working poverty and 
employment performance is illustrated by Scandinavian countries, but this welfare regime 
combines very specific features that probably make this model difficult to export, mainly the 
very large size of the public sector, a strong egalitarian ethos and taxpayers who do not rebel 
against high tax rates. Hence, in the other welfare regimes, there may well be a tradeoff 
between the quantity and the quality of jobs
17
.  
                                                          
17
 Of course, defining the quality of a job is complex and goes beyond income considerations 
(Guillén Rodríguez, Gutiérrez Palacios González Begega, 2009); yet, I have focused on 
monetary aspects in the present work for reasons developed in chapter 2. 
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In Anglo-Saxon countries, the tradeoff exists but is not very marked. Employment 
performance remains the number one priority and the existence of high levels of inequalities 
is not perceived as a major problem, especially in the US. However, as indicated above, the 
large increase in working poverty that took place during the Reagan era seemed to undermine 
a core American belief: That a commitment to the work ethic will provide a road out of 
poverty (Levitan and Shapiro, 1988). After the peak of the neoliberal era, measures aiming at 
helping low-income working families have been largely expanded in the 1990s, especially the 
EITC, but also healthcare coverage for children (SCHIP), and, as of the writing, a 
fundamental reform of healthcare is being implemented, which ensures that the vast majority 
of Americans is covered. It is noteworthy, though, that the access to financial support has 
become more restricted for nonworking persons, especially since the 1996 reform.  
Continental Europe appears to be the region in which this tradeoff is the most pronounced. 
The German case is very interesting in this regard. In the 1990s, Germany was regarded as the 
“sick man of Europe” due to its difficulties to perform well in macroeconomic terms, 
especially its high unemployment levels. Now that the Hartz reforms have been introduced, 
some of which increased the number of jobs supplied, especially in the low-wage segment, 
Germany appears to have achieved better employment performances – yet, there are other 
factors than the Hartz reforms that also explain this improvement, for instance the growing 
importance of exception clauses in collective agreements. In parallel, Germany has also 
experienced growing earnings and income inequality. In recent years, the Hartz reforms have 
contributed to the creation of many low paying jobs and, according to evaluations, to an 
increased efficiency of public employment services. On the other hand, however, both 
earnings inequality and the poverty risk have been on the increase in Germany in recent years, 
and many voices have expressed their concern. After the electoral defeat of the government 
that implemented the Hartz reforms, subsequent administrations have adopted a more 
moderate stance towards labor flexibilization. Morevoer, many politicians have advocated the 
introduction of a minimum wage to stop this trend towards increased inequalities. 
In Mediterranean countries, too, this tradeoff between protecting the core labor force (and 
thereby protecting them against working poverty by allowing constant patterns of labor force 
participation) and preventing too strong a dualization of the labor market exists, with a very 
high degree of protection of the core labor force. In my view, national debates on a reform of 
the labor market cannot be avoided. The Spanish government has recently introduced such a 
reform by reducing the layoff costs, from 45 days of indemnization per year worked in the 
company to 33 days, among other measures (El Mundo, June 16, 2010). As unemployment 
levels are currently very high and public debt abysmal, however, the priority may well be 
given to reducing unemployment and cutting welfare state expenses, especially pensions, 
thereby relegating poverty reduction to the role of a secondary goal for some years.  
In conclusion, I would like to underline that what could work in each welfare regime in the 
fight against working poverty largely depends on the existing policy mix, because it has a 
differential impact on the three types of working poverty, that is, it has an impact on the 
relative weight of each working poverty mechanism. It is then necessary to identify which of 
the working poverty mechanisms are not efficiently combated in order to broaden the scope of 
the fight against working poverty.  
In addition, it seems reasonable to conclude that the trade-off between the quality and the 
quantity of jobs can be overcome, but that it probably takes a costly policy mix to achieve this 
goal: Countries like Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands spend at least 1.4 percent of their 
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GDP on active labor market policies (Kluve, 2006), and Sweden and Denmark spend around 
1.5 percent of their GDP on family services (mainly childcare services).  
 
8.2 Public policy matters a great deal 
 
In this work, public policy factors are analyzed in two ways. First, they shape working 
poverty, by influencing each of the three working poverty mechanisms. Second, they can be 
adjusted and reformed in order to better combat different forms of working poverty. I have 
been able to show whether specific policies are efficient tools in the fight against working 
poverty or not. I did not, however, draw conclusions as to the overall impact of social policy, 
though I have drawn conclusions in terms of the overall impact of each welfare regime. 
Moreover, social policy always interacts with economic and demographic factors. This 
section is devoted to this interaction.  
In chapter 3, I have presented in a systematic and organized fashion many findings regarding 
the poverty impact of the main economic and sociodemographic factors in postindustrial 
countries, including reflections as to the impact of economic growth and unemployment on 
poverty, while chapter 4 has dealt with public policy factors, and underscored the main 
instruments that contribute to the fight against working poverty.  
Whereas I have presented evidence on whether specific policies have an impact on 
employment and poverty when macroeconomic factors are accounted for and analyzed the 
overall impact of welfare regimes on working poverty, I still have to assess the overall impact 
of economic, demographic, and public policy factors. In order to do so, I searched in the 
literature for regression models with specifications that allow answering the question: What 
is the impact of social policy factors when the impact of economic and demographic 
factors is controlled for?  
Some authors have tried to organize the plethoric empirical findings found in the comparative 
literature, usually by using regression models in order to obtain a hierarchy of various factors. 
Brady (2004), in a very encompassing approach, including demographic, macroeconomic, 
policy and institutional factors, has tried to identify the most important poverty factors, using 
the Luxemburg Income Study, namely datasets from 18 Western nations from 1967 to 1997. 
As already indicated, many studies have established in a descriptive fashion, by comparing 
pretax/pretransfer and posttax/posttransfer poverty rates, that the welfare state effectively 
reduces poverty. However, this approach does not account for the fact that social benefits and 
the tax burden they impose might slow down economic growth and reduce employment 
levels, among other neoliberal criticisms. Hence, Brady takes into account what he calls “the 
liberal critique” which blames the welfare state for generating welfare dependency, favoring 
single-headed households, and hindering the full realization of potential economic growth. 
This “liberal” critique rests upon the assumption that economic performance is the main 
determinant of poverty.  
Brady also takes account of the comparative sociological literature on welfare states, 
including Esping-Andersen‟s famous typology of welfare regimes: liberal (residual, mainly in 
Anglo-Saxon countries), corporatist (read continental European) and social democratic (i.e. 
Scandinavian) (Esping-Andersen, 1990). As of 2004, according to Brady, „only descriptive 
evidence exists on the patterns in poverty across welfare state regimes‟ (Brady, 2004: 10). 
Comparing what he calls “market generated” poverty (i.e. pretax/pretransfer) and “state 
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mediated” poverty (i.e. posttax/posttransfer), using a relative poverty threshold, he comes to 
the following conclusions: 
„The state mediated poverty results do not support liberal economic claims. The welfare state, 
not economic performance, is the most important influence on poverty. While economic 
growth significantly reduces state mediated poverty, its standardized coefficient is less than a 
sixth as large as the combined effect of social security transfers and public health 
spending…unemployment [does] not have significant effects…the percent of the population 
not in the labor market and the percent of children in single mothers families are 
insignificant…the welfare state does not indirectly increase poverty…results contradict 
Esping-Andersen‟s arguments18…Public health spending has the largest effect of the welfare 
state features, and in fact of any variable‟ (Brady, 2004: 20-27).  
Brady‟s model demonstrates that the welfare state does not have a negative impact on 
poverty; on the contrary, it is the main antipoverty factor (actually social security transfers 
and health spending). Economic growth is also a statistically significant antipoverty factor. 
His model explains about 80 percent of the variability of the poverty rate across countries.  
Lane Kenworthy (1999), using an absolute poverty line for international comparisons (based 
on purchasing power parities), first shows that welfare state awards do not negatively affect 
pretax/pretransfer income (the correlation between social transfers and the pretax/pretransfer 
poverty rate is very small, r = 0.18), contrary to the “welfare dependency”-thesis, an 
archetypal example being Charles Murray‟s famous statement according to which: „We tried 
to provide more for the poor and produced more poor instead‟(quoted in many articles 
including Kenworthy, 1999 and Darity and Myers, 1987). This welfare-as-a-poverty-factor 
view holds that „economic growth, the key to poverty reduction, is crippled by excessive 
redistribution‟ (Kenworthy, 1999: 1120). Using an absolute threshold and pretax/pretransfer 
allows Kenworthy to take account of the fact that the welfare state might slow down 
economic growth and hence, the growth of the median income, a fact that relative poverty 
indicators do not reflect. However, even when taking into account the indirect, longer-run 
effect of social welfare transfers, the welfare state does reduce poverty (Kenworthy, 1999).  
Other regression models have been developed by Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley and 
Nielsen (2003). Analyzing the situation of households in which the head is 25 to 59, they use 
50 percent of the average household income as a poverty line. Their regression models 
explain the level of pretax/transfer poverty and poverty reduction, that is, posttax/posttransfer 
poverty levels.  
They note that researchers have recently begun to examine the predictors of cross-national 
differences in relative poverty. Analyzing the impact of economic development, they state 
that „The historical association with decreasing poverty may have ended in recent 
decades…There is some evidence…that income inequality becomes positively associated 
with GDP at high levels of development‟ (Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Nielsen, 2003: 
24). As many authors, they note that the manufacturing sector has higher average wages and a 
more equal income distribution. They also take account of the changing role of women and 
changing family patterns, single-headed households becoming much more frequent. Political 
and institutional factors are also accounted for, i.e. the presence of a left-wing or a Christian 
democrat or a conservative cabinet and the impact of welfare policies, including potential 
                                                          
18According to Brady‟s regression models, surprisingly enough, welfare-state clusters have no 
statistically significant effect on poverty, whereas the level of social welfare expenditures has. 
The latter finding probably explains the former. 
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negative impacts such as an increased pretax/pretransfer poverty due to the disincentive to 
work caused by “too generous” transfers. The constitutional structure can also be important: 
Proportional systems allow small parties to have some MPs elected and have their voice 
heard, whereas majoritarian systems do not allow that. Moreover, some political systems have 
more veto points than others (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Women‟s political mobilization can 
also play an important role in shaping social policy and the poverty risk of some subgroups of 
the population. In their model, labor markets institutions (bargaining centralization and wage 
coordination), vocational education, and capital market openness, are also seen as potential 
predictors of poverty.  
These predictors can be subsumed in 5 categories of independents variables: 
- economic development (GDP/capita, agricultural employment, human capital, …) 
- the U-turn problematic (deindustrialization, globalization, …) 
- female labor force participation and single-mother families 
- labor markets institutions (union density, wage coordination) 
- political variables (left cabinet, Christian democratic cabinet, and constitutional structure) 
The main findings of this article regarding the predictors of pretax/pretransfer poverty are the 
following: 
„in advanced industrial countries, economic development has lost its antipoverty 
effectiveness…coefficients for globalization are nonsignificant…the most powerful predictors 
of pretax/pretransfer poverty are industrial employment…unemployment…and wage 
coordination‟ (Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Nielsen, 2003: 39-40).  
Regarding the determinants of poverty reduction, they note that: 
„there is a strong correlation between left cabinet and union density…left cabinet, 
constitutional structure and welfare policy structure are the central determinants of poverty 
reduction‟ (Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Nielsen, 2003: 42-43). 
In sum, „The more generous the welfare state, the greater is the extent of poverty 
reduction…One of the most effective antipoverty policy instruments is child and family 
allowances…industrial employment has declined and unemployment has risen, particularly 
among workers with few skills…However, we do not find much support for the globalization 
hypothesis‟ (Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Nielsen, 2003: 44). 
Lohmann (2006) has proposed a multivariate analysis of working poverty based on a logit 
model, with pooled data – 8 years, 15 European Union countries - showing that there is „a 
strong interplay between welfare state characteristics and the composition of households and 
the labour market involvement of household members‟ (Lohmann, 2006). Lohmann shows 
that welfare state variables (social expenditures, replacement rate of the unemployment 
benefits, and available childcare for 100 children), labor market institutions (centralized 
bargaining, minimum wage legislation, union coverage) and economic conditions (GDP, 
unemployment
19
) all significantly affect the incidence of working poverty (Lohmann, 2006); 
“poverty” is measured as 60 percent of median income and the current employment status is 
                                                          
19
We find here further evidence of the relationship between unemployment and working 
poverty already analyzed in chapter 3. 
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the work criterion. He also shows that such factors as age, gender, educational level, number 
of children, marital status, employment status (low-wage earners, self-employed), and 
occupational categories have an impact on the likelihood of being working poor, which is 
confirmed by virtually all working-poverty studies. Lohmann has carried out a similar 
exercise more recently (Lohmann, 2008); however, his regression model is based on a much 
smaller, transversal sample of EU countries, and conclusions are less relevant for the present 
work.  
In summary, the regression models presented here tend to show that the welfare state has a 
positive antipoverty effect, even when the possibility that social benefits reduce economic 
growth and employment is accounted for. Indeed, these models suggest that it is possible to 
implement social policy tools that help the poor without hindering economic growth. 
Moreover, it seems that social spending and welfare-state benefits have a bigger antipoverty 
impact than economic performance in postindustrial countries.  
 
8.3 Where do we go now? Challenges for working poverty research 
 
The findings presented in sections 8.1 and 8.2 open up interesting and important avenues of 
research: Further theoretical developments are necessary, and some empirical challenges 
should be tackled.  
8.3.1 Theoretical developments   
 
This work combines a sociological comparative analysis of welfare regimes and social 
inequalities with a political economy that aims at the identification of best practice models. 
Each part relies on a theoretical and conceptual framework that is coherent, for instance 
conceptual reflections about the nature and the definition of the problem and about the 
dimensions that underpin the welfare regime typology used in this work, a causality model 
based on exogenous factors and mechanisms, etc. But having two distinct parts makes the 
development of a global theoretical framework more difficult.  
A fundamental question would be at the heart of this theoretical framework: To what extent 
is it possible to compare models and regimes? This theory should be three-pronged:  
i) The role of social norms and cultural values: There are many indications of the importance 
of cultural values and social norms scattered throughout the text. I have underlined the role of 
the family in Southern European countries, the fact that young Swedes leave the parental 
home very early; one of the main aims of the Scandinavian welfare regime is that people are 
not dependent on their family. I also underlined the fact that Scandinavians do not rebel 
against high tax rates nor against the strong intervention of the state in many aspects of 
everyday‟s life, and that they have an egalitarian ethos, while most Americans are not 
appalled by the high level of income inequalities found in the US and are distrustful towards 
government interventions. Moreover, the impact of what people think about what “goods 
mothers” should do is measured in some of the studies I have meta-analyzed. The fact that 
Germany displays a “modified male breadwinner model” and that mothers are still expected 
to leave the labor market for a few years after childbirth is pivotal in this country chapter. In 
addition, it appears that the maximization of labor force participation is an important 
dimension of the fight against working poverty in protestant countries (the US and Sweden).  
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However, there is no such thing as a systematic and coherent model of the impact of social 
norms and cultural values on social policies. This model should include the following 
dimensions: The perceptions of the role of the family and of the distribution of roles within 
the family, the conception of “solidarity” and of the relationship between citizen and the state, 
and even the impact of religion. Some of these aspects are found in the literature, of course, 
but the idea would be to have a systematic modelization. Such a systematic analysis of these 
factors could greatly enhance our understanding of the “exportability” of policy mixes.  
ii) The impact of the specific context in which a model was implemented. All the conclusions 
drawn in this work pertain to specific points in time and space. In the comparative social 
policy literature, many “models” and “employment miracles” are put to the fore, and they are 
often seen as a coordinated model that was the object of conscious decisions, such as the 
“Dutch miracle”, flexicurity in Denmark, family policies in Sweden or the “work-first” model 
developed in the US, to name a few examples. With hindsight, however, these models can be 
questioned. In some cases, one could even ask: Was it really cleverness or was it luck? Was it 
really a coordinated effort? In the case of flexicurity in Denmark, for instance, social partners 
and the government probably never had a clear and systematic model in mind; it was the 
result of a stepwise negotiation and adaptation to adverse economic conditions; the same can 
be said about the Netherlands (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). In the case of family policies in 
Sweden, they were not meant to fight (working) poverty and were introduced at a time when 
the financing of pensions was not yet a pressing problem (Bonoli, 2007). In the US, the 
expansion of the EITC combined with the welfare reform has been hailed as successful by 
many authors, as shown in the meta-analysis: The employment of low-skilled mothers 
increased and poverty decreased; moreover, TANF caseloads plummeted. However, some 
American authors have underlined that these reforms took place in a very specific context, 
namely one of the most prosperous decades in American history (Sawhill and Thomas, 2001). 
On the contrary, some cases were presented as obvious failures. Germany was seen as the 
“sick man of Europe” until recently and as a “frozen landscape”, as other Continental 
European countries, while the massive impact of the reunification of Germany was largely left 
out of the analysis. However, a few years later, in the midst of one of the worst recessions 
since the Great depression, Germany is performing well and has a reasonably low level of 
unemployment compared to other countries, and has been able to undergo important labor 
market reforms in a recent past.  
In summary, the success stories and alledged failures presented in the literature depend on a 
very specific context and some successes may have been somewhat “lucky”. In addition, the 
current worldwide crisis may well question some models, for example the American “work-
first approach”, as the poverty rate among the working-age population is at its highest level 
since the 1960s (US Census Bureau, 2010). In a model that mainly relies on the maximization 
of labor force participation, when unemployment strongly increases, the poverty rate 
skyrockets.  
iii) The differences between a large country like the US, with its federalist institutions and its 
great diversity and a small country like Sweden with its relatively homogenous population 
may constitute a major obstacle to comparative analysis. Hence the differences in terms of 
size and political institutions should also be problematized in this model.  
Apart from this global theoretical model aiming to modelize the conditions under which 
sound comparisons can be made, two other theoretical avenues could contribute to a better 
understanding of the conditions under which “best practices” can be exported. Such theories 
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already exist in the literature, most notably in the field of political science, but specific models 
could be developed for the analysis of working poverty.  
A first theoretical element would be an analysis of the dynamic aspects of working poverty. 
The present work largely relies on a static analysis of welfare regimes and the types of 
working poverty they generate, but a longitudinal perspective would add to our understanding 
of the situation in various welfare regimes. Theoretical models are already available, such as 
the “path dependency” model in political science; interestingly, however, as indicated by 
many authors, some recent successes took place in countries in which policymakers ans social 
partners walked away from the path and found original solutions (Kenworthy, 2004, Viebrock 
and Clasen, 2009). Another important dimension of a dynamic analysis would include a 
longitudinal analysis of the financial situation of working households; I get back to this point 
below.  
A second important contribution would be a theory of the role of various actors (politicians, 
social partners, policymakers, and other stakeholders) and the conditions under which they 
successfully impose their views on how to best combat working poverty and contribute to 
social policy reforms. General models pertaining to social policy in general already exist, such 
as neo-institutionalist models, the power resources model, the garbage can model, the rational 
choice model, just to name a few. The idea would be to develop a specific model dealing with 
the fight against working poverty.   
8.3.2 Empirical challenges 
 
Apart from the theoretical models discussed above, the results presented in this work also 
open up interesting avenues in terms of empirical work.  
Dynamic aspects and longitudinal analyses 
As indicated above, I have focused on static aspects of working poverty in the present work. It 
would be equally important, however, to include dynamic aspects in the analysis. The 
situation of a worker who had a low income for one or two years, and then experienced an 
income increase is fundamentally different from that of a working household that is in the 
midst of a long poverty spell. In addition, the choice of a social policy instrument to help a 
group of disadvantaged workers may depend on the duration of the problem before the policy 
intervention. For instance, in the case of the working poor who have a low labor force 
participation, it is fundamental to know whether they have been underemployed for a long 
time or not; this has an impact on the choice of the social policy instrument and on the cost of 
the policy intervention.  
However, analyzing the situation of the workforce (at the microlevel) over a period of, say, 
five to ten years poses very tricky empirical challenges, not least in terms of the availability of 
panel data and of sample size. Indeed, the working poor (luckily) represent a small share of 
the workforce; in addition any panel is subject to attrition over time. This means that the 
sample size shrinks rapidly. Indeed many analyses focus on overall poverty rather than 
working poverty; in addition, the number of years analysed is usually small, typically three to 
five years (García, Gutiérrez, Ibáñez, Tejero, undated) 
Meta-analysis 
Despite the difficulties faced by the meta-analyst, this technique - which combines the 
systematic search and retrieval of evaluations using various search engines and the statistical 
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treatment of estimates in order to summarize and organize findings – is probably a useful tool. 
Meta-analysis goes beyond traditional literature reviews in which the selection criteria are 
rarely explicit and the conclusions drawn as to the efficiency or inefficiency of a policy left to 
the subjective appreciation of the researcher. Meta-analysis is, hence, less exposed to 
subconscious subjective biases and more rigorous than traditional literature reviews, as shown 
in chapter 6. In addition, the method I have used does not exclude any evaluation a priori: 
Even if I excluded some evaluations or estimates from the meta-analysis in a second step, the 
decision was based on explicit criteria (sample size, the use of economic controls in the 
econometric models, etc.). Moreover, all the studies I have identified are summarized 
appendix A, even those that have not been included in the meta-analysis, so that the reader 
can draw his or her own conclusions.  
One of the main difficulties of meta-analysis is the famous “apples and oranges problem”: 
How is it possible to draw general conclusions on the basis of evaluations that analyze 
different countries, different risk groups, and rely on different poverty and employment 
measures? A first way to proceed is to take into account the fact that each policy is 
intertwined with a large set of public policies, and its impact depends on the 
sociodemographic composition of the population in general, and of the workforce in 
particular, as well as on the degree of economic performance of a given country or region. So 
all meta-analyses presented in chapter 6 were broken down by welfare regimes; as far as I 
know, this is a relatively original solution to the problem of meta-analysis applied to social 
policy analysis. Moreover, after the meta-analysis, I had a more in-depth look at the evidence 
and tried to answers the following questions: Are conclusions different for various risk 
groups? Are there major disagreements among authors depending on the evaluation method 
used, mainly regression models, “natural experiments” and microsimulations?  
In summary, meta-analysis appears to be a useful tool that probably deserves more attention 
by social scientists, and its benefits outweigh its drawbacks. In many cases, a meta-analysis 
can be more fruitful than yet another evaluation of the impact of given social policy on a 
specific subgroup of the labor force in a given country, especially when the corpus of 
available evaluations is relatively large. Moreover, if the number of estimates is large enough, 
a meta-regression could prove even more useful than the kind of meta-evaluation I have 
carried out, but this requires being able to find a common metric for all estimates: This is far 
from a trivial task for multiple regression results, especially for generalized linear models 
(logit, probit, etc.).  
Hence, a promising avenue of research would be to expand the pool of evaluations of the 
employment and antipoverty effects of the policies I have analyzed in this work and to carry 
out a meta-regression of the estimates, controlling for the population group analyzed (all 
workers, single mothers, unskilled female workers, etc.), for various institutional factors, such 
as a measure of the strictness of the employment protection legislation and the level of payroll 
taxes, for sociodemographic controls such as the share of unskilled workers in the labor force 
or the share of single mothers among welfare recipients. It remains to be seen whether 
economic controls should be included or not in the meta-regression, because most estimates 
stem from econometric evaluations that rely on specifications that include economic controls, 
the most usual being GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  
This would largely solve the problem of comparing apples and oranges, as the effect 
measured by the coefficient of the policy variable would be the “pure effect” of the program, 
all other things being equal.   
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9 Appendix A: Summary tables of the articles dealing with the antipoverty and employment effects of various 
policies 
 
In the following tables, some abbreviations have been used in order to reduce the size of paragraphs:  
w/  with, w/o  without, b/w between, ppts  percentage points, pvty  poverty, min  minimum, CC childcare, hh household,  
ctrl control.  
Table A1: Employment effects of the minimum wage 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Employment effects Comments 
Sabia (2008), USA, 
effective minimum 
wage, 1992-2005 
Regression model: employment, weekly hours, weeks 
last year, annual hours regressed on the ln(effective 
min wage), state and year fixed effects, a state-
specific time effect (quadratic), state economic 
controls (average wage rate, unemployment rate, 
ln(GDP), and welfare variables (welfare waivers, 
ln(max AFDC+food stamps)),  
Single mothers, for various educational levels. 
No impact on single mothers overall, even in specifications 
including government transfers and the EITC; however, 
reduces weekly and annual hours and weeks last year for high 
school dropouts. HS dropouts: Increase 10% in min wage 
reduces employment by 8.8%, weekly hours -9.2%, weeks last 
year -11.6%, annual hours -11.8%   
Elasticities are quite large 
compared to literature on 
teenagers , maybe due to 
the fact that before 
PRWORA there was 
strong disincentive to 
work; in addition min 
wage increases may shift 
employment away from 
low-skilled adults 
Bazen (2000), France, 
Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy, Denmark, UK, 
US, minimum wage and 
collective bargaining 
Correlations; Remark: min wage 60% in F, 50% in BE 
and in NL, poverty line = 50% average income 
There is no one-to-one mapping between the presence of 
mechanisms to regulate low wages and labor market 
performance 
EC: purely descriptive, not 
included in vote-counting 
procedure.  
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Vedder, Gallaway 
(2002), USA, state & 
federal minimum wage,  
1953-1998 
Regression model (ARIMA), impact of min wage 
deflated with CPI on hours worked and overtime 
hours, controlling for the unemployment rate and 
GDP growth, for all full-time year-round workers 
in non agricultural sector.  
Significant negative relationship b/w hours worked and 
overtime hours and the real minimum wage, full-time year-
round workers. A 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces 
the number of hours worked by 1.3%; a 1$ (real) increase 
reduces weekly hours in manufacturing sector by 0.816 hrs 
and overtime hours by 0.349 hr.   
Reason for choosing full-
time year-round workers: 
they usually do not lose 
their jobs as a consequence 
of minimum wage hikes, 
yet they may have a 
reduction in hours worked. 
Indeed, FTYR workers 
tend to work a bit less 
when min wage increases, 
i.e. the employment effect 
of min wage is probably 
understated in most studies 
(only unemployment is 
considered).  
Neumark, Wascher 
(2002), USA, state & 
federal minimum wage, 
1986-1995 
Regression model (multinomial logit), probability of 
more workers/same number/fewer workers regressed 
on real minimum wage (deflated w/ CPI), a state 
dummy variable, fixed year effects, a vector of 
controls (unemployment, quartiles of earnings 
distribution, and welfare policies (AFDC waivers, 
max AFDC benefits).  
All families. 
Effect on number of workers in family: total effect has a 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of having fewer 
workers in year 2; only significant for nonpoor families (in 
year 1). A $1 increase in real min wage increases the 
likelihood of having fewer workers in year 2 than in year 1 by 
0.021 for nonpoor families (0.015 for all observations, 
significant at 10% level) 
A higher minimum wage 
generates trade-offs: some 
families gain and escape 
poverty and others slip into 
poverty, due in part to 
negative employment 
effects. On balance, no 
compelling evidence that 
minimum wages help in 
the fight against poverty. 
Various trade-offs more 
closely resemble income 
redistribution among low-
income families than 
income redistribution for 
high- to low-income 
families.  
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Watson (2000), UK, if 
all workers' wage=w(p), 
i.e wage that could be 
earned given their 
human capital; i.e. 
without underpayment, 
what would happen ? 
1985-1993 
Simulation, calculation of full earnings given the 
number of hrs worked. H0: workers cannot change 
contractual hours & H0': if min wage <=w(p), no 
decrease in employment. In order to determine 
underpayment, ln(wage) is regressed on a sum of 
human capital characteristics, and unobserved 
individual characteristics to calculate the wage person 
should get.  
Wage capacity rates differ substantially across industries 
(agriculture, energy, metal extraction, engineering, other 
manufacturing, construction, distribution, transport, 
bank/finance, other services), difference b/w union and non-
union. The wage capacity ranking is as follow (increasing): 
agriculture, distribution, other manufacturing, transport and 
communication, construction, other services, engineering, 
metal extraction, bank/finance, energy.  
As the degree of underpayment increases in a group, the 
minimum wage rate that can be introduced without causing 
unemployment will also increase.  
As wage capacity rates 
differ substantially, a 
Wage Councils orientation 
is preferable to a national 
minimum wage.  
EC: does not provide an 
estimate of employment 
effect, hence not included 
in vote-counting 
procedure.  
Neumark, Adams 
(2003), USA, living 
wage legislation + 
minimum wage, 1996-
2000 
Regression model, impact of presence of living wage 
ordinance and minimum wage. Probability of 
employment in various ranges of the wage 
distribution (lowest decile, b/w 10
th
 and 25
th
 
percentile, between 25
th
 and 50
th
 percentile, and 
b/w 50
th
 and 75
th
) is regressed on year, month and city 
fixed effects, on max(ln(wage ordinance, min wage)), 
on ln(min wage) and a vector of individual 
characteristics Workers in cities that have adopted 
living wage legislations are compared to workers in 
metropolitan areas that haven‟t ; lags of 6 and 12 
months are tested 
Living wage has a significant negative impact (w/ 12-month 
lag) on probability of being employed for workers below 
lowest decile of wage distribution, and positive impact b/w 
25th and 50th (contemporaneous and 6 months) and b/w 50th 
and 75th percentile (contemporaneous and 12 months). 
Minimum wage has no significant impact. Lowest-wage 
workers (lowest decile) : a 10% increase in LW lowers 
probability of employment by 0.56 percentage points 
LWO: Disemployment 
effects appear moderate. 
There is some evidence of 
positive employment 
effects for workers in the 
higher percentiles of the 
wage distribution.  
Portugal, Cardoso 
(2006), Portugal, 
minimum wage, 1986-
1989  
Regression model (Poisson regression/ firm-specific 
random effects), impact of large increase in minimum 
wages for teenagers in 1987. 
Gross flows (accessions and separations are analyzed 
separately).  
Number of teenage workers (hired/ 
separated/dismissed) regressed on year dummies (88 
and 89), firm size and hiring rates and market 
concentration.  
Also simulations w/ 3 alternative scenarios for 
teenage shares: actual 1986, the 1988 & 1989 share 
Companies significantly decreased the share of teenagers 
among their newly hired workforce; however, also a 
significant negative impact on share of teens in job 
separations. New firms ('88 and '89) recruited a significantly 
lower share of teenagers than those set up before min wage 
hike of 1987; in addition, teens overrepresented in firms going 
out of business. In 1988.in 1988 & 1989, the share of 
teenagers in overall job accessions to continuing firms was 4% 
lower than in 1986; however, the share of teenagers in job 
separations was 15% lower in 1988, and 14% lower in '89. 
New firms (set up in '88 & '89) hired a 4% lower share of 
teens. Simulations: the change in min wage was responsible 
for an increase in total employment of 0.41 percentage pts in 
Therefore, the decline in 
separations has clearly 
driven the rising teenage 
employment level. Another 
specification measures the 
impact of retention rates, 
which increased by 38%, 
which points to the 
relevance of supply-side 
factors. It should be noted 
that Portugal's labor 
market has one of the most 
stringent employment 
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that would prevail given the estimated impact 
(regression parameters) and actual shares in '88 & '89  
'88 and 0.32 percentage pts in '89.  protection legislation 
Skedinger (2004), 
Sweden, minimum wage 
through collective 
bargaining, 1979-1999 
Regression model, situation in Swedish hotels and 
restaurants, gross flows (hirings and separations) 
limited to unskilled workers.  
Sample is divided into two parts: observations with 
increasing or with decreasing min wages. Each is 
divided into four groups: wage lower than min wage, 
treatment group with wage b/w old and new min 
wage, control group w/ wage b/w new min wage and 
1,05*new min wage, and above.  
Separate estimations for 1979-1991 and 1992-1999. 
Logit: probability of separated in the next period (min 
wage increase) or accessed the job in current period 
(min wage decrease) explained by group 
dummies*real increase/decrease in min wage and 
controls (real wage, age, number of employees, 
gender, type of contract, occupation). 
Min wage increases and decreases contribute significantly to 
job separations and accessions, respectively, except for 
teenagers 1993-1988; job separations increase when min wage 
increases, but the evidence is less conclusive for 
accessions.1979-91: an increase in min wage increases job 
separations in treatment group by 1.332 % more than in the 
"high" wage group, by 0.756% for control group. The 
difference 1.332-0.756 = treatment effect = 0.576%. For 
decreasing min wages, the difference in elasticities is 0.843%. 
1992-1999: the effect is insignificant for workers aged 20-59 
in the full sample, but significant for two-year panel of firms; 
for teens the impact is insignificant 
The effects are not 
dramatic, but of non-
negligible magnitude. 
Another specification leads 
to the conclusion that the 
effects of decreasing min 
wages on job separations 
are insignificant and 
smaller than the effects of 
increasing min wages; 
however, accessions are at 
least as large when 
minimum wages increase 
as when they decrease. 
Differs from Card and 
Kruger, maybe due to the 
fact that the min wage bite 
is larger in Sweden 
Campolieti, Gunderson, 
Riddell (2006), Canada, 
minimum wage, 1981-
1997 
Empirical estimate, new research design by Neumark, 
where researcher has to precomit to a methodology, 
specifications, and data set prior to estimating 
employment effects; method applied here to Canadian 
data. Regression explaining the employment to 
population ratio of youth (16-19 & 20-24). Baseline 
model: employment-to-population ratio for a given 
age group regressed on ratio of min wage to average 
wage of workers 16-64 in given region (both year t 
and t-1), regional and year dummies, and controls. 
Another specification uses the “fraction below new 
minimum wage” instead of the minimum wage itself.  
The sum of current and lagged effect: statistically significant 
negative effect on employment for teens (16-19, elasticity -
0.282) and young adults (20-24, elasticity -0.155). Using 
"fraction below" as min wage variable, also significant 
negative impact. Then, two-stage regression model, modeling 
demand elasticities for teens, in which the wage of the group 
under study is regressed on the minimum wage and control 
variables, and then in the second stage the employment rate is 
regressed on this instrumented wage rate and control 
variables. This 2-stage model leads to elasticities most of 
which are insignificant for teens, but significant for 20-24. For 
16-24, specification with minimum wage index, elasticity of -
0.256 (current + lagged), and lagged elasticity is larger than 
contemporaneous. The adverse effect is larger for 16-19, 
elasticity = -0.282. For specification w/ "fraction below" 
(i) There may be 
publication bias, but also 
"author bias" where 
authors run alternative 
specifications until they 
get the results they want. 
(ii) in Canada, no federal 
min wage b/c under 
provincial jurisdiction --> 
considerable cross-
sectional and time series 
variation, hence 
particularly appropriate 
(iii) substantial adverse 
employment effects for 
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variable, results are fairly similar. youths, however, estimates 
for demand elasticities are 
mixed. 
Ragacs (2007), Austria, 
minimum wage through 
collective bargaining, 
1967-1995 
Empirical estimate, growth rate of employment = 
f(time trend, growth rate of output, lagged labor 
productivity, ln(real minimum wage)), also lagged 
employment is added as a predictor. Aggregated data 
for Austrian industry, average employment 
Contrary to the "textbook model", no significant negative 
effect of minimum wages on employment could be found.  
Austrian labor market may 
be organized differently 
than described in textbook 
model, and unions' wage 
claim may be very modest, 
due to productivity-
oriented wage settings 
Doucouliagos, Stanley 
(2009), USA, minimum 
wage  
Meta-regression analysis, 1,474 estimates from 64 
US studies, accounting for publication bias by 
regressing the estimated elasticities on their standard 
error. There's evidence of publication bias, i.e. 
selection for negative employment effects. Selection 
bias included in regression model. 
Estimates of the empirical effect corrected for publication bias 
show that there's no evidence of a genuine employment effect 
when using Card and Kruger data set. Using the authors' much 
extended data set and meta-regression analysis techniques, 
conclusions are similar: there's strong evidence of publication 
selection; once this publication selection is filtered, no 
evidence of a minimum-wage effect remains. The publication 
bias appears rather severe. publication bias -> elasticity of 
employment effect = f(standard error): the intercept of 
regression model lies between -2 and -3 for the specifications 
preferred by the authors or the articles, -1.3 to -2.63 for all 
estimates. The all-set meta-regression finds, contrary to the 
best-set one, a very small but significant negative minimum-
wage effect --> a 10% increase in min wage decreases 
employment by 0.1%. Conclusion: the average publication 
bias for the minimum-wage literature is -0.231 (multivariate 
meta-regression analysis) or -0.273 (simple multiple 
regression). Subtracting the estimated publication bias, the 
average employment effect of -0.19 is converted to +0.041, 
but too small to be of practical import. 
The elasticity estimates are 
getting 0.14 larger (or less 
negative) every decade, 
not as a result of falling 
real minimum wage 
 
EC: meta-analysis, hence 
not included in own 
meta-analysis, but 
analyzed in text.  
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Sabia (2009 a), USA, 
effective minimum 
wage, 1979-2004 
Regression model, impact of ln(min wage) on teenage 
employment-to-population ratio and hours of work 
(unconditional and conditional hours), with state 
effects and a set of state-level time-varying controls 
(economic + demographic). Appropriateness of 
including year effects, which may capture much of the 
variation in the min wage measure, but this is hotly 
contended. First a model w/ months dummies, then 
another specification w/ year & months dummies.  
For period 1979-1997: Without year effects, stat. significant 
negative impact on employment/population ratio for teens, 
whereas when year effects are included, the estimated 
elasticity becomes insignificant. For period 1979-2004: the 
impact is statist significant w/ or w/o year effects. Hours 
effect: consistent evidence of decrease in average weekly 
hours. Evidence for conditional hours = inconclusive. For 
1979-1997: w/o year effects, a 10% increase in min wage is 
associated with a 2.8-3% decline in teenage employment ratio. 
1979-2004: w/o year effects, -2%, and w/ year effects -0.3%. 
When lagged effects included (t and t+1), for 1979-2004, the 
elasticity is slightly larger and significant: a 10% increase in 
min wage associated with a "long-run" 2.5-3.3% decrease in 
ratio of employed teens. (Unconditional) hours effects: "long-
run" elasticities range from -0.37 to -0.51 
  
Kalenkoski, Lacombe 
(2007), USA, Federal & 
state minimum wage, 
2000 
Regression model (OLS) at county level, b/c 
geographical variables are important, e.g. Card & 
Kruger noted changes induced by the inclusion of 
regional dummies.  
Log of employment-to-population ratio for 16-19 yrs 
old at the county level, explained by log of effective 
min wage, income/capita, weekly wage, 
unemployment rate, and demographic controls, 
accounting for spatial autocorrelation, notably 
neighboring counties. 3,605 counties in sample 
Increase in the effective minimum wage has significant impact 
on teenage employment/population ratio. Increase of 10% 
leads to a statistically significant decrease in 
employment/population ratio of teens of 2.5%. With the 
spatial autocorrelation model, a 10% increase causes a 3.2% 
decrease in youth employment to population ratio 
Accounting for spatial 
autocorrelation leads to a 
coefficient that is 28% 
higher than the OLS 
estimate 
Addison, Blackburn, 
Cotti (2009), USA, 
federal & state 
minimum wage, 1990-
2005 
Regression model at country level (payroll data) for 
the retail-trade sector nationwide, ln(employment) 
is regressed on ln(min wage), county and quarter fixed 
effects, and controls (population, total employment, 
weekly earnings, unemployment and enrollment rate); 
the model incorporates a county-specific time trend in 
the error term, as in Sabia 2008.  
Results are sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific 
trends, impact of the "effective" minimum wage.  
W/o time trend: 3 out of 5 coefficients are positive but 
insignificant (1), (2) & (4); only significant effect is negative 
in subsector (3). With county-specific trends, 4 out of 5 
coefficients are stat significant and positive (whereas for 
sector (3) at 10% level only). Another model accounting for 
border counties leads to a largely similar general pattern of 
results as that obtained w/ detrended data. W/ county-specific 
trends: a 10% increase in min wage leads to a 1 to 2% increase 
in employment in 4 out of 5 subsectors of retail trade 
Explanation may be 
efficiency wage or 
monopsony, but authors 
not convinced. Could be 
the impact of increased 
earnings for minimum-
wage workers (increased 
demand).  
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5 subsectors: (1)food & beverage stores, 
(2)supermarket/grocery stores, (3)convenience stores, 
(4)specialty food stores, (5)beer/wine/liquor stores 
Fang, Gunderson 
(2009), Canada, 
Minimum wage, 1993-
1999. In Canada, min 
wage is under provincial 
jurisdiction  
Regression model, probability of being employed 
(probit model) in subsequent year depending on 
whether in treatment (wage b/w old & new min wage 
at time t-1) or control group, controlling for individual 
characteristics, and including time and region 
dummies. The focus is on older workers, contrary to 
most of the literature, namely workers 50+. Various 
ctrl groups: ranging from 0-0.25 Canadian $ above 
min wage, up to $4 above. Authors prefer 0-1 $ above 
min wage as ctrl group. Other control groups also 
include wages below old minimum wage. 22 
regressions were carried out (11 comparisons groups,  
w/ or w/o wages below min wage). 
Model for preferred control group, i.e. within $1 above the 
min wage: minimum wages have a statistically significant and 
positive impact on affected workers aged 50+. When all 22 
regressions are considered, overall, the effects are significant 
and positive; no coefficient is negative. Model w/ control 
group within $1: workers 50+ affected by min wage increase 
were 14 % points more likely to be employed the next year 
compared with otherwise similar low-wage workers not 
affected by theses increases 
Results for older workers 
are completely at odds 
with the results for youth 
found in the recent 
Canadian literature, which 
found substantial negative 
effect  
Wessels (2007), USA, 
Minimum wage, 1990-
1991 and 1996-1997 
Reevaluation of Card and Kruger (1995) difference-
in-difference model, with the main minimum wage 
indicator being the proportion of workers affected by 
the minimum wage hike, but dependent variable 
changed. 
Log (employment-to-population ratio 1992/e-t-p ratio 
1989), regressed on fraction of affected workers + 
ln(change in adult employment) as control. 
Teenagers. 
Re-evaluate C & K: when controlling for business cycle (adult 
employment change), the regression coefficient becomes 
insignificant - same conclusion as C&K.  
However, second model for 1996-1997 min wage hike leads 
to a significantly negative coefficient. Regression rerun for 
states with the federal min wage only: for 1996-97, coefficient 
is stat significant and negative. Elasticities for 1996-1997: 
regression coefficient is-0.4112 for fraction of affected 
workers, and the fraction averaged 44.9% for teenagers, hence 
elasticity should be -0.4112*0.449=-0.18, as the equation is of 
the log-linear type. When only states with federal min wage in 
the equation, the coefficient is -0.7576 (but % of affected 
workers not indicated hence no elasticity) 
C&K were correct with 
their model for 1990-1991; 
however, for the 1996-
1997 hike, the impact was 
significantly negative, 
maybe due to a higher 
number of workers 
affected by the hike.  
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Feldmann (2009), 73 
countries, minimum 
wage, 2000-2003  
Regression model (random effects) based on 2004 
Executive Opinion Survey, based on 60-70 executives 
pro country, who gave answers on scales between 0 
and 1 (agree/disagree), on 4 topics: minimum wage 
has little impact b/c low or not obeyed; hiring and 
firing are determined by private contract; the share of 
wages set by collective bargaining is low; 
unemployment benefits preserve incentives to work + 
1 objective measure: duration of conscription, rescales 
--> 0 to 1. Dependent variable is the unemployment 
rate. A set of controls is added: business regulation, 
tax burden, GDP growth, % of children, ethnic 
fractionalization, whether the country is landlocked, 
wars, transition economy, and the model includes year 
dummies.  
Coefficient for variable "little impact of minimum wage" has 
not a significant impact on unemployment rate 
EC: not quite reliable 
(opinion questions), hence 
not included in meta-
analysis  
Böckerman, Uusitalo 
(2009), Finland, 
Minimum wage through 
collective bargaining 
1991-1996, reduction in 
min wage for workers 
under 25 over period 
June 1993- June 1995 
(80% of the lowest task- 
and region-specific 
tariffs) 
Regression model (difference-in-difference) effect 
of this decrease based on payroll records. 
Time (before/during/after the reform) and treatment 
group (Trainee, under 25) dummies and their 
interactions to explain share of workers in control and 
treatment group in each firm (employment share + 
share of hours worked), control group =workers under 
30 w/ a maximum of 2 years‟ work experience.  
Workers under 25. 
Contradictory findings: there was a decrease in employment in 
the affected group both when min wage exceptions were 
introduced and then removed. Potential endogeneity problem 
as subminimum wage is reaction to growing unemployment, 
hence inclusion of interaction term (business cycle x treatment 
group) and GDP growth or unemployment rate. Authors also 
narrowed the age range, and compare 24- w/ 26-year-olds. 
Specifications with interaction terms --> treatment*business 
cycle (real GDP, unemployment) lead to negative estimates 
very close to zero and insignificant. W/ narrower age range, 
slight increase when min wage decreased and slight decrease 
when exceptions removed, but not significant. Conclusion: No 
statistically or economically significant effects of changes in 
youth minimum wage.  
i) Due to a severe 
recession in early 1990s 
unemployment 
skyrocketed, and unions 
signed agreements w/ 
employer organizations to 
relax wage regulations for 
young workers. ii) Out of 
86 minimum wage studies 
surveyed by Neumark and 
Wascher (2007), only 
Skedinger (2006) analyzes 
the effects of union-
negotiated min wages 
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Thompson (2009), USA, 
minimum wage, 1996-
2000, in 15 states 
covered in dataset based 
on unemployment 
insurance wage records 
and affected by changes 
in the min wage in the 
mid-1990s 
Much of research showing small effects relies on 
state-level panels => here regression model: impact of 
the 1996 and 1997 min wage rises on teenage 
employment share w/ county level data, counties are 
classified as "low-impact" and "high-impact" based on 
regional earnings variation, either with thirds or fifths 
(top and bottom) of teenage earnings distribution. 
Model (difference-in-difference): teen employment is 
regressed on impact variable (low vs. high impact), 
time indicator (=1 after reform) and 
controls(unemployment, teens as a % of working-age 
population, adult earnings) 
Membership in the high-impact group following the 1996 
increase has a stat significant negative impact on teenage 
employment, the addition of states fixed effects has no impact. 
Interestingly, county-level data show a stat significant 
negative effect, while state-level data yields insignificant 
effects. W/ usual covariates, 1996: membership in high-impact 
group (bottom third) is associated with a 3.1% reduction in 
teenage employment (-3.0% if states fixed effects are 
included); -3.4% if high-impact is bottom fifth; that is 
elasticities of -0.26 and -0.29 respectively; for the 1997 
increase, elasticities are -0.29 and -0.37, but when high-impact 
defined by bottom third, the results narrowly miss 
significance. A stable/transitory (stable= lasting at least the 
full quarter) tenure variable is added, which shows min wage 
increases only have an impact on transitory teenage 
employment. 
(i) No significant impact 
on 19-22 years old in most 
regressions in 1996 and 
1997 (ii) Impact was 
stronger is small counties 
i.e. with total employment 
below 10,000 (elasticites 
in the range 0.59-0.67 in 
'96 and 0.38-0.54 in '97)  
Orrenius, Zavodny 
(2008), USA, Effective 
minimum wage, 1994-
2005 
Regression model (Huber White std errors and 
correction for heteroskedasticity): log(employment-to-
population ratio) of low-skilled immigrants is 
regressed on log(min wage), business cycle controls 
(log GDP/capita, unemployment, and construction 
permits), and state and time fixed effects, w/ state-
level data.  
3 groups: 20-54 natives w/o high school diploma, 
same group but foreign-born and not US citizen at 
birth, and all teens. Alternative independent variable 
is ln(minimum wage/real average wage of 20-54 yrs 
old), same model for hours worked. Another model 
includes mobility variables, w/ % of low-skilled 
immigrants and average yrs of education among 
immigrants as dependent variables. 
Real min wage has no significant effect but for teens when 
controlling for state-level economic conditions (significant for 
male but not for female teens). No significant employment 
losses for immigrants. Same conclusions for relative minimum 
wage. Same for hours worked, only significant effect is for 
teens; however, hours increase for male teens, and decrease 
for female teens (which explains why no employment effet for 
female teens). Finally, results suggest that min wages 
influenced low-skilled immigrants' location patterns. Teens: a 
10% increase in the min wage reduces teen employment by 
1.8%, a result driven by male teens, among whom a 10% 
increase reduces employment by 1.9%; non stat significant 
effect for female teens. The estimated responses to this min 
wage increase are 1% increase in male teens hours worked, 
and a 1.3% decrease in female teens' average hours. Regarding 
mobility patterns: raising the minimum wage has a stat 
significant negative impact on the fraction of low-skilled 
immigrants at state level 
(i)Including a one-year lag 
of the real minimum wage 
is not significantly 
negatively associated with 
employment rates or 
average hours, except for 
employment among low-
skilled adult immigrant 
women. Hence, results are 
broadly unaffected by this 
addition. (ii) the gender 
asymmetry in teen results 
is striking, may depend on 
incidence of tipped jobs 
and higher enrollment in 
school of young women 
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Sabia (2009 b), USA, 
Effective minimum 
wage, 1979-2004 
Regression model of retail industry-wide 
employment effects with a state-month panel, effect 
on 16-64 as well as teenagers (16-19). Dependant 
variable is ratio of retail employment to total 
population 16-64 regressed on ln(min wage) , state, 
month, and year fixed effects, and economic controls 
(ln wage rate of workers 25-54, unemployment rate), 
average weekly hours equations are also specified. 
Minimum wage increase leads to significant but modest 
reduction in retail employment. However, when state-specific 
linear month trends are included, adverse retail employment 
effects disappear. With Kaitz index as independent variable, 
not stat different from zero. Hours effects: significant negative 
impact on hours worked, but again quite sensitive to the 
inclusion of state-specific time trends. Elasticities: min wage 
hikes seem to have larger effects on retail employment rather 
than on conditional hours worked. Effects are stronger for 
teenagers. W/o time trend, employment: a 10% increase in 
min wage is associated with a 1.1% decline in employment. 
Hours worked: a 10% increase reduces average retail hours 
worked by about 1%. Teenagers, employment effect: a 10% 
increase in min wage associated with a 3.4% decrease in teen 
retail employment, and a 3.8% to 4.1% decrease in average 
teenage hours worked in retail trade 
State trends may be 
capturing retail 
employment variation that 
the model seeks to explain 
Hyslop, Stillman (2005), 
New Zealand, Large 
reform of minimum 
wage affecting youth 
workers in 2001, period: 
1997-2003. Before 16-
19 yrs old min wage = 
60% of min wage, after 
18-19 yrs old get adult 
min wage + youth min 
wage 80% of adult min 
wage 
Regression model (difference-in-difference estimates, 
robust standard errors) comparing employment rate 
for 16-17 yrs old and 18-19 yrs old to those of young 
adults (20-25), before and after the 2001 reform: 
employment is regressed on age dummies interacted 
with post-2001 dummy and on single-age dummies, 
quarter-specific dummies, and on controls (gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, NZ born, urbanicity, region, 
and the size of each age group).  
Descriptive stat: min wage changes that occurred after 2001 
do not appear to have had a substantial effect, at best weak 
effects. Regression results: the estimated employment effects 
are negative but not stat significant. Control for announcement 
effect with a dummy variable (announcement in April 2000, 
dummy=1 for Q2, Q3 and Q4 of 2000): announcement effects 
are quite important in 2003. Main model: interact quarterly 
and age-specific dummy variables and also add 26-49 yr-olds 
unemployment rates; the estimated impacts are non significant 
in 2001 & 2002, but significantly negative in 2003. For hours 
worked, most effects are insignificant. Estimates of the impact 
on unemployment, results are not plausible. Accounting for 
announcement effects, there is a significant negative impact 
on youth employment in 2003 (-2.6% to -2.9%). With the 
more complete models, including age-specific business cycles, 
there is a decline in 2003 b/w 2% and 4% of 16-17 and 18-19 
year-olds 
no evidence of adverse 
effects on youth 
unemployment 
immediately following the 
reform; some weak 
evidence of employment 
loss by 2003; but also an 
increase in hours worked, 
depending on specification 
adopted 
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Kawaguchi, Yamada 
(2007), Japan, Min wage 
is Japan is rather low (as 
a share of median 
earnings). All Japanese 
prefectures are divided 
into four categories. 
Period 1993-1999  
Regression model based on a panel survey of 
consumers.  
 5 groups are defined, observations for 2 consecutive 
years, the full sample (n=1438): workers with wage 
<110% min wage (sample A, n=236), sample A w/ 
wage below 110% for 2 yrs or more (sample A', 
n=152), sample A' but w/o workers w/ wage below 
min wage (sample B, n=148), and sample B in 2 yrs 
or more (sample B', n=96). Linear probability model: 
Employment dummy regressed on treatment group 
dummy (wage b/w old and new minimum) and 
controls (age, children, education, marital status, job 
openings) and prefecture and time dummies 
Results are not statistically significant. The preferred samples, 
namely A and B, lead to negative regression coefficients, 
suggesting disemployment effects. However, none is 
significant. This may be due to very small sample sizes.  
EC: small sample sizes, 
hence not included in 
meta-analysis. 
Kawaguchi, Mori 
(2009), Japan, min wage 
set at the prefecture 
level, years 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002 
Regression model (weighted least square), the change 
in employment rate regressed on the fraction affected 
over a 5-year period, proportion in each category (7 
categories: male/female teens, male/female young 
adults (20-24), male/female 60+, and 20-59 
women), year dummies, unemployment, and average 
wages. 
Workers working less than 200 days in a year are 
dropped.  
Significant reduction of employment rate among male 
teenagers, and among women in the 20-59 age group, but not 
for young adults aged 20-59. Male teens: A 1% increase in the 
fraction affected reduces employment by 0.2 percentage point. 
Less clear for female teens. Women aged 20 to 59: A 1% 
increase in the fraction affected decreases the employment 
rate by 0.4-0.8 percentage point 
Min wage in Japan is 
rather low (as a share of 
median earnings) 
Abowd, Kramarz, 
Margolis, Philippon, 
France, min wage, 1990-
1998 
Regression model (logit): Treatment t and control 
groups are defined by the log real minimum wage in 
year t and t+1 (control group‟s upper bound = log 
(1.1) + ln(real min wage)).  
Exit models: Probability of being in employment in 
year t+1 conditional on being in employment in year t 
and on an increase in the min wage is regressed on 
interaction treatment*difference b/w new and old min 
wage (amount), on interaction control*difference, and 
on a vector of controls (age, sex, seniority, type of 
contract, education, and year). Two separate model for 
increasing and decreasing real minimum wages.  
Difference-in-diff estimator of exit based on both increases 
and decreases: the elasticity is -0.404 for French men and -
0.2983 for French women, and the impact is statistically 
significant. The probability of being in employment in year 
t+1 significantly decreases when the real minimum wage 
increases. When increases and decreases are analyzed 
separately, elasticities are very high: approximately -2 for men 
and -1.5 for women.  
 
Regarding entry probabilities: the effects are essentially zero. 
Hence, an increase in minimum wage strongly and negatively 
affects exit probabilities in France, while it has virtually no 
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There are also entry models, similarly specified.  
Overall employment, broken down by gender.  
effect on entry rates.  
Grogger (2003), USA, 
EITC, 1979-2000 
Based on state-level variation in welfare reform 
policy. Employment and weeks worked of female-
headed families are regressed on log (minimum 
wage), the introduction of time limits, a dummy for 
the introduction of welfare reform, demographic 
controls and the generosity of the maximum credit of 
the EITC. The model includes states dummies and 
state-specific quadratic trends.  
Log(minimum wage) has no significant impact on the 
employment rate and on the number of weeks worked among 
female-headed families.  
 
 
Table A2: Antipoverty effects of the minimum wage 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Antipoverty effect Comments 
Neumark, Wascher 
(2001), USA, federal & 
state minimum wage, 
1986-1995 
Regression model: linear probability model using 
first-difference estimators (robust standard errors) 
probability of being nonpoor in year 2 if poor in year 
1 (pre-tax poverty) regressed on real minimum wage, 
controlling for the unemployment rate, # of children 
under 18 (1, 2, 3+), with state and year dummies.  
Poor and low-income families. 
 
similar specifications to examine effects on changes 
in the income-to-needs ratio (official poverty line)  
No significant effect overall, however positive impact on 
families with children, with or without workers in year one 
(lagged effect if no worker in year 1). Significantly increases 
pre-tax income-to-needs ratio of families below poverty line 
in year one. An average increase in the real minimum wage (+ 
$0.2) increases the probability of escaping poverty by 0.013 
for families with kids, 0.02 for families w/ at least 1 worker in 
year 1. Income-to-needs ratio increase = 0.018, which is weak 
(i) 23% of families in 
sample are pretax poor 
(ii) Families w/o worker 
in year one +0.012; 
families w/ at least one 
worker +0.02 
Sabia (2008), USA, 
effective minimum wage, 
1992-2005 
Regression model: the dummy variable poverty 
(income is below the official poverty line) is 
regressed on the ln(effective min wage), state and 
year fixed effects, a state-specific time effect 
No significant impact on single mothers' poverty (whether 
they work or not and whatever their educational level) 
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(quadratic), state economic controls (average wage 
rate, unemployment rate, ln(GDP), and welfare 
variables (welfare waivers, ln(max AFDC+food 
stamps).  
Single mothers.  
Joassart-Marcelli (2004), 
California, state 
minimum wage, 1998-
2000 
Simulation, official poverty line, no employment 
effect 
Minimum wage of 8.45$ would be necessary so that a full-
time full-year worker can provide the basic needs of a family 
of 4 i.e. much higher than minimum wage b/w 98 and 2000 
($5.75); if poverty line = 50% of median in Los Angeles, then 
minimum wage should amount to $12.80 
 EC: does not provide 
any estimate of the 
antipoverty effect, hence 
not included in meta-
analysis 
Vedder, Gallaway 
(2002), state & federal 
minimum wage, 1953-
1998 
Regression model (ARIMA), impact of real 
minimum wage (deflated with CPI) on official 
poverty rate, controlling for unemployment, GDP 
growth, GDP/capita, and quadratic term for real 
transfers/capita. Full-time year-round workers in 
nonagricultural sector.  
No statistically significant relationship b/w min wage and 
poverty rate, not even for full-time year-round workers, and 
not in 3 out of 4 broad census regions: South, Midwest, and 
West ; in Northeast, significant positive impact: higher min 
wage increases poverty (for f-t y-r workers). Increase of 1$ in 
real min wage leads to 0.36 percentage point increase in 
official poverty rate in the Northeast (+1.56 for Nonwhites) 
Reason for choosing 
full-time year-round 
workers: they usually do 
not lose their jobs as a 
consequence of 
minimum wage hikes, 
yet they may have a 
reduction in hours 
worked. Indeed, f-t y-r 
workers tend to work a 
bit less when min wage 
increases, i.e. the 
employment effect of 
min wage is probably 
understated in most 
studies (only 
unemployment is 
considered).  
Neumark, Wascher 
(2002), USA state & 
federal minimum wage, 
1986-1995 
Regression model (logit), impact of real minimum 
wage on probability of escaping poverty (official 
poverty line), remaining in poverty and slipping into 
poverty and impact on needs-to-income ratio (n-to-i 
ratio <1 = poor), similar specification as described 
above.  
Full model: real minimum wage has a significant negative 
impact on probability on staying in poverty in year 2 
(contemporaneous effect); however, no significant lagged 
effect. Total effect on poor population is not significant. For 
nonpoor persons in HH with at least 1 worker in year 1, 
minimum wage significantly increases probability of slipping 
into poverty; no effect for HH w/o a worker. Another model 
A higher minimum 
wage generates trade-
offs: some families gain 
and escape poverty and 
others slip into poverty, 
due in part to negative 
employment effects. On 
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All families. (multinomial logit): effect of min wage on various income-to-
needs categories: <=1[poor], 1-1.5, 1.5-2, >=2). Total effect 
(contemporaneous +lagged) are generally not significant, but 
increased likelihood to slip into poverty for persons in inc-to-
needs ratio >1.5. For all poor HH, regardless of the number of 
workers: 1$ increase decreases probability of staying in 
poverty by 0.094 (-0.096 for HH w/ at least 1 workers, -0.081 
for HH w/o a worker). For nonpoor HH, a 1$ increase 
increases probability of slipping into poverty by 0.02 (0.024 
for HH w/ at least 1 worker, not significant for HH w/o a 
worker). Second model shows that for families entering 
poverty, a $1 higher minimum wage reduces the income-to-
needs ratio by 0.08; for families remaining in poverty, 
however, the contemporaneous effect of a $1 increase is an 
increase of 0.072 of the income-to-needs ratio, which is 
nontrivial given that these HH have a ratio <1 (by definition) 
balance, no compelling 
evidence that minimum 
wages help in the fight 
against poverty. Various 
trade-offs more closely 
resemble income 
redistribution among 
low-income families 
than income 
redistribution for high- 
to low-income families.  
Heller Clain (2007); 
USA, living wage 
legislation + state 
minimum wage at county 
level, two time periods: 
ca. 1990 and ca. 2003 
Regression model, impact of presence or absence of 
both living wage ordinance and state minimum wage 
above federal minimum on poverty rate.  
Poverty rate is regressed on a vector of behavioral 
and demographic controls (race, age, family 
structure, education, labor force status), 
unemployment rate, unionization rate, a dummy for 
state min wage above federal min wage and dummy 
for the presence of local living wage ordinance. But 
endogeneity problem, hence 2-stage estimation to 
estimate instrument variables for the local economic 
activity and state and local wage policies.  
Overall poverty rate.  
Living wage ordinances have a statistically significant impact: 
they reduce poverty rates; on the contrary, there is no 
significant evidence that state minimum wages reduce 
poverty. Presence of a living wage ordinance in at least one 
municipality of significant size reduces poverty rate by 1.821 - 
1.965 ppts (depending on specifications), i.e. for the average 
county with a population of 720,273 in 2000, b/w 13,115 and 
14,155 individuals lifted out of poverty  
No evaluation of 
employment effect, but 
the favorable effect of 
living wage ordinances 
is probably due to the 
absence of 
disemployment effects: 
Coverage is much 
narrower - approx. 1-2% 
of workers in lowest 
quartile of wage 
distribution - and the 
employers of low-wage 
workers targeted by 
legislation sell services 
to local governments, 
who intentionally 
maintain their demand 
and absorb the higher 
costs; the redistribution 
occurs b/w taxpayers in 
general and low-wage 
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workers 
Watson (2000), UK, if all 
workers' wage=w(p), i.e 
wage that could be 
earned given their human 
capital; i.e. without 
underpayment, what 
would happen ? Poverty 
line = 140% of a single 
person's supplementary 
benefit/income support 
allowance rate. 1985-
1993 
Simulation, ln(wage) = function of human capital, 
unobserved characteristics and error term. If the latter 
= 0 => potential wage. Calculation of full earnings 
and wage capacity earnings given the number of hrs 
worked. H0: workers cannot change contractual 
hours & H0': if min wage <=w(p), no decrease in 
employment. Impact on disposable equivalized 
income. 
The payment of household income capacity (wage capacity 
earnings) reduces poverty, but not sufficiently to eradicate it. 
Payment of household income capacity (full earnings capacity 
given contractual hours) reduces working poverty by 39.4% 
Theory of dynamic 
monopsony: due to job 
search costs, workers 
will accept wages below 
their marginal 
productivity; as wage 
capacity rates differ 
substantially, Wage 
Councils orientation is 
preferable to a national 
minimum wage.  
EC: no estimate of 
antipoverty effect, hence 
not included in meta-
analysis. 
Burkhauser, Sabia 
(2007), USA federal & 
state minimum wage, 
1988-2003 
Regression model at state level: ln(pvty rate) is 
regressed on ln(min wage), ln(% of adult males 
unemployed) and ln(mean wage rate), some 
specifications w/ year and state fixed effects, and 
Prais-Winsten GLS to deal w/ autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity across states. Total population / 
single mothers.  
Simulation of 96-97 increase $4.25 to 5.15 and 
proposed increase $5.15 to 7.25, H0: no employment 
effects and no decrease in hours worked (overall + 
single mothers), sample of workers aged 16-64.  
Across specifications there is little evidence of a significant 
relationship b/w min wage increases and overall state poverty 
rate; no evidence that min wage decreases poverty rate among 
single mothers. Regression coefficients have negative sign, 
but never statistically significant. Simulation: 1997 increase 
only helped 27.3% of poor workers and only 14.7% of 
beneficiaries lived in poverty; however, 55.6% of single 
mothers who benefited from min wage increase lived in 
poverty; simulation of proposed increase: would help 31.1% 
of poor workers; only 13.4% of beneficiaries live in poor 
households (53.4% among single mothers) 
(i) In the presence of 
monopsonies, minimum-
wage hikes could have 
positive employment 
effects (ii) increase from 
$4.25 to $5.15: 60.6% of 
benefits went to workers 
in households with 
income-to-needs ratio 
greater than 2.   
Morgan, Kickham 
(2001), USA, Effective 
minimum wage 1987-
1996 
Regression model: child poverty rate regressed on 
minimum wage, average EITC and food stamps 
benefits, indicators of child support effort and 
collection, and controls (# of births to unmarried 
women, single-parent families, % of African 
Americans, average pay, unemployment rate), w/ and 
w/o state dummies.  
Minimum wage has a significant negative impact on child 
poverty rate. If real minimum wage decreases by an inflation-
adjusted $1, child poverty rate increases by 2.51 % points 
The minimum wage's 
employment effects and 
its impact on poverty are 
less than commonly 
believed, the poverty-
fighting potential has 
more support 
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Gundersen, Ziliak 
(2004), USA, effective 
minimum wage ; 1981-
2000 
Regression model, log pre-tax and post-tax Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke indicator w/ α=0 regressed on 
ln(effective min wage), a lagged term (poverty in 
previous year), other policy variables (dummy before 
and after introduction of TANF, log(food 
stamps+AFDC), log effective EITC), macroeconomic 
indicators (unemployment, employment growth rates, 
state median wage & wage inequality), aggregate and 
state-specific fixed time effects, a state-specific time 
trend two dependent variables: poverty rate and 
squared poverty gap (α=2) for all families, female-
headed families, married-couple families, white 
families, black families.  
The higher the state minimum wage relative to the federal 
level, the lower the poverty head count, before as well as after 
tax; also a significantly negative impact on pre-tax squared 
poverty gap, but no significant impact on post-tax squared 
poverty gap. A 10% increase in the state min wage lowers pre-
tax poverty by only 0.5%; conclusion changed little after tax 
liabilities netted out and EITC credits added. Also reduced 
pretax squared poverty gap, and regression coefficient is 
larger than in poverty equation (-0.036 vs. -0.027) 
  
Sawhill and Thomas 
(2001) in Bartik (2004), 
USA, federal minimum 
wage increase  
Simulation of increase from $5.15 to $6.15 
(simulation parameters not indicated) 
This increase would reduce poverty by 4%   EC: indirect account 
w/o details hence not 
included in meta-
analysis 
Neumark, Adams (2003), 
USA, living wage 
legislation + minimum 
wage, 1996-2000 
Regression model, impact on workers living in cities 
w/ living wage ordinance vs. workers in cities w/o 
such ordinance on poverty, depending on level of 
living wage. Also impact of minimum wage on 
probability of being poor. For both policies, lags of 6 
and 12 months are tested. For more details, see 
above.  
All families. 
Living wage has significant negative impact on probability of 
income below poverty line only w/ 12-month lag. Minimum 
wage has a contemporaneous impact (significant and 
negative), but no significant lagged effect. A 10% increase in 
the living wage reduces the probability that a family lives in 
poverty by 0.0033 to 0.0039, i.e. 1/3 of a percentage pt. A 
10% increase (contemporaneous) in min wage decreases 
probability of income below poverty line by 0.9 to 1.38 
percentage points 
Disemployment effects 
appear moderate. There 
is some evidence of 
positive employment 
effects for workers in 
the higher percentiles of 
the wage distribution.  
Leigh (2007), Australia, 
Minimum wages 1994-
2003, real min wages 
increased by 9% over the 
period 
Simulation using a range of plausible elasticities; 
Elasticity of wages b/w 0 and 1, and elasticity of 
labor demand b/w 0 and -1. Three scenarios: (1,0); 
(0;-1), (1;-1), for hourly wages and labor demand, 
estimates are averaged over 50 replications of the 
simulation. Simulation of the effect of giving 
minimum-wage workers a 10% pay rise, firing 10% 
of minimum-wage workers, or both.  
Estimated impact on the share below half the median pretax 
equivalized income; income inequality rises under the three 
scenarios, i.e. relative poverty. These are extreme cases. 
Among workers, the correlation b/w hourly wages and family 
income is 0.43. Simulation results: Status quo, pre-tax poverty 
rate = 21.7%, scenario (1,0) poverty rate=22.4%, scenario (0,-
1) pr=22.0%; scenario (1,-1) pr=22.4%. Assuming an hourly 
wage elasticity of 1, a min wage rise will lower inequality 
(Gini of pretax income) if elasticity of labor demand < -0.4; if 
this elasticity is 0.5, min wage rise will lower inequality if 
(i) Stigler wrote in 
1946:' the connection 
b/w hourly wages and 
the standard of living of 
the family is… remote 
and fuzzy.' (ii) the 
typical minimum-wage 
worker is likely to live 
in a middle-income 
household (iii) Australia 
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elasticity of labor demand <-0.2 has relatively high min 
wage, 58% of mdn vs. 
34% in the US, 
subminimum wages 
exist under 21 (iv) these 
estimates do not take 
account of income 
support and taxation 
EC: no estimate of 
antipoverty effectnot 
included in meta-
analysis 
Hyslop, Stillman (2005), 
New Zealand. Large 
reform of minimum wage 
affecting youth workers 
in 2001, period: 1997-
2003. Before: 16-19 yrs 
old min wage = 60% of 
min wage, after: 18-19 
yrs old get adult min 
wage + youth min wage 
80% of adult min wage 
Regression model comparing the outcomes (log 
weekly income) for 16-17 yrs old and 18-19 yrs old 
to those of young adults (20-25), before and after the 
2001 reform, with age dummies and post-2001 
dummy and covariates. For more details on 
specifications: see above. 
W/o age-specific business cycle controls, significant positive 
impact in 2002; w/ business cycle controls, income impact is 
insignificant. W/o business cycle controls, for 16-17 yr-olds: 
significant 16 log points increase in individuals' total weekly 
income in 2002, and for 18-19 yr-olds about 10 log pts 
increase in 2002. When business controls are added, no 
significant effect.  
  
Neumark, Schweitzer, 
Wascher (2005), 
effective minimum wage, 
1986-1995   
Regression model with non parametric technique, 
difference-in-difference estimators of the effect of 
minimum-wage increases on the density at each 
income-to-needs ratio. Availability of 2 consecutive 
years for each family. Treatment = in states in which 
min wage increased b/w years 1 and 2, control = min 
wage remained constant. Does not rely on the 
linearity of any relationship. Lagged effects are 
accounted for.  
All families in various income-to-needs ratio 
categories. 
Contemporaneous effect: share of income-to-needs (i-t-n) 
ratio b/w 0 & 0.6 decreases, share of i-t-n 0.6 to 1.5 increases 
and proportion w/ i-t-n b/w 1.5 and 2.7 decreases. Lagged 
effect: unambiguously increases share w/ i-t-n ratios b/w 0 and 
1.3 and reduces the share above 1.3. Total effect: essentially 
no change for i-t-n below 0.3, a marked increase for i-t-n b/w 
0.3 and 1.4 and decrease for i-t-n b/w 1-4 and 3.3. Not 
significant for i-t-n ratios b/w 0 and 0.5 but significant b/w 0.5 
and 1. An increase in the min wage has no effect for income-
to-needs ratio below 0.5. In contrast, increase of 0.0079 in the 
proportion of families w/ i-t-n b/w 0.5 and 1; that is an 
increase of 0.0083 (0.83 % point) in the share of the 
population w/ an income-to-needs ratio b/w 0 and 1, i.e. 
The share of nearpoor 
families also increases, 
but only significant at 
10%-level 
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increase in poverty; as the poverty rate is 18%, this change 
represents a 4.6% increase in the poverty rate 
Vedder, Gallaway 
(2001), USA, federal 
minimum wage, 1953-
1998 
Regression model: poverty rate regressed on real min 
wage, unemployment, and real transfer 
payments/capita (w/ quadratic term), aggregate data 
at national level; overall 8 models for 9 cohorts. 
First-difference approach, which solves many 
econometric issues. Evidence reviewed based on 
changes in the poverty rate. Also cross-sectional 
analysis using state data over period 1996-1999.  
Overall poverty rate.  
Rem: in 1999, only 12% of the poor worked full-time. Most 
evidence suggests no stat significant relationship (127 out of 
144 models). First-difference regressions: in all 72 regressions 
the observed relationship b/w poverty rate and real min wage 
was not stat different from zero. Same conclusions with 
another poverty indicator and another price index. Analysis by 
region (Northeast, South, Midwest, West), no significant 
effect. Regressions for nonwhite workers: results are the same. 
Then use of state cross-sectional state-level data, average 
poverty rate 1996-1998 regressed on number of times state 
min wage was changed b/w 96 and 99, state unemployment 
rate, and level of income per capita. No significant impact on 
poverty. Identical analysis w/ data 1991-1993, same 
conclusions.   
(i) The literature on the 
poverty effects of the 
min wage is surprisingly 
modest compared with 
that on the employment 
effects (ii) Joseph 
Stiglitz wrote "a higher 
min wage does not seem 
to be a particularly 
useful way to help the 
poor".  
Müller, Steiner (2008), 
Germany, minimum 
wage, 2008 (2005 
income data adjusted 
with average growth 
rates) 
Simulation of the introduction of a min wage of 7.5 
€, using a model accounting for the complexity of the 
German tax-benefits system: means-tested schemes, 
exemptions from social security contributions for 
"mini jobs", joint income taxation for married 
couples. Poverty line = 50% of median income and 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke. Changes in labor supply 
and demand are deemed negligible, based on 
Neumark & Wascher (2007), hence no effect 
simulated. 
All workers. 
Overall, the income change would amount to roughly 1.5 
billion € a year, about 40% of the total increase in net 
household income would go to East Germany (around 20% of 
population). There would be less people affected in the lowest 
income decile than in 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th. Very little effect 
on the incidence and depth of poverty, decrease in the poverty 
rate would be weak, from 11,75% to 11,56%, with no change 
in West Germany and a decrease from 21,25% to 20,28 in 
East Germany. Results are fairly robust to the definition of the 
poverty line. The poverty gap remains virtually unchanged.  
There has been little 
research on the question 
to what extent minimum 
wages affect the income 
distribution and may 
serve as an instrument to 
reduce poverty. 
Relationship b/w lower 
wages and low incomes 
is rather weak. 
Kawaguchi, Mori (2009), 
Japan, minimum wage, 
1982, 1987, 1997, 2002 
Descriptive stat on profile of min wage workers: 
empirical first-difference estimates of the impact of 
the "fraction below" on employment rates of various 
groups at the prefecture level allow authors to draw 
conclusion on efficiency of minimum wage as an 
antipoverty tool. People working less than 200 
days/year on irregular schedules are dropped. 
70% of minimum-wage workers are not household heads, and 
around 50% of min wage workers belong to middle- to high-
income families as nonhead of household. More than half of 
min wage workers are middle-aged women (30-59). 7 
categories are defined: male 15-19, male 20-24, female 15-19, 
female 20-24, elderly women (60+) and 25-59 married 
females. Fraction below: significant reduction in male teen 
employment (+10% increase in min wage => employment -
 EC: no estimate of the 
antipoverty impact, 
hence not included in 
meta-analysis 
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2%). For married women 25-59%, a 10% increase in min 
wage decreases employment by 4 to 8% (also decreases 
employment for teens and young adults). Overall, a rising 
minimum wage does not seem to be an efficient policy to 
alleviate poverty in Japan, because it is not well targeted to the 
poor and reduces the employment of less-skilled workers.  
Sutherland (2001), UK, 
national minimum wage 
(NMW) combined with 
Working Family Tax 
Credit (WFTC) and other 
benefits, 2000/2001 
Simulation, poverty=60% of median, using 
POLIMOD, simulation program of tax and benefits. 
No employment effects simulated. Counter factual: 
the policy that would have prevailed had Labour not 
come to power. Situation in 2000/1 with tax and 
benefits unchanged since April 1997; poverty rates 
are higher than those observed. 
Overall poverty/ singles/couples w/ children.  
Reform package proposed by government (NMW + WFTC + 
increases in some benefits) reduced overall poverty by 23%, 
from 18.6% to 14.4%. Of these 23.0 percentage points, 21.8% 
attributable to tax-benefit changes and only 1.2% to the 
NMW. Of families affected by the NMW, only 16% are poor 
  
Giannarelli, Morton, 
Wheaton (2007), EITC, 
USA, 2004 
Microsimulation model TRIM3, which contains 
detailed state-specific modeling of the rules of tax 
and transfer programs. Employment effects are also 
simulated using estimates derived from US 
evaluations. Several variables were imputed: monthly 
transfers, child care expenses, housing expenses. 
Simulation based on income definition that is broader 
than the official definition, but poverty lines set at a 
level that produces headcount ratios very similar to 
the official ones.  
Model simulates an increase in the federal minimum 
wage to $7.25 per hour (from 2010 to 2003 dollars), 
b/c new minimum wage set to be implemented in 
2010. Assumption: a min wage worker‟s probability 
of losing his or her job equals 0.06 times the 
percentage increase in the min wage, and indirect 
wage gains for those slightly above and below min 
wage (spillover effects).  
Workers  
Assuming no employment or wage effects, the increase in the 
minimum wage lifts approximately 200,000 people out of 
poverty.  
 
Assuming the expected job loss and indirect wage gains, 
poverty falls by 475,000 people.  
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Bargain (2009), income 
support, WFTC and other 
reforms in the UK , 
1998-2001.  
Microsimulation and decomposition into three effects 
i) changes in tax-benefit policy ii) adjustments of tax-
benefits monetary parameters according to market 
income growth iii) changes in market income 
inequality, by calculating counterfactuals based on 
the EUROMOD tax-benefit calculator. Poverty line 
fixed at 60% of median income.  
During this period, Income Suport was increased, 
WFTC more generous than its predecessor and 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
(NMW).  
Overall poverty rate.  
Over the period, total poverty decreased 2.4 ppt as measured 
by the FGT indicator w/  =0 (headcount), and by 0.1 ppt with 
the FGT indiactor with     (poverty gap). The severity of 
poverty FGT (     increased by 0.1 ppt.  
The changes in tax-benefit policy amounts to -2.5/-2.4, -0.6/-
0.1 and -0.2/0.1 respectively, which means that these changes 
more than offset slight increases in market income inequality.  
More specifically, of the -2.4 ppt overall effect, -0.2 ppt can 
be attributed to the introduction of the NMW, i.e. 8% of the 
decrease in poverty attributed to the tax-benefit system 
(NMW, WFTC, Income Support, and other changes)  
 
Grogger (2003), USA, 
EITC, 1979-2000 
Based on state-level variation in welfare reform 
policy. Income and log(income) of female-headed 
families are regressed on the introduction of time 
limits, a dummy for the introduction of welfare 
reform, demographic controls and the generosity of 
the maximum credit of the EITC. The model includes 
states dummies and state-specific quadratic trends.  
Log(minimum wage) has no significant effect on income and 
log(income) among female-headed families.  
 
Gerfin, Leu, Brun, 
Tschöpe (2002), 
Switzerland, EITC and 
WFTC (simulated) 
Simulation: introduction of a minimum wage set at 
3‟000 Swiss Francs gross/net, no employment impact 
simulated. Results are based on families in which 
household members together work at least 40 
hours a week (i.e. 1 full-time job at the HH level). 
Effect is positive w/ a ½ ppt decrease in poverty among 
workers who live in a household whose members work at least 
40 hours a week in total.  
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Table A3: Employment effects of tax credits 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Employment effects  Comments 
Ellwood (2000), USA, 
EITC, 1975-1999 
First, runs a wage equation for 1998 for women 
aged 18-44 who worked 26+ weeks, and then can 
predict a potential 1998 wage for all women 18-
44 in each sample from 1975-1978 and defines 
quartiles  it obviates the need to do regression-
corrected estimates (thanks to consistent 
wage/skill quartiles). Predicts incentives with 
effective tax rate for median earnings for women 
who work more than 26 weeks. Then compares 
change in employment between 1986 and 1999 
across quartiles for unmarried women with 
children and then for married mothers, and checks 
whether differences are statistically significant.  
Mothers 18-44, single or married. 
The difference-in-difference estimated impacts are 
statistically significant for unmarried mothers, and amount 
to:  
. Increase in bottom quartile – increase in highest quartile = 
+18 percentage points (ppts) 
. Increase in bottom quartile – increase in 3rd quartile =+13 
ppts).  
 
For married mothers,  
. Increase in bottom quartile – increase in 3rd quartile = -3 
ppts, not significant 
. Increase in bottom quartile – increase in 2nd quartile = -5 
ppts, significant 
 
Neumark, Wascher (2001), 
USA 
state & federal EITC, 
1986-1995 
 
Regression model, impact of changes in EITC 
credit rate + other policies (minimum wage) on 
probability of adding an adult worker in year 2 if 
no worker in year 1 or 1 worker in year 1, and 
impact on change in hours worked in poor 
families with kids.  
Unemployment and other controls. 
Average EITC federal credit rate = 14,8% for 
families with children, 4,8% for state credit 
Both federal and state credit have positive impact on P(add 
a worker if no worker in year 1), which improves likelihood 
by 11,2 and 14,1 ppts respectively, but no impact on P(add 
a worker if one worker in year 1) .  
For hours worked, significant impact of state credit on both 
families with or without workers in year 1, positive impact 
for families w/o worker (+205.39 hours) and negative for 
families w/ workers (-162.64). Federal EITC has essentially 
no effect on hours worked.   
The absence of effect of 
federal EITC on hours 
worked is at odds with the 
large positive employment 
effect. Lack of consistency 
of the results for the federal 
credit, while state credit has 
sizable positive effects. 
Eissa, Hoynes (2004), 
USA, EITC, 1985-1997 
1. Regression model (probit), difference-in-
difference estimates, Labor force participation  
(LFP) of married couples is regressed on fixed 
group effect*time effect, post 1992*2+kids fixed 
effects, time and group effects and individual 
characteristics. A 2
nd
 model adds year 
dummies*any child  
2. Reduced form labor force participation 
equation (probit), LFP regressed on net nonwage 
income, gross wage and tax rate and controls, 
then parameters estimated are used for a 
1. All mothers were 1.5 ppt less likely to be working after 
the EITC expansions, and mothers with larger families (2+ 
kids) were additionally 3.6 ppts. Total effect for mothers of 
2+ kids is a 5 ppts decrease 
2. Simulation: married mothers were 1.1 ppt less likey to 
work in 1996, while fathers were only 0.2 ppt more likely 
to work. For married women whose husband‟s wage is in 
the lowest decile, probability of employment is reduced by 
1.7 ppt, and in the second decile 1.6 ppt. For married men 
the increase is always less than 0.6 ppt. In the phase-in 
range, married women have an increase in employment 
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simulation of the employment impact.  
Married couples. 
probability (+1.1 ppt), a decrease in flat range (-1.5 ppt) 
and in the phase-out range (-2.1 ppt). For men, impact is 
always positive and very small, whatever the region of the 
tax credit  
Grogger (2003), USA, 
EITC, 1979-2000 
Regression model: Based on state-level variation 
in welfare reform policy. Employment rate and 
weeks worked among female-headed families 
are regressed on the introduction of time limits, a 
dummy for the introduction of welfare reform, 
demographic controls and the generosity of the 
maximum credit of the EITC. The model includes 
states dummies and state-specific quadratic 
trends.  
The maximum credit has a significant impact on both the 
employment rate and weeks of work. A $1000 increase in 
the maximum credit leads to a 3.6 ppt increase in 
employment for single-mothers and to an increase of about 
1.2 weeks of work. The effect of the EITC explains 34% of 
the increase in employment among single mothers and 27% 
of the increase in weeks worked.  
 
 
Trampe (2007), USA, 
EITC, 1993 expansion 
Regression model: Focuses on the phase-out 
range of the credit, 200 households in the phase-
out range in 1993, 1994, and 2006 and calculates 
the phase-out rate that applies to each household 
(all households, not only single mothers as is 
often the case).  
Hours worked are regressed on the EITC phase-
out range, age, gender, number of children, 
educational level, marital status, and school 
enrollment of parents. 
The phase-out rate has a small but statistically significant 
negative impact. The 1993 expansion (a 7.2 ppt increase in 
the phase-out range) caused those in the phase-out range to 
reduce their hours of work by 2.7 hrs/week if they have 2 
kids and by 1.1 hours/week for those with 1 kid.  
Hoynes: If women who 
enter the workforce work 
less than those already in 
the labor force, there is an 
endogeneity problem. In 
addition, no control for year 
fixed effects, no controls 
for macroeconomic trends, 
and the analysis pools 
single and married women.  
EC: very small sample. 
=> Not included in meta-
analysis 
Herbst (2008), USA, EITC, 
1986-2005 
Regression model: Single mothers with at least 
one child 0-18. Probit: probability of various 
outcomes (any work, work and no welfare, full-
time full-year work) as a function of social policy 
reforms  federal and state maximum EITC 
credit, child care subsidies, welfare benefits 
(+work requirements, sanctions, time limits), state 
and year fixed effects, state unemployment rate, 
demographic and human capital controls and time 
trends. Another specification decomposes the 
impact across quartiles of unemployment levels 
(heterogeneous effects model)  
 
EITC has a significant impact on any employment and full-
time year round employment. Average effects model: a 
$1,000 increase in the max credit is expected to increase 
any employment by 1.1 ppt, but decrease full-time full-year 
employment by a similar amount.  
Heterogeneous effects model: same magnitude (+1.1 ppt 
and -1.1 ppt respectively). The impact is very similar across 
unemployment quartiles, including for single mothers with 
a high school diploma or less and for non-white single 
mothers.  
75% of EITC dollars are 
paid to single-parent 
families (48% of all 
claimants) 
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Noonan, Smith, Corcoran 
(2007), USA, EITC, 1991-
2003 
Regression and simulation: focus on single 
mothers, differences b/w black and white 
mothers. Multilevel logistic regression: Variable 
“employed in the week prior to the survey” 
regressed on maximum federal and state EITC, 
welfare policies (any waiver, TANF, sanctions, 
benefits) and sociodemographic controls. 
Simulation: 1991, 2000 and 2003 samples 
thanks to regression coefficients, probability of 
being employed is calculated; then, each women 
is assigned the conditions (labor market and 
welfare policies) she would have faced in 2000, 
and also the EITC she would have received (for 
the 1991 sample). Finally, this counterfactual 
probability of being employed is compared to 
observed values.   
Full regression model: the max EITC benefit has a 
significant impact on employment. For each $1,000 
increase in the maximum EITC, the odds of employment 
are 9.1% greater.  
 
Simulation: between 1991 and 2000, changes in the EITC 
explain 20-25% of the increase in employment for black 
single mothers and 23-31% for white single mothers (19-
25% for all single mothers). The decrease in employment 
after 2000 -2% is completely attributable to the increase in 
unemployment.  
Black single mothers are 
younger, more likely to be 
never married and high 
school dropouts, and have 
more children on average.  
Meyer, Rosenbaum (2001), 
USA, EITC, 1984-1996 
Regression with focus on all single mothers.  
Probit employment estimates (worked in 
reference week), independent variables are: a 
vector of demographic and economic controls 
(state, age, race & ethnicity, education, marital 
status and kids, unemployment, unearned income, 
central city, month), year dummies and an 
interaction term year*any children. The 
coefficient of the latter variable gives the 
difference-in-difference estimates. 
Taxes have a significant impact on employment: a $1,000 
reduction in income taxes (or increase in tax credit) 
increases employment last week by 2.7 ppt, and increases 
employment last year by 4.5 ppt. The effects are larger for 
the less educated: for high school dropouts the 
corresponding increases are +4.2 ppt and +8.8 ppt 
respectively. For hours worked per year conditioning on 
positive hours, the policy variables have the same signs, but 
smaller and less significant effects.  
Using parameter estimates, the EITC explains 62% of the 
increase in weekly employment over the 1984-1996 period, 
but only 27% b/w 1992 and 1996. For annual employment, 
EITC explains 61% of annual employment.  
Single parents received 
about two thirds of EITC 
dollars; EITC credits 
increased fifteenfold.  
Blundell (2006), United 
Kingdom, WFTC, 1996-
2003 
Regression models and simulation to evaluate the 
impact on single mothers under 45: First a 
structural model discrete choices from a small 
subset of hours (0, 1-15, 16-22, 23-29, 30-36, 
37+) w/ usual sociodemographic and economic 
controls as well as child care demand as a 
function of hours worked and fixed costs of work. 
Then parameters are used for a simulation.  
2
nd
 regression model used as a quasi-experimental 
approach: difference-in-difference estimate of the 
Difference-in-difference results: the impact was a 3.5 to 4 
ppt increase in single mothers labor supply attributable to 
the WFTC policy (using 2 different surveys), the response 
was slightly larger for the lower education group. 
Significant impact.  
 
Simulation: moving from the Family Credit to the WFTC 
increase in single mothers‟ employment rate +5.95 ppt 
(about 7.5 ppt for children aged 3 to 10). The same 
simulation including all reforms directed to single mothers 
A pronounced puzzle: the 
UK policy appears twice as 
generous as the US policy. 
Yet the impact looks to be 
half what is was among 
similar groups in the US.  
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impact of the WFTC on employment (comparison 
group = single women w/o children) 
shows an increase of 3.86 ppt: the contemporaneous 
increase in Income Support dulled the positive labor supply 
of the WFTC 
Brewer, Duncan, Shephard, 
Suarez (2006), UK, WFTC, 
1999-2003 
Simulation based on parameters of structural 
equation Tobit regression model, sample of all 
families with children in Great Britain, but 
separate regression for single mothers and 
couples. Probability of choosing from a subset of 
working hours (same one as Blundell (2006)) as a 
function of demographic and other household 
characteristics. Wage equation also specified. 
Simulation shows that replacing Family Credit with WFTC 
lead to a statistically significant 5.11 ppt rise in the 
proportion working among lone mothers. Hours worked are 
estimated to increase by 14%, with average weekly hours 
worked by those working increasing by 2.7% (0.75 
hrs/worker). The non-WFTC reforms reduced the positive 
employment impact by 1.45 ppt.  
Among couples with children, there was a slight increase 
for women whose partner doesn‟t work (+0.06 ppt), but a 
decrease amongst women whose partner is in work of -0.64 
ppt. The overall decrease: -0.57 ppt. For men in couples, 
the WFTC increased employment by +0.75 ppt.  
 
Blundell (2000), UK, 
WFTC, 1994-1996  
Simulation using discrete choice structural labor 
supply model similar to the one already described 
above, simulation for samples of single parents 
and married couples (including de facto 
married) with children, excluding self-employed 
from the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 family 
resources survey; simulation allowing child care 
demand to vary w/ hours worked, fixed cost of 
work, and stigma associated with welfare.  
WFTC simulations show an increase of 2.2% in the number 
of single parents who work (+34,000), 1.32% for women 
with a nonworking partner (+11,000), a decrease of 0.57% 
for women whose partner is in work (-20,000)  an overall 
increase among mothers +24,000. In addition, an increase 
for men with a nonworking partner of 0.37% and for men 
with a working partner of 0.3%.  
The overall decrease in workless families amounts to 
57,000 families.  
 
Francesconi, Rainer, van 
der Klaauw (2009), UK, 
WFTC, 1991-2002 
 
Francesconi, van der 
Klaauw (2007), WFTC, 
UK 
Regression model, married and cohabiting 
couples. If man works 16+ hours and is in top 
quartile of earnings distribution  excluded from 
sample. Quasi-experimental: employment is 
regressed on dummy experimental vs. control 
group, a time trend interacted with this dummy, 
the difference b/w any year and the year of the 
reform, a vector of individual characteristics and 
an individual fixed effect.  
Lone mothers and women in couples.  
The overall impact on women in couples with children is 
not significant, but heterogeneity in responses. Strong 
effect among women whose partner did not work or worked 
fewer than 16 hours: increase in employment by 3 ppt, with 
an increase in full-time employment rate by 2 ppt.  
Very similar findings in Francesconi and van der Klaauw 
(2007) for single mothers.  
For women with a partner who works 16+ hours, no 
significant effect.  
No statistically significant difference between low-
education sample and the rest of the sample. 
Among women whose partner works less than 16 hours or 
not at all, significant impact of WFTC on persistence 
probability (i.e. staying in employment) as well as entry 
probability. 
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No significant impact on men whatever their partner‟s labor 
force attachment.   
Bargain, Orsini (2005), 
France, Germany, Finland 
Simulation of the introduction of the WFTC in 
these 3 countries (but extended to childless 
singles and couples), as well as that of a 
hypothetical low-wage subsidy (LWA) using the 
lowest decile of the wage distribution as a 
threshold, those earning between 1 and 1.4 times 
this amount getting the subsidy, Simulation uses 
the 1998 Income Distribution Survey for Finland, 
the 1998 Socio-Economic Panel for Germany and 
the 1994 Household Budget Survey for France.  
The parameters stem from a structural model, a 
discrete-choice logit model similar to that 
developed by Blundell, including disposable 
income, the costs of work, a vector of socio-
demographic characteristics. Wages are predicted 
for non-participants.  
Lone mothers and married women.  
WFTC single women: 1.8% of single women in Germany 
and in Finland enter the labor force, while the effect is 
smaller in France (0.51%). 80% of these movers are single 
mothers.  
As for women in couples, 4.3% in France, 1.43% in 
Germany and 1.17% in Finland leave their job. Almost all 
negative responses concern women with children.  
Overall, the disincentive effect for married women prevails 
so that the net effect on employment is negative.  
 
LWS: The impact on single women is lower, between half 
and 2/3 of what is found with the WTC. For married 
women the impact is positive: 3.1% in France, 0.99% in 
Germany and 0.34% in Finland % of the sample who 
enters the labor market.  
Contrary to the US and the 
UK, the overall effect is 
negative. Why? A smaller 
share is in the phase-out 
range in the UK and the 
US. In addition, these 
countries have a wider 
wage distribution and lower 
level of taxation. Moreover, 
the poverty rate of lone 
mothers is lower in 
Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia; however, it is 
as high in Germany as in 
the UK. More 
fundamentally, the 
employment level of single 
mothers is higher in 
Continental Europe and 
even higher in Scandinavia.  
Scarth, Tang (2008), 
Canada, Working Income 
Tax Benefit 
Simulation, based on a nine-equation system, 
based on some important assumptions: 
globalization constraint (if government raises 
taxes, owners of capital can relocate their factors 
of production, there is involuntary unemployment 
among the unskilled, government budget 
constraint –how the program is financed, the rich 
receive 2/3 of income, the WITC benefits 10% of 
workers, all poor have same benefits – although 
there are a phase-in and a phase-out range, a the 
take-up rate is 100%.  
Options: an income tax credit financed by higher 
tax on “rich” population or a cut in spending 
(upper half) or by a cut in spending (both amount 
to 1 ppt), allowing for changes in labor force 
participation or not.  
Poorest decile of the population.  
Poorest decile of the population who work at minimum-
wage levels of remuneration, allowing for changes in the 
labor force participation:  
Increase in taxes: the unemployment rate decreases by 
approximately 0.17 ppt 
Decrease in spending: the unemployment rate decreases by 
approximately 0.2 ppt.  
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Gregg, Harkness, Smith 
(2009), UK, WFTC, 1998 
and 2003, and employment 
rates 1993-2003 (labor 
force survey panel) 
Detailed evidence on entry and exit rates, 
dynamic approach. Difference-in-difference 
approach w/ 2 control groups 1) women w/ kids in 
couples 2) single childless women.  
Probit regression model: probability of being 
employed regressed on an interaction lone 
mother*post-reform, a lone mother dummy, a 
post-reform dummy, and controls (age, education, 
age of child, ethnicity, region, and interaction 
terms). 
Dynamic aspects probit model probability of 
job loss after break-up for partnered women in 
year t-1 (become single mother in year t), 
conditioning on education, age, and other 
differences. Another probit model (difference-in-
difference) for entry/exit with an interaction lone 
mother*post-reform, a lone-mother dummy, and 
same controls as 1
st
 model described above, w/ 
and w/o poor health control.  
Fixed-effects regression for weekly hours, similar 
controls, with two groups: < 16 hrs/week and >= 
16 hrs/week. 
Lone parents.  
Lone mothers, employment: compared to single childless 
women: probability increased by +5.2% (significant), 
compared to mothers in couples +3.8%(significant) 
Lone parents, employment: compared to single childless 
adults +4.1%(significant), compared to parents in couples  
+ 3.8%(significant) 
 
Dynamic model of exit rates: in 1993-1999, becoming a 
lone mother increased the exit probability by a stat 
significant 9.5% and in 1999-2003 the impact was 
insignificant.  
Regarding the probability of entering the labor market, 
when single mothers are compared to childless single 
women, the difference is significant (+4.8%), however 
when a poor health control is included the result is 
insignificant. There is no difference when the comparison is 
made w/ mothers in couple.   
Regarding exit probabilities: significant w/o poor health 
control (-3.7%), not significant when this control is 
included. No difference with mothers in couples.  
Hours worked (mothers in couple for comparison): + 3.06 
hours among part-timers but -1.33 hours among full-timers 
The increase in generosity 
of out-of-work benefits 
reduced some of the 
WFTC‟s pro-employment 
effects. 
 
The increase in lone 
mothers‟ employment has 
come largely from a sharp 
increase in the share of 
mothers becoming lone 
parents holding on to work 
at the point of transition 
into lone motherhood.  
Haan, Myck (2007), 
Germany, introduction of 
UK‟s WTC and CTC, 2005 
Simulation w/ 2003 data, based on discrete choice 
labor supply estimation, similar model as Bargain 
and Orsini (2006), extended to women and men, 
and uses 2005 parameters to account for the Hartz 
reforms. The structure and generosity of the 
simulation are based on the 2005 system in the 
UK: working tax credit (WTC) and child tax 
credit (CTC) introduced in 2003, childless 
individuals becoming eligible (contrary to 
WFTC).  
H0: income from tax credits is included in the 
means test for income support, which is 
withdrawn at a rate of 100%.  
 
Use of the STSM microsimulation model of the 
German tax and benefit system 
Labor supply, restricted to households where both spouses 
are aged b/w 25 and 59 not in education and not self-
employed: the overall employment of single women 
increases by more than 95,000 or +2.9%, almost 
exclusively borne by lone mothers. The effects on single 
men are modest, namely +10,000 (+0.3%).  
Total employment among women in couples decreases by 
more than 55,000, i.e. -0.8%; for men in couples the effect 
is also negative but smaller, namely -13,000 or -0.2%. The 
negative impact is highly concentrated among two-earner 
couples (-53,800 among women and -29,900 among men), 
while there is an increase among workless households 
(+8,500 and +26,100 respectively). Put differently, many 
no-earner and two-earner couples become one-earner 
couples.  
 
These estimations call for a 
high degree of caution as 
far as „importing‟ UK-style 
tax credits to Germany is 
concerned. A solution could 
come in the form of an 
individual tax credit 
combine w/ addressing the 
problem of supply 
shortages of childcare 
places.  
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Lone parents and couples.  The overall effect is slightly positive (+35,000), contrary to 
Bargain and Orsini‟s simulation findings for Germany.   
Shannon (2009), Canada, 
changes in various 
provinces, 1976-2001  
Article follows Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), 
with probit employment equations, the probability 
of employment being regressed on the effect of 
interaction term having children* year, with the 
following controls: age, education, province, 
marital status, unemployment rate, age of 
children. Comparison of single mothers w/ 
unattached women (=in single-person 
households).  
 
Policy effects are measured by 1) classifying 
provinces by their degree of aggressiveness 2) 
calculate an aggressiveness indicator based on 
cuts in real welfare benefits, presence and level of 
income support program for the working poor at 
the province level. Ontario and Alberta are the 
most aggressive reformers, Newfoundland and 
New Brunswick the least aggressive. Regression 
model, employment probits, with employment 
regressed on province classified by degree of 
aggressiveness, maximum welfare benefit 
available, full-time earnings at minimum wage 
level, and a “welfare wall” variable including 
income supplements for the working poor and 
their tax treatment. Some specifications include 
aggressiveness and welfare generosity dummies. 
When possible, the whole sample, otherwise the 
1989-2001 sample. Simulation using the 
coefficients with welfare pre-reform values and 
unemployment rates at their 1992 value.  
The negative impact on employment of having a child 
diminished markedly after 1994: By 2001, the effect of a 
child on weekly employment had diminished from 16.6% 
to 4.7% and that on annual employment from 14.8% to 
3.3%.  
Restricting the sample to younger women (20-34 years) 
made little difference, as did an analysis of the difference 
b/w single and nonsingle. In Canada, unattached women are 
also eligible to collect welfare, contrary to the US.  
By contrast, the differences by skill level are striking, the 
effect being, as in the US, strongest for the least educated.  
 
Changes in income support policies do not explain much of 
the rise in lone mothers‟ employment in Canada, increased 
by 3.1-3.5 ppt. Policy changes explain at most 10-20% of 
the rise in Canadian lone mother‟s employment during the 
1990s.  
Canadian welfare program 
changes went less far than 
those in the US. However, 
in the UK, in contrast to 
Canada, welfare benefits to 
nonworking lone mothers 
rose significantly. Yet, the 
UK reforms appear to 
explain a larger share of the 
increase of lone mothers‟ 
employment. Maybe the use 
of other datasets and 
techniques will uncover 
more significant results. 
EC: does not really provide 
an estimate of employment 
effect, hence excluded 
from meta-analysis.  
Stancanelli (2008), France, 
“employment premium” 
(PPE) 
Difference-in-difference approach: difference b/w 
the employment probabilities of women in the 
treatment group and that of women in the control 
group. 3 different “treatments”: 1) potential 
eligibility (conditional on earnings and household 
income if married) 2) Comparison of married and 
cohabiting women 3) Comparison of lone mothers 
Treatment 1: eligibility No significant effect on overall 
female employment. For married women, negative and 
significant impact (-3 ppts) in fixed-effects model, but 
insignificant in random-effect model. For cohabiting 
women, the effect is significant at the 10% level and 
positive (+6 to 6.9 ppts). The effect is not significant for all 
single women.  
This is the 1st evaluation of 
the employment effects of 
the French tax credit using 
non-experimental methods.  
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and single childless women.  
Logit of employment dummy regressed on 
treatment dummy, fixed group and year effects, 
and a vector of controls (experience, education, 
number of children, region, nationality, wage rate) 
, with robust standard errorsautocorrelation).  
A random-effect model is also specified (term ci 
added for individual unobserved effects).  
Women: Married, cohabiting, single.  
Treatment 2: marital status  significant negative impact (-
3 to 3.5 ppts) for married women compared to cohabiting 
women.  
Treatment 3: lone parents vs. single childless women  the 
impact is not significant. Maybe due to the fact that 
childless singles are also eligible for the tax credit.  
Net impact on total female employment is very small, about 
2,000 jobs.  
Bloemen, Stancanelli 
(2007), France, 
“employment premium” 
(PPE), 1999-2002 
Estimation of the employment effects, accounting 
for potential endogeneity: Eligibility depends on 
earnings and so does the employment decision in 
theory, wage rates and employment are 
potentially correlated  this may introduce a bias 
in the usual difference-in-difference estimates.  
 
First, a wage equation is estimated, so that the 
probability distribution of eligibility can be 
obtained: log earnings are regressed on individual 
characteristics, and then a probit specification is 
used to estimate P(eligibility). Then sophisticated 
regression models are specified that estimate the 
conditional probability of employment whether 
the person is eligible or not, and the probability of 
non-employment, whatever the eligibility. Hence, 
P(employment) is regressed on eligibility, 
eligibility*policy year, and controls, with a 
specific joint distribution of residuals. Robust 
standard errors are estimated to control for serial 
correlation. The policy year is 2002.  
 
Sample of women: single, married and 
cohabiting. Self-employed are dropped, retired 
women and full-time students as well. Those who 
have a retired or self-employed husband too.  
W/o controls: overall significant (at the 10% level) negative 
impact on employment. Insignificant effect on married 
women, cohabiting women and single women.  
 
When controls are included, w/ and w/o corrections for 
potential endogeneity, all effects are insignificant. Hence, 
there is no evidence of any positive effect of the tax credit 
on employment.  
 
Regarding working hours, the effect isn‟t significant either. 
The PPE did not affect women‟s working hours.  
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Table A4: Antipoverty effects of tax credits 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Antipoverty effects  Comments 
Gundersen, Ziliak (2004), 
USA, state and federal 
EITC, 1981-2000 
Regression model, impact of macroeconomic 
factors and policy factors (TANF, waivers, food 
stamps, EITC and minimum wage) on logarithm 
of pre-tax and post-tax Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(FGT) indicator + squared poverty gap (alpha=2), 
for various groups (all families, female-headed 
families, married-couple families, white 
families, black families), with time and state 
fixed effect and state-specific time trends + 
macroeconomic and policy controls (described 
above). A lag is included in the specification, 
namely FGT poverty in year t-1 
EITC variable = ln(state-federal EITC) 
EITC increases pre-tax poverty and squared poverty gap, 
no significant impact on post-tax poverty and squared 
poverty gap; however, the 1990s trend-break variables 
(after 1990, after 1992, after 1995) have stat significant and 
higher coefficients in post-tax models suggesting a positive 
role of the EITC in eradicating post-tax poverty in the 
1990s 
 
 
Morgan, Kickham (2001), 
USA, EITC, 1987-1996 
 
 
Regression model, pooled times series (OLS with 
state fixed effects), impact of rise of the 
maximum tax credit eligibility (beginning of 
phase-out range) on child poverty rate.  
 
In specifications only with significant state dummies, the 
EITC variable has a stat significant impact. As the 
threshold for maximum tax credit eligibility rises by $1000, 
child poverty declines by 0.18 percentage points.   
 
Neumark, Wascher (2001), 
USA 
state & federal EITC, 
1986-1995 
 
Regression model, impact of on pre-tax poverty 
among poor families with kids, probability of 
being nonpoor in year 2 if poor in year 1, and 
impact of income-to-needs ratio (official poverty 
line) of changes in EITC credit rate + other 
policies (minimum wage). Unemployment and 
other controls. 
Average EITC federal credit rate = 14,8% for 
families with children, 4,8% for state credit.  
Poor families. 
An average change in state credit rate (0.04) has a 
significant impact on P(nonpoor in year 2/poor in year 1) 
which is increased by 7 ppts, and on change in income-to-
needs ratio (+0.076) for families with children, federal 
EITC has no significant effect.  
For families with children and no adult worker in year 1, 
the state EITC significantly increases P(nonpoor in year 2) 
by 10.9 ppts, but no effect on families w/ kids who already 
have a worker. The same pattern applies for income-to-
needs ratio (significant +0.1 if no worker, no increase 
otherwise). Federal EITC has no effect.  
i) Probability of increasing 
earned income  impact on 
pretax poverty. The increase 
in total resources would be 
more pronounced if one 
considered the additional 
income received from the 
credit itself 
ii) It is not clear why the 
incentives posed by the 
federal and state tax systems 
should differ.  
Grogger (2003), USA, 
EITC, 1979-2000 
Based on state-level variation in welfare reform 
policy. Income and log(income) of female-
headed families are regressed on the introduction 
of time limits, a dummy for the introduction of 
Surprisingly, the results from income and log(income) 
regressions suggest that the EITC has no net effect on 
income. 
The absence of a significant 
effect on income may be due 
by the offsetting effects of a 
decrease in welfare use and 
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welfare reform, demographic controls and the 
generosity of the maximum credit of the EITC. 
The model includes states dummies and state-
specific quadratic trends.  
an increase in work and 
earnings. However, the 
author underlines that EITC 
income is not reported at all 
in the March Current 
Population Survey  
Keegan Eamon, Wu, Zhang 
(2009), USA, EITC 1996-
1998 and 2003-2005 
Measure used is disposable family income 
obtained by adding the EITC and near cash 
government benefits to the family‟s income and 
subtracting federal, state and payroll taxes. 
Authors carried out simple calculations 
comparing the poverty rate before and after the 
EITC benefit is added to the disposable family 
income measure for 2004 and 2005. For previous 
years, they used figures from other authors‟ 
articles based on the same database (Current 
Population Survey) and similar indicators. Child 
poverty. 
Reduction in child poverty rate thanks to the EITC: 1996 -
14.5% for all children (-30% for children with working 
parents), 1997 -15.6% (-27.2%), 1998 -17.9% (-27.7%), 
2003 -19% (n/a), 2004 -18.3% (n/a) and 2005 -19.5% (n/a) 
“the method might overstate 
the poverty reduction 
effectiveness…First…the 
EITC can serve as a 
disincentive for employed 
parents to work more 
hours…or for married 
women to enter the work 
force. Second… earning 
more income increases taxes 
and decreases eligibility for 
or the amount of other 
means-tested benefits” 
(p.924) 
EC: simple pretax/transfer – 
posttax/transfer comparison, 
hence not included in 
meta-analysis.  
Bargain, Orsini (2005), 
France, Germany, Finland 
Same simulation as described above: Ignoring 
behavioral responses, there is obviously a 
reduction in the poverty rate, but also when 
behavioral responses are accounted for. Poverty 
line set at 50% of median equivalized income 
(also 40% and 60% for comparisons).   
Overall poverty rate. 
For the WTC: France: poverty rate decreases from 7.03% 
to 6.35%, Germany 5.65%→5.41 and Finland 3.75 
→3.71%, when behavioral responses are included in the 
simulation.  
The impact of the LWS is surprisingly similar to that of the 
WTC, even though smaller amounts are distributed to many 
more working families, including those in high income 
brackets with 6.45% (France), 5.5% (Germany) and 3.66% 
Finland 
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Gerfin, Leu, Brun, Tschöpe 
(2002), Switzerland, EITC 
and WFTC (simulated) 
Simulation: the EITC and WFTC parameters are 
adjusted using purchasing power parities. A 
structural model allows predictions of family 
labor market participation, following Blundell‟s 
discrete-choice model described above.  
Results are based on families in which 
household members together work at least 40 
hours a week (i.e. 1 full-time job at the HH 
level).  
The EITC has no impact, while there is a very slight 
increase (+0.1 ppt) in the working poor rate with the 
WFTC, because some households decide to work full-time 
but remain poor nonetheless.  
 
Scarth, Tang (2008), 
Canada, Working Income 
Tax Benefit 
Simulation, based on a nine-equation system, 
based on some important assumptions: 
globalization constraint (if government raises 
taxes, owners of capital can relocate their factors 
of production, there is involuntary unemployment 
among the unskilled, government budget 
constraint –how the program is financed, the rich 
receive 2/3 of income, the WITC benefits 10% of 
workers, all poor have same benefits – although 
there are a phase-in and a phase-out range, a the 
take-up rate is 100%.  
Two options are tested: an income tax credit or an 
individual wage subsidy as the one proposed by 
Phelps; both programs can be either financed by a 
1 ppt increase in the tax rate of by a 1 ppt cut in 
other spending. 
Poorest decile of the population. 
Poorest decile of the population who work at minimum-
wage levels of remuneration:  
Increase in taxes, no change in labor force participation: 
average income goes up by 3.9%, with change in labor 
force participation by 4.3% 
Decrease in spending, no change in labor force 
participation: average income increases by 8.1%, with 
changes in labor force participation by 8.6% 
EC: antipoverty impact 
depends on the average 
income gap (in terms of 
incidence) 
Haan, Myck (2007), 
Germany, introduction of 
UK‟s WTC and CTC, 2005 
Simulation w/ 2003 data, based on discrete 
choice labor supply estimation, similar model as 
Bargain and Orsini (2006), extended to women 
and men, and uses 2005 parameters to account 
for the Hartz reforms. The structure and 
generosity of the simulation are based on the 
2005 system in the UK: working tax credit 
(WTC) and child tax credit (CTC) introduced in 
2003, childless individuals becoming eligible 
(contrary to WFTC).  
H0: income from tax credits is included in the 
means test for income support, which is 
withdrawn at a rate of 100%.   
Distributional impacts: families in the 2
nd
 decile (+ 
€52.10/week i.e. +4%) and in the 3rd decile (+€ 60 i.e. 
+3.8%) would gain the most, while families in lowest 
decile would gain € 25.80 i.e. +3.4%  
EC: antipoverty impact 
depends on the average 
income gap (in terms of 
incidence).  
Behavioral impact not 
accounted for, even though 
authors show the 
employment effect is 
negative for couples.  
Not included in meta-
analysis.  
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Giannarelli, Morton, 
Wheaton (2007), US, 
EITC, 2004 
Microsimulation model TRIM3, which contains 
detailed state-specific modeling of the rules of tax 
and transfer programs. Employment effects are 
also simulated using estimates derived from US 
evaluations. Several variables were imputed: 
monthly transfers, child care expenses, housing 
expenses. Simulation based on income definition 
that is broader than the official definition, but 
poverty lines set at a level that produces 
headcount ratios very similar to the official ones. 
Workers. 
 
3 types of EITC expansions simulated. For 
childless workers, phase-in rate of 20% instead of 
7.65%, and phase-out rate 0f 16%. Further, 
extension to childless workers aged 18-24 who 
aren‟t full-time students. Moreover, the provision 
for married couples excludes ½ of the earnings of 
a lower-earning spouse if it would result in larger 
EITC, and, third, for families w/ 3+ kids, phase-
in rate=45% and phase-out rate=23.69%.  
Assuming no employment effects, the packet of EITC 
changes reduces poverty by approximately 2 million 
individuals.  
 
Assuming higher employment among childless workers, 
poverty would decline by 2.2 million individuals.  
 
Bargain (2009), UK, 
income support, WFTC 
and other reforms , 1998-
2001.  
Microsimulation and decomposition into three 
effects i) changes in tax-benefit policy ii) 
adjustments of tax-benefits monetary parameters 
according to market income growth iii) changes 
in market income inequality, by calculating 
counterfactuals based on the EUROMOD tax-
benefit calculator. Poverty line fixed at 60% of 
median income.  
 
During this period, Income Suport was increased, 
WFTC more generous than its predecessor and 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
(NMW).  
Overall poverty rate.  
Over the period, total poverty decreased 2.4 ppt as 
measured by the FGT indicator w/  =0 (headcount), and by 
0.1 ppt with the FGT indiactor with     (poverty gap). 
The severity of poverty FGT (     increased by 0.1 ppt. 
The changes in tax-benefit policy accounts for -2.5/-2.4, -
0.6/-0.1 and -0.2/0.1 respectively, which means that these 
changes more than offset slight increases in market income 
inequality.  
 
More specifically, of the -2.4 ppt overall effect, -0.8 ppt 
can be attributed to the change from Family Credit to the 
WFTC, i.e. 1/3 of the changes in total poverty attributable 
to the tax-benefit system(NMW, WFTC, Income Support, 
and other changes).  
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Bargain, Terraz (2003), 
France, “employment 
premium” (PPE), 2002 
Microsimulation based on SYSIFF98, used for 
static simulations of the tax-benefit system, i.e. 
employment effects aren‟t accounted for, based 
on Household Budget Survey 2002.  
 
Impact of the reform of the initial PPE introduced 
in 2001 w/ increased credit for part-time workers 
(in force from 2003 onwards, hereafter named 
“PPE Raffarin”, named after the Prime Minister 
who was in charge at that time). It is a 4.4% 
credit rate w/ an increased credit for part-time 
workers (corresponding to approx. 6.6%). Two 
poverty lines: 50% and 60% of median income.  
Overall poverty rate.  
PPE Raffarin has an extremely weak impact on poverty 
despite the increased credit for part-time workers: the 
poverty rate decreases from 6.51% to 6.47% (poverty 
line=50% of median) resp. from 12.97% to 12.94% 
(poverty line=60% of median).  
 
 
EC: Accounting for 
employment effects 
wouldn‟t change much, as 
these effects are usually 
estimated to be very weak. 
 
 
Table A5: Employment effects of family cash benefits 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Employment effects Comments 
Del Boca, Pasqua, 
Pronzato (2008), Italy, 
Spain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherland, 1999 
Family allowances. 
Use the large variations across EU countries in terms 
of CC slots and opening hours. Bivariate probit 
model, i.e. the probability of choosing to work and to 
have children are modeled jointly. The probability of 
working and of having children are regressed on the 
woman‟s age (and its square), educational level, other 
hh income, the age of the youngest child, part-time 
jobs‟ availability and quality, CC availability, family 
allowances, length of optional leave, and cluster 
dummies (pro-natalist, pro-traditional, pro- 
egalitarian, on-interventionist).   
HH w/ women aged 21-45, married or living w/ a 
partner 
Family allowances have a statistically significant negative 
impact on the probability to be in work.  
 
Regressions are carried out separately for women w/ tertiary 
education and women w/ less than a tertiary education. Family 
allowances only have a statistically significant negative 
employment impact for women w/ less than tertiary education. 
For women w/ tertiary education, the impact is also negative 
but much smaller and insignificant.  
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Sánchez-Mangas, 
Sánchez-Marcos (2008), 
Spain, 1996-2004. 
Introduction of €100 
monthly cash benefit for 
working mothers of 
children under three. 
 
Introduction in Spain in 2003 of a monthly cash 
benefit of €100 per child under three for working 
mothers.  
Difference-in-difference-in-differences approach 
(DDD), based on a probit model which regresses the 
likelihood of labor market participation on after-the-
reform dummy, a treatment dummy (mothers of kids 
under 3 as opposed to the comparison group: mothers 
of kids aged 3-6), an interaction after*treatment, a 
time trend, an interaction time*treatment, educational 
attainment, age and age squared, number of kids, 
employment status in previous year, and employment 
status of spouse. Fertility is assumed to be exogenous. 
Married women under 45.  
The policy variable, namely after*treatment, has a statistically 
significant and positive effect on employment.  
 
The estimated change that results from this reform is a 2.93 
ppts increase in labor market participation, which represents 
approximately 5% of the labor market participation of the 
treatment group in 2002.  
 
Estimates by educational level are the following: the reform 
has a positive effect on each educational level; however, it is 
only significant for women with an intermediate educational 
level (as opposed to those with a primary or tertiary level).  
EC: employment-
conditional benefit 
Berninger (2009), 21 
European countries, 
2004-2005.  
Family cash benefits 
Situation in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
France, Greece, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Spain, Czech 
Republic, and Hungary. Multilevel regression models: 
maternal employment rates regressed on individual 
characteristics (age, age squared, youngest kid‟s age, 
number of kids, educational level, marital status, 
personal representation of mother‟s role) and macro 
characteristics (supply of CC for kids under 3, CC 
supply for kids aged 3-5, family cash benefits as a % 
of GDP, number of weeks of maternal leave, 
employment of childless women, and national 
representation of mothers‟ role). 
The representation of the maternal role is measured w/ 
the question: “A woman should be prepared to down 
on her paid work for the sake of her family” 
Mothers of children under 16, aged 25-60 
In the model that includes all individual and macro 
characteristics, income transfers have a negative but 
insignificant effect on maternal employment. Indeed, the log 
odds amount to 0.977, indicating a very small decrease in the 
odds of being in employment.  
The insignificant effect of 
cash benefits could be due 
to lack of differentiation of 
the operationalization, 
which includes universal 
child benefits, benefits that 
provide incentives to stay 
at home, and employment-
conditional benefits.  
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Milligan, Stabile (2007), 
Canada, 1996-2000. 
Introduction of National 
Child Benefit.  
1998: introduction of the National Child Benefit 
(NCB), w/ national benefit, also for nonworking 
parents + provincial benefit that is employment-
conditional. Some provinces subtract NCB from 
welfare payments (“clawback states”) while others 
don‟t. Clawback states increase incentives to work 
through child benefit. The provincially-run earned 
income supplements provide more incentive to join 
the labor force. 
Regression: linear probability model or OLS, both w/ 
instrument variable b/c of the endogeneity of benefits. 
NCB depends on income, which in turn depends on 
earnings and other income sources. 
Welfare recipients, mothers aged 18-50, married 
women are excluded.  
The interaction term Clawback state*NCB has a significant 
positive impact on single mothers‟ probability to have positive 
earnings, and also for all single women.  
 
This interaction term has a positive but insignificant impact on 
the number of weeks worked; however, its impact on hours 
worked is statistically significant and positive for single 
mothers. For all single women, however, the impact on both 
variables is insignificant.  
EC: employment-
conditional benefits 
Naz (2004), Norway, 
1998-1999.  
Cash-for-care benefit. 
In 1998 the Norwegian government introduced cash 
benefits up to approx. €400/month for parents of 1-to-
3 years old kids who don‟t utilize state-subsidized 
day-care facilities.  
Difference-in-difference estimator, treatment = 
parents of kids under 3, control = parents of kids 3-6. 
Outcome variables are: market intensity (husband‟s 
working hours+ his wife‟s), specialization (husband‟s 
working hours – his wife‟s), wife‟s working hours and 
husband‟s working hours.  
1
st
 specification: each outcome is regressed on child-
under-3 dummy, a before/after dummy, and an 
interaction child under 3*after the reform. 2
nd
 
specification adds a tertiary education dummy 
variable and interaction terms w/ previous dummies. 
3
rd
 specification adds a vector of control variables and 
interactions w/ the same dummies (child under 3, 
after, child under three*after).   
Married and cohabiting couples who have children 
Policy variable is the interaction term Child under 3*after the 
reform. It has a statistically significant and positive impact on 
specialization (+3.28 hours), a significantly negative impact 
on market intensity (-2.42 hours) and on wife‟s working hours 
(-2.85 hours), and an insignificant (but positive) impact on 
husband‟s working hours (+0.43 hour).  
 
Adding the educational level shows that the difference b/w the 
reform‟s effects for the two types of hh (tertiary vs. below 
tertiary educational level) is stat insignificant. If the wife has a 
university degree, the increase in specialization amounts to 
5.06 hours (significant), in other hh by 2.43 hours 
(insignificant). For market intensity, the decrease amounts to 
3.49 for women w/ a tertiary educational level, and -1.9 hours 
otherwise, but these decreases, as well as the difference, are 
not significant. Wives‟ working hours are decreased in both 
groups, but only significantly so for women w/ a higher 
educational level. The impact on husbands‟ working hours is 
positive but insignificant whatever the educational level.  
Surprisingly, bigger 
impact on wives w/ a 
university degree. Reason 
could be that the use of 
subsidized childcare is 
higher among higher-
educated mothers.  
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at least one-year-old  
Brink, Nordblom, 
Wahlberg (2007), 
Sweden, 1999.  
Simulated child benefit 
reform.  
In 2002, a maximum was introduced in Sweden. 
Simulations are carried out, based on parameters 
obtained from a sophisticated structural labor supply 
model. This model allows estimating pre-reform labor 
supply and disposable income. Then, the maximum 
fee is applied (3% of gross hh income for the 1
st
 child, 
2% for the 2
nd
 and 1% for the 3
rd
, for family incomes 
below 38,000 SEK  this fee is applied to all hh). A 
tax-benefit simulation model from Statistics Sweden. 
Information about CC is simulated: for single 
mothers, number of working hours = use of CC; for 
couples, time in CC = working hours of the parent 
who works the least.  
This policy is compared with a theoretical child-
benefit increase that gives the same budgetary 
implications as the maximum fee reform.   
Single mothers and couples w/ children born b/w 
1994 and 1998.  
Simulated child benefit reform, which amounts to a 5,500 
SEK/year increase, i.e. a 61% increase: for single mothers, 
employment decreases by 1% overall and 6.5% in the lower 
income quartile, whereas hours of work decrease by 2.4% 
overall and 5.4% in the lower income quartile.  
 
For two-parent families, husband‟s and wife‟s employment 
rate and hours of work remain unchanged.  
 
Van Damme, Kalmijn, 
Uunk (2009), 13 
countries, Denmark, 
UK; Belgium, 
Netherlands, Austria, 
Germany, France, 
Ireland, Finland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
1994-2001. 
Family cash benefits 
Measuring the impact of family benefits and CC 
policy on the odds of after-separation employment. 
Simple and multinomial logit models: Outcomes are 
regressed on cash benefits in PPPs as the sum of 3 
allowances (basic welfare + single-parent allowance + 
child allowance), on the number of public CC 
slots/100 kids under 3, macro-level controls (female 
unemployment rate, incidence of part-time work, and 
gender role values derived from a scale), and 
individual variables (married before separation, ex 
partners‟ income quartile, living w/ adult family e.g. 
mother‟s parents, education, a dummy for repartnered 
mothers, duration of inactivity for mothers who didn‟t 
work before break-up, dummies kids 0-6 and kids 7-
Women who didn‟t work before separation:  
The net monthly allowance for single-parents has a negative 
and significant impact in the baseline model, in the model 
controlling the impact of gender role values and in the model 
where the impact of CC is interacted w/ dummies kids 0-6 and 
kid 7-15. It is negative and insignificant in the model w/ the 
interaction term net allowance*1
st
 quartile. Baseline: an 
increase of 100 PPP in allowances reduces the entry odds by 
9%.  
Women who worked before separation (3 outcomes: increase 
in working hours, decrease, and exit):  
The net monthly allowance has a positive but insignificant 
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15, dummies for # of years after separation. The 
allowance variable is interacted w/ 1
st
 income quartile 
of ex partner and CC variable interacted w/ dummies 
kid 0-6 and kid 7-15.  
Women aged 18-60 at the time of separation who 
experienced a separation during the panel period 
impact on the odds of exit (compared to stability, the reference 
category), i.e. negative employment impact, but 
nonsignificant. 
 
Cho (2006), Korea, 
1998-2003 
Child allowances  
Complex simulation process: first, a wage equation is 
calculated, and then a non-maternal income equation. 
Then, a certain number of parameters are estimated 
from the dataset, based on an initial guess. The 
estimated values are compared to existing values 
(employment, hours of work, labor force participation 
within 5 years since birth, income share of 
expenditure on kids, number of kids, age at 1
st
 birth), 
and if necessary, parameters are adjusted.  
Women aged 20-40 w/ at least 1 child 
The introduction of child allowances would decrease labor 
force participation by 5.4% (from 57.6% to 54.5%). For 
women within 6 years since birth, employment is reduced by 
13,9% (from 34.6% to 29.8%).  
Interesting, b/c only one 
type of family policy exists 
in Korea, namely CC 
subsidies 
Jaeger (2010), 10 
countries, 1995-2000: 
Australia, Canada, 
Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, and the US.  
Family cash benefits 
Probit regression model: probability of employment is 
regressed on family cash benefits as % of GDP, 
benefits in kind as a % of GDP, a dummy variable 
strong religious ties (based on 2 questions), and 2 
interaction terms (cash benefits*religious ties and in-
kind benefits*religious ties), and a set of 
sociodemographic control variables (age, family 
status, # of kids, education, living area, denomination, 
social class, chief-earner dummy, living w/ parents, 
female unemployment rate, GDP/capita, and growth 
rate).  
Mothers aged 25-40 or 25-54.  
Model w/o interaction terms: family cash benefits have a 
negative but insignificant impact on labor force participation, 
whereas the impact is stat significant and negative for full-
time employment. The same conclusions apply to the models 
that include interaction terms.  
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Table A6: Antipoverty effects of family cash benefits 
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Antipoverty effect Comments 
Milligan, Stabile (2007), 
Canada, 1996-2000. 
Introduction of National 
Child Benefit. 
1998: introduction of the National Child Benefit 
(NCB), w/ national benefit, also for nonworking 
parents + provincial benefit that is employment-
conditional. Some provinces subtract NCB from 
welfare payments (“clawback states”) while others 
don‟t. Clawback states increase incentives to work 
through child benefit. The provincially-run earned 
income supplements provide more incentive to join 
the labor force. 
Regression: linear probability model or OLS, both w/ 
instrument variable b/c of the endogeneity of benefits. 
NCB depends on income, which in turn depends on 
earnings and other income sources. 
Welfare recipients, mothers aged 18-50, married 
women are excluded.  
The interaction term Clawback state*NCB has a positive, yet 
insignificant effect on single mothers‟ total income. On the 
contrary, it has a statistically significant and positive effect on 
total income for all single women.  
EC: employment-
conditional benefits 
Matsanganis, Levy, 
Mercader-Prats, Toso, 
O‟Donoghue, 
Coromaldi, Farinha 
Rodrigues, Tsakoglu 
(2005) Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Italy, 1995-1996 
Family cash benefits.  
Static simulation, does not account for behavioral 
responses; as it appears that means-tested or universal 
benefits tend to reduce maternal labor force 
participation, the estimates are overoptimistic.  
Microsimulation based on EUROMOD, tax and 
benefit simulator for 1998. Data 1995-1996, adjusted 
for 1998. Impact of family allowances and non-
refundable tax credits. 
Child poverty  
The impact on the child pvty rate / pvty gap :  
Greece:    -8.1% (-1.5 ppt)  / -11.4% 
Italy:        -19.0%(-6.2 ppts) / -28.2% 
Spain:      -7.7% (-1.8 ppts) /  -12.1 
Portugal: -20.9% (-6.1 ppts)/  -36.7% 
The impact on Foster-Greer-Thorbecke w/ α=2 :  
Greece:   -13.2%  
Italy:        -30.8% 
The most striking finding 
is that the overall value of 
family transfers in 
southern Europe is 
extremely low.  
 
EC: doesn’t account for 
behavioral responses, not 
included in vote count.  
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Spain:      -14.0%  
Portugal: -44.0% 
Brink, Nordblom, 
Wahlberg (2007), 
Sweden, 1999. 
Maximum fees reform. 
In 2002, a maximum was introduced in Sweden. 
Simulations are carried out, based on parameters 
obtained from a sophisticated structural labor supply 
model. This model allows estimating pre-reform labor 
supply and disposable income. Then, the maximum 
fee is applied (3% of gross hh income for the 1
st
 child, 
2% for the 2
nd
 and 1% for the 3
rd
, for family incomes 
below 38,000 SEK  this fee is applied to all hh). A 
tax-benefit simulation model from Statistics Sweden. 
Information about CC are simulated: for single 
mothers, number of working hours = use of CC; for 
couples, time in CC = working hours of the parent 
who works the least.  
This policy is compared with a theoretical child-
benefit increase that gives the same budgetary 
implications as the maximum fee reform.   
Single mothers and couples w/ children born b/w 
1994 and 1998.  
Simulated child benefit reform, which amounts to a 5,500 
SEK/year increase, i.e. a 61% increase, increases disposable 
income by 4.6% overall, and by 4.3% in the lower quartile for 
single mothers. For two-parent hh, disposable income 
increases by 1.5% overall and 2.3% in the lower quartile.  
 
Distributional effects: the reforms decrease inequality (Gini 
coefficient) by 3.4% and P90/P10 by 1.22%. 
 
Misra, Moller, Budig 
(2007), 11 countries: 
Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Canada, UK, 
USA. Mid-1990s  
early 2000s.  
Family benefits.  
Logistic regressions, w/ robust estimator (Huber-
White for heteroskedasticity). Probability of poverty 
is regressed on family benefits (% of social 
insurance), on the % of 1-2-year olds in formal CC, 
paid leave and family leave (including family leave
2
) 
and controls: age, part-time and full-time 
employment, education, partnered or not, parent or 
not, partnered*parent.  
Women aged 25-59 
W/o control for paid and family leaves, family benefits have a 
significant and positive antipoverty effect (poverty reduced by 
1.9%). Same result when paid leave is included (-1.2%).  
 
When family leave and its square are entered, CC availability 
has a positive but insignificant effect on poverty.  
Misra, Moller, Budig 
(2007), 11 countries: 
Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Canada, UK, 
USA. Mid-1990s  early 
2000s.  
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Bäckman, Ferrarini 
(2009), 21 countries, 
2000: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherland, 
Norway, Poland, 
Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US  
child allowances, lump-
sum maternity grants, 
tax deductions 
Multilevel, random intercept regression model: odds 
that children are poor are regressed on “traditional” 
policies (child allowances, tax deductions, lump sum 
grants), dual-earner policies (parental insurance 
transfers), age of family head, labor market 
attachment i.e. the # of earners, a female-head dummy 
variable, and interaction terms.  
In some specifications, the public CC coverage of kids 
aged 0-3 is added. Moreover, the coefficients are 
estimated w/ the whole sample or w/ the sample w/o 
postcommunist countries (and w/o Denmark which 
displays very specific patterns).  
HH with pre-school children 
Whole sample: The “traditional” benefits variable has a 
positive but insignificant antipoverty effect; controlling for the 
number of earners, the gender of the hh head, and interaction 
terms doesn‟t affect these conclusions. The odds ratio in the 
1
st
 model is 0.19; surprisingly enough, this large change in the 
odds is not stat significant. When the public CC coverage for 
kids aged 0-3 is added, the impact becomes stat significant 
and remains positive (odds ratio=0.26).  
When the sample excludes postcommunist countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), the 
conclusions are the same: traditional programs only have a 
significant impact when public CC coverage is included in the 
model.  
 
Frick (2007), 15 
countries, 1994-1998: 
Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, UK, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Poland and Hungary.   
First, usual pretransfer and posttransfer comparison to 
calculate a “poverty reduction effect” due to the 
receipt of family-related transfers (FRT) expressed in 
%. Poverty is measured w/ the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke indicator w/  =2 (severity of poverty).  
The “poverty reduction effect” is regressed on family 
benefits as a % of GDP, length of maternity leave, 
female employment, country dummies, welfare-
regime dummies, and on socioeconomic 
characteristics: educational level within hh, # of 
siblings, age structure of hh, health status of adults, 
single-parenthood dummy, immigrant status dummy, 
unemployment dummy, and an inactivity dummy.  
FRT = sum of family related cash benefits, social 
assistance and housing allowance.  
Children identified as poor in a fictitious world w/o 
FRT 
Family cash benefits as a % of GDP has a stat significant and 
positive effect on poverty reduction in the model that includes 
country dummies as well as in the model that contains 
welfare-regime dummies. 
 
W/ the Corporatist regime as a reference category, the social-
democratic dummy has a positive and significant impact, 
ceteris paribus, whereas the Southern regime and the liberal 
regime have a negative and significant impact on poverty 
severity reduction. The negative impact is much stronger for 
the Southern dummy than for the liberal.  
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Table A7: Employment effects of childcare (CC) availability and cost  
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Employment effects Comments 
Del Boca, Pasqua, 
Pronzato (2008), Italy, 
Spain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherland, 1999 
CC availability.  
Use the large variations across EU countries in terms 
of CC slots and opening hours. Bivariate probit 
model, i.e. the probability of choosing to work and to 
have children are modeled jointly. The probability of 
working and of having children are regressed on the 
woman‟s age (and its square), educational level, other 
hh income, the age of the youngest child, part-time 
jobs‟ availability and quality, CC availability, family 
allowances, length of optional leave, and cluster 
dummies (pro-natalist, pro-traditional, pro- 
egalitarian, on-interventionist).   
HH w/ womend aged 21-45, married or living w/ a 
partner 
CC availability (% of children aged 0-2 using CC facilities) 
has a significant positive effect on the probability of working 
for the entire sample.  
 
Regressions are carried out separately for women w/ tertiary 
education and women w/ less than a tertiary education. CC 
availability is significantly positive for both groups of women, 
but the coefficient is higher for lower-skilled women.  
 
Kornstad, Thoresen 
(2006), Norway, 
1998/2003. Reform 
aiming at reducing 
queues and fees.  
The Norwegian parliament has passed a resolution to 
end queues in childcare centers and to reduce fees. 
Simulation based on parameters derived from a joint 
labor supply and childcare choice decision model, 
from a finite set of jobs and childcare arrangements (3 
modes of care and 4 brackets of working hours). A 
multinomial logit regression model is used: the 
probability of choosing 1 of the 12 combinations is 
explained by disposable income, the number of hours 
worked, number of children, the number of 
opportunities and of jobs available. The simulation is 
based on 1998 data projected to 2003; the tax and 
benefit system in 2003 serves as a baseline.  
Married and cohabiting parents with at least one 
child aged 1-5.  
Increasing the number of places at CC centers up to a point 
where there are no more queues has a strong impact on female 
labor supply. The probability of working 38+ hours increases 
from 31 to 37%, whereas the probability of working b/w 28 
and 38 hours increases from 14% to 17% (approx.). The 
likelihood also increases in others work hours brackets, hence 
overall increase in employment.  
In the lowest and 3rd deciles of the income distribution, there 
is a one-hour increase in mothers weekly working time. The 
increase is even higher in the 2
nd
 lowest decile (approx. 1.2 
hours). The increase is slightly less than 1 hour in the upper 
two quintiles.  
Overall, expected hours of work for married or cohabiting 
mothers of pre-schoolers increase by 4% 
A 50% reduction in CC fees increases labor supply by about 2 
EC: only 768 
observations, hence not 
included in vote-counting 
procedure. 
 
Only small number of 
families has access to 
informal cares by others, 
especially grandparents.  
 
70% of kids aged 1-5 
attented childcare centers 
in 2003 in Norway.  
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hours a week, i.e. about 8%.  
When queues are suppressed and fees reduced by 50%, labor 
supply increases by 13%.  
 
 
Sánchez-Mangas, 
Sánchez-Marcos (2008), 
Spain, 1996-2004. 
Introduction of €100 
monthly cash benefit for 
working mothers of 
children under three.  
Introduction in Spain in 2003 of a monthly cash 
benefit of €100 per child under three for working 
mothers.  
Difference-in-difference-in-differences approach 
(DDD), based on a probit model which regresses the 
likelihood of labor market participation on after-the-
reform dummy, a treatment dummy (mothers of kids 
under 3 as opposed to the comparison group: mothers 
of kids aged 3-6), an interaction after*treatment, a 
time trend, an interaction time*treatment, educational 
attainment, age and age squared, number of kids, 
employment status in previous year, and employment 
status of spouse. Fertility is assumed to be exogenous. 
Married women under 45.  
As indicated above, the introduction of a €100 benefit per 
child under 3 for working mothers had a significantly positive 
impact on maternal employment, namely around 3 ppts. Since 
the cash benefit represents 39% of the average child care cost, 
the implied elasticity of labor market decision of mothers of 
children under 3 with respect to CC prices is -0.07, assuming 
that there is no effect of the cash benefit on the equilibrium 
price of CC services.  
 
Berninger (2009), 21 
European countries, 
2004-2005  
Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Greece, UK, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Austria, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden, 
Slovakia, Spain, Czech 
Republic, and Hungary. 
CC availability.  
Multilevel regression models: maternal employment 
rates regressed on individual characteristics (age, age 
squared, youngest kid‟s age, number of kids, 
educational level, marital status, personal 
representation of mother‟s role) and macro 
characteristics (supply of CC for kids under 3, CC 
supply for kids aged 3-5, family cash benefits as a % 
of GDP, number of weeks of maternal leave, 
employment of childless women, and national 
representation of mothers‟ role). 
The representation of the maternal role is measured w/ 
the question: “A woman should be prepared to down 
on her paid work for the sake of her family”. 
Mothers of children under 16, aged 25-60 
In the model w/ all individual and macro variables, CC 
availability for kids under 3 has a significant and positive 
impact on maternal employment, whereas rather small effect 
as the odds increase by 3.6 percent  e(β)=1.036. 
In the 2 models w/ all individual variables but only significant 
macro variables, 2 interaction terms are added. Conclusions: 
CC availability has a significant positive impact and the odds 
ratio increases by 3 to 4.7 percent.  
Interaction term CC availability*age of youngest child shows 
that the negative impact of the age of the youngest child 
significantly decreases when CC availability increases.  
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Baker, Gruber, Milligan 
(2008), Quebec/Canada, 
1994-2003, Québec‟s 
new CC policy 
Quebec introduced a major family-policy reform: 
began in 1997 w/ the extension of full-time 
kindergarten to all 5-year-olds, and the provision of 
CC at an out-of-pocket price of $5.00 for all children 
0-4. Program was phased in, starting w/ the 4-year-
olds, than 3-year-olds in ‟98, all 2-year-olds in ‟99, 
and all kids under 2 in 2000. Moreover, the number of 
spaces doubled b/w ‟97 and ‟05.  
Difference-in-difference: %of mothers in employment 
is regressed on a policy eligibility dummy (=1 if kid is 
under 5 and lives in the province of Quebec), province 
and year dummies, as well as a vector of parents‟ 
characteristics, city size, number of siblings, age and 
sex of child.  
Panel survey of children w/ details on parental 
situation.  
For two-parent families: There is a statistically significant rise 
in employment of women in Quebec, relative to the rest of 
Canada, of 7.7 ppts, that is, 14.5% of baseline participation. 
Including an economic control (male unemployment rate) 
slightly decreases this coefficient: 7.4 instead of 7.7.  
 
Alternative samples: for single mothers, the impact is positive, 
but insignificant. For mothers in couples w/ kids aged 0-2, the 
impact is positive and significant (+0.09), as well as for kids 
aged 3-4 (+0.055). For mothers in couples high school or less, 
the impact is positive but insignificant, contrary to mother w/ 
some post-high school education (+0.095).  
Before the 1997 reform, 
CC policies targeted low-
income families  the 
reform brought little gain 
for the lowest-income 
families, which explains 
why impact is much larger 
for women in couples and 
w/ higher education level.  
Brink, Nordblom, 
Wahlberg (2007), 
Sweden, 1999, impact of 
the maximum fees 
reform.  
In 2002, a maximum was introduced in Sweden. 
Simulations are carried out, based on parameters 
obtained from a sophisticated structural labor supply 
model. This model allows estimating pre-reform labor 
supply and disposable income. Then, the maximum 
fee is applied (3% of gross hh income for the 1
st
 child, 
2% for the 2
nd
 and 1% for the 3
rd
, for family incomes 
below 38,000 SEK  this fee is applied to all hh). A 
tax-benefit simulation model from Statistics Sweden. 
Information about CC is simulated: for single 
mothers, number of working hours = use of CC; for 
couples, time in CC = working hours of the parent 
who works the least.  
This policy is compared with a theoretical child-
benefit increase that gives the same budgetary 
implications as the maximum fee reform. Single 
mothers and couples w/ children born b/w 1994 
and 1998.  
Single mothers: the maximum fee reform increases average 
labor force participation by 0.7%, and by 4.6% in the lower 
income quartile. The increase in working hours amounts to 
1.4% overall, and 16.5% in the lower quartile.  
Two-parent households: the wife‟s labor market participation 
increases by 0.4% and working hours by 0.5%, and for the 
husbands the increases amount to 0.2% and 0% respectively. 
In the lower income quintile, wife‟s employment increases by 
2.5% and working hours by 3.1%; for husbands, these 
increases amount to 1.3% and 0.3%. 
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Del Boca, Vuri (2007), 
Italy, 1998 
Availability and cost of 
CC.  
Regression: bivariate probit model to jointly estimate 
the probability of maternal employment and of CC 
use. Both outcomes are regressed on hourly CC costs, 
on a dummy variable for regions in which the 
provision of CC is highest (Emilia Romana, Lomardia 
and Veneto), and sociodemographic controls (wife's 
and husband's age and education, dummy grandparent 
still alive, husband's labor income and hh's nonlabor 
income, family transfers, # of kids 4-5, # of kids 6-13) 
and labor market variables (% part-time jobs, 
unemployment rate).  
A second model includes an interaction hourly CC 
costs*dummy(Emilia Romana, Lombardia, Veneto).  
In addition the estimates are used for a simulation of 
the absence of rationing and of two subsidies: 100% 
and 50% of CC costs.  
Married adults w/ the youngest kid under 3. 
Simulation: W/ no rationing, a 50% CC subsidy increases 
employment by 15.5% and a 100% subsidy increases 
employment by 26.5% (from a baseline of 61.5%).  
 
Model I: hourly CC costs have a negative but insignificant 
effect on P(mother works). Living in in a region in which the 
provision of CC services is highest significantly increases this 
probability. 
 
Model II, w/ interaction term: hourly CC costs still have a 
negative but nonsignificant impact; living in one of the 3 
"high CC provision" regions has a stronger impact. The 
interaction term has a stat significant and negative impact on 
P(mother works), which demonstrates that CC cost do have an 
impact, but only if CC availability is not heavily constrained.  
 
EC: simulating the absence 
of rationing and a 100% 
subsidy is not realistic 
simulation results not 
included in vote count. 
- An important component: 
the distance b/w the 
family's house, the 
workplaces and the 
location of CC facilities.  
- In the North, 15-20% of 
kids under 3 are in public 
CC, while in the South 
only 1-2%. 
 
Bub, McCartney (2004), 
USA, children born in 
1991 followed until 1st 
grade,  
 
Families were recruited after the birth of a child in 
1991, the follow-up interviews until kid is in 1st 
grade, i.e. 6-7 years old. Families recruited in 10 
cities across the country. Three measures: 24 months 
after birth, 36 months and 54 months. Maternal 
employment hours are regressed (OLS) on hours of 
childcare, a dummy continuous employment, pre-birth 
maternal employment, partner employment status, 
income-to-needs ratio dummy (below or above 
2*official poverty line), interactions hours in 
CC*maternal education and hours in CC*poverty 
status, and control variables (child gender and 
ethnicity, maternal partner status and maternal 
education).  
 
The hours spent in CC at 24 months have a positive and stat 
significant impact on maternal employment when the kid is in 
1st grade, and so do hours in CC at 36 months and at 54 
months, w/ coefficients of 0.39, 0.43, and 0.5 respectively.  
Interaction terms do not have a significant impact, but poverty 
status*Hours in CC at 54 months. Signs for maternal 
education are negative, signs for poverty status are positive. 
So the impact does not vary by maternal educational level nor 
by hh's income level; however, hours in CC at 54 months have 
a bigger impact for higher income families.  
 
EC: sample not 
representative, sample size 
is small, and attrition is not 
at random --> The final 
sample: highly educated 
overrepresented, partnered 
women overrepresented, 
African American 
underrepresented. 
Not included in vote-
counting procedure. 
Blau, Tekin (2007), 
USA, 1999, substantial 
increase in funding of 
CC subsidy programs 
Welfare reform in 1996 consolidated four existing CC 
subsidy programs into a single block grant, the 
Childcare and Development Fund (CCDF), which 
substantially increased funding. Parents must be 
4 specifications: w/ or w/o lagged variables, welfare reciept 
since January 1997 (dummy) and CC assistance after welfare 
since January 1997. Either one OLS regression (2nd equation) 
or 2-stage least square model (both equations) 2SLS --> model 
EC: results from models 
III and IV are disputable. 
And criticized by the 
authors themselves.  
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 employed, in training, or in school. However, there 
aren't enough funds approx 12-15% of those eligible 
are served.  
A subsample of 13 oversampled states, all hh 
headed by an unmarried mothers w/ at least 1 kid 
under 13.  
Pair of linear probability equations: 1) subsidy receipt 
(dummy) is regressed on family characteristics and 
policy variables 2) employment (and other outcomes) 
is regressed on this estimated subsidy dummy, the 
same hh characteristics and other policy variables. 
Rationing defined at the county level --> county 
dummies (i.e. the instrument variables) included in the 
set of policy variables in the 1st equation, but not in 
the second. State fixed effects are included in both 
equations.  
  
HH characteristics are: age, age
2
, 
black/white/Hispanic dummies, a good health dummy, 
12-15 years of education and education > 15 years, 
nonwage income, family size and its square, kids 0-5 
only and kids 6-12 only --> used in the first equation. 
Then, estimated likelihood of subsidy receipt included 
in 2nd equation.  
  
Single mothers of children under 13. 
1= OLS w/o lagged variables, model 2= OLS w/ lagged 
variables, model 3 = 2SLS model w/o lagged variables, model 
4 = 2SLS model w/ lagged variables. 
 
CC subsidy receipt has a significant positive impact in all 4 
models: likelihood of employment increases by 13 ppts in 
model I, by 12.5 ppts in model II, by 17 ppts in model III, and 
by 32.9 ppts in model IV. However, in model III the impact is 
not significant, b/c standard errors are very large in the 2SLS 
model. Equations III and IV: the validity of county dummies 
as instruments for CC subsidy is disputable.  
 
2SLS not included in 
vote-counting procedure, 
only OLS results.  
Fitzpatrick (2010), US, 
2000, universal pre-
kindergarten in Georgia 
and Oklahoma.  
Georgia and Oklahoma introduced universal 
prekindergarten for all 4-year-olds kids who turned 
4 by September 1, 2000. Program take-up is high: 50 
to 60% of all 4-year-olds.  
Identification of eligible and ineligible kids in the 
1999-2000 school year, kids born within 100 days 
before the cutoff date and 100 days after the 
reform. Census data.  
Outcomes are regressed on the difference b/w date of 
The policy variable (eligibility) has a negative but 
insignificant impact on labor market participation (worked last 
week & worked during the year prior to the interview) and 
hours of work per week. The impact on weeks worked is 
positive but insignificant.  
 
The cutoff variable (child born before cutoff date) also has a 
negative and insignificant impact on labor force participation 
and hours per week. The impact on weeks worked is negative 
Conclusion: labor supply 
of mothers didn‟t increase 
following the introduction 
of pre-K for all 4-year-
olds. First, female labor 
supply elasticities seem to 
be declining; moreover, 
many women in the 
comparison group may 
already be receiving 
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birth (DOB) and cutoff date (number of days), on a 
dummy “born before cutoff date”, an interaction term 
number of days*cutoff, and an eligibility term (born 
in Oklahoma and Georgia before the cutoff date) and 
a set of demographic controls. For the “number of 
days” variable and the interaction term “number of 
days*cutoff”, a polynomial is used (cubic).  
Outcomes pertain to maternal labor supply: 
employment over a year, employment last week 
(Probit), and hours/weeks of work (OLS).  
but insignificant.  
Generally, it is not possible to reject the assumption that the 
estimated effects are the same across groups of mothers 
(single or married, w/ or w/o a younger child). The effect is 
never significant.  
One exception: for weeks worked, the “cutoff variable” has a 
significant negative impact for single mothers who don‟t have 
younger kids or for married mothers who do. 
subsidies.  
Pettit, Hook (2005), 19 
countries, mid-1990s: 
Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, 
UK, USA.  
Public provision of CC.  
Multilevel model: For each country, a dummy 
“woman employed or not” is regressed on individual-
level characteristics: age, age
2
, marital status, 
education, # of kids, having a kid under 3, youngest 
child 4-6. Then, the coefficients of these country-level 
regressions are used as dependent variables and 
regressed on national characteristics: Maternity leave 
weeks, parental leave weeks, parental leave
2
, public 
provision of CC, unemployment, service sector 
growth, and the share of women in parliament.  
Both OLS and random-effects regression are carried 
out. Women 18-65 
OLS specification: public provision of CC has a positive 
impact for married women and women w/ children 0-3 and 
children 4-6. Another specification leads to identical 
conclusions. The random-effect model leads to similar 
conclusion, but the impact is only significant for children aged 
4-6. 
 
Lundin, Mörk, Öckert 
(2008), Sweden, 2001 
and 2003, maximum 
fees reform in Sweden 
 
Analyze the 2002 maximum CC fees reform.  
Employment dummy and share of full-time 
conditional on employment are regressed on the price 
of CC and household characteristics. A 2
nd
 
specification includes hh type fixed effects as well as 
hh type*municipality fixed effects, and the 3
rd
 
(preferred by the authors) also further includes a hh 
type*time effect.  
Two-parent hh w/ at least one child aged 1-9.  
Model w/ hh characteristics: The maximum fee has a 
statistically significant and negative impact on the probability 
of being in employment. However, in the preferred 
specifications w/ hh type fixed effects, interacted w/ 
municipality and time, the impact of maximum fees is 
negative but insignificant.  
 
Regarding the impact on the share of full-time mothers among 
those already in the labor force, the impact is always negative 
but insignificant.  
Highly subsidized CC 
already existed in Sweden 
before the reform, hence 
the difference w/ previous 
studies.  
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Lefebvre, Merrigan, 
Verstraete (2009), 
Canada, 1999-2004 
Québec‟s new CC 
policy 
Québec‟s new CC policy w/ large increase in the 
number of subsidized spaces and low fees provides a 
Canadian “natural experiment”.  
A difference-in-difference (DD) model is specified: 
Various outcomes are regressed on a Québec dummy, 
a dummy for mothers having benefited from the 
program, and a sum of year dummies multiplied by 
the Québec dummy, plus a set of control variables. 
Both a model w/ equal effects (the coefficients of the 
policy variable are constrained to be identical every 
year) and w/ unequal effects are specified. The article 
focuses on unequal effects.  
A DD-in-difference (DDD) model is also specified, 
mothers w/ kids aged 12-17 and no kind under 12 are 
added, but only as a robustness check.  
Mothers w/ at least 1 kid aged 6-11 and no kid 
under 6, a group that potentially benefited from the 
new policy when their kid was under 6.  
Labor force participation (LFP): coefficients for 2002, 2003 
and 2004 are positive and have a significant effect and LFP 
increased by 3.4, 6.1, and 5.7 ppts respectively. For women w/ 
high school diploma or less, the effect is significantly positive 
and very large: 8.3, 16.1 and 17.3 ppts, but insignificant for 
mothers w/ a higher educational level.  
Weeks of work/year: coefficients for 2002, 2003 and 2004 are 
positive and have a significant effect; +2.07, +2.76 and +3.98 
weeks respectively. For mothers w/ HS diploma or less, effect 
is significantly positive and large: +5.63, 9.29, and 10 weeks 
respectively. For mother w/ a higher educational level, the 
impact is insignificant.  
Hours of work/year: coefficients for 2002, 2003 and 2004 are 
positive and have a significant effect; +95, +92 and +147 
weeks respectively. For mothers w/ a HS diploma or less, 
effect is significantly positive and large: +114, 266, and 318 
hours respectively. For mother w/ a higher educational level, 
the impact is insignificant.  
It is noticeable that there is an increasing pattern.  
 
Kalb, Wang-Sheng Lee 
(2008), Australia, 2002 
Cost and availability of 
formal and informal CC 
Sophisticated microsimulation based on regression 
models and a tax/benefit simulation program. A 
simultaneous bivariate tobit model predicts formal CC 
hours and informal CC cost. The average price of 
formal CC is available from an external source; hence 
the cost of formal CC can be predicted.  
Another bivariate model predicts the demand for both 
formal and informal CC. The budget constraint is 
based on a tax and transfer simulator (MITTS). 
Finally a labor supply model is specified based on 
wage rates, nonlabor income other than taxes and 
transfers, number and ages of kids, age and education 
of each parent. Two scenarios are simulated : a 10% 
increase in net costs (=cost of formal CC – CC 
subsidies + cost of informal CC) and a 10% increase 
A 10% increase in the net costs of CC:  
- Lone parents: hours of labor decrease by 1.4% and 
participation decreases by 1.5% 
- Mothers in couples: hours of labor decrease by 0.3% and 
participation by 0.2% 
- Fathers in couples: both indicators remain unchanged. 
A 10% increase in gross hourly prices w/ adjustment in 
demand:  
- Lone parents: hours of labor decrease by 1.6% and 
participation decreases by 1.9% 
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in gross hourly prices allowing for adjustment in 
demand.  
Families w/ kids younger than 12 years of age.  
- Mothers in couples: both indicators remain unchanged  
- Fathers in couples: both indicators remain unchanged. 
Lefebvre, Merrigan 
(2008), Canada, 1999-
2002, Québec‟s new CC 
policy 
September 1, 1997, the government of Québec 
implemented a new policy of day-care subsidies. On 
September 1, 2000, all kids aged less than 59 months 
were eligible for reduced contribution spaces.  
Difference-in-difference procedure (DD), comparison 
group is made up of women w/ kids under 6 in other 
Canadian provinces. Outcomes are regressed on a 
Québec dummy, an after-the-reform dummy, a sum of 
time-specific Québec dummies, and a vector of 
controls (mother's age (& age squared), years of 
education (& education squared), dummy mother born 
abroad, single-mother dummy, number of kids under 
5, dummy kid under 6 and dummy kid under 3, and 
earned income from other sources).  
 
All mothers aged 18-56 w/ at least 1 kid younger 
than 6. 
For all mothers w/ kid under 5:  
Participation: all coefficients positive and significant for 
period 1999-2002, w/ increases by 7.6, 5.3, 8.3, and 8.1 ppts 
respectively.  
Annual hours: all coefficients positive, but only significant for 
2001 and 2002: + 84, 64, 169, and 231 hours respectively 
Annual weeks: all coefficients positive and significant for 
period 1999-2002: + 3.8, 3.29, 5.09, and 5.17 weeks 
respectively  
 
For mothers w/ educational level <= high school 
Participation: all coefficients positive, however only one 
significant at 10%-level (1999) 
Annual hours: all coefficients positive, however only one 
significant at 10%-level (2002) 
Annual weeks: all coefficients positive, however only one 
significant at 10%-level (2002)  
For mothers w/ educational level> high school 
Participation: all coefficients positive, all significant but in 
2001 
Annual hours: all coefficients positive, significant in 2001 and 
2002 
Annual weeks: all coefficients positive and significant  
The price reduction was 
larger for high and middle-
income families, because 
CC subsidies for low-
income families existed 
prior to the reform.  
Uunk, Kalmijn, Muffels 
(2005), 13 EU countries, 
1994-1999, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the UK. CC 
Impact of the availability of CC, but also of the GDP 
level and of gender values (measured w/ European 
Values Survey questions). For each year, assess 
whether a child was born since the prior wave. 
Working hours are measured 1 year before birth and 2 
years after. Multilevel regression model (random 
intercept model): changes in women's working hours 
after 1st childbirth are regressed on a CC indicator 
(number of public spaces per child aged 0-3), GDP in 
1st specification w/ the CC variable and individual controls 
only: a 10% increase in CC availability increases mother's 
afterbirth labor supply by 2.9 hours (significant increase). 
Adding the impact of GDP in a 2nd specification leads to the 
conclusion that the impact is stat significant and positive; it is 
larger than in the 1st model: +4.72 hours. A 3rd model also 
includes gender values: the impact of CC availability grows 
even bigger +5.44%.  
  
GDP has a stat significant 
and negative impact on 
mother's employment 
when controlling for the 
availability of CC slots. 
Gender values have an 
insignificant impact once 
controlling for CC 
availability.  
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availability US$ at price levels and exchange rates of 1995, scale 
results (1-4) derived from 2 attitudinal questions on 
gender roles, and individual control variables 
(mother's age, education, partner's hours, and hh 
income/1000 in PPPs).  
Women aged 20-40 in married or unmarried 
cohabitation, focus on 1st childbirth. 
 EC: small sample 1004 
observations, but OK for 
vote-counting procedure.  
 
Van Ham, Mulder 
(2005), The 
Netherlands, 1998. 
 CC availability 
Availability of CC, including geographical factors  
depending on distance b/w home and CC facilities. 
Logistic regression: whether or not in paid 
employment for more than 12 hours is regressed on 
the number of institutionalized CC slots/100 kids aged 
0-4 within 10 minutes‟ travel from the residence, the 
number of jobs by jobs level that can be reached by 
car in 15 minutes, and sociodemographic controls 
(age, age
2
, education, a more-than-one-kid dummy, a 
single-mother dummy, additional income, a dummies 
for immigrant mothers and religious mothers).  
Mothers w/ children 0-6 
Having good access to CC has a positive and significant 
impact on the odds of maternal employment: One extra CC 
slot per 100 kids increases the odds of a mother being in paid 
employment by 2.2%.  
 
Van Damme, Kalmijn, 
Uunk (2009), 13 
countries, Denmark, 
UK; Belgium, 
Netherlands, Austria, 
Germany, France, 
Ireland, Finland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
1994-2001. 
CC availability 
Measuring the impact of family benefits and CC 
policy on the odds of after-separation employment. 
Simple and multinomial logit models: Outcomes are 
regressed on cash benefits in PPPs as the sum of 3 
allowances (basic welfare + single-parent allowance + 
child allowance), on the number of public CC 
slots/100 kids under 3, macro-level controls (female 
unemployment rate, incidence of part-time work, and 
gender role values derived from a scale), and 
individual variables (married before separation, ex 
partners‟ income quartile, living w/ adult family e.g. 
mother‟s parents, education, a dummy for repartnered 
mothers, duration of inactivity for mothers who didn‟t 
work before break-up, dummies kids 0-6 and kids 7-
15, dummies for # of years after separation. The 
allowance variable is interacted w/ 1
st
 income quartile 
of ex partner and CC variable interacted w/ dummies 
Women who didn‟t work before separation:.  
Public CC provision has a positive and significant impact on 
entry odds  an additional CC place increases the odds by 1.6% 
in the baseline model,  by 1.4% in the model controlling the 
impact of gender role values, by 0.9% in the model where the 
impact of CC is interacted w/ dummies kids 0-6 and kid 7-15, 
and by 1.3%  in the model w/ the interaction term net 
allowance*1
st
 quartile 
 
Women who worked before separation (3 outcomes: increase 
in  working hours, decrease, and exit):  
Public CC provision significantly increases the odds of 
increased working hours but also of decreased hours, as 
compared to stability. The odds of exit increase, but the effect 
The model for women who 
were in employment 
before separation: effects 
are weaker and less in line 
w/ expectations than the 
effects on labor market 
entry.  
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kid 0-6 and kid 7-15.  
Women aged 18-60 at the time of separation who 
experienced a separation during the panel period.   
is insignificant.  
  
Stähli, Le Goff, Levy, 
Widmer (2009), 
Switzerland, 1998-99, 
CC availability  
The reduction in labor activity (never reduced/reduced 
at some moment/stopped for kids but now active 
again/has completely stopped working) is regressed 
on the type of CC (collective day nursery, nanny & 
day mother, informal, …), on geographical context 
(metropolitan, small center, periurban, etc.), age, 
national origin, occupational position (manager, 
professionals, etc.), # of kids, age of youngest kid, 
partner‟s income, feminized job (> 70% women) or 
masculinized or mixed, lifestyle preferences (opinion 
questions home-centered, work-centered or 
adaptative), kind of network (sparse, friendship, 
interfering, etc.). Multinomial logistic regression, the 
reference category of the dependent variable being 
“homemaker”.  
Mothers in married and unmarried couples w/ at 
least 1 child of any age.  
Having a child in a collective day nursery has a positive and 
significant impact on the odds of never having reduced labor 
force participation (rather than leaving the labor market and 
still being out of it) and of having interrupted employment 
participation but being back in the labor market. The impact 
on the odds of having reduced at some moment rather than 
completely stopped is positive but insignificant.  
Having a kid minded by a nanny or a “day mother” 
significantly increases the odds of never having reduced labor 
force participation or having temporarily reduced it rather than 
completely leaving the labor market. The impact is positive 
but insignificant on the odds of having temporarily interrupted 
labor market participation rather than leaving the labor 
market.    
 
Rammohan, Whelan 
(2007), Australia, 2002, 
CC cost 
Dependent variable: odds of being in full-time 
employment, part-time employment, and not working. 
Model is a structural ordered probit regression. First, 
labor force participation is regressed on age, age
2
, 
experience, experience
2
, a dummy partner works 
regular shifts, education, immigration status, region of 
residence, number and age of kids. A wage equation is 
calculated using the same variables. The cost of CC 
equations are calculated using age, partner works 
regular shifts, migration status, region, number and 
age of kids.  
Then, the odds of labor outcomes are regressed on 
predicted wage, predicted CC costs, region, and 
number and age of kids.  
The (predicted) cost of CC has a negative but insignificant 
impact on the odds of being in part-time employment and in 
full-time employment. Hence, no stat significant impact on 
maternal employment status.  
 
Restricting the sample to mothers of children of preschool age 
yields similar results.  
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Mothers w/ kids aged less than 15 
Tekin (2007), USA, 
1997, CC cost and CC 
development fund 
Structural model: a multinomial logit model and two 
OLS equations are modeled jointly. The price of CC is 
regressed on state dummies and a vector of individual 
characteristics (mother‟s age, education, nonwage 
income, race, ethnicity, health, region of residence, 
presence of kids by age); the logarithm of wage rates 
for full-time or part-time employment is regressed on 
state dummies and the same set of socio-demographic 
characteristics. In the multinomial logit model, the 
outcomes are regressed on these estimated prices of 
CC and wage rates and on the same set of individual 
characteristics, plus a control for labor demand factors 
(unemployment rate). 
The outcomes are full-time work w/ paid care, and 
part-time work w/ paid care; the reference category is 
no employment and no CC.  
Based on regression coefficients, a a $1 decrease in 
CC costs is simulated.  
Single mothers w/ kids younger than 13. 
The price of CC has a negative but insignificant impact on 
part-time employment w/ paid care (vs. no employment & no 
CC) w/ a CC price elasticity of -0.068, and a negative and 
significant impact on full-time employment w/ CC (vs. no 
employment, no CC), w/ a CC price elasticity of -0.139. 
 
A simulated decrease in hourly CC price of $1, which 
corresponds to an annual subsidy of $2,080, leads to an 
increase in overall employment of 3.7 ppts, i.e. 5.2%.  
A higher price of CC is a 
stronger deterrent to full-
time employment than it is 
for part-time employment 
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Table A8: Antipoverty effects of childcare (CC) availability and cost  
Author(s), country. 
Evaluated program, 
period 
Method, independent variable(s) Antipoverty effect Comments 
Kornstad, Thoresen 
(2006), Norway, 
1998/2003. Reform 
aiming at reducing 
queues and fees. 
The Norwegian parliament has passed a resolution to 
end queues in childcare centers and to reduce fees. 
Simulation based on parameters derived from a joint 
labor supply and childcare choice decision model, 
from a finite set of jobs and childcare arrangements (3 
modes of care and 4 brackets of working hours). A 
multinomial logit regression model is used: the 
probability of choosing 1 of the 12 combinations is 
explained by disposable income, the number of hours 
worked, number of children, the number of 
opportunities and of jobs available. The simulation is 
based on 1998 data projected to 2003; the tax and 
benefit system in 2003 serves as a baseline.  
Married and cohabiting parents with at least one 
child aged 1-5.  
The change in post-tax equivalent income due to fee 
reductions of around 50% amounts to approx. 3,000 
Norwegian crowns (NOK) in the lowest 3 quintiles and 
around 4000 NOK in upper two quintiles, i.e. around US$ 415 
and $550 respectively in 2003, from a baseline of 326,200 
NOK (unequivalized), i.e. an equivalized disposable income 
of 163,100 given that the mean number of children is 2 and 
the equivalence scale used is the square root of the number of 
household members.  
Overall, an increase of 3,600 NOK, around +2.2% in 
disposable equivalized income.  
The impact of increasing the number of spaces at childcare 
centers on disposable income is much smaller, namely less 
than 1,000 NOK in the lower 2 quintiles and virtually zero in 
the other three quintiles, due to the moderate impact on 
working hours.  
EC: only 768 
observations, hence not 
included in vote-counting 
procedure. 
Only small number of 
families has access to 
informal cares by others, 
especially grandparents.  
70% of kids aged 1-5 
attended childcare centers 
in 2003 in Norway.  
 
Brink, Nordblom, 
Wahlberg (2007), 
Sweden, 1999. 
Maximum fees reform.  
In 2002, a maximum was introduced in Sweden. 
Simulations are carried out, based on parameters 
obtained from a sophisticated structural labor supply 
model. This model allows estimating pre-reform labor 
supply and disposable income. Then, the maximum 
fee is applied (3% of gross hh income for the 1
st
 child, 
2% for the 2
nd
 and 1% for the 3
rd
, for family incomes 
below 38,000 SEK  this fee is applied to all hh). A 
tax-benefit simulation model from Statistics Sweden. 
Information about CC are simulated: for single 
mothers, number of working hours = use of CC; for 
couples, time in CC = working hours of the parent 
who works the least.  
Single mothers: Disposable income increases by 3.7% overall, 
and by 3.2% in the lower income decile.  
Two-parent families: disposable income increases by 2.7%; in 
the lower income quartile, it increases by 1.7%.  
Distributional impact: two-parent families gain more than 
single mothers and high-income more than low-income 
families. The maximum fee reform keeps the Gini coefficient 
constant, but the P90/P10 ratio increases by 1,8%  reform 
enlarges the gap b/w low and high-income families.  
The low cap makes the fee 
reduction larger for high-
income families.  
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This policy is compared with a theoretical child-
benefit increase that gives the same budgetary 
implications as the maximum fee reform.  
Single mothers and couples w/ children born b/w 
1994 and 1998.  
Fitzpatrick (2010), US, 
2000. Universal pre-
kindergarten in Georgia 
and Oklahoma.  
Georgia and Oklahoma introduced universal 
prekindergarten for all 4-year-olds kids who turned 
4 by September 1, 2000. Program take-up is high: 50 
to 60% of all 4-year-olds.  
Identification of eligible and ineligible kids in the 
1999-2000 school year, kids born within 100 days 
before the cutoff date and 100 days after the 
reform. Census data.  
Outcomes are regressed on the difference b/w date of 
birth (DOB) and cutoff date (number of days), on a 
dummy “born before cutoff date”, an interaction term 
number of days*cutoff, and an eligibility term (born 
in Oklahoma and Georgia before the cutoff date) and 
a set of demographic controls. For the “number of 
days” variable and the interaction term “number of 
days*cutoff”, a polynomial is used (cubic).  
Outcomes pertain to maternal labor supply: 
employment over a year, employment last week 
(Probit), and hours/weeks of work (OLS).  
The policy variable (eligibility) has a positive but insignificant 
impact wage and salary.  
The cutoff variable (child born before cutoff date) has a 
significantly negative impact (-$1,672).  
Analyzing the effect across groups of mothers (single or 
married, w/ or w/o a younger child), one result is significant:  
The policy variable reduces the wage of single mothers who 
also have younger children 
EC: impact on wage, not 
on income, hence not 
included in vote count 
Misra, Moller, Budig 
(2007), 11 countries: 
Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Canada, UK, 
USA. Mid-1990s  
early 2000s.  
Logistic regressions, w/ robust estimator (Huber-
White for heteroskedasticity). Probability of poverty 
is regressed on family benefits (% of social 
insurance), on the % of 1-2-year olds in formal CC, 
paid leave and family leave (including family leave
2
) 
and controls: age, part-time and full-time 
employment, education, partnered or not, parent or 
not, partnered*parent.  
W/o control for paid and family leaves, CC availability has a 
significant and positive antipoverty effect (poverty reduced by 
0.5%). Same result when paid leave is included (-0.4%).  
When family leave and its square are entered, CC availability 
has a positive but insignificant effect on poverty.  
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CC availability Women aged 25-59 
Bäckman, Ferrarini 
(2009), 21 countries, 
2000: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherland, 
Norway, Poland, 
Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US.  
Public CC coverage of 
kids under 3.  
Multilevel, random intercept regression model: odds 
that children are poor are regressed on “traditional” 
policies (child allowances, tax deductions, lump sum 
grants), dual-earner policies (parental insurance 
transfers), age of family head, labor market 
attachment i.e. the # of earners, a female-head dummy 
variable, and interaction terms.  
In some specifications, the public CC coverage of kids 
aged 0-3 is added. Moreover, the coefficients are 
estimated w/ the whole sample or w/ the sample w/o 
postcommunist countries (and w/o Denmark which 
displays very specific patterns).  
HH with pre-school children 
For the whole sample: an increase in public CC coverage has a 
stat significant positive antipoverty impact; conclusions are 
not affected if postcommunist countries are not taken into 
account, nor when both postcommunist countries and 
Denmark aren‟t included in the sample.  
 
Kreyenfeld, Spiess, 
Wagner (2000), 
Germany, 1996. 
CC fees 
Day care fees are expressed as a percentage of 
household equivalized net income, for each income 
quintile.  
Families w/ kids 0-11 years old.  
HH in the bottom quintile spend 4.1% of their income on day 
care fees, while this share amounts to 3.3 in the 2
nd
 quintile, 
3.3 in the 3
rd
, 3.0 in the 4
th
, and 2.3 in the 5
th
, although day 
care fees increase w/ income.  
Hence these fees could increase relative poverty as they seem 
to increase income inequality.  
From the 1920s onward, 
municipalities started 
funding day care for the 
working class. However, 
slots in public funded 
centers are scarce. 
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10 Appendix B: Tables used for the vote counts 
Table B1: Employment effects of minimum wages (141 estimates) 
Study ID Country Policy Population Employment indicator Sign Signif  weight 
LIBERAL CLUSTER         
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers Employment   - NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers Weekly hours + NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers Weeks last year - NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers Annual hours - NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers HS dropouts Employment   - S 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers HS dropouts Weekly hours - S 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers HS dropouts Weeks last year - S 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers HS dropouts Annual hours - S 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers, education >= HS Employment   - NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers  education >= HS Weekly hours + NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers  education >= HS Weeks last year - NS 0.5875 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers  education >= HS Annual hours + NS 0.5875 
VedderG02 US Min wage  full-time full-yr workers in nonagricultural sector hours worked - S 3.525 
VedderG02 US Min wage  full-time full-yr workers in nonagricultural sector overtime hours - S 3.525 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers in lowest decile of wage distribution 
probability of being employed 
(contemporaneous) - NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers in lowest decile of wage distribution probability of being employed (6 months lag) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers in lowest decile of wage distribution probability of being employed (12 months lag) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 10th & 25th percentile 
probability of being employed 
(contemporaneous) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 10th & 25th percentile probability of being employed (6 months lag) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 10th & 25th percentile probability of being employed (12 months lag) - NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 25th & 50th percentile 
probability of being employed 
(contemporaneous) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 25th & 50th percentile probability of being employed (6 months lag) + NS 0.7833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage workers b/w 25th & 50th percentile probability of being employed (12 months lag) + NS 0.7833 
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Sabia09a US Min wage Teenagers, w/o year effects, 1979-1997 employment-to-population ratio of teens - S 1.7625 
Sabia09a US Min wage Teenagers, w/o year effects 1979-2004 employment-to-population ratio of teens - S 1.7625 
Sabia09a US Min wage Teenagers, w/ year effects 1979-1997 employment-to-population ratio of teens - NS 1.7625 
Sabia09a US Min wage Teenagers, w/ year effects 1979-2004 employment-to-population ratio of teens - S 1.7625 
KalenkoskiL07 US Min wage Teenagers, w/o spatial autocorrelation model employment-to-population ratio of teens - S 3.525 
KalenkoskiL07 US Min wage Teenagers, w/o spatial autocorrelation model employment-to-population ratio of teens - S 3.525 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors employment, food & beverage stores + NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment,Supermarkets and other grocery 
stores + NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors employment, Convenience store - NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors employment, specialty food stores + NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors employment, Beer, wine & liquor stores - NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment, food & beverage stores , w/ time 
trends + S 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment,Supermarkets and other grocery 
stores , w/ time trends + NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment, Convenience store , w/ time 
trends + S 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment, specialty food stores , w/ time 
trends + NS 0.705 
AddisonBC09 US Min wage Overall, retail trade sector, 5 subsectors 
employment, Beer, wine & liquor stores , w/ 
time trends + S 0.705 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1989-1992 
log change in employment, w/o business cycle 
control + S 1.175 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1989-1992 
log change in employment, w/ business cycle 
control - NS 1.175 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1995-1998 
log change in employment, w/o business cycle 
control - S 1.175 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1995-1998 
log change in employment, w/ business cycle 
control - S 1.175 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1989-1992, modified fraction affected 
log change in employment, w/o business cycle 
control + S 1.175 
Wessels07 US Min wage Teenagers, 1995-1998, modified fraction affected 
log change in employment, w/ business cycle 
control - NS 1.175 
Thompson09 US Min wage Teenagers w/o state fixed effects high vs low impact counties teen employment share  - S 1.7625 
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Thompson09 US Min wage Teenagers w/ state fixed effects high vs low impact teen employment share  -  S 1.7625 
Thompson09 US Min wage Teenagers, w/o average teen earnings teen employment share  + S 1.7625 
Thompson09 US Min wage Teenagers, w/ average teen earnings teen employment share  + S 1.7625 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage 20-54 natives w/o HS diploma employment rates - NS 1.175 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage 20-54 foreign born non US citizen at birth, w/o HS diploma employment rates + NS 1.175 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage all teenagers employment rates - NS 1.175 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage 20-54 natives w/o HS diploma average hours worked - NS 1.175 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage 20-54 foreign born non US citizen at birth, w/o HS diploma average hours worked - NS 1.175 
OrreniusZ08 US Min wage all teenagers average hours worked - NS 1.175 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, baseline employment - S 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, state-specific trends employment + NS 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, Kaitz index  employment - NS 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, baseline unconditional hours  -  S 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, state-specific trends unconditional hours  + NS 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, baseline conditional hours  + NS 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, 16-64 years, state-specific trends conditional hours  - NS 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, teenagers, baseline employment - S 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, teenagers, baseline unconditional hours  - S 0.705 
Sabia09b  US  Min wage retail industry, teenagers, baseline conditional hours  - NS 0.705 
Grogger03 US Min wage female-headed families employment rate  - NS 3.525 
Grogger03 US Min wage female-headed families number of weeks worked  - NS 3.525 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+, control group 1 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + S 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 2 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + S 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 3 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + S 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 4 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + S 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 5 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + S 0.6409 
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FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 6 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + NS 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 7 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + NS 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 8 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + NS 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 9 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + NS 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 10 
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year + NS 0.6409 
FangG09 Canada Min wage Older workers aged 50+ control group 11  
Probability of being employed in subsequent 
year - NS 0.6409 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-19 years old, current plus lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 20-24 years old,  current plus lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-24 years old,  current plus lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-19 years old, current effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 20-24 years old,  current effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-24 years old,  current effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-19 years old,  lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 20-24 years old,   lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-24 years old,   lagged effects employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 
16-19 years old, current plus lagged effects, fraction-below 
indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 
20-24 years old,  current plus lagged effects, fraction below 
indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 
16-24 years old,  current plus lagged effects, fraction below 
indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-19 years old, current effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 20-24 years old,  current effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - NS 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-24 years old,  current effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-19 years old,  lagged effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 20-24 years old,   lagged effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  - S 0.3917 
CampolGR06 Canada Min wage 16-24 years old,   lagged effects, fraction below indicator employment-to-population ratio for this group  -  S 0.3917 
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HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2001-2003 employment - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2001-2003 employment - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2001, w/ annoucement effects employment + NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2001, w/ annoucements effects employment - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2002, w/ annoucement effects employment + NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2002, w/ annoucements effects employment - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2003, w/ annoucement effects employment - S 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2003, w/ annoucements effects employment - S 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2001 hours worked + NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2002 hours worked + S 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 16-17 years old, 2003 hours worked + NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2001 hours worked - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2002 hours worked - NS 0.5036 
HyslopS05 
New 
Zealand Min wage 18-19 years old, 2003  hours worked - NS 0.5036 
CORPORATIST CONSERVATIVE & MEDITERRANEAN      
  KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage male teens employment rate - S 1.0071 
KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage female teens employment rate - NS 1.0071 
KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage male 20-24 employment rate -  NS 1.0071 
KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage female 20-24 employment rate - NS 1.0071 
KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage male 60+ employment rate -  NS 1.0071 
KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage female 60+ employment rate - NS 1.0071 
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KawaguchiM09 Japan Min wage married 20-59 women employment rate - S 1.0071 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 1 growth rate of employment + NS 1.175 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 2 growth rate of employment - NS 1.175 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 3 growth rate of employment - NS 1.175 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 4 growth rate of employment + NS 1.175 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 5 growth rate of employment + NS 1.175 
Ragacs03 Austria Collective Aggregated data for industry, equation 6 growth rate of employment + NS 1.175 
PortugalC06  Portugal Min wage Teenagers'  total employment 1988 
overall effect: hired/separated/firms out of 
business/new firms + S 3.525 
PortugalC07 Portugal Min wage Teenagers' total employment  1989 
overall effect: hired/separated/firms out of 
business/new firms - S 3.525 
AbowdKMP00 France  Min wage Male workers w/ wage b/w old and new min wage 
probability (employed in year t+1) conditional 
on employment in year t - S 3.525 
AbowdKMP00 France  Min wage Female workers w/ wage b/w old and new min wage 
probability (employed in year t+1) conditional 
on employment in year t - S 3.525 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CLUSTER          
BöckermanU09 Finland Collective Wokers under 25, when subminimum removed employment - S 1.7625 
BöckermanU09 Finland Collective Wokers under 25, when subminimum removed hours - S 1.7625 
BöckermanU09 Finland Collective Wokers under 25, when subminimum removed 
employment, interaction terms (business 
cycle*treatment) - NS 1.7625 
BöckermanU09 Finland Collective Wokers under 25, when subminimum removed hours (business cycle*treatment) - NS 1.7625 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled, hotels/restaurants, full sample 1979-91, min wage 
increases 
probability not employed in next period, 
control vs treatment - S 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled, hotels/restaurants, 2-year panels, 1979-91, min 
wage increases 
probability not employed in next period, 
control vs treatment - S 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled, hotels/restaurants, full sample 1979-91, min wage 
increases ", but decreases in the minimum wage - S 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled, hotels/restaurants, 2-year panels, 1979-91, min 
wage increases ", but decreases in the minimum wage - S 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled 20-65, hotels/restaurants, full sample 1993-1998, 
min wage increases 
probability not employed in next period, 
control vs treatment - NS 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled 20-65, hotels/restaurants, 2-year panels, 1993-
1998, min wage increases 
probability not employed in next period, 
control vs treatment + S 0.8813 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective Unskilled 18-19, hotels/restaurants, full sample 1993-1998, probability not employed in next period, + NS 0.8813 
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min wage increases control vs treatment 
Skedinger04 Sweden Collective 
Unskilled 18-19, hotels/restaurants, 2-year panels, 1993-
1998, min wage increases 
probability not employed in next period, 
control vs treatment + NS 0.8813 
         
Table B2: Antipoverty effects of minimum wages (87 estimates) 
   
Study ID 
Countr
y Policy Population Poverty indicator Sign Signif weight 
LIBERAL CLUSTER         
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers high school dropouts headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
Sabia08 US Min wage Single mothers w/ at least HS diploma headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
Sabia08 US Min wage Working single mothers headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
Sabia08 US Min wage Working single mothers HS dropouts headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
Sabia08 US Min wage Working single mothers w/ at least HS diploma headcount (official line) + NS 0.8056 
VedderG02 US Min wage  full-time full-yr workers in nonagricultural sector headcount (official line) - NS 4.8333 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, contemporaneous Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, lagged effect Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, total effect Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, contemporaneous Nonpoor->poor (official) - NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, lagged effect Nonpoor->poor (official) - S 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage All families, total effect Nonpoor->poor (official) - S 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1, contemporaneous Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1 lagged effect Poor->non poor (official) - NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1 total effect Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1, contemporaneous Nonpoor->poor (official) - NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1 lagged effect Nonpoor->poor (official) - S 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/ 1 worker in year 1 total effect Nonpoor->poor (official) - S 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1, contemporaneous Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
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NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1 lagged effect Poor->non poor (official) - NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1 total effect Poor->non poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1, contemporaneous Nonpoor->poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1 lagged effect Nonpoor->poor (official) - NS 0.2685 
NeumarkW02 US Min wage Families w/o worker in year 1 total effect Nonpoor->poor (official) + NS 0.2685 
HellerClain07 US Min wage County population, fixed-effects headcount (official line) + NS 2.4167 
HellerClain07 US Min wage County population, diff-in-diff model headcount (official line) + NS 2.4167 
BurkhauserS07 US Min wage State population headcount (official line) + NS 1.2083 
BurkhauserS07 US Min wage State working population headcount (official line) + NS 1.2083 
BurkhauserS07 US Min wage Single mothers headcount (official line) + NS 1.2083 
BurkhauserS07 US Min wage Working single mothers headcount (official line) - NS 1.2083 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage All families  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + S 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage All families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) + NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Female-headed families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Female-headed families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) + NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Married-couple families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Married-couple families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage White families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + S 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage White families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Black families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + NS 0.4833 
GundersenZ04 US Min wage Black families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.4833 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage All families P(family income< official poverty line) + S 1.6111 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage All families, 6-month lag P(family income< official poverty line) + NS 1.6111 
NeumarkA03 US Min wage All families, 12-month lag P(family income< official poverty line) + NS 1.6111 
NeumarkSW05 US Min wage All families Proportion of income-to-needs ratio b/w 0-0.5 - NS 1.6111 
NeumarkSW05 US Min wage All families Proportion of income-to-needs ratio b/w 0.5-1 - NS 1.6111 
NeumarkSW05 US Min wage All families Proportion of income-to-needs ratio b/w 0-1 - NS 1.6111 
VedderG01 US Min wage Overall poverty  headcount (official line) + NS 2.4167 
VedderG01 US Min wage Overall poverty, 1st difference estimator  headcount (official line) missing NS 2.4167 
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Grogger03 US Min wage Female-headed families Income + NS 2.4167 
Grogger03 US Min wage Female-headed families Log income - NS 2.4167 
MorganK01 US  Min wage Children, no state dummies child poverty rate (official threshold) + S 2.4167 
MorganK01 US  Min wage Children, state dummies child poverty rate (official threshold) + S 2.4167 
GiannarelliMW07 US Min wage Workers  
headcount (ad hoc threshold yielding rates 
similar to official figures) + 
-
6.30% 4.8333 
NeumarkW01 US min wage All families, contemporaneous P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage All families, lagged effect P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids, contemp. P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids, lagged effect P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & no worker at t, contemp. P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & no workers, lagged effect P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t, contemp. P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & at least 1 workers, lagged effect P(nonpoor at t+1, poor at t) pre-tax + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage All families, contemporaneous Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage All families, lagged effect Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids, contemp. Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids, lagged effect Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & no worker at t, contemp. Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) - NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & no workers, lagged effect Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t, contemp. Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.3021 
NeumarkW01 US min wage Families w/ kids & at least 1 workers, lagged effect Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.3021 
Bargain09 UK Min wage Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0, 60% of median 
income) + 
-
4.60% 1.6111 
Bargain09 UK Min wage Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 1, 60% of median 
income) zero zero 1.6111 
Bargain09 UK Min wage Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2, 60% of median 
income) zero zero 1.6111 
Sutherland01 UK Min wage people in working-age family headcount (poverty line=60% median) + 
-
1.20% 1.6111 
Sutherland01 UK Min wage single people headcount (poverty line=60% median) + 
-
3.70% 1.6111 
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Sutherland01 UK Min wage couples with children headcount (poverty line=60% median) + 
-
7.10% 1.6111 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 16-17 years old, 2001 log weekly income + NS 0.8056 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 16-17 years old, 2002 log weekly income + NS 0.8056 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 16-17 years old, 2003 log weekly income + NS 0.8056 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 18-19 years old, 2001 log weekly income + NS 0.8056 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 18-19 years old, 2002 log weekly income + NS 0.8056 
HyslopS05 NZ Min wage 18-19 years old, 2003  log weekly income - NS 0.8056 
CORPORATIST CONSERVATIVE & MEDITERRANEAN        0 
MüllerS08 Germany Collective Household affected by min wage of 7.5€/hour 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0, poverty= below 
50% of median income) + 
-
1.60% 1.6111 
MüllerS08 Germany Collective Household affected by min wage of 7.5€/hour 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 1, poverty= below 
50% of median income) + 
-
1.60% 1.6111 
MüllerS08 Germany Collective Household affected by min wage of 7.5€/hour 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2, poverty= below 
50% of median income) + 
-
1.80% 1.6111 
GerfinLBT02 CH Min wage 1 Poverty rate among HH w/ at least full-time job poverty rate + 
-
22.7% 2.4167 
GerfinLBT02 CH Min wage 2 Poverty rate among HH w/ at least full-time job poverty rate + 
-
18.2% 2.4167 
 
 
       
Table B3: Employment effects of tax credits (162 estimates) 
   Study ID Country Policy Population Employment indicator Sign Signif. weight 
LIBERAL CLUSTER         
Ellwood00 US EITC Single mothers 18-44 Employment difference b/w skill quartiles + S 3.17647 
Ellwood00 US EITC Married mothers 18-44 Employment difference b/w skill quartiles - S 3.17647 
Ellwood00 US EITC All mothers  Employment + S 3.17647 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children , state EITC P(add an adult worker if no worker in year 1) + S 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children, federal EITC  P(add an adult worker if no worker in year 1) + S 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children , state EITC P(add an adult worker if 1 worker in year 1) + NS 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children, federal EITC  P(add an adult worker if 1 worker in year 1) - NS 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children , state EITC Change in total hours if no adult worker in year + NS 1.19118 
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1 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children, federal EITC  
Change in total hours if no adult worker in year 
1 + S 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children , state EITC 
Change in total hours if 1 adult worker in year 
1 + NS 1.19118 
NeumarkW01 US  EITC Families with children, federal EITC  
Change in total hours if 1 adult worker in year 
1 - S 1.19118 
EissaH04 US EITC Married women with children Labor force participation rates - S 2.38235 
EissaH04 US EITC Married women with 2+ children Labor force participation rates - S 2.38235 
EissaH04 US EITC Married men with children Labor force participation rates + NS 2.38235 
EissaH04 US EITC Married men with 2+ children Labor force participation rates + NS 2.38235 
Grogger03 US EITC female-headed families Employment rate + S 4.76471 
Grogger03 US EITC female-headed families Weeks worked  + S 4.76471 
Herbst08 US EITC Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Work + S 1.58824 
Herbst08 US EITC Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Full-time full-year work - S 1.58824 
Herbst08 US EITC ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Work + S 1.58824 
Herbst08 US EITC ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Full-time full-year work - NS 1.58824 
Herbst08 US EITC ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Work + S 1.58824 
Herbst08 US EITC ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Full-time full-year work - NS 1.58824 
NoonanSC07 US EITC Single mothers Employment  + S 1.90588 
NoonanSC07 US EITC Single mothers*HS dropouts Employment + S 1.90588 
NoonanSC07 US EITC Single mothers*HS   Employment + S 1.90588 
NoonanSC07 US EITC Single mothers*Some college Employment + S 1.90588 
NoonanSC07 US EITC Single mothers*College Employment + NS 1.90588 
MeyerR01 US  EITC All single mothers Probability of employment (year) + S 1.58823 
MeyerR01 US  EITC All single mothers Probability of employment (last week) + S 1.58823 
MeyerR01 US  EITC single mothers, < 12 years of education Probability of employment (year) + S 1.58823 
MeyerR01 US  EITC single mothers, < 12 years of education Probability of employment (last week) + S 1.58823 
MeyerR01 US  EITC single mothers, >= 12 years of education Probability of employment (year) + S 1.58823 
MeyerR01 US  EITC single mothers, >= 12 years of education Probability of employment (last week) + S 1.58823 
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Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45, youngest child 0-2 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45, youngest child 0-2 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 3-4 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 3-4 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 5-10 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 5-10 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 11-18 Employment +  S 0.79412 
Blundell06 UK  WFTC Single mothers under 45 youngest child 11-18 Hours worked +  S 0.79412 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Lone mothers  Employment rate + 
11.30
% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Lone mothers  Average weekly hours (unconditional) + 
12.50
% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Lone mothers  Average weekly hours (workers) + 2.70% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Mothers in couples Employment rate - 
-
0.80% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Mothers in couples Average weekly hours (unconditional) - 
-
0.90% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Mothers in couples Average weekly hours (workers) - 0 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Fathers in couples Employment rate + 0.80% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Fathers in couples Average weekly hours (unconditional) - 0.70% 1.05882 
BrewerDSS06 UK  WFTC Fathers in couples Average weekly hours (workers) + 0 1.05882 
Blundell00 UK  WFTC Lone parents  Employment  + 2.20% 1.58823 
Blundell00 UK  WFTC Married women, partner not working Employment  + 1.32% 1.58823 
Blundell00 UK  WFTC Married women, partner working Employment  - 
-
0.57% 1.58823 
Blundell00 UK  WFTC Married men, partner not working  Employment  + 0.37 1.58823 
Blundell00 UK  WFTC Married men, partner working  Employment  - 
-
0.30% 1.58823 
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Blundell00 UK  WFTC Workerless families  Employment  + 
-
57,000 
familie
s 1.58823 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, partner works 0-16 hrs  P(working 16+ hours) +  S 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, partner works 0-16 hrs  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, partner works 16+ hrs P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, partner works 16+ hrs P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, low educational level  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women,  low educational level P(working 30+ hours) + S 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, low educational level, partner works 0-
16 hrs  P(working 16+ hours) +  S 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, low educational level, partner works 0-
16 hrs  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, low educational level, partner works 
16+ hrs P(working 16+ hours) +  NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, low educational level, partner works 
16+ hrs P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women, high educational level  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married women,  high educational level P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, high educational level, partner works 
0-16 hrs  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, high educational level, partner works 
0-16 hrs  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, high educational level, partner works 
16+ hrs P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC 
Married women, high educational level, partner works 
16+ hrs P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men, partner works 0-16 hrs  P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men, partner works 0-16 hrs  P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
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FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men, partner works 16+ hrs P(working 16+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
FrancescRK09 UK  WFTC Married men, partner works 16+ hrs P(working 30+ hours) + NS 0.39706 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC Lone mothers (vs. Single women) P(being employed) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC Lone parents  (vs. Single adults no child) P(being employed) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC Lone mothers (vs. Mothers in couples) P(being employed) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC Lone parents (vs. Parents in couple)  P(being employed) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC 
Single mothers not working at t-1 (vs. Childless single 
women) P(entering employment) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC 
Single mothers not working at t-1 (vs. Mothers in 
couples) P(entering employment) + NS 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC 
Single mothers not working at t-1 (vs. Childless single 
women) P(exiting employment) + S 1.19118 
GreggHS09 UK  WFTC 
Single mothers not working at t-1 (vs. Mothers in 
couples) P(exiting employment) + S 1.19118 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 1  Unemployment rate + 
-
2.80% 2.38235 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 2  Unemployment rate + 
-
3.30% 2.38235 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 3  Unemployment rate + 
-
2.80% 2.38235 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 4  Unemployment rate + 
-
3.30% 2.38235 
CORPORATIST CONSERVATIVE & MEDITERRANEAN        
 
BargainO05 France  WFTC Married women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) - 
-
4.32% 1.05882 
BargainO05 France  WFTC Single women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) + 0.51% 1.05882 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Married women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) - 
-
1.43% 1.05882 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Single women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) + 1.72% 1.05882 
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BargainO05 France  WFTC Women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) - 
-
3.00% 1.05882 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) - 
-
0.60% 1.05882 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single childless women, West  Change in employment  zero  0.02% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single mothers, West Change in employment  + 6.47% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single childless women, East Change in employment  + 0.36% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single mothers, East Change in employment  + 
15.00
% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single women Change in employment  + 5.00% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single men w/o children (West+East) Change in employment  + 0.27% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single men w/ children (West+East) Change in employment  + 1.73% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single men  Change in employment  + 0.44% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Childless women in couples, West  Change in employment  zero 0.01% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Mothers in couples, West Change in employment  - 
-
1.33% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC childless women in couples, East Change in employment  zero 0.00% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Mothers in couples, East Change in employment  - 
-
1.50% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Women in couples Change in employment  - 
-
0.81% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Childless men in couples, West  Change in employment  zero 0.00% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Fathers in couples, West Change in employment  zero 
-
0.04% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC childless men in couples, East Change in employment  zero 
-
0.02% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Fathers in couples, East Change in employment  - 
-
1.27% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Men in couples Change in employment  - 
-
0.16% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single childless women, West  Change in number of hours zero 0.04% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single mothers, West Change in number of hours + 5.95% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single childless women, East Change in number of hours + 0.59% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single mothers, East Change in number of hours + 15.17 0.26471 
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% 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single women Change in number of hours + 2.58% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single men w/o children (West+East) Change in number of hours + 0.27% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC single men w/ children (West+East) Change in number of hours + 1.18% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Single men  Change in number of hours + 0.31% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Childless women in couples, West  Change in number of hours zero 0.01% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Mothers in couples, West Change in number of hours - 
-
1.41% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC childless women in couples, East Change in number of hours zero 0.01% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Mothers in couples, East Change in number of hours - 
-
2.17% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Women in couples Change in number of hours - 
-
0.85% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Childless men in couples, West  Change in number of hours zero 
-
0.01% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Fathers in couples, West Change in number of hours zero 
-
0.49% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC childless men in couples, East Change in number of hours zero 
-
0.02% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Fathers in couples, East Change in number of hours - 
-
1.71% 0.26471 
HaanM07 Germany WTC Men in couples Change in number of hours - 
-
0.05% 0.26471 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Married women, logit P(employment) - S 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Cohabiting women, logit P(employment) + NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Single women, logit P(employment) - NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Women, logit  P(employment) - NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Married women, random effect logit P(employment) - NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Cohabiting women, random effect logit P(employment) + NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Single women, random effect logit P(employment) - NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Women, random effect logit  P(employment) + NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE Married women against cohabitants P(employment) - S 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE ", random effect logit P(employment) - S 0.79412 
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Stancanell08 France  PPE Lone parents vs childless single women  P(employment) - NS 0.79412 
Stancanell08 France  PPE ", random effect logit P(employment) zero NS 0.79412 
BloemenS07 France  PPE All women Employment probability - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Married women Employment probability - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Cohabiting women Employment probability - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Single women Employment probability - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE All women Working hours  - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Married women Working hours  + NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Cohabiting women Working hours  - NS 1.19118 
BloemenS07 France  PPE Single women Working hours  - NS 1.19118 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) + 0.14% 1.05882 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Married women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) - 
-
1.17% 1.05882 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Single women 
Overall (Non-work to work and work to non-
work) + 1.85% 1.05882 
        
 
       Table B4: Antipoverty effects of tax credits (51 estimates) 
Study ID Country Policy Population Poverty indicator Sign Signif weight 
UNITED STATES          
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC All families  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC All families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC Female-headed families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC Female-headed families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC Married-couple families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US state-federal Married-couple families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.51 
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EITC 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC White families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) + NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC White families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) + NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC Black families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0) - NS 0.51 
GundersenZ04 US 
state-federal 
EITC Black families Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2) - NS 0.51 
MorganK01 US  EITC Children, no state dummies child poverty rate (official threshold) + S 2.55 
MorganK01 US  EITC Children, state dummies child poverty rate (official threshold) + NS 2.55 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  All families P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income + NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income + NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  All families P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income - S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  All families Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  All families Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids & no worker at t P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids & no worker at t P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income + S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t P(nonpoor at t, poor at t-1), pre-tax income + S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids & no worker at t Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  
Federal 
EITC  Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) - NS 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids & no worker at t Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.31875 
NeumarkW01 US  State EITC  Families w/ kids & at least 1 worker at t Change in income-to-needs ratio (pre-tax) + S 0.31875 
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Grogger03 US EITC  Female-headed families Income + NS 2.55 
Grogger03 US EITC Female-headed families Log(income) - NS 2.55 
GianarellMW07 US 
EITC 
extension Workers  
headcount (ad hoc threshold yielding rates 
similar to official figures) + -6% 5.1 
OTHER LIBERAL COUNTRIES        0 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 1  Average income + 3.90% 1.275 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 2  Average income + 4.30% 1.275 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 3  Average income + 8.10% 1.275 
ScarthT08 Canada 
Working 
Income Tax 
Benefit Poorest decile of income distribution, setting 4  Average income + 8.60% 1.275 
Bargain09 UK WFTC  Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 0, 60% of median 
income) + 
-
0.80% 1.7 
Bargain09 UK WFTC  Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 1, 60% of median 
income) + 
-
0.10% 1.7 
Bargain09 UK WFTC  Population 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (α= 2, 60% of median 
income) 0 0 1.7 
Continental Europe (+ Finland)       0 
BargainO05 France WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (60% median) + 
-
12.40
% 0.56667 
BargainO05 France WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (50% median) + 
-
9.70% 0.56667 
BargainO05 France WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (40% median) + 
-
6.60% 0.56667 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (60% median) + 
-
5.60% 0.56667 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (50% median) + 
-
4.40% 0.56667 
BargainO05 Germany WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (40% median) + - 0.56667 
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3.70% 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (60% median) + 
-
3.60% 0.56667 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (50% median) + 
-
0.90% 0.56667 
BargainO05 Finland WFTC Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (40% median) + … 0.56667 
BargainT02 France PPE (2003) Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (50% median) + 
-
0.60% 2.55 
BargainT02 France PPE (2003) Overall poverty rate Poverty rate (60% median) + 
-
0.20% 2.55 
GerfinLBT02 Switzerland EITC Poverty rate among HH w/ at least full-time job Poverty rate 0 0 2.55 
GerfinLBT02 Switzerland WFTC Poverty rate among HH w/ at least full-time job Poverty rate - 4.50% 2.55 
         
 
 
Table B5: Employment effects of family cash benefits (66 estimates) 
Study ID Country Policy Population Employment indicator Sign Signif weight 
WHOLE SAMPLE         
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,UK 
Family 
allowances married/cohabiting women 21-45 Probability of working  - S 
1.99999
998 
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,UK 
Family 
allowances ", with tertiary education Probability of working  - NS 
1.99999
998 
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,UK 
Family 
allowances ", with less than tertiary education Probability of working  - S 
1.99999
998 
SanchezMSM08 Spain  
Empl-
conditional 
child benefit married women under 45 Probability of employment +  S 1.5 
SanchezMSM08 Spain  
Empl-
conditional 
child benefit ", elementary educational level Probability of employment +  NS 1.5 
SanchezMSM08 Spain  
Empl-
conditional 
child benefit ", secondary Probability of employment +  S 1.5 
275 
 
SanchezMSM08 Spain  
Empl-
conditional 
child benefit ", tertiary Probability of employment +  NS 1.5 
Berninger09 Germany 
Family 
transfers Mothers of children <16, aged 25-60 Odds employment - NS 6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB Single women on welfare P(+ earnings) +  S 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare P(+ earnings) +  S 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare, specification2 P(+ earnings) +  S 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB Single women on welfare Weeks worked +  NS 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare Weeks worked +  NS 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare, specification2 Weeks worked +  NS 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB Single women on welfare Hours worked +  S 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare Hours worked +  NS 
0.66666
6 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare, specification2 Hours worked +  S 
0.66666
6 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  Married/cohabiting couples w/ kid 1-6 Specialization  +  S 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  Married/cohabiting couples w/ kid 1-6 Market intensity - S 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  Married/cohabiting couples w/ kid 1-6 wife's hours - S 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  Married/cohabiting couples w/ kid 1-7 husband's hours +  NS 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife university degree Specialization  +  S 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife's education < tertiary Specialization  +  NS 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife university degree Market intensity - NS 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife's education < tertiary Market intensity - NS 0.49999
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9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife university degree wife's hours - S 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife's education < tertiary wife's hours - NS 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife university degree husband's hours +  NS 
0.49999
9 
Naz2004 Norway Cash-for-care  ", wife's education < tertiary husband's hours +  NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% single mothers, kids under 5 labor force participation - -1% 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% ", lower income quartile labor force participation - 
-
6.50% 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% single mothers, kids under 5 Hours worked - 
-
2.40% 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% ", lower income quartile Hours worked - 
-
5.40% 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples husband's labor force participation zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples, lower quartile husband's labor force participation zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples husband's hours of work zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples, lower quartile husband's hours of work zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples wife's labor force participation zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples, lower quartile wife's labor force participation zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples wife's hours of work zero NS 
0.49999
9 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples, lower quartile wife's hours of work zero NS 
0.49999
9 
vDammeKU09 
13 EU 
countries 
welfare+child 
allowance+si
ngle-parent 
allowance separated women,didn't work before breakup odds(entry into employment) - S 1.2 
vDammeKU09 13 EU welfare+child ", controlling for gender values odds(entry into employment) - S 1.2 
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countries allowance+si
ngle-parent 
allowance 
vDammeKU09 
13 EU 
countries 
welfare+child 
allowance+si
ngle-parent 
allowance ", control: allowance*ex-partner bottom income quartile odds(entry into employment) - NS 1.2 
vDammeKU09 
13 EU 
countries 
welfare+child 
allowance+si
ngle-parent 
allowance ", control: CC*kid 0-6/kid 7-15 odds(entry into employment) - S 1.2 
vDammeKU09 
13 EU 
countries 
welfare+child 
allowance+si
ngle-parent 
allowance separated women, worked before breakup odds (exit) - NS 1.2 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Work - S 
0.99999
96 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Full-time full-year work - S 
0.99999
96 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Work - NS 
0.99999
96 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Full-time full-year work - NS 
0.99999
96 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Work - NS 
0.99999
96 
Herbst 2008 US 
AFDC/TANF 
max, non 
working 
mother ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Full-time full-year work - NS 
0.99999
96 
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MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP single women  P(employment last week) - S 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education < 12 years P(employment last week) - NS 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education = 12 years P(employment last week) - NS 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education > 12 years P(employment last week) - NS 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP single women  P(employment last year) - S 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education < 12 years P(employment last year) - NS 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education = 12 years P(employment last year) - NS 0.75 
MeyerR01 US 
max 
AFDC/FSP ", education > 12 years P(employment last year) - NS 0.75 
Cho06 Korea 
Child 
allowances Women aged 20-40 w/ at least 1 child Employment  rate - 
-
5.40% 3 
Cho06 Korea 
Child 
allowances ", within 6 years since birth Employment  rate - 
-
13.90
% 3 
Jaeger10 10 countries 
Family cash 
benefits Mothers aged 25-40 or 25-54 labor force participation - NS 1.5 
Jaeger10 10 countries 
Family cash 
benefits Mothers aged 25-40 or 25-54 Full-time work - S 1.5 
Jaeger10 10 countries 
Family cash 
benefits ", w/ interaction terms labor force participation - NS 1.5 
Jaeger10 10 countries 
Family cash 
benefits ", w/ interaction terms Full-time work - S 1.5 
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Table B6: Antipoverty effects of family cash benefits (29 estimates) 
    Study ID Country Policy Population Poverty indicator Sign Signif weight 
WHOLE SAMPLE 
     
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB Single women on welfare Change in total income 
+ NS 1.38095
2 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare Change in total income 
+ S  1.38095
2 
MilliganS07 Canada 
Clawback 
state*NCB all singles on welfare, specification2 Change in total income 
+ S  1.38095
2 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% single mothers, kids under 5 disposable income 
+ 4.60% 1.03571
4 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% ", lower income quartile disposable income 
+ 4.30% 1.03571
4 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples disposable income 
+ 1.50% 1.03571
4 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  
child benefit 
+60% two-parent couples, lower quartile disposable income 
+ 2.30% 1.03571
4 
MisraMB07 11 countries 
Family benefits 
(% total social 
insurance) Women aged 25-59, control: CC availability p(poverty) 
+ S  1.03571
4 
MisraMB07 11 countries 
Family benefits 
(% total social 
insurance) ", ", further control: paid leave p(poverty) 
+ NS 1.03571
4 
MisraMB07 11 countries 
Family benefits 
(% total social 
insurance) ", ", further: family leave p(poverty) 
+ S 1.03571
4 
MisraMB07 11 countries 
Family benefits 
(% total social 
insurance) ", ", ", further: family leave squared p(poverty) 
+ NS 1.03571
4 
GiannarelliMW0
7 USA 
Child tax credit 
full refundable workers, no employment effect number of poor 
+ 
-
9.30% 1.38095
2 
GiannarelliMW0
7 USA 
CC subsidies & 
CCTC workers, no employment effects number of poor 
+ 
-
2.80% 1.38095
2 
GiannarelliMW0
7 USA 
CC subsidies & 
CCTC workers, employment effects accounted for number of poor 
+ 
-
1.38095
2 
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7.60% 
MorganK01 USA 
average 
AFDC/FSP children, no state dummies child poverty rate 
- NS 1.38095
2 
MorganK01 USA 
average 
AFDC/FSP children, state dummies child poverty rate 
+ NS 1.38095
2 
MorganK01 USA 
average 
AFDC/FSP children, only significant state dummies child poverty rate 
+ S 1.38095
2 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers male breadwinner+homemaker, 2 kids odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", control for # of earners odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", male vs. female head odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", ", interaction terms  odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", ", interaction terms 2  odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", control for public CC coverage of kids<3 odds(child poverty) 
+ S 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", w/o postsocialist EU countries odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", ", control for CC coverage odds(child poverty) 
+ S 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", w/o postsocialist & Denmark odds(child poverty) 
+ NS 0.41428
5 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
parental 
insurance 
transfers ", ", control for CC coverage odds(child poverty) 
+ S 0.41428
5 
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Frick07 15 countries 
Family benefits 
(% GDP) kids who're poor w/o family benefits poverty severity reduction (FGT) 
+ S 2.07142
8 
Frick07 15 countries 
Family benefits 
(% GDP) ", welfare regimes instead of countries poverty severity reduction (FGT) 
+ S 2.07142
8 
          
 
Table B7: Employment effects of childcare availability and cost (171 estimates) 
    Study ID Country Policy Population Employment indicator Sign Signif weight 
WHOLE SAMPLE         
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,U
K 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-2) married/cohabiting women 21-45 Probability of working  +  S  
2.84999
997 
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,U
K 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-2) ", with tertiary education Probability of working  +  S  
2.84999
997 
DelBocaPP08 
BE,DK,F,I,
NL,ESP,U
K 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-2) ", with less than tertiary education Probability of working  +  S  
2.84999
997 
Berninger09 Germany 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-3) Mothers of children <16, aged 25-60 odds (employment) +  S  
2.84999
997 
Berninger09 Germany 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-3) ", specification 2 odds (employment) +  S  
2.84999
997 
Berninger09 Germany 
CC availability 
(% 0f 0-3) ", specification 3 odds (employment) +  S  
2.84999
997 
DelBocaV07 Italy CC availability Married mothers w/ youngest kid<3 P(mother works) +  S  1.71 
DelBocaV07 Italy CC costs Married mothers w/ youngest kid<4 P(mother works) -  NS 1.71 
DelBocaV07 Italy 
CC 
availability&co
st Married mothers w/ youngest kid<5 P(mother works) -  S  1.71 
DelBocaV07 Italy CC availability ", no interaction term P(mother works) +  S  1.71 
DelBocaV07 Italy CC costs ", no interaction term P(mother works) -  NS 1.71 
BlauT07 USA CC subsidy single mothers, kids under 13 P(employment) +  S  4.275 
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BlauT07 USA CC subsidy ", w/ lagged variables P(employment) +  S  4.275 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees single mothers, kids under 5 labor force participation +  0.70% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees ", lower income quartile labor force participation +  4.60% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees single mothers, kids under 5 hours worked +  1.40% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees ", lower income quartile hours worked +  
16.50
% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples husband's labor force participation +  0.20% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples, lower quartile husband's labor force participation +  1.30% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples husband's hours of work zero NS 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples, lower quartile husband's hours of work +  0.30% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples wife's labor force participation +  0.40% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples, lower quartile wife's labor force participation +  2.50% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples wife's hours of work +  0.50% 0.7125 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples, lower quartile wife's hours of work +  3.10% 0.7125 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5  mothers in 2-parent families maternal employment +  S  1.425 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", kids 0-2 maternal employment +  S  1.425 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", kids 3-4 maternal employment +  S  1.425 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 single mothers maternal employment +  NS 1.425 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 mothers 2-parent families, <=high school maternal employment +  NS 1.425 
BakerGM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", some post-high school maternal employment +  S  1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees Two-parent hh w/ at least 1 child 1-9 P(mother in employment) -  S  1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees Two-parent hh w/ at least 1 child 1-9 % of full-time  -  NS 1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees ", w/ hh type fixed effects  P(mother in employment) -  NS 1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees ", w/ hh type fixed effects  % of full-time  -  NS 1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees ", ", w/interaction terms P(mother in employment) -  NS 1.425 
LundinMÖ08 Sweden  CC fees ", ", w/interaction terms % of full-time  -  NS 1.425 
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PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, OLS impact of marriage on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, OLS impact of kid 0-3 on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, OLS impact of kid 4-6 on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, OLS impact of kid on P(employmt) +  NS 0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, random effects impact of marriage on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, random effects impact of kid 0-3 on P(employmt) +  NS 0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, random effects impact of kid 4-6 on P(employmt) +  NS 0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, random effects impact of kid on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, 3rd specification impact of marriage on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, 3rd specification impact of kid 0-3 on P(employmt) +  NS 0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, 3rd specification impact of kid 4-6 on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
PettitHk2005 19 countries 
CC availability 
(% of 0-2) Women 18-65, 3rd specification impact of kid on P(employmt) +  S  0.7125 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date work in previous year -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date work in previous year -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date work in previous week -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date work in previous week -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date hours per week -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date hours per week -  NS 1.06875 
Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date weeks worked +  NS 1.06875 
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Fitzpatrick10 USA 
universal pre-
K, 4 yrs old kids born 100 days before/after cutoff date weeks worked -  S  1.06875 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5  Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 labor force participation 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 labor force participation 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 labor force participation 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 weeks worked 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 weeks worked 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 weeks worked 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 hours of work 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 hours of work 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 Mothers w/ at least 1 kid 6-11 & none<6 hours of work 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school labor force participation 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school labor force participation 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school labor force participation 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school labor force participation 2002 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school labor force participation 2003 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school labor force participation 2004 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school weeks worked 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school weeks worked 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school weeks worked 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
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LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school weeks worked 2002 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school weeks worked 2003 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school weeks worked 2004 +  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school hours of work 2002 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school hours of work 2003 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", <= high school hours of work 2004 +  S  
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school hours of work 2002 +  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school hours of work 2003 -  NS 
0.31666
667 
LefebvreMV0
9 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 ", > high school hours of work 2004 +  NS 
0.31666
667 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Lone parents, kids under 12  hours of work + 
-
1.40% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Lone parents, kids under 12  participation  + 
-
1.50% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Fathers in couples, kids under 12  hours of work zero NS 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Fathers in couples, kids under 12  participation  zero NS 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Mothers in couples, kids under 12  hours of work + 
-
0.30% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
10% increase in 
net costs Mothers in couples, kids under 12  participation  + 
-
0.20% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Lone parents, kids under 12  hours of work + 
-
1.60% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Lone parents, kids under 12  participation  + 
-
1.90% 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Fathers in couples, kids under 12  hours of work zero NS 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Fathers in couples, kids under 12  participation  zero NS 0.7125 
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KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Mothers in couples, kids under 12  hours of work zero NS 0.7125 
KalbWSL08 Australia 
gross hourly 
cost +10% Mothers in couples, kids under 12  participation  zero NS 0.7125 
VanHamM05 Netherlands 
# of CC slots 
within 10 
minutes' travel Mothers w/ kids 0-6 log odds(work >12 hrs/week) +  S  8.55 
UunkKM05 
13 EU 
countries 
# public 
spaces/kid 0-3 Women 20-40 married/cohabiting, 1st childbirth ∆ working hours after 1st child +  S  2.1375 
UunkKM05 
14 EU 
countries 
# public 
spaces/kid 0-4 ", controlling for GDP ∆ working hours after 1st child +  S  2.1375 
UunkKM05 
15 EU 
countries 
# public 
spaces/kid 0-5 ", controlling for gender values ∆ working hours after 1st child +  NS 2.1375 
UunkKM05 
16 EU 
countries 
# public 
spaces/kid 0-6 ", controlling for GDP and gender values ∆ working hours after 1st child +  S  2.1375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years mothers 18-56 w/ at least 1 kid <6 years, 1999 participation  +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2000 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2001 participation  +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2002 participation  +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years mothers 18-56 w/ at least 1 kid <6 years, 1999 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2000 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2001 annual hours +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2002 annual hours +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years mothers 18-56 w/ at least 1 kid <6 years, 1999 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2000 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", 2001 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC $5 fee for all ", 2002 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
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<5 years 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education<= high school, 1999 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education<= high school, 1999 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education<= high school, 1999 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education > high school, 1999 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 participation  +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education > high school, 1999 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 annual hours +  NS 0.2375 
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LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 annual hours +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 annual hours +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", education > high school, 1999 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2000 annual weeks +  NS 0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2001 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
LefebvreM08 Canada/QC 
$5 fee for all 
<5 years ", ", 2002 annual weeks +  S  0.2375 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 separated women,didn't work before breakup odds(entry into employment) +  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 ", controlling for gender values odds(entry into employment) +  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 
", control: allowance*ex-partner bottom income 
quartile odds(entry into employment) +  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 ", control: CC*kid 0-6/kid 7-15 odds(entry into employment) +  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 separated women, worked before breakup odds (increase in hours) -  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 separated women, worked before breakup odds (decrease in hours) +  S  
1.22142
821 
vDammeKU0
9 
13 EU 
countries 
# public CC 
slots/100 
kids<3 separated women, worked before breakup odds (exit) +  NS 
1.22142
821 
RamohanW07 Australia CC costs Mothers w/ kids aged less than 15 P(full time) -  NS 2.85 
RamohanW07 Australia CC costs Mothers w/ kids aged less than 15 P(part time) -  NS 2.85 
RamohanW07 Australia CC costs Mothers w/ kids aged less than 15 P(not working) -  NS 2.85 
StähliLGLW0 Switzerland CC Mothers in couples >=1 child, day nurseries  odds(never reduced vs. homemaker) +  S  1.425 
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9 availability/use 
StähliLGLW0
9 Switzerland 
CC 
availability/use Mothers in couples >=1 child, day nurseries  odds(reduced vs. homemaker) +  NS 1.425 
StähliLGLW0
9 Switzerland 
CC 
availability/use Mothers in couples >=1 child, day nurseries  odds (stopped but active now vs. homemaker) +  S  1.425 
StähliLGLW0
9 Switzerland 
CC 
availability/use ", nanny or "day mother" odds(never reduced vs. homemaker) +  S  1.425 
StähliLGLW0
9 Switzerland 
CC 
availability/use ", nanny or "day mother" odds(reduced vs. homemaker) +  S  1.425 
StähliLGLW0
9 Switzerland 
CC 
availability/use ", nanny or "day mother" odds (stopped but active now vs. homemaker) +  NS 1.425 
Tekin07 USA CC costs Single mothers w/ kids younger than 13 odds(full-time vs. no employmt) -  S  2.1375 
Tekin07 USA CC costs Single mothers w/ kids younger than 13 odds(part-time vs. no employmt) -  NS 2.1375 
Tekin07 USA 
decrease:$1/ho
ur  Single mothers w/ kids younger than 13 full-time emplyoment +  6.10% 2.1375 
Tekin07 USA 
decrease:$1/ho
ur  Single mothers w/ kids younger than 13 part-time emplyoment +  0.50% 2.1375 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Work +  S  1.425 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 Single mothers w/ at least 1 child Full-time full-year work -  S  1.425 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Work +  S  1.425 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 ", education<= HS, unemployt<26th Full-time full-year work -  NS 1.425 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Work +  S  1.425 
Herbst 2008 US 
CC 
funding/kids 0-
12 ", education<= HS, unemployt>75th Full-time full-year work -  NS 1.425 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single single women  P(employment last week) +  S  1.06875 
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mom  
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education < 12 years P(employment last week) +  NS 1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education = 12 years P(employment last week) +  NS 1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education > 12 years P(employment last week) +  NS 1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  single women  P(employment last year) +  S  1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education < 12 years P(employment last year) +  NS 1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education = 12 years P(employment last year) +  NS 1.06875 
MeyerR01 US 
CC expenditure 
+ $500/single 
mom  ", education > 12 years P(employment last year) +  NS 1.06875 
 
 
Table B8: Antipoverty effects of childcare availability and cost (12 estimates) 
Study ID Country Policy Population Poverty indicator Sign Signif weight 
WHOLE SAMPLE          
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees single mothers, kids under 5 disposable income 
+ 
3.70% 
0.75 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees ", lower income quartile disposable income 
+ 
3.20% 
0.75 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples disposable income 
+ 
2.70% 
0.75 
BrinkNW07 Sweden  CC fees two-parent couples, lower quartile disposable income 
+ 
1.70% 
0.75 
291 
 
MisraMB07 11 countries 
% 0-2 in formal 
CC Women aged 25-59, control: CC availability P(poverty) 
+ S  0.75 
MisraMB07 12 countries 
% 0-2 in formal 
CC ", ", further control: paid leave P(poverty) 
+ S 0.75 
MisraMB07 13 countries 
% 0-2 in formal 
CC ", ", further: family leave P(poverty) 
+ S 0.75 
MisraMB07 14 countries 
% 0-2 in formal 
CC ", ", ", further: family leave squared P(poverty) 
+ NS 0.75 
BäckmanF09 21 countries 
CC coverage 0-
3 years male breadwinner+homemaker, 2 kids odds (child poverty) 
+ S 1 
BäckmanF09 16 countries 
CC coverage 0-
3 years ", w/o postsocialist EU countries odds (child poverty) 
+ S 1 
BäckmanF09 15 countries 
CC coverage 0-
3 years ", w/o postsocialist & Denmark odds (child poverty) 
+ S 1 
KreyenfeldSW00 Germany CC fees Families w/ kids 0-11 Income inequality  
- 
n/a 
3 
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